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Abstract
The Anglo-Saxon literature on Italian prosecutors (and the Italian criminal justice 
system in general) is limited. Moreover, the literature using a socio-legal approach 
and trying to understand what prosecutors do in practice is almost inexistent. This 
study seeks to fill, partially, this gap. Legal actors are, obviously, an extremely 
important focus for those who intend to study criminal justice and criminal procedure. 
Legal systems are applied and interpreted (translated to use Langer’s words) 
according to different legal cultures. Amongst the judicial actors who appear to be, 
legally, in the position to determine the way the legal system works there are 
prosecutors. Prosecutors carry out many functions and, in Italy, they are involved 
from the beginning of the investigation till the end of the trial. In other words: Italian 
prosecutors play a very important part during both the pre-trial and trial phase. We 
will concentrate on the former trying to answer one main question: what prosecutors 
do in practice? In particular, this is a study o f the legal and cultural influences on the 
role and function of Italian prosecutor with particular reference to their gate-keeping 
role. In this sense the thesis brings out the distinctive impact of both the legal 
framework and prosecutors’ professional culture and identity on the prosecutors’ 
capacity to mediate of ‘crime control’ policies. While we will study this we will also 
analyze Italian prosecutors’ legal and professional culture and their relationship with 
the police. This will be crucial to understand the way prosecutors take gate keeping 
decisions. The analysis of the Italian case seems to be very important. It shows that, 
when it comes to definition of the crime problem, prosecutors still play an important 
and distinct role. Important because their decisions still influence the definition of 
priorities (i. e. they do not seem to be mere executors of anticrime policies). Distinct 
because prosecutors appear to be able to mediate the impact of external influences. 
So. they have a (partially) different idea of priorities compared to the dominant 
political culture. This puts them in a different (distinct) position. To sum up: in Italy 
the prosecutors’ role during the pre-trial phase of being ‘between’ crime fighter and 
judge is visible. There is room for prosecutors’ choices and decisions. To corroborate 
this thesis we used the examples of street crime, immigration and the impact of moral 
panics on prosecutors’ decisions. These are all issues which concern very much the 
“fight against insecurity” which is considered, in the western capitalistic countries, a
crucial problem for the central state, the public and the media. We will try to 
demonstrate that, although Italian prosecutors are affected by the “problem of 
security” and, certainly, can not block the evolution (or involution) of the criminal 
justice system, they are in the position to limit the impact of these external influences.
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION: SUBJECT, 
PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF THIS STUDY
1
1. Subject
This study seeks to provide a better understanding of Italian prosecutors’ functions 
during the pre-trial phase. This will not be a normative analysis. We intend to focus 
on what prosecutors do in practice during the pre-trial phase. This involves empirical 
(see chap. 3 for the methodology), comparative and socio-legal research. But the 
reader will not find (most of the times) direct comparison between different legal 
systems (e. g. in Italy and in England and Wales). We intend to study the Italian case 
using concepts (e. g. legal culture, definition of the crime problem etc.) which are 
familiar and mostly developed within the Anglo-American academic literature. These 
will help to categorize information and conclusions. Moreover, this is not an attempt 
to develop and reconsider the Italian literature on prosecutors. This will be briefly 
outlined where relevant, but our focus is different. The Italian literature mainly 
concentrates on the analysis of the legal rules (with some remarkable exceptions that 
will be explained). We want to concentrate on what prosecutors do in practice. The 
argument is not that the legal context has no influence. On the contrary we will try to 
outline the situations where legal procedures de facto limit prosecutors’ power to take 
discretionary decisions. But our primary aim is to consider all the factors which are 
useful to understand prosecutors’ role and functions during the pre-trial phase. 
Amongst these legal rules certainly play a very important role, but, of course, they are 
not the only criterion we need to look at to understand prosecutors’ position. Finally, 
this study does not encompass an analysis of prosecutors’ roles within the whole 
Italian criminal justice system. The subject is the prosecutor within a specific 
environment: the pre-trial phase. We will examine the practice of prosecution 
decision-making, with a particular focus on the way they define their priorities. But 
this can not be fully understood if we do not provide a broader image of prosecutors 
during the pre-trial phase. To do this we will examine three issues: the organizational 
relations within prosecution offices, prosecutors’ professional and legal culture and 
the relationship with the police during the pre-trial phase.
Why is this subject significant? There are various reasons. The most obvious is 
that there is very little empirical research on Italian criminal justice. The empirically- 
based literature in English has studied other continental jurisdictions (mainly France), 
but has not concentrated very much on Italy. Furthermore, a general state prosecution
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service has only existed in England and Wales since 1985. So, state prosecutors are 
relatively new legal figures. It is interesting to analyze what prosecutors do in another 
jurisdiction in which, in 1989, there was an important reform which modified criminal 
procedure, which is now (or should be) adversarial in nature. Third, there is a huge 
academic literature which focuses on the way legal actors take discretionary 
decisions. But the Italian case is peculiar. This is because there is the legality 
principle. This study does not intend to engage with the internal Italian debate about 
the merits and demerits of the legality principle nor with debates as to how it might be 
reformulated. However, it is interesting to analyze how prosecutors define the crime 
problem within a legal system where there are no legal provisions aimed at imposing 
priorities and/or suggesting criteria that prosecutors should use to determine priorities. 
Finally, in discussing these issues we will also examine allarme sociale1 as a criterion 
that prosecutors use to determine priorities. The focus will be on how and how much 
the sense of insecurity, the fear of crime and the images o f crime of the dominant 
political cultures (i. e. media, the central state and the civil society) can influence 
prosecutors. These are surely significant issues given that insecurity, street crime and 
the impact of immigration are key problems in any western capitalist country. In this 
regard, the Italian case looks particularly interesting in that prosecutors seem to be 
able to limit the impact of these influences.
2. Purpose
The purpose of this thesis is, as we have just said, to identify prosecutors’ role during 
the pre-trial phase. We want to demonstrate that, at this stage, this legal actor is not a 
mere executor of anti-crime policies decided by the central government and 
implemented by the police. Italian prosecutors are not simply vehicles to bring into 
courts the cases that the police have decided to investigate. During the pre-trial phase
1 This literally means social alarm. Its meaning in practice is similar to moral panics. This means that 
social alarm is addressed towards ‘suitable enem ies’ who do not fit with certain established societal 
values (i. e. immigrants). However, ‘moral panic’ has stronger connotations o f  disproportionality (for a 
more extensive definition o f  allarm e sociale  see chap. 10). According to the Sage dictionary o f  
criminology (McLaughlin E. and Muncie J. (compiled and edited by). “The Sage dictionary o f  
crim inology”. 2001. London: Sage, p. 175) moral panic is defined as a “disproportionate and hostile 
reaction to a condition, person or group defined as a threat to societal values, involving stereotypical 
media representations and leading to demands for greater social control and creating a spiral o f  
reaction”. See also Cohen S. “Folks Devils and M oral Panics. The Creation o f  the M ods and Rockers”. 
2002. 3rd ed. London and N ew  York: Routledge.
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there is room for prosecutors’ discretionary decisions. These legal actors play a 
substantial role in what criminologists call the social construction of crime (see chap.
9). To understand this we will discuss how prosecutors define their priorities. This is a 
complicated issue and the meaning of priorities and the difference amongst these will 
be explained (chap. 9). Moreover, we will describe the criteria for decision-making 
that prosecutors use to determine priorities (and the differences between them) (chap.
9). Social alarm is one of these criteria so that analysis of the way prosecutors treat 
social alarm is particularly important. We intend to demonstrate that Italian 
prosecutors are in the position to mediate the impact of certain forms of social 
anxiety. It appears that the perception they have of social alarm is different when 
compared to the perception evident within the dominant political cultures. In other 
words,' the image that the dominant political cultures have of the crime problem (and 
of the insecurity this creates) is different to the image that prosecutors have. 
Prosecutors seem to be able to mark this difference and their contribution (as experts) 
to the definition of the crime problem seems visible. Of course, we are not claiming 
that these legal actors are not affected at all by external influences. Prosecutors are not 
formidable walls which can keep the Italian criminal justice system insulated from 
any major change. In Italy, like in the other western capitalist countries, social alarm 
(mainly linked with street crime and immigration) has strongly influenced the political 
agenda and governments (mainly the centre-right coalitions) have passed legislation 
to deal with these problems. In particular, in the last 10 years there have been various 
attempts to suggest priorities (mainly street crime and immigration) to prosecutors. 
The consequence is that now there are procedures that have been de facto imposed on 
prosecutors as to how to treat certain crimes (see chap. 8, 9 and 11). However, by an 
analysis of the way Italian prosecutors deal with street crime and immigration, we will 
be able to demonstrate that the impact of these legal and administrative rules2 (as 
much as forms of social pressure) is mediated by prosecutors.
We said above that, in order to deal properly with these difficult questions, we 
need to provide a broader image of prosecutors’ role during the pre-trial phase. The 
first issue concerns organizational relations within prosecution offices. The purpose is 
to describe the meaning of prosecutors’ legal independence in practice. This will 
substantially contribute to the defining of the environment in which prosecutors work
2 These are de facto a form o f  administrative guidance within the prosecution office.
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(and take decisions on the definition of priorities). Moreover, legal independence is 
one of the key characteristics of prosecutors’ professional and legal culture. This is 
the second issue. We will describe and analyze prosecutors’ professional self image 
and their professional and legal culture in practice. Here we aim at demonstrating that 
prosecutors are in a ‘different position’ compared to other legal actors (and the police 
in particular). The last issue regards the relationship with the police during the pre­
trial phase. This is relevant because the police are directly involved in the 
investigation and carry out investigative activities. So, they provide information to 
prosecutors. Here the aim is to show that prosecutors use two distinct approaches to 
the supervision of investigations; that these imply a different relationship with the 
police; and that the choice of the approach depends on the seriousness of the case (in 
the prosecutors’ view). But, we will also begin to describe the elements which 
influence prosecutors’ definition o f priorities, in particular, the impact of the police 
decisions. This is certainly an external influence on decision-making (something that 
prosecutors did not create themselves, see chap. 9). But at the same time we will try to 
demonstrate that prosecutors do not simply swallow police priorities. They are, again, 
in a position to mediate these.
Finally, here it is important to describe briefly the approach we aim to use in this 
thesis. As already indicated, we do not intend to carry out a systemic analysis o f the 
Italian criminal justice system. In other words, our considerations will not specifically 
concern the direction (e. g. repression, due process etc.) that the Italian criminal 
justice system is taking or has taken. Some reflections about, for example, the real 
significance of the legality principle or o f supervising the investigation will be made. 
However, these will only be complementary to our main focus: the role and practices 
of the Italian prosecutor in defining the crime problem. Ultimately the aim is to 
develop an independent perspective on prosecutors’ work but one that is informed by 
their perspective on what they do developed through semi-structured interviews (see 
chap. 3 for methodology). This will eventually lead us to outline some peculiar 
characteristics of the Italian criminal justice system. But our focus will always be the 
analysis of the role and the functions, in practice, of a specific legal actor.
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3. Structure
The first chapter (after this brief introduction) will deal with a short comparative 
analysis of prosecutors in Italy and other continental jurisdictions. This will help to 
understand the issues that have been raised within the English literature with regards 
to prosecutors in Italy (and, more generally, in the continent) and to outline some of 
the key features of Italian prosecutors in a comparative context. Then (chap. 3) we 
will outline the research questions we want to deal with in this thesis. Moreover, we 
will also explain (briefly, at this stage) the methodology we have used to carry out our 
empirical research.
Subsequently we will move to the first substantive part of the thesis: the legal and 
socio-political context. In particular, the fourth chapter will be dedicated to the 
analysis of the legal principles and rules that are relevant for this study. But this will 
not only be a mere legal description. This chapter will substantially help to define 
more precisely the issues we will discuss later. But while the legal context is certainly 
important, it is not sufficient to understand the socio-political conditions which 
influence prosecutors’ working environment. So, chapter five will deal with images of 
crime and prosecutors o f the dominant political cultures. Italian politics are, to say the 
least, always evolving. We began this research in 2005 when there was a centre-right 
government, which then lost the 2006 elections. The newly elected centre-left 
government only lasted for two years. Finally, in 2008 there were elections again and 
the centre-right coalition won. So, Italian politics are quite difficult to catch, but 
certainly not boring. The last three governments passed very important pieces of 
legislation. These directly concerned prosecutors’ working environment and aimed at 
tackling street crime and immigration as major crime problems. These issues certainly 
have a strong political flavour (justice and security are amongst the matters which 
determine the outcome o f general and local elections). And they have been matter of 
strong confrontation between the centre-right government and the judiciary 
(sometimes, as now, the political tone is that of a mild dictatorship). We will 
summarize all the legislative interventions (and their socio-political consequences) 
which are relevant for this thesis. Moreover, we will explain how and why there is this
J This is pretty much the same coalition which governed Italy from 2001 till 2006, Berlusconi is still 
the Prime Minister.
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clash between part of the political world and the judiciary. However, the reader should 
note that we stopped collecting information on August 31 2008. Finally, chapter five 
will not only deal with the central state. It will also examine the images of crime and 
prosecutors within the media and the civil society. In general, this chapter is aimed at 
understanding the potential external influences which might affect prosecutors’ legal 
culture and their decisions on the definition of priorities.
With chapter six we will be moving into the very core of this thesis. Part II 
(which includes chapters six, seven and eight) is dedicated to the analysis o f 
prosecutors’ working context. Three issues will be discussed: organizational relations 
within the prosecution office (chap. 6), prosecutors’ professional and legal culture 
(chap. 7) and the relationship with the police during the pre-trial phase (chap. 8) (see 
above for the purpose o f these chapters). Part III (chapters nine, ten and eleven) is 
dedicated to prosecutors’ construction of priorities. The argument will be built around 
three issues: the definition of priorities (chap. 9), prosecutors and social alarm (chap.
10) and prosecutors, street crime and immigration (chap. 11) (see above for the 
purpose of these chapters). The division between these two parts will sometimes be 
blurred. This is because in part II we will already begin to outline some of the 
influences which might partially determine the way prosecutors define their priorities 
(i. e. the police influences). Moreover, prosecutors’ professional and legal culture and 
the way legal independence works in practice will be crucial to understand how 
prosecutors determine priorities. Finally, these chapters (from chap. 6 to chap. 11) 
will all have a peculiar structure. We have decided to concentrate the literature review 
and its discussion at the beginning of the chapters. This is for two reasons. First, the 
Italian literature (the English one is limited) is mainly focused on the legal rules and it 
was not, o f course, designed for common law lawyers (e. g. the debate on the legality 
principle). So, it needs to be carefully explained. We believe (second reason) that if 
we had incorporated the literature within the main body of the chapters the reader 
could have lost some of the points we wanted to make. In other words, without the 
literature the key sections o f the chapters read better and are less cumbersome.
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CHAPTER II. THE PROSECUTOR IN 
CONTINENTAL EUROPE AND IN ITALY
1. Introduction
In this chapter we want to provide a brief description of the fundamental 
characteristics of continental prosecutors (as identified by the Anglo-Saxon academic 
literature). Subsequently we will concentrate on the English literature on Italian 
prosecutors. The aims of this chapter are basically three-fold. First, to set out a range 
of comparative perspectives upon prosecutors in continental Europe. This will help 
(second aim) to develop a better understanding of certain distinctive features of Italian 
prosecutors. Thirdly, we will outline the major issues dealt with by the (not very 
extensive) literature in English on Italian prosecutors.
2. The prosecutor in continental Europe: the fundamental 
characteristics according to the Anglo-American literature
The literature in English on the continental prosecutor emphasizes certain distinctive 
ways that prosecutors work in continental Europe. Germany and France are two good 
examples because the criminal procedure system is still broadly inquisitorial (at least 
during the pre-trial phase). At this stage, studying these two legal systems will be 
useful to outline some classical characteristics of the continental prosecutor. In 
particular, even if there are clear differences (e. g. legality principle applied in 
Germany; expediency applied in France) we can identify four common features: (a) 
the prosecutor is included in an hierarchical system; (b) the prosecutor disposes of the 
case (prosecution or dismissal); (c) the prosecutor directs the investigation and 
supervises the police; and (d) the prosecutor may act as a sentencer (conditional 
diversion powers).
In Germany prosecutors belong to the executive and they must follow the 
instructions o f their superiors (§ 146 Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, law on judicial 
organization, GVG). However, this subordination is not absolute. First, the legality 
principle (§ 152 II Strafprozefiordnung, code of criminal procedure, StPO) forbids any 
directive aimed at preventing the continuation of a prosecution. Second, the Minister 
o f Justice is bound to respect the law and justice (art. 20 para. 3, Grundgesetz,
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German constitution, GG).1 On the other hand, in France the discretionary power of 
prosecutors is limited by the guidelines issued by their superiors (art. 31, Criminal 
Procedure Code, CPP). At the top of the hierarchy there is the Minister of Justice. The 
guidelines can be general (e. g. policy) or individual (e. g. the way a case is treated). 
Thus, in France, the prosecutor is part of a hierarchical system which should lead to 
the following strict rules. But what is the real nature of the relationship between 
prosecutors and their superiors? For example, in France there is little control over the 
application of guidelines issued by the Minister of Justice. In theory, the Minister 
himself can issue an instruction to prosecute a particular case, but he may never 
instruct prosecutors not to prosecute a case (art. 36 CPP). However, these rules are not 
always applied. In 1989, the Minister of Justice Henri Nallet wrote to the public 
prosecutor for the court of appeal o f Aix-en-Provence instructing him to drop a case.4 
In continental Europe it is the prosecutor who decides whether or not commence a 
prosecution (i. e. disposal of the case). This power used to mark a clear distinction 
with the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), who had the power to discontinue 
prosecutions but not to initiate them. This is no longer true. Now, under the statutory 
charging scheme,5 the CPS has the power to charge suspects in all but very minor 
cases.6 This has certainly enhanced the role of the CPS. However, unlike on the 
continent, the police are still in charge of the investigation and they still have a crucial 
‘‘gate-keeping” role.7
In Germany and France, by law or de facto, the decisions to prosecute are 
implemented on discretionary basis. For example, in Germany the legality principle is 
limited by relevant exceptions. The prosecutor dismisses a case if  there is not enough 
evidence to obtain a conviction. Furthermore, a case can be dropped if there is 
sufficient evidence, but the prosecutor believes that there is no public interest in
1 Juy-Birmann RCThe German system ”. In Delmas-Marty M. and Spencer J. eds. “European Criminal 
Procedures”. 2002 (reprinted in 2004). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 299.
2 Dervieux V. “The French system ”. In Delmas-Marty et al eds. (2002) op. cit. p. 224.
J Elliott C. and Vernon C. “French Legal System”. 2000. Harlow: Longman, p. 152.
4 Ibid. pp. 153-154.
5 PACE s. 37B (as amended by the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 2003).
6 S. 28 and Sched. 2, amending PACE s 37 (creating the new s 37B). See also Sanders A. and Young R. 
Criminal Justice”. 2007. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 332-333; and Brownlee I. D.
“The statutory charging scheme in England and Wales: towards a unified prosecution system ?”. 2004. 
Criminal Law Review. Nov. 2004. pp. 896-907.
7 This is because it is up to the custody officer to decide which cases should be considered for 
prosecution. In this sense police officers still retain the power to release detainees with no further 
action being taken (NFA). This involves a large number o f  suspects (20-25%) and police officers have 
no duty to report non-prosecuted cases to the CPS. See Sanders and Young (2007) op. cit. pp. 328-329.
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commencing a prosecution (e. g. the offence is a minor one). In these cases the 
prosecutor, following the consent o f the judge (which is normally a formality),8 may 
dismiss a case either conditionally or unconditionally. Unconditional dismissals are 
authorized by the StPO (§ 153) and include all the misdemeanours and all the 
offences not carrying a mandatory minimum sentence (StPO § 153, as amended in 
1993). In these cases the consent of the judge is not necessary. Conditional dismissals 
concern offences not carrying a mandatory minimum penalty. In these cases the 
prosecutor, with the necessary consent of the accused person(s), suspends the 
prosecution if the offender complies with certain requirements (e. g. providing some 
form of compensation for the victim StPO § 153 a). In most of the cases enunciated 
by § 153 a there is no longer need for the court’s consent. However, even when this is 
required it is “rarely withheld”.9
The analysis of these legal provisions leads us to the conclusion that the 
prosecutor has a pivotal role in criminal proceedings.10 T he statistics concerning 
France underline that only 5.3%n of the cases are treated by an investigating judge. 
All the other offences are supervised by the prosecutor himself. This datum becomes 
even more important if we think that in 1998 the cases sent to the investigating judge 
were 6.5%12 and that in 1971 they were 14.5%.13 This situation stems from the fact 
that French prosecutors tend to investigate cases which are particularly serious or/and 
complicated. In 1971 Goldstein and Marcus described a procedure called 
correctionalization. Through this procedure French prosecutors can ignore 
aggravating circumstances, so that a crime (which must be investigated by the juge  
d ’instruction) becomes a delit (which can be investigated by the juge d'instruction)}*
8 Fionda J. “Public Prosecutors and Discretion: a Comparative Study”. 1995. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
New York : Oxford University Press, p. 136.
9 Ibid. p. 137.
10 For a comparative analysis o f  prosecutors’ pivotal functions during the pre-trial phase see: Jackson J. 
D. “ The effect o f  legal culture and p ro o f  in decisions to prosecute”. 2004. Law, Probability and Risk. 
Vol. 3 N. 2. pp. 109-131. The author analyzes ideal types o f  prosecutorial fact finding and he compares 
European continental jurisdictions (and Scotland) with England and Wales and other common law 
countries.
11 Ministere de la Justice. Les chiffres-cles de la Justice [Online]. 2004. Available at: 
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art pix/1 chiffrescles2004.pdf [Accessed: 15/05/06]. The data refer to the 
activity o f prosecutors in 2003. p. 16.
12 Ministere de la Justice. “Les chiffres-cles de la Justice Chiffres-cles. ”. As cited in Verrest P. “The 
French Public Prosecution Service”. 2000. European Journal o f  Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice. Vol. 8/3. pp. 210-244. p. 234.
|j Goldstein A. S. and Marcus M. “The Myth o f  Judicial Supervision in Three “Inquisitorial” Systems: 
France, Italy, and Germany”. 1977. The Yale Law Journal. Vol. 87. pp. 240-283. p. 251. This article 
was (also) based on interviews with prosecutors and judges.
14 Ibid.
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The authors gave a clear example of this process: a theft committed at night (or in a 
home or with a weapon), which is a crime, can be converted into a simple theft, which 
is a d e l i t To conclude: the correctionalization procedure is a good example of 
prosecutors’ power to take decisions on anti-crime policy. This is because the 
prosecutor has, in practice, the opportunity to decide how serious a crime is. In 
Germany this is even clearer, because on one hand we have the legality principle. On 
the other one we have exceptions to this principle. These are based on broad 
principles such as “public interest”. In other words, the prosecutor still retains 
substantial powers to define what is a crime and the seriousness of this.
Within an inquisitorial system the prosecutor is usually the supervisor of the 
investigation. He may indeed be seen as the most important investigator and, 
sometimes, he retains adjudicative powers. As a consequence prosecutors have 
authority over the police. The law is clear. For example, in France the activities of the 
police are divided into mission de police judiciaire and mission de police 
administrative. The latter is aimed to maintain public order, while the former concerns 
investigation of offences. The adjective judiciaire (judicial) has a clear meaning: the 
investigation is part of a judicial procedure, as a consequence it must be directed by a 
judicial figure, which is, in the vast majority of the cases, the prosecutor. However, 
empirical research undertaken by Marcus and Goldstein and by Hodgson designs a 
different scenario, where the police complete “the whole job of the investigating 
magistrate”.16
Thus, the prosecutor in legal theory supervises the police during the
investigation. This principle is clearly stated in Germany and France. But, what is the
meaning of this supervision? In France, due to an increase of criminal provisions and
crimes, procureurs may not directly deal with the investigation of all crimes.17 In fact,
the police often conduct the investigation and the prosecutor takes a decision without
any direct participation in the investigating activities. For example, in France, where
possible, decisions about a case (dismissal, prosecution, or alternative ways such as
1 8reparative measures) may be made by phone. Therefore, in practice, the prosecutor 
relies on activities which have not been undertaken or directed by him. This idea is
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid. p. 255.
17 Verrest (2000) op. cit. p. 233.
18 Ibid. p. 234.
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even clearer if we look at the empirical research undertaken by Hodgson, who reports 
that 85% of prosecutors said that they “would never see the police”.19
The fourth issue that we underlined above concerns the sentencing powers of 
the prosecutor. Following the distinction that Fionda made, we can say that 
prosecutors have indirect sentencing powers (e. g. deciding charges or suggesting a 
punishment) and direct sentencing powers (e. g. the prosecutor de facto makes an 
adjudication of guilt and issues a penalty).20 In legal form these powers may often be 
described as power of conditional diversion. For example, in Germany, the prosecutor 
can drop a case on the satisfaction of particular conditions. In these cases the 
prosecutor de facto decides that the accused is guilty and decides upon a sort of 
punishment (i. e. compensation for the victim). The defendant can always refuse to 
accept the ‘condition’ or de facto punishment, in which cases there will be a 
prosecution and trial. Moreover, there are cases which are prosecuted but they do not 
reach the court. These are dealt with under the penal order system. Penal orders are 
documents prepared by the prosecutor including: the details of the fact, the offence 
committed and the punishment suggested. To be legally binding these orders require
99 •the consent of the judge. However it is clear that the merits of the decision are 
handled by the prosecutor, who takes decisions on his own: he does not have to ask 
the judge’s opinion. We must note that now even the CPS has powers of conditional
99 •diversion. Prosecutors can decide to warn rather than to prosecute an offender. This 
power can be used if the interests of the suspect, the victim and the community can be 
better achieved by the suspect complying with certain conditions. The objectives that 
conditional diversion has to serve are: rehabilitation, reparation and punishment.24
The English literature has examined these questions and underlined the 
contradictions that we outlined above. The conclusion was that the prosecutor in 
continental Europe follows technical rules which are different to those typical within
19 Hodgson J. “ The police, the prosecutor and the ju ge  d ’instruction. Judicial Supervision in France, 
Theory and Practice”. 2001. British Journal o f  Criminology. Vol. 41(2). pp. 342-361. p. 351. See also: 
Hodgson J. “French Criminal Justice”. 2005. Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing.
20 Fionda (1995) op. cit. pp. 1-2.
21 Ibid. p. 141.
22 Ibid. p. 142.
23 See CJA 2003 Pt3.
24 Brownlee I. D. “Conditional cautions and fa ir  trial rights in England and wales: form  versus 
substance in the diversionary agenda?”. Feb. 2007. Criminal Law Review, pp. 129-140. In particular 
pp. 129-130.
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the Anglo-American criminal justice tradition. However, in practice these differences 
may be less significant than in theory and indeed may be becoming even less so with
25recent reforms (see above CPS’s charging and conditional diversion powers). In 
fact, as in Germany and France, English prosecutors dispose of the case and rely on 
the investigation implemented by the police. But this is one interpretation. Langbein 
and Weinreb argued that the differences are consistent and significant. For example, 
the French dossier about the investigation is not a mere police report. And the 
procureur has supervision powers over the police (e.g. of evaluation of police officers 
under his supervision).26 In a similar way Field (et al.), while they analyze prosecution 
practice in Holland, underline that prosecutors’ responsibility for the construction of 
the file has a different significance within the inquisitorial tradition compared to the 
adversarial one. This means that prosecutors (together with judges and defence
27counsels) have the power to influence the way the file will be shaped.
3. The prosecutor in Italy: the English literature
The Italian tradition in criminal justice has traditionally been strongly inquisitorial. 
Following the French model, there was an investigating judge (giudice istruttore) and 
the trial was the place where the dossier compiled during the investigation was 
presented and evaluated by a judge. The pre-trial phase was secret and the defence
9Rcould not participate in this phase. In 1989, 35 years after the Parliament began to 
debate wholesale reform of criminal procedure, the new criminal procedure code was
90approved (d. P. R. n. 447/1988). This reform radically changed the Italian tradition. 
Now the system is meant to be adversarial. The giudice istruttore no longer exists, the 
investigation is undertaken by the prosecutor who supervises and directs the police
23 See, for example, Goldstein and Marcus (1977) op. cit.
26 Langbein J. H. and Weinreb L. L. “Continental Criminal Procedure: “Myth and Reality”. 1978. The
Yale Law Journal Vol. 87 n. 8. pp. 1549-1569. pp. 1553-1555.
27 Field S., Alldridge P. and Jorg N. “Prosecutors, Examining Judges, and Control o f  Police
Investigations”. In Fennel P., Harding C, Jorg N. and Swart B. eds. “Criminal Justice in Europe A 
Compartaive Study”. 1995. Oxford: Clarendon Press. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 235.
28 See, for example, Pizzi T. and Marafioti L. “The New Italian Code o f  Criminal Procedure: The 
Difficulties o f  Building an A dversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation”. 1992. The Yale 
Journal o f International Law Vol. 17 n. 1. pp. 1-40. pp. 3-5.
29 This means decreto del Presidente della Repubblica. It is a piece o f  delegated legislation issued 
(formally, the government prepares and is responsible for delegated legislation) by the President o f  the 
Republic. In this case the dPR was implementing the legge delega  n. 81/1987. A legge delega  is a 
parent act enabling the government to pass measures which have the force o f  law. O f course, the aim o f  
this legge delega  was to reform the code o f  criminal procedure.
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(polizia giudiziaria, PG) and the trial is an open confrontation between the parties. 
Such a reform appears revolutionary in Continental Europe. In fact, we have seen that 
in Germany and France the inquisitorial approach is still alive.
The Italian prosecutor has always represented a particular legal actor in the 
European panorama. This is because of the principle he has to follow when he 
disposes of a case. The constitution is clear: penal action is mandatory (art. 112). This 
means that in Italy the legality principle is in theory fully implemented: unlike in 
Germany, there are no exceptions to this rule. On the other hand, there are also 
important similarities between the Italian prosecutor and his German and French 
colleagues. In Italy prosecutors retain indirect30 and direct31 sentencing powers. 
Moreover, and more important for us, Italian prosecutors are the leading investigators 
during the pre-trial phase and they supervise and direct the police.
The literature in English has addressed some of the issues above. In general 
authors emphasized three points: (a) prosecutors’ functions are normally highly 
influenced by the police; (b) prosecutors have huge discretionary powers when they 
act as gate-keepers; and (c) the legality principle, in practice, does not exist. However, 
the volume of work in English is limited. In particular, there is very little empirical 
research.
In 1977 Goldstein and Marcus studied the pre-trial phase and the discretion of 
judicial actors in situations which could give rise to criminal proceedings (e. g. 
prosecute or dismiss, mode of trial etc.). The authors reached the conclusion that even 
if the prosecutor (and the examining judge) in theory is supposed to supervise the 
investigation, the reality is that police actions are not subject to any real review.32 At 
that time (1977) prosecutors had discretionary powers to decide whether or not to 
refer a case to the examining judge. They were taking this decision according to very 
broad principles such as “there is no need for complex inquiries and difficult 
verifications”/ 3 As a consequence, Marcus and Goldstein estimated that the 
prosecutor investigated 70% to 90% of the cases.34 So, under the former inquisitorial 
code the prosecutor had a pivotal role during all the pre-trial phase. But these powers 
had become merely formal in relation to investigation, because in these situations the
j0 1, e. suggesting a sentence to the judge.
jl E. g. there is a procedure similar to the German penal order system.
j2 Goldstein and Marcus (1977) op. cit. p. 258.
23 Ibid. p. 257.
j4 Ibid.
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prosecutor normally relied on police reports.35 Thus, the theory of prosecutorial 
supervision obscured the reality o f police autonomy in investigation.
The authors also analyzed the way the principle of legality was implemented 
in Italy. The conclusion was that the prosecutor had a wide discretion regarding 
prosecution or dismissal of a case. This was determined by three factors. First, the 
prosecutor evaluates evidence and can decide that there is not enough to put forward a 
prosecution or that the evidence supports a particular charge but not another. Second, 
the prosecutor might simply decide not to gather evidence. Third, the police did not 
report some crimes because these are too petty. Finally, Goldstein and Marcus also 
underlined the de facto adjudicative powers of Italian prosecutors. Briefly, in the 
Italian criminal justice system guilty plea and plea bargaining procedures did not 
formally exist. All crimes had to be prosecuted to trial. However, uncontested trials 
were de facto possible through arrangements between the prosecution and the 
defence. In other words, the prosecutor and the counsel reach an agreement before the
T7trial, so that evidence and the sentence requested will not be challenged.
Since 1977 there has no been real empirical research (by those working in 
Anglo-Saxon contexts or, at least, writing in English) about Italian criminal procedure 
in general and about the prosecutor in particular. However, some papers analyzing the 
peculiar characteristics of the Italian prosecutor (before and after the 1989 reform) 
have been written. For example, Guamieri has compared the legality principle applied 
in Italy with the expediency one applied in France. The author says that even if the 
Italian constitution states the legality principle, the prosecutor has strong discretionary 
power. In particular, due to the fact that it is very difficult to prosecute all the cases 
and that prosecutors are not part of a hierarchical organization, they will de facto 
decide the prosecution policy. On the other hand, in France the expediency principle 
is qualified by the fact that prosecutors are part of a hierarchical system (see above).38
Some other works have focused on the adversarial reform in 1989. They have 
mainly underlined the adversarial nature of this reform, the reasons which led to the 
creation of the new code and the problems that this created. Within this scenario they
35 Ibid. p. 263.
36 Ibid  pp. 271-272.
37 Ibid. pp. 264-270.
j8 Guamieri C. “Prosecution in Two C ivil Law Countries: France and I ta ly .  In Nelken D. eds. 
''Comparing Legal Cultures”. 1997. Aldershot: Dartmouth, pp. 183-190.
16
briefly described the characteristics of the Italian prosecutor.39 In particular, Grande 
underlined “the lack of separation between adjudicating and prosecuting members of 
the judiciary”40 (e. g. they follow the same bureaucratic career, enjoy the same 
economical treatment etc.) and that, during the preliminary investigation, the 
prosecutor has an enormous power compared to the other parties.41 Moreover, she too 
commented on the difference between the legality principle stated by the law and its 
application.42 To conclude, she emphasized the lack of accountability of the 
prosecutor for his work (e. g. length of proceedings, numbers of acquittals or 
convictions).43 The author believes that the prosecutor is the real leader of the 
criminal procedure in Italy (i. e. total discretion in disposing of a case). This leads to 
the consequence that prosecutors are a “fourth power next to the legislative, the 
executive and the judicial ones”.44
Giuseppe Di Federico has specifically written about the unfettered powers of 
prosecutors and their proximity to judges. Again it is stated that legality principle is 
not implemented, that prosecutors are de facto creating criminal policy in Italy and 
that they are not accountable to anybody.45 Di Federico’s conclusions were 
corroborated by huge empirical research. They involved interviews with 1000 defence 
lawyers and 70% confirmed that there was substantial difference in the way 
prosecutors “define priorities in the exercise of their functions”.46 Regarding the 
proximity between judges and prosecutors, Di Federico is very clear when he writes 
that judges have inclination “to satisfy the expectations of their colleagues
'’9 See, for example: Miller J. J. “Plea bargain and its analogues under the new Italian criminal 
procedure code and in the United States: towards a new understanding o f  comparative criminal 
procedure”. 1989-1990. 22 N. Y. U. Journal o f  International Law and Politics, pp. 215-251. Pizzi and 
Marafioti (1992) op. cit. Fassler L. J. “The Italian Penal Procedure Code: An Adversarial System o f  
Criminal Procedure in Continental Europe”. 1991. 29 Columbia Journal o f  Transnational Law. pp. 
245-278. Del Duca L. F. “An Historic Convergence o f  Civil and Common Law System s-Italy’s New  
“A dversaria l” Criminal Procedure System”. 1991. Dickinson Journal o f  International Law. Vol. 10:1. 
pp. 73-92. Freccero S. P. “An Introduction to the New Italian Criminal Procedure”. 1994. American 
Journal o f Criminal Law. Vol. 21 n. 3. pp. 345-383. And Amodio E. and Selvaggi E. “An Accusatorial 
System in a C ivil Law Country: the 1988 Italian Code o f  Criminal Procedure”. 1989. Temple Law 
Review. Vol. 62. pp. 1211-1224.
40 Grande E. “Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and Resistance”. 2000. 48 American Journal o f  
Comparative Law. pp. 227-260. p. 237.
4 ' Ibid.
42 Ibid. pp. 240-241.
43 Ibid. pp. 255-256.
44 Ibid. p. 242.
43 Di Federico G. “Prosecutorial independence and the democratic requirement o f  accountability in 
Italy Analysis o f  a Deviant Case in a Comparative Perspective”. 1998. British Journal o f Criminology. 
Vol. 38(3). pp. 371-387. pp. 378-380.
46 Ibid. p. 381.
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[prosecutors]” and that, in Italy, this is not considered a violation of ethics.47 This 
view was supported by the lawyers interviewed who reported that there are “informal 
communications on the substance of the cases at hand between prosecutors and 
judges”.48 So, the author argues that Italian prosecutors have enormous powers, which 
are not counterbalanced by any form of accountability.49
To conclude this rapid analysis we can say that the literature in English has 
suggested the following issues regarding the Italian prosecutor. First, the 1989 reform 
put the prosecutor within an adversarial system, the only such case in continental 
Europe. But there is little work on how the reform has affected the nature of the 
prosecutor’s work. Secondly, a pure legality principle applies in theory (the only such 
case in continental Europe), but commentators are sceptical about its real force in the 
Italian legal system. Thirdly, the prosecutor supervises the investigation, like in 
Germany and France. However, this is seen to be a merely bureaucratic function in 
practice. The police have substantial powers to influence prosecutors’ decisions 
during the pre-trial phase. Fourthly, the Italian prosecutor is fully independent and 
he/she does not work within a hierarchical system. In particular, Italian prosecutors 
are not accountable to anyone and they seem to be judicial actors like judges.
CHAPTER III. RESEARCH AND 
METHODOLOGY
19
1. Researching the Italian prosecutor
As we have seen the literature in English concerning the Italian prosecutor is limited. 
In particular, there is a substantial lack of empirical data. This is because academics 
(in particular Italian ones) have preferred to analyze the ‘black letter’ legal rules. 
Thus, the question is: what does the prosecutor do in practice? We saw that the Italian 
prosecutor has a fundamental role during both pre-trial and trial phases. Our intention 
is to focus on the former. In particular we want to analyze four aspects:
1. Prosecutors and their working context.
2. Prosecutors’ professional and legal culture.
3. The prosecutor’s role in supervising the investigation.
4. The prosecutor and his role in defining the crime problem.
The first issue will give us the opportunity to discuss the operation of prosecutors’ 
legal independence. We will analyze the strategies o f persuasion implemented within 
prosecution offices (in contrast to a pure hierarchical system). This will not only be a 
description of the relationship of superior-inferior within the prosecution office. In 
fact, this analysis will also seek to provide a first introduction to prosecutors’ 
professional culture.
Subsequently we will specifically focus on professional and legal culture. Here we 
will try to outline prosecutors’ professional self-image. In particular, we will 
concentrate on the differences between crime fighters and legal filters. Italian 
prosecutors see themselves as legal filters (i. e. real judicial figures) and not as crime 
fighters (i. e. the police, in prosecutors’ view). Moreover, and probably more 
important, we will compare prosecutors’ professional self image with the practice. 
What does it mean, in practice, legal filtering? And what is the real nature of 
prosecutors’ judicial self professional image? These are the main questions we will try 
to answer at that stage. The meaning of legal filtering is particularly important. This is 
because, through the analysis of this concept, we will begin to define prosecutors’ 
functions during the pre-trial phase. In particular, we will start to emphasize 
prosecutors’ different ‘position’ compared to that o f other legal actors (and 
particularly the police).
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Concerning the investigation phase we will focus on the police-prosecutor 
relationship. This issue was only really discussed by Goldstein and Marcus in 1977. 
Their conclusion was that supervision of investigation was a passive activity. 
Prosecutors relied on police reports. However, the authors wrote in 1977, before the 
reform. Thus, it would be useful to verify if the conclusions are the same now, 
because the new code set out a particular relationship between the police and 
prosecutors (see chap. 4). Moreover, Goldstein and Marcus say that police officers are 
the real investigators. This was based on empirical research, but they say very little 
about the activities that prosecutors undertake everyday. In other words, they use an 
approach where the lack of supervision is determined by the fact that the police 
implement investigation activities. We will analyze these issues from a different 
angle. We want to focus on the meaning o f supervising (or directing) an investigation. 
In fact, although it is undeniable that the police have a pivotal role during the pre-trial 
phase, we believe prosecutors can still take substantial decisions. In particular, by 
determining the way the investigation has to be supervised, prosecutors decide how 
much they can modify what Hodgson calls the “case parameters set by police”.1
In relation to the final question, conclusions about the dichotomy between legality 
principle stated by the law and legality principle in practice need to be supplemented. 
It is clear that the Italian prosecutor has de facto a huge discretionary power. 
However, this is only the first step. There is a need to go further and understand the 
social elements that the prosecutor takes into account when he/she decides to 
prosecute a case. These elements could be the media pressure or the influence of the 
local community or national or local state (i. e. the images of crime of the dominant 
political cultures). Moreover, the relationship with the police seems to be important as 
well. Finally, prosecutors’ political and social values may also influence their choices. 
This analysis will also provide a better understanding of prosecutors’ functions and 
professional culture. Prosecutors’ ‘filtering action’ seem to be also aimed at mediating 
external influences (i. e. filtering out certain forms of social anxiety).
To analyze these issues we will also take into account the approach and the 
conclusions used in modern empirical studies about the prosecutor in continental 
Europe. In particular, Hodgson’s work about the French prosecutor raises some key
1 Hodgson (2005) op. cit. p. 169.
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issues, such as: (a) the supervision mechanisms (e. g. bureaucratic, ‘hands on’ etc.); 
(b) the extent to which prosecutors are dependent on police reports; and (c) the 
difference between prosecutors and the police during the pre-trial phase. The answers 
to these kinds of questions are important. They will help us to outline some of the key 
features we need to know in order to understand the way Italian prosecutors work in 
practice.
Moreover, these problems must be approached in the light of the debate about 
prosecutors in Italy. In particular, the centre-right governments (the current and the 
2001-2006 one) had never hidden their view that prosecutors are politically orientated 
and that their aim is to provoke ‘political revolutions’ as during the tangentopoli 
episode. This was a anti-corruption operation begun in the nineties by some 
prosecutors in Milan. The consequences have been significant. A generation of 
corrupt politicians was removed by the work of prosecutors (and judges). The former 
centre-right government (2001-2006) proposed a radical justice reform (the 
ordincimento giudiziario reform, see chap. 4) whereby prosecutors would have lost 
part of their independence. This reform was then modified by the centre-left 
government. However, the bill proposed by the Berlusconi’s government provoked a 
strong reaction from prosecutors, judges and lawyers. So, in Italy we have been 
witnessing a real conflict (still very much alive) between the judiciary and the 
political power. This scenario will have to be taken into account when we discuss the 
role, the powers and the functions of Italian prosecutors.
2. Methodology
For this research I conducted 54 semi-structured interviews between May and October 
2006. These have all been qualitatively analyzed using ATLAS (creating codes and 
families). First o f all I interviewed 5 ‘consultants’ (2 prosecutors, 1 police officer and 
2 lawyers). The aim of these interviews was to understand the kind of questions that 
needed to be asked to obtain the information needed. In other words: we could be 
more open and, partially, reveal to the ‘consultants’ what it was that we wanted to find 
out. Then we analyzed these interviews and defined the questions we wanted to ask 
the interviewees. Moreover, this provided a better understanding of the way 
interviewees might react to our questions. The problem is that, in Italy, legal actors
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are not normally used to answering questions about what they do in practice. They 
normally expect to discuss the general principles of law. So, we learnt how to put 
questions in such a way as to avoid long answers on, for example, the case law of the 
constitutional Court. However, did not prove to be particularly difficult. In general, 
we were very well welcomed and prosecutors, police officers and lawyers were happy 
to talk about what they do everyday.
There were 49 interviewees (27 prosecutors, 11 police officers and 11 
lawyers). I conducted the interviews in 10 prosecution offices (lawyers and police 
officers working in the same areas) located in the north (mainly), in the centre and in 
the south of Italy. The size o f the prosecution offices (determined according to the 
number of prosecutors) was: large, medium-large, medium and small. The statistical 
data we will report in this thesis are only based on the interviewees. But interviews 
with ‘consultants’ will be quoted and used as examples were appropriate. Finally, 
interviews normally lasted 45 min. (1 h. with consultants). Some were longer, some 
others only lasted 30/35 min. In general, the more I learnt about Italian prosecutors 
the more I could lead the conversation to the issues I was interested in. So, short 
interviews were probably the most productive.
The abbreviations that we will use in this thesis refer to both consultants and 
interviewees:
CP (chief prosecutor)
DCP (deputy chief prosecutor)
AP (assistant prosecutor)
APApl. (assistant prosecutor at the court of appeal)
L (lawyer)
Pol. (police)
O f course we will also identify (roughly) the geographical area where 
interviewees and consultants were working:
N (north)
S (south)
C (centre)
So, for example AP(N1) means: assistant prosecutor who works in a prosecution 
office located in the north. We also numbered interviews (from 1 to 54, including the 
consultants). The size of the prosecution offices is not reported but, if relevant, we
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will emphasize it in the text. Sometimes we will specifically identify the prosecution 
office (and, in one case, the name of the prosecutor). But this will only be done when 
the information is well known and nothing confidential has been said (e. g. it is known 
that the urban safety group is in Turin or that the chief prosecutor in Bolzano, Cuno J. 
Tarfusser, launched a project to improve the organization of this prosecution office). 
We committed ourselves to anonymity and we will comply with that. More 
information about the methodology will be included later in the methodological 
appendices.
We chose to carry out semi-structured interviews because the questions allow 
open answers. As we said (chap. 1), we wanted to have the point of view of the legal 
actors, trying to emphasize the peculiar characteristics of the Italian case and, where 
possible, trying to avoid the risks of ethnocentrism. However, the open-endedness of 
this research does not mean that the information collected is totally unstructured. As 
we explained (chap. 1), we tried to analyze issues which are familiar to Anglo-Saxon 
socio-legal lawyers (e. g. legal culture). So, we had to rely very much on legal actors’ 
opinions. However, questions were designed to identify possible contradictions 
(particularly when it comes to the way prosecutors treat street crime and 
immigration). Moreover, given that we first interviewed consultants, we already had 
an idea of the answers we might get. This was very important because the more we 
knew about prosecution practice, the more the interviewees were ready to talk about it 
(and not to give standard answers). Finally, we must not forget that we did not only 
interview prosecutors. The answers given by police officers and lawyers provided a 
good test (or at least a different point of view) for the information we obtained from 
prosecutors. So, the questions we prepared and the strategy we used to carry out the 
research were not only aimed at understanding what prosecutors say that they do. We 
wanted to know what they do in practice. In this sense the differences between 
prosecutors’ professional self-image and the practice is probably the best example. 
Certainly this methodology has some limits. In particular, we did not carry out direct 
observation or any analysis o f case files. But we have doubts that this would have 
provided better information. The problems with direct observation are, of course, that 
people can act differently while they know they are observed. The analysis of files can 
be useful, but this would probably give more information about the criminal justice 
system in general. We wanted to analyze a specific legal actor. For example, if we
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look at the files dealing with immigration and street crime we would probably realize 
that these cases are dealt with as soon as possible and they are the majority of the 
cases treated by prosecutors. But can we really say that these are priorities for 
prosecutors? Moreover, interviews allow us to see what legal actors say they are 
doing (and want us to think they are doing). This prevents us attributing intentions to 
them on the basis of what is done elsewhere. Clearly, outcomes cannot be inferred 
from intentions any more than the opposite. But there are some obvious indicators we 
can use (eg. what we know about the time spent on different sorts of cases). Finally, 
this is an empirical research within the context of a PhD. We wanted to cover a 
number of prosecution services across Italy that it simply was not practicable to do 
observation and file analysis as well as interviews. Furthermore, access negotiation 
would probably have been more difficult.
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CHAPTER IV. THE LEGAL CONTEXT
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1. Introduction
This chapter will focus on two main questions. First, we need to explain the legal 
context. Three issues will be discussed: the legality principle, the organization of 
prosecution offices and the police-prosecutor relationship during the investigation. 
Although our aim is not to deal with purely legal questions (i. e. by analysis of the 
legality principle), we need to define the ‘legal environment’ within which Italian 
prosecutors work (at least those legal principles which are relevant here). This is 
because, as McBarnet has argued, “the law itself, not just the people who operate it, 
must be put under the microscope for analysis”1 and, more importantly, “the law itself 
is also one o f the contextual elements of decisions”.2 Our aim is to investigate the way 
in which prosecutors take decisions. So, the examination of these rules will be crucial 
to the understanding of the issues we will discuss later. Second, this legal analysis 
should lead to other considerations. We will be able to analyze in greater detail some 
of the key problems discussed by the literature in English (see chap. 2). These do not 
simply concern prosecutors, but, more generally, those legal issues which characterize 
the Italian criminal justice system and influence prosecutors’ functions (e. g. the 
legality principle).
2. The legal framework of the legality principle within the Italian
legal system
As indicated above (chap. 2), in Italy prosecutors are legally required to prosecute all 
the criminal offences. Indeed, the Italian constitution specifically states that the 
legality principle applies within the Italian legal system (art. 112 cost.).3 This is 
unusual amongst European jurisdictions. The expediency principle is applied, for 
example, in England, France and in the Netherlands. In Germany criminal action is 
mandatory, but, as we saw (see chap. 2), this principle is qualified by significant 
exceptions (i. e. where there is no public interest in commencing a prosecution). In 
contrast, formally speaking in Italy the prosecutor does not have any discretionary
1 McBarnet D. J. “Conviction : law, the state and the construction o f  ju stice”. 1981. London: 
Macmillan, p. 6.
2 Ibid. p. 7.
’ Art. 112 says: “The public prosecutor has the duty to initiate criminal proceedings”.
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power which can be used in the pre-trial phase to decide to drop a case. In this section 
we will explain the social and political reasons behind Italy’s formal adoption o f the 
legality principle and the impact that this provision has during the pre-trial phase.
The Italian constitution and Acts of Parliament set out a system whereby 
prosecutors (and judges) are fully independent. In particular, prosecutors have an 
'external independence’ from all the other constitutional powers.4 This means that 
prosecutors should not be subjected to any form of external pressure when they 
execute their functions. Moreover, the Italian constitutional fathers thought that 
“independence and mandatory prosecution [are] two faces of the same coin”.5 As the 
Constitutional Court has stated, the principle set out in art. 112 cost is intended to 
guarantee equality before the law within the penal process. This is because institutions 
subject to the legality principle act only in the interest of the law and, as we have said, 
may not be subjected to any external pressure.6 The Court has also specified that this 
independence does not just apply to the moment when the prosecutor decides upon 
penal action. The prosecutor is fully independent (from any external interferences) 
even during the investigation phase.7
The reasons why the Italian constitution seeks to use the legality principle as a 
tool to protect the ‘external independence’ o f the prosecutor are mainly historical. 
During the Fascist period prosecutors were not part o f the judiciary, but rather 
belonged to the executive, in particular to the Minister o f Justice who, for example,
o
nominated and dismissed them. They were an arm of a dictatorial regime, which 
widened their powers as defenders of public order.9 Of course that public order was 
fascist in nature. Thus, the aim of the drafters of the 1948 Italian constitution was to 
re-design a system where impartiality and equality before the law were not limited by 
any executive pressure. According to the Italian constitutional fathers, this aim could 
be achieved through a complete independence of the judiciary. Now prosecutors are 
part of the judiciary and the legality principle is seen as fundamental to guarantee this
4 This interpretation rises from the wording o f  different articles in the Italian constitution. These are: art 
104 para. 1, art. 108 para. 2, art. 109 and art. 112 (legality principle). See, for example, Voena G. P. 
“SoggeltT . In Conso G. and Grevi V. eds. “Compendio di Procedura Penale”. 2003. 2nd ed. Padova: 
CEDAM. p. 58-59.
3 Di Federico (1998) op. cit. p. 375.
6 Corte cost. sent. n. 88/1991, stated also in Corte cost. sent. n. 111/1993. See also, for example, Voena 
(2003) op. cit. p. 59.
7 Corte cost. sent. n. 420/1995. See also, for example, Voena (2003) op. cit. p. 59.
8 Cordero F. “Procedurapenale”. 2003. 7th ed. Milano: Giuffre. p. 193.
9 Ibid. p. 425.
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independence. Two elements (related to art. 112 cost.) seem to corroborate this thesis. 
First, as we said, the legality principle is intended to ensure that the prosecutor is not 
influenced by external pressures when he decides to prosecute or not. Secondly, if the 
prosecutor is bound to prosecute all crimes, as a consequence, formally he can not 
take decisions based on personal values (i. e. to prosecute or not a case because of 
political issues). This very brief introduction has explained why the legality principle 
operates in the Italian legal system; let us now analyze the way this provision is 
implemented.
When the prosecutor is informed that a crime has been committed, he must act 
(but there are exceptions, see later). In particular, after a preliminary investigation (if 
necessary) he must instigate penal action through a specific request to the preliminary 
hearing judge (giudice per I ’udienza preliminare, GUP). This is so unless he can drop 
the charge in accordance with the law by making an archiviazione request (request for 
dismissal of charge) addressed to the preliminary investigation judge (giudice per le 
indaginipreliminary GIP).
The provision stated in the constitution at art. 112 has been restated in the 
criminal procedure code (codice di procedura penale, cpp) (art. 50 cpp). The code 
specifies that the prosecutor implements penal action on his own authority, or after the 
fulfilment of particular requisites (e. g. a complaint from the victim, called querela, 
which is necessary to begin the prosecution of certain crimes such as defamation) (art. 
50 para. 2 cpp). Moreover, art. 50 para. 3 cpp states the irretrattabilita of the penal 
action. This means that a prosecution cannot be interrupted or suspended (after the 
penal action has been formally implemented), unless this is provided for by the law (e. 
g. when the penal decision depends on the resolution of a dispute about citizenship). 
This is seen as a logical consequence of the adoption of the legality principle.10 
Otherwise a prosecutor could easily get round the provision by dropping a prosecution 
immediately after commencing it. Thus, the prosecutor is formally bound. The 
legality principle forbids the creation of a provision which formally gives to the 
accuser the discretionary power that a prosecutor has in England or in the USA.11 In 
other words: when a prosecution begins it should in law end in a judicial decision on 
guilt unless the law states differently.
]0 Ibid. p. 402.
" Ibid. p. 401.
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Of course, prosecutors do not have to initiate a prosecution every time they 
receive a crime report or after all investigations. According to art. 50 para. 1 cpp this 
needs not happen when the prosecutor requests archiviazione. The archiviazione can 
be requested in five different situations. First, when the notizia di reato (crime report) 
is groundless (art. 408 para. 1 cpp). Secondly, if a legal condition for the 
commencement of the prosecution (condizione di procedibilita, e. g. lack of querela, 
see later) is missing (art. 411 cpp). Thirdly, if the offence has been ‘extinguished’ (art. 
411 cpp) (e. g. when the offender has died, art. 150 codice penale, Italian criminal law 
code, cp.). Fourthly, when the facts do not in law constitute a crime (art. 411 cpp). 
Fifthly, when the perpetrators are (after the investigation) unknown (art. 415 par. 1 
cpp). A groundless crime report is explained in art. 125 of the provisions to 
implement the criminal procedure code (norme di attuazione del codice di procedura 
penale, disp. att.)12. This says that the report is groundless when the evidence 
collected during the investigation is not sufficient to support an accusation during the 
trial. This is so when the investigation has disclosed that the facts did not happen, the 
accused did not commit them or that the facts do not constitute a crime. Moreover, 
this occurs when the evidence that the facts happened, that the accused committed it 
or that the fact is a crime is insufficient, contradictory and it is believed that sufficient 
consistent evidence cannot be acquired through the criminal process.13
These rules define the decisions that prosecutors must make in the first 
instance to implement art. 112 cost., but their actions are subject to the review and 
intervention of other legal actors. There is one procedure which entitles the general 
prosecutor attached to the court of appeal to take over the investigation carried out by 
a prosecutor: this is called avocazione (taking over of the conduct of the prosecution, 
see later). This tool can be used when certain conditions occur, in particular the 
avocazione is automatic when the prosecutor does not request archiviazione but 
neither does he or she exercise penal action within the terms fixed by the law (art. 412 
para. 1 cpp). In this way the legislation seeks to ensure the application o f the legality 
principle. More importantly, and closely connected to the correct implementation of 
the legality principle, is the role of the preliminary investigation judge. As we said 
before, penal action is formally set in motion (rinvio a giudizio, sending the case to
12 This means Italian provisions to implement the criminal procedure code.
1' See, for example, Scaparone M. “Indagini preliminari e udienza prelim inare”. In Conso et al. eds. 
(2003) op. cit. pp. 455-552. pp. 522-523.
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trial) at the udienza preliminare (preliminary hearing, see later). However, the GIP 
may take decisions which mean penal action is not taken (archiviazione requests).14 In 
particular, if an archiviazione application is made by the prosecutor (art. 408 para. 1 
cpp) the GIP, after the examination of the file containing all the evidence collected 
during the investigation, will decide whether there is insufficient evidence to support a 
prosecution. If he/she disagrees with the application, the GIP can require the 
prosecutor to carry on the investigation (art. 409 para. 4 cpp), to formulate a particular 
charge (art. 409 para. 5 cpp) or to charge a particular accused (art. 415 para. 2 cpp).
Thus, the legislator has given to a separate judicial actor (the GIP is a real 
judge) a power to regulate the prosecutor’s implementation of the legality principle.13 
In particular, this judge ensures through the archiviazione procedure that the 
prosecutor is not evading the duty stated in art. 112 cost.16 This prerogative is not 
merely formal. In particular, the GIP can require the prosecutor to record a person(s) 
as accused when this is not identified by the prosecutor, but his identity seems clear 
(to the GIP) from the investigative acts (art. 415 para. 2 cpp). Furthermore, when the 
charge seems clear from the investigation (art. 409 para. 5 cpp) the GIP orders the 
prosecutor to formulate it. There are legal arguments in the Italian literature that the 
power thus conferred on the GIP does not comply with the legal requirements of 
impartiality and neutrality that a judge’s status requires.17 This is because the judge de 
facto determines the charges. It has been argued that this should only be done by the 
prosecutor, who, in the Italian system, is the only judicial actor entitled to put forward 
an accusation. However, this encroaching between the separate domains of different 
legal actors is said to be justified by the aim to preserve the legality principle, which is
i o
a constitutional principle.
The last judicial actor involved with the implementation of the legality 
principle in the pre-trial phase is the preliminary hearing judge. As indicated above 
this actor is called into action when a rinvio a giudizio request is made. The GUP does 
not formally verify whether art. 112 cost, has been correctly applied (this is only a 
GIP’s task, in the case where the prosecutor wants to drop the charge). This judge has 
“to protect the accused and the good functioning of the justice system from rash
14 The penal action is never set in motion before the GIP, this is why this legal actor is said to have a 
“jurisdiction without action”. See, for example, Scaparone (2003) op. cit. p. 460.
15 Scaparone (2003) op. cit. p. 522.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid. p. 526.
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requests for trial”.19 However, in implementing this function the GUP will judge if
• 20there is sufficient evidence to support an accusation during the trial. He/she hears 
the parties, then he/she may decide to drop the prosecution (,sentenza di non luogo a 
procedure, art. 425 cpp) or to send the case to trial (rinvio a giudizio, art. 424 cpp). 
Moreover, if the judge believes that the investigation is not complete, he/she may
indicate to prosecutors the investigations that they have to carry out (art. 421 bis para.
211 cpp). Thus, the GUP’s main task is to verify that the investigation is complete, and 
not that the prosecutor has correctly implemented penal action. However, this 
verification is, obviously, based on the same issues (whether there is evidence to 
support the charge) that the prosecutor takes into account in deciding to prosecute.
To conclude, we have outlined a complicated system whereby the 
implementation o f the legality principle is the subject of intervention by different 
judicial actors during the pre-trial phase. It appears clear that decisions on 
prosecutions are constrained within strict legal rules and subject to close judicial 
monitoring. However, as we said “it appears”. This study aims at understanding 
whether this is more appearance than reality.
2.1. Legality principle: the legally defined exceptions
There are exceptions which exempt the prosecutor from acting when a crime report is 
received and in which circumstances the legality principle is not regarded as having 
been violated. It is the law which binds the prosecutor, in certain circumstances, not to 
prosecute.22 This happens when one of the four condizioni di procedibilita stated by 
the law is missing. For example, if A reports that B has been slandered the prosecutor 
may not intervene if there is no querela (a formal complaint made by the victim, who, 
in this case, is B). In this case the prosecutor does not begin the investigation and ask 
for archiviazione because a condition (in this case the querela) that the law requires to 
implement the penal action is missing (art. 411 cpp). The prosecutor can begin an
19 Ibid. p. 522 and 534.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid. p. 534.
22 Scaparone (2003) op. cit. p. 469. See also Cordero (2003) op. cit. pp. 407-408.
■ ’ The condizioni di procedibilita  (art. 345 cpp) are: querela (complaint from the victim) (art. 336 cpp), 
istanza (another form o f  complaint made by the victim) (art. 341 cpp), richiesta  (complaint made by 
the competent organ, for example the Minister o f  Justice, in some circumstances) (art. 342 cpp) and
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investigation only if he/she believes that the condition may be fulfilled in the future 
(art. 346 cpp).24 Thus, we can say that when one of these conditions is missing the 
crime report is de facto groundless because no crime can be prosecuted. In these cases 
it is the law which requires the decision. The prosecutor does not have a real 
discretionary power. So, the system allows exceptions to the legality principle.
There are a number of justifications advanced for these exceptions. In Italy it 
is recognized that under certain circumstances discretion is legitimate and under 
others not.25 Moreover, these remedies are linked to precise decisions taken by the 
legislator. For example, the reasons for requiring the querela26 may be that the crime 
is so petty that the prosecution should be dependent on the victim’s will. Moreover, 
crimes concerning the honour or the ‘sexual freedom’ of the victim should require 
his/her consent to be prosecuted, because the publicity deriving from the proceedings
7 7may intensify the consequences of the crime itself. The Constitutional Court has 
made it clear that the legality principle is not compromised by these exceptions. This 
is because the penal action must be implemented if the condition is fulfilled.
2.2. Legality principle: implicit discretionary judgements
In this section we deal with the extent to which discretion remains implicit within the 
legal rules and structures outlined before. First, let us consider the start of the criminal 
process. The crime report has just been received, penal action has neither been 
instigated nor discontinued (through the archiviazione or rinvio a giudizio requests). 
At this specific moment some crime reports may be manifestly groundless from the
7Q •beginning. We are talking about all these cases where the facts reported obviously 
do not constitute a crime. A typical example is when A claims that B owns him some
cnttorizzazione a procedere  (assent) (art. 343 cpp). There is no need to explain in detail these 
provisions. Suffice here to say that, without these conditions, a case can not be prosecuted.
24 This provision is important because the condizioni di procedibilita  may be necessary to prosecute 
serious crimes, such as rape (art. 609 septies cp), which require the querela from the victim.
For example, Cordero (Cordero (2003) op. cit. p. 407) clearly explains that a system needs selective 
remedies to make it work better.
26 Not all the condizioni di procedibilita  are aimed to decrease the backlog o f  the penal system. For 
example, the autorizzazione a procedere  is a procedure in which the prosecutor obtains the permission 
(from a public body) to begin a proceedings or to implement certain investigation activities. This 
happens, for example, when members o f  the Parliament are involved.
27 Scaparone (2003) op. cit. p. 470-471.
2* Ibid. p. 470.
29 Cordero (2003) op. cit. p. 422.
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money. This is not a crime, unless the prosecutor believes that there is a fraud behind 
it.30 In these situations we can assume that no file will be opened and there will not be 
an archiviazione request before the GIP. Here we can say that prosecutors have a sort 
of discretionary power, in that there is no need to begin proceedings when the crime 
report is without legal foundation. The reasons for the necessity of this form of 
discretion are clear. The legality principle can not avoid the logical necessity of 
assessing the legal quality of particular acts.
What happens when the crime report has some legal foundation? Prosecutors 
have the duty to record in a specific register every crime report (this will not happen 
for the example just given, because the fact is not a crime) that they receive or that 
they discover (art. 335 cpp).31 The denunciation is particularly important. All citizens 
(not only the victim) have the right to make a denunciation (written or oral) when they 
know about a crime (for some crimes this right becomes a duty) (art. 333 cpp). The 
denuncia (written) is compulsory for public officials who come across a crime while 
they are exercising their functions (art. 331 cpp). This document includes the essential 
elements. In particular: it explains the facts, the day the crime was discovered, the 
evidence already known and information (e.g. address) about the person who may 
have committed the crime, the victim and all the other persons who may know 
something about the crime (art. 332 cpp). Thus, when prosecutors receive (directly or 
through the police) these documents they must act. These kinds of crime reports are 
specifically set out by the law and they represent the stimulus to begin proceedings. 
The same function can be served by some condizioni di procedibilita (e.g. querela): in 
this case the documents act as both condizioni di procedibilita and crime reports as 
well.j2
These documents do not represent the only opportunities that the prosecutor 
has to begin an investigation. Crime reports may come in different forms which are 
not specified by the law; for example: information published in newspapers or 
through confidential channels. These are called ‘innominate’ crime reports, because
30 Ibid. p. 424.
31 At this stage the proceedings is not technically started, in fact the crime report recording is only a 
premise to begin a penal proceedings. This will formally start with the first investigation act made by 
the prosecutor or by the police. See Scaparone (2003) op. cit. p. 465. The law defines certain forms o f  
crime reports, the denuncia (denunciation) and the referto (report) (art. 330-334 cpp), the latter has to 
be filled by persons who work in the health area.
Scaparone (2003) op. cit. p. 465.
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they do not have a specific name and specific characteristics. In these cases the 
prosecutor decides if they need to be formally recorded in the register and 
investigated. In other words: the prosecutor decides if they are real crime reports, in 
which case he/she must record them (art. 335 cpp). An example, given by Cordero, of 
this form of crime reports is the news. The author is very clear when he says that if  the
33prosecutor does not believe that these crime reports are reliable he “ignores them”. 
For example, prosecutors may read an article about a crime, but if they believe that 
the account given by the journalist is not correct, they will not record it in the register. 
Thus, in these circumstances prosecutors de facto also have a discretionary power. 
Because a crime report must be based on concrete evidence, prosecutors need not pay 
attention to someone simply expressing their own opinion that a crime has been 
committed, particularly if the crime has been already investigated.
The existence of prosecutorial discretion in these situations is not regarded as 
compromising the legality principle. In fact, it is true that such a provision can only be 
fully implemented if this action is preceded by an adequate investigation. However, 
we can not ask prosecutors to act upon every allegation of crime that comes to their 
report. The consequences of this solution might be catastrophic. Everyone who has a 
slight suspicion will refer it to the authorities, who will be forced to act. This would 
eventually clog up the system. This may be true of another situation: the anonymous 
denunciation. The code is clear these kinds of crime reports can not be used, unless 
they represent the corpo del reato34 or they come from the accused (art. 333 para. 3 
cpp related to art. 240 cpp). However, it is recognized that prosecutors and the police 
may use anonymous denunciations to discover the crime itself.35 It is clear that if the 
system were to give automatic legal status to these types of anonymous crime reports 
the backlog of cases to investigate and prosecute could become unsustainable. 
Moreover, a denunciation, even if it is anonymous, implies a responsibility. If one 
makes a false allegation of crime (citing a specific accused) and the person who made 
it knows that it is not true he or she can be prosecuted for calunnia (false allegations, 
art. 368 cp). For these reasons the law prevents the prosecutor from formally using 
these types of information. But it seems logical to tolerate an unofficial use of these 
denunciations, because they might be important (e.g. somebody might be too scared to
Cordero (2003) op. cit. p. 428. 
j4 These are the objects through which or on which the crime was committed and the fruits o f  crime 
(see art. 253 para. 2 cpp, for example: a gun used to commit murder, stolen goods).
33 Scaparone (2003) op. cit. p. 466.
36
sign an official allegation, but the report may look reliable). In this way we can speak 
of a form of discretionary power. It is left to the prosecutor as to how to use the 
anonymous denunciation.
There is another form of implicit discretion that we need to analyze. Here we 
are at a different procedural moment. We are still at the very beginning, but the 
prosecutor has already recorded the crime report. For a number of reasons (mainly 
linked to the impossibility of coping with the amount of work, see chap. 8) he/she can 
not investigate all the cases in the same way. As a consequence prosecutors may 
prioritize the most serious. As Franco Cordero says: this is a “discretion of the 
priorities”/ 7 Prosecutors are allowed to choose the when and the how, but, sooner or 
later, they must begin an investigation concerning all recorded crime reports. 
Prosecutors seem to agree with this concept. An important prosecutor (cited in Nelken 
and Zanier’s work) explained that this is a marginal discretionary power, which is not 
incompatible with the function they have to carry out. Again this is logical and it 
enables the sensible use of resources in order to help the system to work better. No 
one wants a system where a simple theft and a murder are investigated with the same 
amount of resources. This is clear when prosecutors have to make obvious choices 
(murder-theft). However, it becomes more complicated when they have to prioritize, 
for example, white collar crimes over street crime or vice-versa. In these situations, if 
a decision has to be made (e. g. due to lack of resources), it will necessary involve 
value-judgements. These are expressly prohibited under the legality principle. Thus, 
how do prosecutors cope with these situations? Are there uniform and general 
criteria? How important are external influences (e. g. police’s decisions)?
2.3. The legality principle in the English literature
As we saw before (see chap. 2) there is literature from the Anglo-Saxon world which 
has considered the real extent of the application of the legality principle in Italy. 
Goldstein and Marcus underlined the fact that prosecutors are “relatively passive” and
j6 Cordero (2003) op. cit. p. 428.
j7 Ibid.
Nelken, D. e Zanier, M.L. “Tra norme e prassi: durata del processo penale e strategie degli 
operatori del diritto”. 2006. Sociologia del Diritto. N .I. pp. 143-166. This article is also based on 
interviews with prosecutors and other legal actors.
37
• 39they rely completely on the information reported by the police (see later). Thus, if 
the police decide not to report a case this will not be prosecuted. Moreover, even if  the 
case is brought to the prosecutor, he/she can decide to gather no further evidence: as a 
consequence the case will be dropped because it appears that there is no crime. 
Finally, the prosecutor can decide to put forward certain charges and to drop others.40 
Thus, Goldstein and Marcus argue that these factors effectively qualify the legality 
principle because in practice, during the pre-trial phase, it allows the police and 
prosecutors to drop or to put forward a case on a discretionary basis. The authors give 
one very clear example to illustrate this concept. A prosecutor who receives a report 
from a woman of dubious reputation, who alleges that she has been raped by a man 
who has no previous record, may decide, after an evaluation of the elements, that he 
should not be prosecuted because of a lack of victim credibility.41
Goldstein and Marcus suggest that Italian prosecutors have discretionary 
powers when they define the crime problem, but they do not explain the socio-legal 
elements on which this discretion may be based. The authors also do not seem to 
consider prosecutors’ powers to mediate police influences when they determine 
priorities. So, the question could be: do prosecutors simply “swallow” the priorities 
imposed by the police or can they consider other (personal) criteria which limit the 
impact of police’s decisions?
Finally, the authors wrote their articles in 1977. At that time there was a fully 
inquisitorial system whereas now (after the 1989 reform) the Italian criminal 
procedure has turned to a more adversarial system. This has produced some practical 
effects. Generally speaking this transition is characterized by the fact that the 
guarantees of an adversarial system have been added to those of an inquisitorial
42system. For our purposes the most important change is that the instructing judge 
does not exist anymore so that now only prosecutors are entitled to prosecute.43 
Furthermore, prosecutors clearly appear to be the main legal actors during the pre-trial 
phase. The new code clearly states that the police are at their disposal for the 
investigation (see later).
j9 Goldstein and Marcus (1977) op. cit. p. 250.
40 Ibid. p. 271.
4' Ibid.
42 Nelken and Zanier (2006) op. cit.
b Judges preliminary investigation judge and preliminary hearing judge, see later) still participate 
during the pre-trial phase, but with no real investigative powers.
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The more recent literature in English from Italian authors mainly reflects the 
conclusions of Marcus and Goldstein. In particular, they underline the fact that, in 
practice, the legality principle leaves substantial discretionary powers to prosecutors. 
This literature also studied the consequences that prosecutors’ discretion have for the 
system. According to Boari prosecutors seem to make “indiscriminate use of 
dismissals for a large range of crimes”.44 Moreover, Grande suggests that the de facto 
unfettered freedom that prosecutor retains in deciding where and when to use his/her 
powers leads to “opposite results [compared to the system designed by the Italian 
constitution, see later] in terms of equality before the law” 45 Fabri speaks of 
“prosecutors’ huge discretion” during the investigation phase.46 Finally, Di Federico 
says that prosecutor decides from case to case “whether or not to exercise 
substantially and in full independence police functions; and can decide from case to 
case also the scope and the means of investigation”.47 The author supports the thesis 
that “penal action in Italy is de facto just as discretionary as in other countries, and 
perhaps more”.48
Ultimately, the literature in English (both from Anglo-Saxon and Italian 
authors) has identified that Italian prosecutors take “gate keeping decisions”, and have 
suggested that this does not comply with the implementation o f the legality principle. 
We know that these decisions “determine whether or not a case enters in the criminal
*4Qjustice system”. The authors, although they focused on what happens in practice, did 
not consider specifically the factors which shape these decisions. The approach of this 
thesis is to examine the practice of prosecution decision-making rather than confining 
discussion to the theory.
44 Boari N. “On the Efficiency o f  Penal Systems: Several Lessons from  the Italian Experience”. 1997. 
International Review o f Law and Economics. 17. pp. 115-126. p. 121.
45 Grande (2000) op. cit., p. 241.
46 Fabri M. “Theory versus practice o f  Italian criminal ju stice reform”. 1993-1994. Judicature 77. pp.
211-216. p. 212.
47 Di Federico (1998) op. cit. p. 378.
48 Ibid.
49 Ashworth A. and Redmayne M. “The criminal process'’. 2005. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 138.
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2.4. The legality principle: some brief considerations
In the last sections we have analyzed the legal framework of the legality principle 
within the pre-trial phase in the Italian legal system and some exceptions to its 
application. We have reached certain conclusions. First, the legality principle is set 
out in a clear legislative provision which requires the prosecutor to implement it.50 
Secondly, this strongly expressed principle does not preclude exceptions where failure 
to prosecute is clearly not regarded as contrary to the principle, the condizioni di 
procedibilita system representing a clear example. Moreover, the legality principle 
seems to leave room for forms of discretion that are not explicitly created by 
particular legal rules. In particular: the prosecutor excludes all manifestly ill founded 
crime reports: these are treated as groundless from the beginning. Further, prosecutors 
have to evaluate the ‘innominate’ crime reports and information that does not 
constitute crime reports at all (i. e. anonymous denunciations) and they ignore those 
that they judge groundless. Lastly, the prosecutor has a ‘discretion to prioritize’: the 
more the crime is serious, the more resources are allocated to investigate and to 
prosecute it.
At this point we have described the legal environment where the prosecutor 
works. It is clear that this is shaped by the legality principle, but this does not exclude 
the existence of certain forms of discretion which appear implicit within the system 
(e. g. the fact reported is clearly not a crime). In order to explain adequately how 
prosecutors exercise their discretion and thus define the crime problem we need to 
investigate the elements which, in practice, condition prosecutor’s decisions on the 
crime problem. The literature in English has clearly argued that Italian prosecutors 
retain these discretionary powers. But the authors have not investigated the decision­
making criteria used by prosecutors. Moreover, we will see that these issues have only 
been partially analyzed by the Italian academic literature as well.
'° Cordero (2003) op. cit. p. 402.
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3. The prosecutor’s office and the limits of hierarchical control51
The aim of these sections is to explain the legal rules which define the organization of 
Italian prosecution offices. Moreover, here we will try to make some observations 
about hierarchy and its limits in prosecution offices in Italy.
Previously we have indicated that the Italian constitutional fathers radically 
changed the relationship between the executive power and the prosecutors. The latter 
are now ‘externally’ independent from any other power; they are part o f the judiciary 
as much as judges and they share the same status (art. 104 para. 1 cost.). Thus, 
prosecutors are only responsible before the law. Moreover, judges and prosecutors 
are both subject to the Consiglio superiore della magistratura (higher Council of the 
judiciary, CSM) (art. 105, 106, 107 cost.).53 This suggests that prosecutors are not 
subject to any form o f external pressure. In particular, only the CSM, which is a 
judicial body, is able to affect their careers. It is also important to underline the new 
relationship between the Minister of Justice and the prosecutor. Before 1946, when 
this provision was introduced, the prosecutor exercised its functions under the 
direction of the Minister of Justice, whereas now the latter has only a power of 
supervision (art. 69 legge ordinamento giudiziario, judicial law order, ord. giud.). 
However, this is a Tight supervision’, whereby the Minister has responsibilities for 
the good functioning o f the justice system, but there is no hierarchical relationship 
between him and the prosecutors. Thus, the Minister can no longer instruct 
prosecutors to prosecute or not to prosecute cases, and, further, he/she can not issue 
guidelines of any kind.
The function of prosecutor is exercised, at the first instance courts, by the 
magistrate4 attached to the procura della Repubblica (prosecution office attached to 
the first instance court) (art. 51 para. 1 let. a cpp); at the court of appeal by the 
procura generale presso la corte d ’appello (prosecution office attached to the court of
31 This section will not deal with the organization o f the national prosecutor’s office which handles 
organized crime investigations and prosecutions.
32 Voena (2003) op. cit. p. 59.
5j In particular, art. 105 cost, says that the CSM “has the exclusive competence to appoint, assign, 
move, promote, and discipline members o f  the judiciary” and art. 107 para. 1 cost, says that: “Members 
o f the judiciary may not be removed from office. They may not be dismissed, suspended, or moved to 
other jurisdictions or functions except either by decision o f  the Higher Council o f  the judiciary”.
34 In Italian this name indicates both prosecutors and judges.
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appeal); at the corte di cassazione (the Italian supreme court) by the procura generate 
presso la corte di cassazione (prosecution office attached to the corte di cassazione) 
(art. 51 para. 1 let. b cpp). But prosecutors at a lower court are not subject to 
guidelines or orders issued by prosecutors working in a higher court. There is no 
hierarchical relationship. Prosecutors attached to the court of appeal and his 
colleagues attached to the corte di cassazione are only competent for proceedings 
before these courts.35 They do not interfere with the procure della Repubblica’s job. 
In particular, the procuratore generate presso la corte d ’appello, who is entitled to 
oversee the prosecutor’s offices in his/her district,56 does not have any power to take 
an “autonomous initiative” concerning proceedings.57 Moreover, this legal actor may 
not develop any preliminary investigation even if the crime report comes directly to 
his office;38 in such cases he/she will inform the competent prosecutor. Finally, the 
general prosecutor attached to the court of appeal can not discipline the prosecutor 
who does not act after receiving a piece of information that he/she believes is not (yet) 
a crime report.39 As indicated above, this decision is only taken by the prosecutors 
(chief prosecutor, deputy chief prosecutors and assistant prosecutors) at the procura 
clella Repubblica. Thus, the procuratore generate presso la corte d ’appello does not 
direct the prosecutor’s offices within the court of appeal’s district. Information 
channels may be opened during the preliminary investigation between the procura 
della Repubblica and the prosecutor’s office at the court of appeal. For example, art.
118 bis disp. att.60 enables the general prosecutor, when prosecutors are working on 
connected cases but without coordination or effective coordination, to put together 
those prosecutors (art. 118 bis para. 3 disp. att.).61 However, in these cases, if 
prosecutors continue the inquiry without coordination, the procuratore generate has 
no power to require them to do so. There are no remedies provided by the law, nor can
35 Voena (2003) op. cit. p. 63.
36 Ibid. p. 64.
37 Cordero (2003) op. cit. p. 203.
38 Voena (2003) op. cit. p. 63.
3<J Ibid.
60 If prosecutors are working on particular serious crimes stated in art. 407 para. 2 let. a cpp (e. g. mafia
organized crime) they inform the general prosecutor. This, if  he realizes that these investigations are
connected, informs the competent prosecutors (art. 118 bis para. 1 disp. att.). Moreover, prosecutors
general are informed when prosecutors work, spontaneously or following the information as stated in
art. 118 bis para. 1 disp. att., on connected investigations (art. 118 para. 2 disp. att.).
61 Voena (2003) op. cit. pp. 63-64.
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the prosecutor general (as a real superior within a hierarchical system might do) 
commence a disciplinary action.62
There is only one exception to this scenario in which the roles between 
prosecutors are strictly separated. This is the avocazione (taking over of criminal 
proceedings). In case of avocazione all the functions of the substituted prosecutor 
goes to prosecutor general.63 We saw above that through this procedure the prosecutor 
general automatically takes over the investigation when the prosecutor does not act 
(implementing penal action or archiviazione request, art. 412 para. 1 cpp). There are 
two other cases of automatic avocazione. First, when, within the procura della 
Repubblica office, it is not possible to replace promptly a prosecutor in case of 
abstention or incompatibility64 (art. 372 para. 1 let. a cpp). Second, when the chief 
prosecutor has not replaced the prosecutor in one of the situations set out in art. 36 
para. 1 let. a, b, d and e cpp (art. 372 para. 1 let. b cpp) (see later in this section).65 
There are cases where the avocazione is not automatic but optional. First, when the 
GIP disagrees with the archiviazione request and fixes a hearing to discuss it (art. 412 
para. 2 cpp in relation to art. 409 para. 3 cpp). Secondly, when the GIP agrees with the 
victim’s objection to the prosecutor’s archiviazione request (art. 410 para. 3 cpp in 
relation with art. 409 para. 3 cpp). Thirdly, when the GUP decides that the prosecutor 
must perform further investigations (421 bis para. 2 cpp). Fourthly, the general 
prosecutor can begin the avocazione procedure during the investigation of certain 
cases of organized crime. This happens when, if there are connected investigations, 
the coordination under art. 371 para. 1 cpp is not effective (art. art. 372 para. 1 bis 
cpp). The avocazione order must include the reasons for the choice. Furthermore, this 
is sent to the Higher Council of the Judiciary and to the interested prosecutors, so that 
they can make a complaint to the general prosecutor attached to the corte di 
cassazione66 Thus, the avocazione procedure gives to the general prosecutor 
substantial powers to intervene within a proceedings started by a prosecutor attached 
at a first instance court. However, the cases are strictly fixed by the law and there is
62 Cordero (2003) op. cit. p. 206.
63 Ibid. p. 204.
64 The prosecutor can abstain every time there are serious reasons to believe that this is convenient. 
Incompatibility (art. 1 6 - 1 9  ord. giud.) concerns specific cases indicated by the law (i. e. reasons o f  
kinship).
65 These are the same situations where a judge must withdraw him self from the case and the parties can 
recuse him. For example, the prosecutor has an interest in the trial.
66 Voena (2003) op. cit. p. 65.
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no general power to direct the prosecutor. As a consequence the avocazione procedure 
is not a sign of a hierarchical relationship between the procuratore generale presso la 
corte d ’appello and the procura della Repubblica 61 We can say that this procedure is 
necessary for the efficiency of the system when the prosecutor(s) does not act 
properly given that the system (generally speaking) is not hierarchical.
In this brief overview two points have been emphasized. First, there is no 
hierarchical chain from the Minister of Justice to the ordinary prosecutor, passing 
through the prosecution offices attached at the court of appeal and at the corte di 
cassazione. Secondly, whenever there are exceptions (<avocazione cases) to this rule 
these are really the last resort (e. g. when within the procura della Repubblica office it 
was not possible to substitute the incompatible prosecutor). Moreover, these 
procedures are aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the legality principle, not to 
create a hierarchical relationship between prosecutors. However, in 2005 the centre- 
right government passed an Act which substantially amended the ordinamento 
giudiziario law. This reform was subsequently suspended (2006) and then partially 
amended (2007) by the centre-left government (which lasted from 2006 till 2008). 
These provisions did not bring the system back to the fully hierarchical pre-1946 
situation. In particular, the Minister of Justice still does not have direct influence on 
prosecutors. And a clear separation between the executive and prosecutors (and the 
judiciary in general) has been maintained. But the superior-inferior relationship 
between prosecutors within the prosecution office seems to have changed.68 The 2005 
reform (despite further amendments in 2007) has clearly increased chief prosecutors’ 
hierarchical powers. So, the ordinamento giudiziario reform partially qualifies the 
previous legal regime. In the next section we will try to outline the key features of the 
superior-inferior relationship between prosecutors before and after 2005. We will only 
discuss the organizational relations of prosecution offices attached to the first instance 
courts (i. e. procure della Repubblica). These are the prosecutors who receive crime 
reports, supervise the investigation and implement the penal action.
67 Ibid. p. 64.
68 These reforms treat a wide range o f  topics, such as, for example: separation o f  career and functions 
between prosecutors and judges, career progression, the institution o f  a school for magistrati etc. 
However, for the purposes o f  the current study we will concentrate on the legal provisions which deal 
with the organizational relations within prosecution offices attached at the first instance courts (i. e.
procure della Repubblica).
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3.1 The prosecutor’s office -  micro-level
Every prosecution office is composed of a chief prosecutor {procuratore della 
Repubblica),69 and some magistral, who work as prosecutors. These are the deputy 
chief prosecutors (procuratori aggiunti, if the office is not too small) and the assistant 
prosecutors {sostituti procuratori).10 These are the legal actors entitled to prosecute (i. 
e. to act as pubblico ministero).71 The chief prosecutor directs (art. 70 para. 3 ord. 
giud.) and organizes the office according to the principles of impartiality and buon 
andamento (good functioning) stated in art. 97 para. 1 cost.72 The chief prosecutor can 
issue guidelines in relation to pre-trial investigation (in order to improve the working 
of the procura della Repubblica or other directives (e. g. requirements that he/she be 
informed of the development of investigations). In theory, the pubblico ministero 
who does not follow these rules may be replaced.74 Thus, during the investigation 
there seems to be a real hierarchical relationship between the chief and his/her 
assistant prosecutors. Every prosecutor is fully autonomous during all hearings (art. 
70 para. 4 ord. giud. and 53 para. 1 cpp). This is because of the oral nature of the 
hearing: prosecutors must be free,75 for example, to change their views and tactics 
during the trial. This does not prevent the chief prosecutor issuing directives about 
decisions taken prior to the hearing (e. g. decisions about the charge to put forward in
I f *the udienza preliminare). These directives are regarded as normal and appropriate to
77the relationship chief-pubblico ministero. Furthermore, the prosecutor is not fully 
autonomous at hearings which take place before the prosecution is commenced (e. g. 
hearings before the GIP for ‘precautionary’ measures).78 In these situations art. 70 
para. 3 ord. giud. applies. This states that the chief prosecutor appoints a prosecutor to 
work on a specific case. As a consequence we can assume that, theoretically, during 
the investigation this appointment can be cancelled and another prosecutor selected to
69 O f course for the prosecution office attached at the court o f  appeal the chief prosecutor is the 
pro cu ra to re  generate presso  la corte d ’appello. For the prosecution office attached at the corte di 
cassazione  the chief is the procuratore generate presso la corte di cassazione.
,0 V o ena  (2003) op. cit. p. 71.
71 Effectively the translation o f  pubblico ministero is prosecutor.
72 Voena (2003) op. cit. p. 72.
7'’ Ibid. p. 74.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid. p. 73.
76 Ibid.
77 Cordero (2003) op. cit. p. 213.
78 Precautionary measures are pre-trial controls on the accused, like pre-trial custody or stay at home.
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work on a case. This can happen without following the rules stated in art. 53 para. 2 
cpp about the substitution of a pubblico ministero (see later).79
It is particularly important to examine the way the chief prosecutor designates 
a magistrato (or a group of magistrati) to investigate and prosecute a case (art. 70 
para. 3 ord. giud.). Before the 2005 reform this happened through a “designazione”80 
rather than a delegation of powers.81 This means that the power to prosecute is not 
simply a power held by the chief prosecutors. All the prosecutors have this power, the 
chief only decides who has to deal with which individual cases. Thus, the 
procuratore della Repubblica, as art. 70 para. 3 ord. giud. states, really had mere “job 
organization prerogatives” over the magistrati. But according to Cordero, the verb 
“designare” implies a choice made by the chief prosecutor, so that the magistrato is 
not automatically designated.83 However, Voena has written that this procedure is 
ruled by fixed mechanisms.84 If this is the case the chief prosecutor’s prerogatives 
would be more limited in their practical effect. It is difficult to know which approach 
is correct. The reality may vary in different prosecution offices according to three 
variables. First, the internal culture of prosecutors: what would be regarded as an 
appropriate method for appointing a prosecutor? But decision-making may not only 
be shaped by prosecutors’ views. In fact (second element), the approach to take may 
be determined by the size of the procura della Repubblica. A chief prosecutor 
working in a big city may find it difficult (because of the backlog of cases, of the 
numbers of prosecutors to co-ordinate etc.) to take a decision on the allocation of 
every single case. While a procuratore della Repubblica working in a small-medium 
town may find it easier to decide case by case (because he/she knows much better his 
substitutes etc.). The third element regards the geographical location of prosecution 
offices. In Italy, even if prosecutors are working in areas of similar dimensions, there 
can be huge differences in terms of criminality. Thus, in areas where the problems are 
often similar and not too serious the chief prosecutor may find it more efficient to set 
up fixed rules. Whereas if criminality is more heterogeneous and problems are more
19 Voena (2003) op. cit. p. 72-73.
80 Though the chief can decide to prosecute himself.
81 Cordero (2003) op. cit. p. 212. See also Voena (2003) op. cit. p. 72.
82 Cordero (2003) op. cit. p. 212.
82 Ibid.
Voena (2003) op. cit. p. 72. A fixed mechanism means that superior prosecutors do not decide where
to allocate the case. There is a turnover and, prosecutors who are on duty on a specific day receive the
file (see chap. 6).
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serious the procuratore della Repubblica may want to consider carefully the decision. 
There may be circumstances (other than those we just explained) where the 
procuratore della Repubblica may replace the prosecutor initially allocated to deal 
with a case. These are indicated by the law (art. 53 para. 2 cpp). First, the chief 
prosecutor may decide to do so if there is a serious obstacle (i. e. preventing the 
substitute from working properly) or if there are rilevanti esigenze di servizio (i. e. 
significant reasons related to the correct implementation of the job), which mean that 
it is necessary to replace the prosecutor (eg. the prosecutor is seriously ill). Second, 
the prosecutor will be replaced (automatically) in certain circumstances (art. 36 para. 
1 let. a, b, d and e cpp) which are the same as those requiring a judge to withdraw 
from a case or the parties to recuse him/her (e. g. when he/she has an interest in the
Of
proceedings). Third, the magistrato can be replaced if he/she agrees.
These were and in part are still (after the ordinamento giudiziario reform) the 
rules. They suggest that in legal theory there exist certain limited forms of hierarchical 
powers. But how have prosecutors applied them? According to Di Federico in the last 
30 years we have witnessed a practice called “personalization of prosecutorial 
functions”.86 This means that the initiation of the criminal action is an attribute of the
on
single prosecutor and not of his/her office. Thus, a prosecutor can begin an 
investigation and a prosecution any time he wants. These actions will be only based 
on his personal views. Moreover, Di Federico says that this trend also applies to 
directives on how to deal with single cases, on the investigative means to use and on
o n
whether to restrict personal liberties of suspects. Prosecutors are not in practice 
bound by any rule and are not accountable to their superiors for any of the decisions 
they have to take about a case (including to prosecute or not and to ask for 
precautionary measures). Moreover, pubblici minis ter i can manage the investigation 
the way they want (in terms of expense or restrictions of the accused person(s)’s 
liberty etc.). In particular, the author argues that directives concerning a single case 
are unacceptable when they seem to undermine prosecutorial independence.89 In such 
cases assistant prosecutors have successfully challenged the chiefs power to issue 
these directives before the CSM. As a consequence, chief prosecutors have started to
*5 Ibid. p. 73.
s6 Di Federico (1998) op. cit. p. 379.
8' Ibid.
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use this power less and less.90 Di Federico’s statements about “personalization of 
prosecutorial functions” are supported by a survey involving 1000 defence lawyers. In 
particular, 55% of these said that there is “a substantial difference in the way 
prosecutors decide in very similar cases”.91
Three observations need to be made about Di Federico’s conclusions. First, as 
the author says, prosecutors’ independence is fundamental within the Italian 
constitutional and criminal justice system.92 Thus, it seems plausible that this would 
prevail over any other principle (i. e. hierarchical relationship chief-assistant). 
Secondly, the empirical research undertaken by the author did not involve 
prosecutors. Thirdly, we still do not know how the relationship between chief and 
assistant prosecutors is shaped in practice. We can say that it does not appear 
hierarchical, but if that is so what kind o f relationships do exist (e. g. are they based 
on strategies of persuasion)?
As indicated above, this was the scenario before the 2005 reform. The legge 
delega (parent Act) n. 150/2005 enabled the former centre-right government to 
modify “the organization of prosecution offices”. Subsequently the government 
issued a decreto legislative?94 (D.Lgs. n. 106/2006) which implemented this provision. 
This piece of legislation set out principles which were revolutionary when compared 
to the previous legal rules. The chief prosecutor is now the only legal figure entitled to 
carry out a prosecution (i. e. implementing the penal action). However, given that a 
few persons can not possibly deal with all the cases, this power can be passed to 
assistant prosecutors. The wording of the D.Lgs. was clear: now the procuratore della 
Repubblica does not “appoint” a magistrato to deal with a case, but he “delegates” the 
power to him/her.95 Thus, there is a power which passes from the chief to the 
prosecutors, who do not have this power before the delegation.
The initial reforms were amended. During the electoral campaign (in 2006) the 
centre-left made clear that one of their priorities was the amendment of the
90 ibid.
91 Ibid. p. 381.
92 Ibid. p. 375-376.
9j Act n. 150/2005 art. 1 par. 1 d.
94 These are like statutory instruments and count as primary legislation. In particular, the Parliament 
(through the legge delega) authorizes the government to enact legislation (the decreti legislativi) on the 
basis o f  fixed principles and limits.
93 D.Lgs. n. 106/2006 art. 2 para. 1.
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ordinamento giudiziario reform passed by the centre-right. In October 2006, the 
government (elected the previous May) passed an Act (n. 269/2006). This is important 
for two reasons. First, it suspended the effects of the 2005 reform.96 Later, in July 
2007 (just before the end of the suspension period) another Act was passed (n. 
111/2007). This eventually amended the 2005 reform (that still exists) again (and the 
subsequent delegated legislation linked to these provisions) and gave powers (it 
served as legge delega as well) to create delegated legislation making further 
amendments to the ordinamento giudiziario. The centre-left government collapsed at 
the beginning of 2008 and little use was made of the power to make further delegated 
legislation (see D.Lgs. n. 35/2008).97 Second, and more important, the 2006 Act dealt 
with the organization of prosecution offices (and many other issues). In particular, 
D.Lgs. 106/2006 was amended. The chief prosecutor is still the only legal figure 
entitled to implement penal action. However, he/she does not do it “under his/her 
responsibility” and assistant prosecutors are no longer “delegated” to prosecute, but 
rather they are “assigned”.98 As Pepino underlines, this is not a mere semantic 
distinction. The use of the verb “assegnare” (to assign) implies that pubblici ministeri 
are not mere executors. On the contrary they have a certain degree of autonomy when 
they prosecute cases. However, the author recognizes that, even after these 
amendments, prosecution offices (and the implementation of penal action) seem 
organized on substantially hierarchical rules.99 In fact, these were the only 
amendments concerning the organization of prosecution offices (other very important 
and substantial amendments were made, but they are not relevant here). The situation 
remains very similar to that established by the 2005 reform passed by the centre-right.
So, the former centre-left government did not cancel the 2005 reform. Some of 
the provisions are still applicable. All of these were clearly intended to increase the 
hierarchical relationship within the prosecution office. In particular, five points seem 
relevant. First, the chief not only organizes the prosecution office, he/she determines 
the criteria to organize the office and those that he/she will follow in assigning the 
cases to the prosecutors. In particular, chief prosecutors will have to establish for
^ Act n. 269/2006 art. 1.
9/ Basically, the provisions enacted (included those which were in the Act n. 111/2007) concerned 
magistrates career (e. g. public competition, progression etc.).
98 Act n. 269/2006 art. 1 para. 2.
)} Pepino L. “Quale giudice dopo la riforma d e ll’ordinamento g i u d i z i a r i o 2007 . Questione 
giustizia. Vol. 4. pp. 651-676. pp. 660-661.
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which area of crimes the designation will be based on fixed rules.100 Second, the 
procuratore della Repubblica can determine the criteria that the prosecutors delegated 
to deal with a case have to follow. Moreover, if they do not follow these rules or they 
do not agree with them, the chief has the power to annul the delegation.101 Third, the 
procuratore della Repubblica can set out the general criteria that the magistrati must 
follow in: using the polizia giudiziaria (judicial police, see later), using financial and 
technical resources and planning the investigation.102 Fourth, measures which may 
affect personal freedom or diritti reali (rights on a thing, e. g. property) must be taken 
following the assent of the chief prosecutor or of the magistrato delegated for this 
function.1(b Fifth, the chief prosecutor is now the only representative of the 
prosecution office before the press.104
It is not surprising that the newly elected centre-left government (closer to 
magistratVs ideas about justice reforms compared to the centre-right) blocked and 
amended the 2005 reform so quickly (the government started to operate in June 2006 
and the first Act was enacted the following October). The 2005 reform passed by the 
centre-right created a vehement reaction from prosecutors and judges. This was 
arguably the most acute confrontation between magistrati and a part of the political 
world for more than 15 years. We will go back to this issue in the next chapter. The 
point we want to underline here concerns the legal consequences of this reform. This 
is because, despite some relevant modifications (see above), chief prosecutors seem to 
have acquired a strong power to influence the organizational relations within 
prosecution offices. But what does it mean in practice? Are prosecutors ready to 
accept this? Do chief prosecutors want to use this power? In other words: studying the 
practical impact of the ordinamento giudiziario reform will be crucial to outline the 
principles which shape organizational relations on the ground within the prosecution 
office.
D.Lgs. n. 106/2006 art. 1 para. 6.
101 Ibid. art. 2 para. 2.
102 Ibid. art. 4.
IOj Ibid. art. 3.
104 Ibid. art. 5.
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4. The police-prosecutor relationship during the pre-trial phase
Before we begin to explain in detail the legal rules shaping the relationship between 
the police and prosecutors we need to focus on three preliminary issues. The first is 
the distinction between polizia amministrativa and polizia giudiziaria. The former has 
the function of preventing crime; while the polizia giudiziaria (PG) deals with the 
investigation together with prosecutors. This does not mean that these are two distinct 
police forces. All police officers may be called upon to perform either function. So, 
the PG are police officers (just like the polizia amministrativa) but who primarily deal 
with crime investigation.105 The PG works closely with, and is functionally 
dependent, upon prosecutors (see later). Their functions106 are: receiving notifications 
of crime and discovering crimes; managing the consequences of a crime (e. g. 
restoring public order); conducting investigations; securing evidence; performing any
107act useful to the prosecution; and limiting the consequences of a crime (art. 55 cpp). 
We will be looking at the role, functions and powers of the PG during the 
investigation but the impact of the polizia amministrativa during the pre-trial phase 
should not be underestimated: they too (like the PG) come across and collect crime 
reports.108
The second important conceptual distinction to make is between dipendenza 
fimzionale (functional dependence) and dipendenza organizzativa (organizational 
dependence). The former means that superiors have the right to determine the 
functions that subordinates should carry out. The latter means that superiors have the 
right to manage the organization (e. g. career, promotions, transfers, allocation of 
resources, disciplinary matters etc.) of their subordinates. PG officers are functionally 
dependent on prosecutors and organizationally dependent on police hierarchical 
superiors (prosecutors have no powers in relation to polizia amministrativa).109
The third point concerns the personnel composing the PG. In Italy there are 
three police forces: polizia di Stato, carabinieri and guardia di finanza. Police officers
103 Scaglione A. “L'attivita ad  iniziativa della po lizia  giudiziaria!'. 2001. Torino: Giappichelli. pp. 15-
19.
106 Which, in certain circumstances, can also be carried out on their own initiative, see art. 55 and 348
cpp.
107 See, for example, Voena (2003) op. cit. pp. 80-84. See also (in general for the role and the functions 
o f PG) Scaglione (2001) op. cit.
108 In Italian a crime report is called notizia di reato. This literally means crime notice.
109 Voena (2003) op. cit. pp. 88-90.
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belonging to each of these three police forces can be polizia giudiziaria (art. 57 
cpp).110 The main distinction (not particularly relevant here) between these police 
forces concerns the way they are organized (and their uniforms!). They have different 
hierarchical superiors which determine their promotions, transfers, disciplinary 
matters etc. However, the same legal rules apply to all of them. So, there are no legal 
differences with regards to the relationship with prosecutors during the pre-trial phase.
During the investigation prosecutors have a right to determine the activities 
that the police have to carry out. This has a legal basis: pubblici ministeri have power 
to direct the investigation and the police during the investigation (art. 56 and 327 
cpp).111 This is the basic principle informing the relationship with the police at this 
stage of the proceedings. However, there are still some legal rules we need to clarify. 
First, the PG may carry out investigative acts on its own initiative from the moment 
they receive notification of a crime to the moment the prosecutor begins to direct the 
investigation (art. 55 and 348 cpp.). Second, the police can perform investigative acts 
under prosecutors’ delegated authority (art. 370 cpp. the so called delega12). Third, 
prosecutors can directly carry out investigative acts (art. 370 para. 1 cpp.). Fourth, the
113PG have the duty to communicate to prosecutors ‘without delay’ (immediately in 
some situations) the crime reports they discover (art. 347 para. 1 cpp, see later). 
Finally, even if prosecutors start to direct the investigation, the police still retain some 
powers to take discretionary decisions about the investigative acts to perform (art. 348 
para. 3 cpp.).
Moreover, when the police arrest someone they must immediately inform the 
prosecutor who can decide to set free the arrested person immediately or to ask,
110 PG can also be, for example, the majors o f  places where there are not police forces offices, the 
guardie foresta ll (state guards controlling forests and, in general, protecting wildlife) etc. However, 
these do not normally play a major part in the investigation. Anyway, they do not have a special status. 
So, the same legal rules apply for these as for the other PG officers.
111 For comparative purposes it is interesting to note the similarities between the Italian and the Scottish 
system. In Scotland the investigator is subordinate to the procurator fiscal (White R. M. “Investigators 
and Prosecutors or, Desperately Seeking Scotland: Re-formulation o f  the 'Philips Principle ”’. 2006. 
The Modern Law Review. Vol. 69 N. 2. pp. 143-182. p. 145). To describe prosecutors’ role during the 
pre-trial phase in Italy we could borrow White’s conclusion that in Scotland, unlike England and 
Wales, the prosecutor is the climax o f  the investigation and not a final hurdle ( White (2006) op. cit. p. 
182).
The delega is very similar to the French commission rogatoire. When prosecutors issue a delega  it 
means that they delegated to the police the authority to perform investigative acts (a delega  is, o f  
course, not necessary when police officers retain autonomous powers to investigate, see above).
Ih The original version o f  this article was saying “within 48 hours” and not “without delay”. This was 
amended in 1992 (see chap. 8).
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within 48 hours, the judge to confirm that the arrest was lawful and necessary. The 
decision to arrest is the police’s right (although in some circumstances the arrest is 
compulsory) (art. 379-391 cpp). But the point is that, whenever there is an arrest, 
prosecutors must be immediately involved and they have to treat the case 
immediately. If they do not do this the arrested person(s) will be set free.
So, prosecutors direct the police during the investigation. But the degree of 
functional and organizational dependence on PG may vary depending on the type of 
police officer.114 Here we need to distinguish between the terms sezioni and servizi. 
The sezioni113 of PG are immediately and directly dependent on prosecutors.116 This 
means that prosecutors can use these police officers without the prior intervention of 
police hierarchical superiors.117 The number of allocated PG officers should be, at 
least, double the number of prosecutors in the prosecution office to which the sezione 
is attached. So, in practice, there should be at least two police officers for each 
pubblico ministero (art. 6 disp. att.). Moreover, the officers working in the sezioni can 
only be removed from their (investigative) functions following a decision by the chief 
prosecutor (art. 59 para. 1 and 3 cpp). Police officers belonging to the sezioni 
exclusively carry out investigative functions (i. e. they never work as polizia
/  7 O t
cimministrativa). The servizi of PG also mainly (but not exclusively) deal with 
investigations. However, the degree of organizational and hierarchical dependence 
upon prosecutors is substantially reduced compared to the sezioni. Nevertheless, the 
police officers who direct the local servizi are responsible to chief prosecutors for the 
correct and efficient organization of the servizi (i. e. of the investigative activities they 
carry out, art. 59 para. 2 cpp). Moreover, chief prosecutors (and the prosecutor general 
attached at the court of appeal) retain some rights concerning appointments, transfers 
and promotions of police officers working in the servizi (art. 12, 14 par. 1 and 2 and 
15 para. 2 disp. att.). The servizi only become functionally dependent on pubblici 
ministeri when they are involved in an investigation.119 So, the difference between 
servizi and sezioni stems from the different degree of dependence that the PG have on
114 For a general discussion about functional and organizational dependence o f  PG’s officers see, for 
example, Voena (2003) op. cit. pp. 84-90.
113 This literally means sections.
116 Voena (2003) op. cit. pp. 86-87.
117 Ibid. p. 87 and 89.
'18 This literally means services.
119 Voena (2003) op. cit. pp. 84-90.
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prosecutors. As Voena said, prosecutors can directly use the sezioni, there is no ‘filter’ 
from police officers’ hierarchical superiors.120 But prosecutors have to ask if servizi 
can be made available for the investigation. In practice, if the investigation is or 
becomes complicated (e. g. involve many accused persons, certain difficult 
investigative acts have to carried out etc.) pubblici ministeri will have to contact the 
servizi. The reasons are both quantitative and qualitative. In fact, the servizi comprise 
a much higher number of police officers than the sezioni. They also include some 
specialized units like, for example, those dealing with organized crime.121 So, the 
servizi become essential every time certain complicated cases have to be investigated. 
Finally, there are the other police officers who carry out functions of polizia 
gindiziciria. In relation to these police officers prosecutors’ functional and 
organizational superiority is extremely limited.
The last important issue we want to discuss here concerns disciplinary matters. 
The main point is that prosecutors are involved in disciplinary proceedings but they 
can not impose disciplinary sanctions of their own initiative. On the contrary police 
hierarchical superiors have the power to determine these measures (for both servizi 
and sezioni). This shows, once again, the limits of police dependence on prosecutors. 
Art. 16 disp. att. defines the behaviours which can lead to disciplinary proceedings (e. 
g. when police officers omit to carry out activities ordered by judges or prosecutors). 
Moreover, the same provisions set out the sanctions. These can be quite strong: e. g. 
police officers can be suspended from their functions, those working in the sezioni can 
be removed. Finally, art. 17 and 18 disp. att. set out the procedure for disciplinary 
matters. This is initiated by the prosecutor general attached at the court of appeal 
(competent for the area where the accused police officer(s) works) and then the 
accusation will be discussed before a panel (composed by judges and high ranked 
police officers). However, as we said, this does not automatically trigger (or block) 
any internal disciplinary police proceedings). Prosecutors have no power in this sense.
If this is the legal framework, what is the real nature of prosecutors’ powers 
during the investigation? We want to understand the criteria which determine the way 
cases are supervised in practice. In other words: what are the methods of supervision?
120 Ibid. p. 87.
121 Ibid. pp. 85-86.
1-2 Ibid. p. 87. For sezioni, servizi and other PG officers see art. 56-59 cpp.
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This may provide a better description of the police-prosecutor relationship during the
investigation. However, this is not just a matter of methods of supervision (i. e.
directing the investigation). We must also examine the way the police interact with
prosecutors when they have to define their priorities. Goldstein and Marcus, when
they discussed the real extent o f the legality principle, concluded that prosecutors are
“relatively passive” and they rely completely on the information reported by the
police. The authors underlined the problems related to the application of specific legal
provisions (i. e. the legality principle). However, they leave a number of questions
unanswered. They say that prosecutors are passive, but they do not adequately explain
the nature and significance of this passivity. Moreover, they underline that the trial
dossier is based on investigative acts performed by the police and that the prosecutor
1
makes only a limited contribution to that. The authors do not explain how this 
happens (e. g. through the delegation of all/part of the investigation to the police? 
Through informal agreements? And does the prosecutor make a contribution when the 
file has been prepared (e. g. revising/acting upon police reports on investigation? 
Asking for extra investigations?). These issues need to be discussed for two reasons. 
First, this is important to understand the nature o f prosecutors’ professional culture 
(are they law-enforcers or a sort of barrister who deals with the trial (i. e. bringing 
police’s work to the courtrooms)?). Second, if we know the intensity of prosecutors’ 
interventions during the investigation, we can understand how much control they have 
on the information they receive.
123 Goldstein and Marcus (1977) op. cit. p. 280.
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CHAPTER V. IMAGES OF CRIME AND IMAGES 
OF PROSECUTORS: THE DOMINANT 
POLITICAL CULTURES
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1. Introduction
In the previous chapter we outlined some of the legal rules (those which are relevant 
for this thesis) which shape prosecutors’ working environment. In this section we will 
focus on other elements which are not legal in nature, but which can still influence the 
way prosecutors take decisions. These are neither logistical nor institutional, but could 
be very influential when the prosecutor takes ‘gate keeping’ decisions. We will divide 
this chapter in two parts. First, we will list and explain the images of crime found 
within dominant political cultures (i. e. the state, the public and the media). These are 
external influences that might affect prosecutors when they define the crime problem. 
Second, we will discuss the image of prosecutors’ professional culture. We will focus 
on the socio-political elements which shape this image. Moreover, and more 
important, we will outline the differences between different images of prosecutors’ 
function and role.
2. Images of crime and the crime problem: the media
There are many factors to be taken into account to understand the Italian media, for 
example, the Catholic cultural tradition or the strong influence of Communism in 
Italy.1 However, here we will not focus on these general issues. Here we want to 
describe how media represent crime in Italy.
In Italy, radio, television and newspapers are, generally speaking, politically 
orientated. This means that it is possible, from the reports provided, the questions 
asked and the people interviewed, to identify the political approach (mainly related to 
the political division between centre right and centre left). Furthermore, commentaries 
are very important within the Italian media and generally they have a political 
connotation. The majority of the media (particularly TV) try (very badly) to hide their 
political flavour, but it is clear that there is no real neutrality in them performing of 
their functions (this is true for state television as well). More precisely, the first two 
channels of state television are traditionally close to the government (whether right, 
left or centre), while the third supports the left (in the past the communists). The three
1 See, for example, Nelken D. ‘‘Telling Difference: o f  crime and criminal ju stice in Italy”. In Nelken D. 
eds. “Contrasting Criminal Justice”. 2000. Aldershot: Ashgate. pp. 252-253.
57
private channels, belonging to Berlusconi, do not support the centre-right coalition, 
but only Forza Italia (Berlusconi’s political party). There is another TV channel 
called La 7. This can not be referred as partial. But it is probably true to say that it is 
closer to the centre-left. Amongst the most important newspapers (excluding those 
which belong to political parties) there are similar distinctions. For example, the 
Corriere della Sera is considered impartial (in the past closer to the centre-left, now to 
the centre-right), while La Repubblica is seen as supporting the centre-left. Moreover, 
there is a newspaper, called II Giornale, which belongs to Berlusconi, which, like the 
TV channels, does not support the centre-right generally, but specifically Forza Italia. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that in Italy there are no tabloids. All the newspapers 
are similar, for example, to The Times or The Guardian. Even these quality 
newspapers are more tabloid than Italian ones, though the differences are normally not 
substantial. Thus, although Italian newspapers tend to underline the emotional side of 
crime stories and to personalize the news2 (e. g. where does the criminal live? Is 
he/she rich? How is his/her family?), sensationalism is less important compared to a 
tabloid.
These are the general characteristics, but is crime important for the media? 
Crime news is always an important issue for the Italian media. This includes not just 
news directly related to a particular crime, but inquiries about causes and solutions for 
crime problems. Inquiries about justice and its problems seem to be important as well. 
For example, in 2002 the six most important TV news, monitored during the prime 
time edition, dedicated about 18% of their time to crime and justice news.3 For 
example, sport and labour issues, which are very sensitive topics for the typical 
Italian, took up 8.4 % and 3.7%.
How crime is presented in the Italian media? Of course stories are important. 
In Italy there is a category called cronaca nera (black chronicle) which implies a 
detailed examination of the facts and of the people involved in a crime, with particular 
emphasis on the investigation and on brutal details. Moreover, some criminal 
processes are followed step by step. This happens, when Berlusconi or other 
important members of the society (bankers, politicians, entrepreneurs etc.) are
2 Ibid.
J Osservatorio di Pavia. “L ’agenda dei telegiornali del prim e time nel 2002” [Online]. 2005. Available 
at: http://www.osservatorio.it/cares visual 1 .php?R=rOK [Accessed: 20/09/2005].
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involved or when the crime is particularly emotional (e. g. the victim is a child). In 
these cases, particular emphasis is put on the argument of the parties and on the 
judge’s decisions (including decisions taken by the GIP and the GUP). In fact, the 
main newspapers mainly rely on the reports of prosecutors and judges during the 
investigations,4 while in the UK the police are more important as ‘primary definers’.3 
When the case is not so important the process is not followed step by step, but still 
information coming from judges and prosecutors is very important to shape the news.
What are the sources that the Italian media use? At the first glance the primary 
definers seem to be the legal actors. In Italy reports of judges and prosecutors during 
the investigations represent “the major source of empirical information about crime”.6 
Police officers speak about the investigation they undertook, but, unlike in Britain, 
they do not deal with the crime problem. On the other hand, prosecutors are 
interviewed to explain the characteristics of the crime as such and to give opinions 
about the problems of justice. Thus, the visibility of prosecutors in the media is a 
distinctive characteristic of the Italian case (particularly in comparison with the CPS). 
One of the conclusions drawn in the 2002 analysis of the crime news in the major 
Italian TV news was that “media give a lot of visibility to legal actors”.7 However,
Q
other organizations may be involved as primary definers. This happens when legal 
actors (mainly the police) appear not to have behaved correctly (e. g. abuse of power) 
or a crime problem related to a specific area is discussed (e. g. mafia crimes in Sicily). 
Moreover, media give importance to all the documents concerning investigation 
which become public (everyone can have a copy, included telephone tapping). But 
journalists (at least some of them) have access to many other sources of information 
(which, sometimes, should be secret) which could come from the prosecutor’s office
4 Nelken (2000) op. cit. pp. 242-243.
3 See, for example, Reiner R. '‘''Media-made criminality: the representation o f  crime in the mass 
media”. In Maguire M., Morgan R. and Reiner R. “The Oxford Handbook o f  Criminology”. 2007. 4 th 
ed. Oxford University Press, p. 325. See also, Hall S., Critcher C., Jefferson T., Clarke J., Roberts B. 
“Policing the Crisis: Mugging the State and Law and Order”. 1977. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
6 Nelken (2000) op. cit. pp. 242-243.
7 Osservatorio di Pavia. “Rappresentazione della giustizia e sua tematizzazione in un anno di 
te leg iorn a ir. [Online]. 2005a. Available at:
http://www.osservatorio.it/cares visuall.php?ID=0000000Q37&pos=10&visual=:OK&num=l&pub=ar 
chivio [Accessed: 20/09/2005].
8 These could be international organizations like Amnesty International or, for example, local
organizations (eg. committees o f citizens, see later).
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compared to common law countries”.12 Until the 1990s crimes such as robbery, 
burglary and rape were referred as “micro-crimes”.13 But the situation now may be 
different. Street crime started to be an issue in the 1990s when demands for safety 
increased.14 The studies conducted have shown that Italian citizens are mainly scared 
of theft, robberies, “drugs” and muggings.15 Moreover, the first national victimization 
survey (conducted at the end of 1997 by the Italian National Institute of Statistics 
(ISTAT) and involving 50,000 families) concluded that lack of safety exists and it is 
"a serious social phenomenon”.16 The second survey made in 2002 basically 
confirmed this picture.17
The Italian media seem to reflect this evolution. For example, newspapers 
contain, almost everyday, articles about robberies, thefts and muggings. These are 
written in such a way that the risk of insecurity is easily perceivable. A good example 
concerns robberies in villas. A few years ago the newspapers (and media in general) 
reported that some villas were robbed: quickly robberies in villas became a 
“phenomenon” and it seemed that living in a villa was not safe anymore.
Is there a relationship between deviance (i. e. behaviours which may not be 
strictly criminal but which do not fit with societal standards) and crime in the Italian 
media? There seems to be. For example, the mafia is often described as the anti-state, 
to indicate that it follows rules and values that are rejected (at least formally) by the 
Italian state and society. When it comes to street crime this is even clearer. 
Immigrants are assumed to be, most of the time, the perpetrators of these crimes. 
Some authors have agreed that “in the same way in which foreigners have replaced 
Italians at the lower end of the legal job scale, so they seem to have replaced Italians
• 1Rat the lower end of illicit traffics”. Media tend to reflect this scenario. In particular,
12 N e lken  D. “Italy: A lesson in tolerance?”. In Muncie J. and Goldson B. eds. “Com parative Youth 
Justice: Critical Issues”. 2006. London: Sage. p. 172.
Ibid.
14 M eloss i  and Selmini (2000) op. cit. p. 151.
15 Ibid. p. 152.
IbicL
‘ Muratore G. et al. eds. “La sicurezza dei cittadini. Read, vittime, percezione della sicurezza e sistem i 
di protezione"  [Online]. 2004. ISTAT informazioni n. 18. Available at: 
http://wvvw.istat.it/dati/catalogo/20040915_00/La_sicurezza_dei_cittadini.pdf [Accessed: 8/04/08]. See 
also, Blandry A. C. and Tagliacozzo G. “La percezione della sicurezza nella zona in cui si vive”. In: 
Muratore G. et al. eds. (2004) op. cit. p. 114. It is interesting to note that, according to this survey, the 
crim es which create more fear within the Italian society are thefts at home (60,7%), followed by car 
thefts (46,2%), muggings (44,2%), robberies (43,0%) and sexual offences (36, 3%) (Blandry and 
T a g lia co zzo  (2004) op. cit. p. 113).
18 Melossi D. “In a peaceful life”. 2003. Punishment & Society. Vol. 5(4). pp. 371-397. p. 379.
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newspapers and television (especially those supporting the centre-right) often 
underline that immigrants live, as they say, on the “fringes of society”. Thus, the 
picture they portray appears clear: they do not fit into our standards and values. This 
is not (normally) the case for the huge amount of white collar crime perpetrated in the 
last few years. The media (at least the majority of them) are clear in condemning these 
crimes. However, they do not describe the perpetrators as people living on the 
“fringes of the society”, even when they have not only committed a crime but created 
a network involving many people which conducts business according to rules clearly 
rejected by society (e. g. using bank’s money as if these were their personal money).
Lastly, media agenda may be concentrated on particular types of crimes. For 
example, in 2001, after the Novi Ligure case where a young girl (minor), together 
with her boyfriend (minor as well), killed her mother and her little brother, the media 
concentrated a lot of attention on juvenile crimes and problems. Of course, these were 
issues which had concerned Italian society in the years before. However, until that 
particular crime, the media had never focused much attention on these problems.19 
Thus, the characteristics of a crime (in this case: the victims, the offenders and the
brutality of the crime), pushed the media to investigate the more general category of
20juvenile crime. These kinds of considerations could lead the media to overestimate 
or underestimate a crime problem. If a crime is overestimated this could create
99social alarm. So, the media contribute (together with other actors, see later) to the 
creation of a dominant political culture of crime. Are prosecutors influenced by this? 
Can they mediate these external influences? These are the questions that we will need 
to address.
2.1. Images of crime and the crime problem: central state and the
political class
In Italy we are witnessing a substantial change. During the 1970s and the 1980s
political parties and representative institutions concentrated on mafia and political
u Ossevatorio di Pavia. “L ’agenda dei telegiornali sulle notizie di criminalita e immigrazione: un
confronto fra  il 2000 e il 2001”. [Online]. 2005b. Available at:
http://www.osservatorio.it/download/criminalitd.pdf [Accessed 20/09/2005].
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
"  Ibid.
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terrorism crimes.23 Social alarm was linked to the fact that the state as an institution 
was threatened by these kind of crimes. In the 1990s the situation changed: mafia, 
corruption and, sometimes, political terrorism still remained important issues, but 
security started to emerge on the agenda of political forces.
In 2005, in an interview about the possibility of giving an amnesty (the 
Parliament decides),24 the former Minister of Justice (centre-right) said that he did not
9 <
agree with the idea and that the priority was the “security of citizens”. O f course this 
related to legislative choices, but it may also have been a message for legal actors. 
Moreover, the same Minister, when a goldsmith was acquitted for killing (shooting) 
two burglars, said that finally “after four years of cultural battles” (to make clear that 
victims have the right to protect themselves in any situation) victims are properly 
protected.26 Here the message is even clearer: we must protect, whatever happens, 
people who defend themselves and their properties. Another example concerns a 
murder which happened in 2005, where an illegal immigrant from Albania killed a 23 
year old Italian who was trying to break up a brawl. Again the former Minister of 
Justice was very clear, he said: “Criminality grows around the clandestine 
immigrants”.27 One day after the murder, during a manifestation of solidarity for the 
victim’s family, the former Minister of Welfare (currently the Minister of Interior) 
said: “It is now the moment for zero tolerance [with clandestine immigrants]”.28 
Finally, the importance of security issues for Italian politics can be very well 
demonstrated if we analyze the results of the 2008 elections (won by the centre-right). 
The Lega Nord (Northern League, the secessionist party, supporting the centre-right 
coalition) obtained a remarkable result (around 8-9% of the votes, but this was all 
concentrated in the north, because this is a territorial party which does not exist in the
2j Melossi and Selmini (2000) op. cit. p. 149, 150.
24 Art. 79 cost, states that the amnesty is given through an Act.
Sarzanini F. u Castelli: resto contrario lapriorita  e la sicurezza”. Corriere della Sera, 03/04/2005.
26 Di Gianvito L. “Uccise i banditi, orafo assolto. Castelli: era ora,\  Corriere della Sera, 12/03/2005.
“The cultural battles” led to an important reform which modified the self-defence law. Briefly, the law 
(art. 52 cp) provides that there must be proportionality between the offence and the defence. The 
proposed bill intended to derogate from the proportionality principle in two situations. First, when the 
victim has to defend himself or those close to him. Second, when property is seized and the offender 
does not give up and there is a risk for a person. This bill was eventually enacted with some support (or 
lack o f express criticisms) from the centre-left.
Biglia A. “Castelli: e la prova che i clandestini portano criminalita”. Corriere della Sera, 
13/06/2005.
28 Del Frate C. “ Varese, caccia agli im m igratiper vendetta”. Corriere della Sera, 14/06/2005.
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south of Italy) focusing on two issues: devolution and ‘fighting’ against immigration
29and insecurity (which is seen as deriving from immigration).
Thus, the central political image of crime is now focused on the security of 
citizens. We are still far away from the “culture of control” as it has developed in the 
Anglo-Saxon world.30 However, it is undeniable that security is an issue for the 
political class. This concerns not only the centre-right coalition. We find the first trace 
of this emerging issue in 1997 when a speech was given by Romano Prodi, who, at 
that time, was the prime minister supported by a centre-left coalition. During this 
discourse Prodi spoke about “the problem of safety in the country” and he said that 
this “seems to be no longer one of external safety, but internal safety: the safety of 
citizens in their everyday life”.31 In the end, we could say that the centre-left approach 
is similar to the left-realist perspective, while the centre right approach is more 
authoritarian (particularly from the National alliance, the post-fascist party) or 
populist (particularly the Northern League).
In Italy, law and order campaigns have had success when they have been 
politically motivated (terrorism, corruption and mafia). This means that all these 
crimes were directly (terrorism and corruption) or indirectly (politicians who were 
mafiosi as well or killed by the mafia) affecting the stability of the political world. 
Here we are witnessing a new law and order campaign. We can not say now where 
this campaign will lead, but it might be that the need for control, which has never 
been a feature of the Italian system,33 could become its distinctive characteristic in the 
future. For example, the perceived need for control is clear when immigrants are 
involved. Recent legislation provides a good example of social control targeted at a 
particular group which is seen as behaving in a particular way. The so called Bossi- 
Fini Actj4, which was passed in 2003, provides that, under certain conditions, illegal 
immigrants have to be arrested just for being illegally in Italy (see chap. 8). More
"9 The language used by this party against immigration is often characterized by a strong racism. In 
fact, for example, radio Padania Libera (the official radio o f  the Lega Nord) has once said that 
“unfortunately, it is easier to kill rats then getting rid o f  gipsies”. See Lemer G. “11 N ord del Senatur'\ 
[Online], 2008. Available at: http://www.repubblica.it/2008/04/sezioni/politica/elezioni-2008-
uno/nord-senatur/nord-senatur.html [Accessed 16/04/2008].
l0 Nelken (2006) op. cit. p. 172. 
jl Melossi and Selmini (2000) op. cit. p. 157.
J' Melossi D. “The cultural embeddedness o f  social con trol'. 2001. Theoretical Criminology. Vol. 5(4). 
pp. 403-424. p. 412.
JJ Nelken (2006) op. cit. p. 163.
j4 Bossi is the Northern League leader, Fini is the National Alliance one.
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recently the current centre-right government passed an Act (n. 125/2008, inspired by 
Maroni the Minister of Interior and one of the leaders of Lega Nord) which deals 
specifically with security and immigration. This provides, inter alia, that being an 
illegal immigrant becomes an aggravating circumstance (punishment can be increased 
up to one third) and that soldiers can be used to guarantee, together with the police, 
the security of certain areas.35 However, the Bossi-Fini Act still remains the 
fundamental piece of legislation regulating immigration in Italy.
It must be underlined that, even before the Bossi-Fini, it was the centre-left 
that enacted two pieces of legislation which revealed the perceived need for control in 
relation to immigrants. The first measure was passed in 1995 (decreto Dini) and, as
' Xf iDel Lago says, it stigmatized migrants as a “social problem”. This measure 
introduced two principles: borders have to be closed and deportation (for illegal
T7immigrants) is the answer to the ‘immigrants’ emergency. The second measure was 
the Turco-Napolitano Act (n. 40/1998, both are former communists and were 
ministers at that time, Napolitano is now the President of the Republic), which was 
the precursor for the Bossi-Fini one. This piece of legislation reinforced the idea of 
deportation as the solution to the control of illegal immigrants and created detention 
camps for those who are waiting to be deported (where immigrants are controlled for 
24 hours a day by the police).38 Moreover, at the end of 2007, following the murder of 
an Italian woman by a Romanian citizen, urgent measures were taken by the former 
centre-left government (this was mainly supported by the same coalition which was in 
power from 1996 to 2001). In particular, a decreto legge39 (D.L.) was issued 
immediately and this was (generally) based on the principle that those who may be a 
threat to the security of the state should be deported (even EU citizens, because
°  There are also other important provisions. First, deportation (in general not only for illegal 
immigrants) is now easier. Second, if  a false identity is given (this widely regards immigrants) the 
punishment goes from 3 to 6 years imprisonment. Third, local authorities (e. g. majors) w ill have more 
powers to deal with security and public order. Fourth, fake goods (like designer clothes, DVDs etc. a 
crime normally committed by immigrants who sell these products in the street) will be immediately 
destroyed.
j6 Dal Lago A. “N o n -p e r s o n e 2005. 2nd ed. Milano: Feltrinelli. p. 26.
37 Ibid. p. 27.
38 Ibid. p. 27-28.
j9 Delegated legislation enacted by the government for urgent matters. The Parliament must adopt the 
decreto as a primary piece o f  legislation within 60 days, otherwise it is declared invalid ex tunc (the 
decreto never existed). See art. 77 cost.
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Romania is now part of the EU).40 However, this piece of legislation was eventually 
quashed by the Parliament and, at the moment, it has not been replaced.
Thus, the perceived need for control appears clear; at the same time it is clear 
that these measures are targeted at a particular group. In 2005 Berlusconi, who was 
(as he is now) the prime minister, started a campaign to change the rules for telephone 
tapping.41 In particular, the centre-right coalition intended to create stricter rules for 
the use of telephone tapping during the investigation. They wanted to forbid the 
making public of transcripts (at certain stages of the criminal proceedings these 
become public, e. g. when they are used to justify a request for pre-trial control 
measure (precautionary measure). This campaign started when some of these 
documents were published by newspapers dealing with the Banca Popolare Italiana 
and Unipol cases and they involved certain politicians. Berlusconi said: “it is better to 
have a murderer free than everybody being under surveillance”.42 We know that this 
is a complicated issue and that published telephone tapping may lead to political 
consequences, even if no crime has been committed. Moreover, we do not want to 
compare different things: crimes related to immigrants are different to white collar 
crimes or corruption. However, it seems that in Italy the perceived need for control 
has not been, until now, a general characteristic of criminal justice policy, it has only 
been used in some situations.
To conclude, it appears that from the 1990s the political world has promoted 
the security of citizens as one of the main issues on its agenda. This is mainly 
concentrated on street crime and towards a particular social group: immigrants. This 
has led to increased social control and to different attempts (particularly when more 
conservative political forces are involved) to suggest street crime and immigration as 
major crime problems. However, for the purposes of this study, the question will be 
whether or not prosecutors deal with street crime and immigration as priorities.
40 Sarzanini F. ‘7 / Viminale e pronto a mediare non su ll’allontanamento d ’urgenza”. Corriere della  
Sera, 11/06/07.
41 The same campaign started again in 2008 as soon as the centre-right government was re-elected. This 
became a very important matter when some recorded telephone calls (evidence in a criminal 
proceedings for corruption brought against Berlusconi by prosecutors in Naples) where put on the net 
(by L ’Espresso, a magazine close to the centre-left). These involved Berlusconi who spoke on the 
phone (many times) with a very important manager o f the state television (Agostino Sacca). They were 
exchanging information about a senator belonging to the centre-left (the centre-right was still the 
opposition and Berlusconi wanted to convince some senators to switch coalition). Moreover, they 
discussed managerial and editorial strategies. Basically Sacca (who has now been fired) was passing 
information to Berlusconi. Berlusconi was also suggesting actresses for fictions and soap operas.
4" Martirano D. u« M e g l io  un omicida in liberta che tutti s p i a t i » ”. Corriere della Sera , 17/08/2005.
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2.2. Images of crime and the crime problem: local community
In the 1970s and 80s, when mafia and political terrorism were at the centre of the 
attention, community based reactions to crime were an exception.43 Even though at 
that time social alarm was considerable (i. e. terrorists wanted to start a civil war) 
there was a substantial difference. As Melossi and Selmini say: at that time “public 
opinion did not orient its requests towards more punishment, death penalty, and so 
on”.44 This is happening now.
Sometimes local communities want to express their view about the crime 
problem and the way criminality should be tackled. Generally speaking they do it 
through demonstrations aimed to push the forces of law and order to take specific 
measures. For example, in the eighties in Milan, people living in a specific area 
protested against prostitutes working in the streets. During some of these 
demonstrations, although nothing serious happened, the police had to intervene.45 The 
demonstrators threatened the prostitutes, the police arrived and convinced them to 
stop it. Local citizen committees may also express local opinion. These committees, 
elected in every city district to report problems and comment on developments in that 
specific area, have produced documents about crime issues. For example, (again, in 
Milan in the 1980s) the committees underlined that prostitution problems pushed 
people to ask for more control, but that the forces of law and order replied that they 
had different priorities.46 Similar situations can be found in Genoa where anti-gipsy 
committees were created and in Turin where these organizations were set up to 
complain about crime (e. g. drug trafficking, prostitution and street crime in general) 
and incivilities (e. g. homeless people, drug addicts, prostitutes etc. in general 
behaviours which are not strictly criminal) in some areas of the city centre.47 Thus, 
these committees seem to have in common the idea of order.48 The problems are not 
so much about crime, it is more a matter of disorder and incivilities. For example, a
4j Melossi and Selmini (2000) op. cit. p. 150.
44 Ibid.
43 Dal Lago (2005) op. cit. p. 87 and 90.
46 Ibid. p. 87-88.
41 Ibid. p. 76-91.
48 Melossi and Selmini (2000) op. cit. p. 159.
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leader of one committee in Modena (Emilia Romagna) said: “It’s also the way they 
behave in public places”.49
Why do local communities seem so much more involved now? The answer to 
this question may depend on different factors. Immigration may play an important 
role. People do not know these “new criminals” and feel more threatened. Moreover, 
at the beginning of the 1990s in Italy a new historical period started known as the 
second Republic. This happened following the collapse of the USSR (Italy had the 
biggest communist party in Western Europe) and tangentopoli which undermined two 
of the biggest political parties in Italy (the Socialist party and the Christian 
Democrats). During the second Republic new political issues became important. In 
particular, devolution and the federalist reform of the state have become quite 
important. Thus, there is a policy de jure50 and de facto to delegate tasks to local 
communities. This also concerns “safety” as Pier Luigi Bersani, former governor of 
the Emilia Romagna regional government, said in 1994:
“[the safety issues] are strictly and increasingly related to the new functions that Regions 
and Municipalities may assume in many fields, in the general framework o f  a federalist 
reform o f the State, which gives pre-eminence to the role o f  the Regions”.51
In Emilia Romagna this attitude led to the creation, in 1994, of a programme 
called Citta Sicure. This was “the first Italian attempt to develop a general programme 
about urban safety and crime prevention, through research, promotional activities and 
co-ordination and elaboration of new strategies for reduction of fear and crime 
prevention”.52 It is interesting to see that amongst the guidelines on which this 
programme developed there is “the mobilisation of community participation in safety 
policies and crime prevention”.
To conclude, nowadays in Italy the dominant political cultures seem to have a 
clear idea of the crime problem. One of the priorities (or the main priority) is security. 
The security of the civil society is mainly seen as threatened by street crime and 
immigration. Sometimes legal actors are said to be taking decisions which are
49 Ibid. p. 150. See also: Melossi (2003) p. 384.
50 Both the centre-right and the centre-left government have passed federalist reforms o f  the 
constitution.
Melossi and Selmini (2000) op. cit. p. 153.
Ibid. p. 154.
3J Ibid. p. 155.
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unresponsive to communities’ needs. Thus, this form of pressure exists, but what are 
the consequences, in practice, that this has on prosecutors’ decisions and on their 
professional culture (i. e. do they feel they have to respond to the claims of civil
society)?
3. Images of prosecutors: prosecutor self image and occupational
culture
Generally speaking we can say that when Italians think about prosecutors they have in 
mind great men and women fighting corruption, mafia or terrorism. Sometimes 
prosecutors themselves seem to corroborate this image. For example, Antonio Ingroia, 
a pubblico ministero working in Palermo and appointed to prosecute Marcello 
Dell’Utri (a senator), said after the accused was convicted (not yet a final conviction): 
“a dream came true, after many insults a powerful man has been judged”.54 This 
seems to be the picture of the Italian prosecutor. However, it can only be a stereotype. 
There might be several elements shaping the conception that a prosecutor has of 
himself/herself (e. g. previous experiences of life, education, cases treated etc.). Here 
we will not analyze these micro-elements. We will concentrate on one macro­
category: the prosecutor’s institutional characteristics.
We have already pointed out (see chap. 4) that the Italian constitution and the 
Italian criminal justice system provide a framework whereby prosecutors are fully 
independent as a body (governed by the CSM) and as individuals. This independence 
is constantly underlined by prosecutors who do not seem to tolerate any form of 
influence which is aimed at shaping their professional conduct (e. g. being tougher on 
particular crimes). 55 But prosecutors’ independence is not the only institutional 
characteristic. In analyzing the Italian system a question arises: are prosecutors crime 
fighters or do they tend to think and act more like judges? Prosecutors have a 
monopoly on prosecuting crime and do not have to maintain the same degree of
34 Mignosi E. “< < // sogno si e avverato dopo tanti insulti giudicato un p o t e n t e » ”. Corriere della
Sera, 12/12/2004.
^ For example, see Cavallaro F. “Castelli a Palermo, magistrati a l l ’attacco”. Corriere della Sera,
16/01/2005. Here, during a speech gave for the beginning o f the anno giudiziario, the procaratore della
Repubblica in Palermo underlined that a justice reform should not be aimed to reduce the m agistra tes
independence and the autonomy.
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detachment as judges.56 However, there is a cultural proximity between these two 
judicial actors. To become a judge or a prosecutor it is necessary to pass a public 
competition (art. 106 cost.). If the exam is passed it is necessary to do a period of 
training (uditore giudiziario) (art. 121 ord. giud.), later one will decide to become a 
judge or a prosecutor. Moreover, the recruitment status and initial training are the 
same. Both prosecutors and judges follow the same route. Thus, both judges and 
prosecutors are recruited in the same way, trained in the same way, they share the 
same status (both part of the judiciary and only subject to the CSM), receive the same 
salary, have offices in the same building and, more important, they belong to the same 
professional association (ANM, see later). The distinction begins when a candidate 
takes a decision (to become judge or prosecutor).
Cases where a magistrato during his career has exercised both functions are 
not infrequent. Di Federico calls this cultural proximity a “process of socialization”, 
and refers to the creation of “a strong sense of common belonging and of common 
destiny”.37 Further evidence of cultural proximity is provided by Di Federico’s field 
research. This concludes that there are informal communications between judges and 
prosecutors concerning the decisions the former have to take during the investigation 
(e. g. apply a precautionary measure).38 Moreover, the authors also collected evidence 
that judges tend to satisfy prosecutors’ expectations and that such a phenomenon is 
not considered as a violation of the judicial ethics.59 Di Federico supports his thesis 
with two elements. First, the exceptionally high rate with which judges decide in 
conformity with prosecutors’ requests. Second, the vast majority of the lawyers 
(1,000) questioned indicate that this is what happens in practice.60 However, Di 
Fedrico’s conclusions are not completely convincing for four reasons. First, as we 
said before (see chap. 4), prosecutors were not part of this empirical research. Second, 
it may be that prosecutors tailor their requests according to what they know they can 
get. Third, particularly during the pre-trial phase, prosecutors have an advantage over 
the defence (e. g. they begin the investigation before and the can use investigative 
means, like telephone tapping, which are precluded to the defence). This could make 
their arguments, especially before the GIP, more convincing. Fourth, Di Federico was
36 See, for example, Grande (2000) op. cit.
37 Di Federico (1998) op. cit. p. 381.
58 Ibid. p. 382.
59 . . . .
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a member of the CSM (from 2002 till 2006) supported by Forza Italia, thus not the 
most impartial judge of prosecutors. Finally, we should not forget that, before 1989, 
the Italian system was fully inquisitorial. How much of that inquisitorial attitude is 
felt by prosecutor, especially if they worked or they studied with the aim to become a 
giudice istruttore (investigating judge)?
The scenario we described above suggests that prosecutors and judges are 
extremely close. But what does it mean in practice? In other words: if prosecutors 
work like judges, what do they do? Di Fedrico underlined that the “socialization” 
between these two legal actors leads to an unequal system (mainly for accused 
persons), where judges tend to agree with prosecutors. Here we are not directly 
interested in the Italian criminal justice system as a whole. We want to explain how 
and if this “common destiny” may influence prosecutors’ professional and legal 
culture.
3.1. Images of prosecutors: public representations -  political class
In Italy the relationship between politics and prosecutors (and judges) is extremely 
complex. It has not always been like this. In the past there was no sign of the 
tremendous conflict we are witnessing now between the judiciary and part of the 
political world (i. e. the centre-right). Before, the relationship was based generally on 
reciprocal respect and strict distinction between the roles. The current situation 
represents the evolution of a political process which began with tangentopoli. This 
process is aimed at demonstrating that magistrati are inadequate for the task they have 
to carry out.
In the last fifteen years there has been a constant clash between the judiciary 
and centre-right coalition (which is currently governing Italy) and its leader 
Berlusconi. Thus, there are some politicians who accuse judges and prosecutors (the 
latter more then the former) of having undermined a political system which had been 
legitimately and democratically elected. In particular, they refer to tangentopoli. This 
was a huge anti-corruption operation (called Mani Pulite, clean hands) started in 
February 1992 (though there were beginnings in 1989) and concluded between 1997 
and 1998. It was undertaken by some prosecutors in Milan and it brought to light the
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fact that the political parties used to be financed through illegal operations. Moreover, 
part of the centre right coalition believes that the magistrati want to continue this 
“revolution”, their aim being to attack Berlusconi.61 In fact, he was and he is still 
involved in many proceedings. On the other hand, the magistrati protest that they are 
only doing their job, that they are not politically orientated and that they are not acting 
to destroy a political system in order to help the centre-left coalition. Thus, for the
politicians the problem was and is that the judiciary was and is trying to influence the
62political world; while for legal actors the problem is the opposite.
Some examples can better explain this scenario. In 2001, during a speech in 
the Senate, the former Minister of Justice Castelli (belonging to the Northern League 
coalition within the centre-right government) said that two politicians (Bossi and 
Berlusconi, who were a Minister and the Prime Minister, and now they are again) had 
more than 100 penal proceedings started against them. According to the Minister this 
meant that the judiciary wanted a “political battle”. Moreover, he said that there 
were some magistrati who wanted to overturn the results of the election through 
judicial proceedings.64 Thus, for the former Minister of Justice the situation was clear: 
the fact that some politicians are subjected to a relevant number of penal proceedings 
implies that there is, as he says, “legitimate doubt” that some magistrati are working 
for “political purposes”.65 In 2002, the same minister was even more explicit, he said 
that there were magistrati who were using their power to help the centre-left to take 
power.66 As we saw, Castelli generally mentioned the magistrati, however it is clear 
that he mainly refers to prosecutors, because it was they who investigated the 
politicians and began the proceedings toward them. More recently (just to underline 
that little has changed) Berlusconi said that he was being persecuted (not anymore 
now, he can not be prosecuted, see later).67 Moreover, a very important member of
61 For example, see Zuccolini R. “L ’ira del premier: e una persecuzione". Corriere della Sera, 
13/11/2004. Here many and important representatives (including Berlusconi) o f  the centre-right 
explicitly say that the request made by the prosecutor in Milan, Boccassini, to convict Berlusconi (he 
will be acquitted) for corruption are motivated by a political persecution.
6~ Nelken D. “Legitimate Suspicion? Berlusconi and the judges". in Segatti P. and Blondel J. eds. 
''’Italian Politics: a review ". Vol. 18. 2003. New York: Oxford: Berghahn. p. 113-114.
6j Associazione Nazionale M agistrati (ANM). “7/ Ministro della Giustizia paro le e f a t t r .  [Online]. 
2004. Assemblea Nazionale Roma Available at:
http://www.abusi.it/ordinamento/libro bianco aggiomato.pdf [Accessed 04/08/08].
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid. .
66 Ibid.
67 Fuccaro L. ‘7 / premier: persecuzione finita. E sul petrolio  critica g li arabC. Corriere della Sera, 
24/7/2008.
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National Alliance, which is supporting the current government, called the CSM a
68sewer.
The centre-right coalition not only attacked the magistrati, they also 
introduced new procedural rules which undermined the credibility o f the judiciary. 
These were formally introduced to create new guarantees for citizens. However, many 
felt that the “unconfessable aim” was to save some accused (like Berlusconi) from the 
consequences of a trial.69 For example, the law to move a trial to another court in a 
different place (i. e. remissione) on ground of legitimate suspicion was reintroduced,70 
while there already are sufficient guarantees based on two procedures: ricusazione 
and remissione. These are designed respectively to substitute potentially biased judges 
and to move the trial in a different place. Now, the (unconfessable) aim has been 
achieved. A recently enacted Act (Act n. 124/2008) provides that the Prime Minister, 
the President o f the Republic, the President of the Senate and the President o f the 
Chamber of Deputies can not be prosecuted. Criminal proceedings are suspended and 
there is a, de facto, immunity.
The judiciary in general, and prosecutors in particular, did not accept these 
attacks. In 2005, in a speech making the inauguration of the judicial year, the 
procnratore della Repubblica in Palermo said that it is not possible to have a dialogue 
with someone who believes that there is a plot behind every judicial decision which is
71not welcome. The prosecutor general in Palermo went even further. He said that we 
should hope that this year will not be remembered “as the year in which the political 
power settled the score with the judiciary”.72 Moreover, the judiciary has also 
protested against some legislative choices made by the Parliament. For example, the 
chief prosecutor Di Nicola, speaking generally about laws which do not help to 
prosecute serious crimes (e. g. the false accounting law passed by the centre-right 
government in 2001), said: “We [magistrate, including prosecutors] want to maintain 
the right to be indignant about these things”.73 Of course, politicians do not appreciate
68 Fuccaro L. “Pdl contro il Csm: e una cloaca. Mancino: basta guerre e cl amor P . Corriere della Sera, 
19/7/2008.
69 Nelken (2003) op. cit. p 113-114.
70 Basically the aim was to slow down the trial as much as possible, so that the crime is not 
prosecutable anymore because o f  limitation o f actions (i. e. prescrizione, see chap. 7).
' ' Cavallaro F. “Castelli a Palermo, magistrati a l l’attacco”. Corriere della Sera, 16/01/2005.
77 Ibid.
/J Interview given for: Report [TV program]. “D ei Reati e delle pene”. In ‘7  confronti tra Italia e USA”. 
RAI 3, 10/04/2005.
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this attitude. Again Castelli said that the CSM should think about its problems and 
should not spend time questioning the job of the Parliament.74 Two days before, the 
higher Council of the judiciary had strongly criticized a bill partially aimed at 
reducing the prescrizione of crimes (time limit for prosecution, see chap. 7). Today 
the reactions of the judiciary seem to be less strong. Criticisms of the new Acts which 
deal with security and immunity have been made. But these are surely less vehement 
(at the moment) compared to the past.
Finally, we should underline that there are political distinctions (which surely 
fed the centre-right’s image of prosecutors acting for political purposes) between 
members of the judiciary. In Italy there is an association called Associazione 
Nazionale Magistrati (national association of magistrati, ANM). This association was 
founded in 1906 and its purposes are “to protect the independence and the prestige o f 
the Magistratura and to take part in the debate within the society to put forward 
necessary reforms and to ensure a better service of justice”.75 At the moment (2008)
7 fk8284 magistrati out of 8886 are part of this association. The ANM has a central 
committee composed of 36 members. This is elected every four years using a 
proportional system. The members of this committee (as the vast majority o f the 
ANM members) belong to other association of magistrati which have different ideas 
and purposes. At the moment, o f the central committee members, 12 belong to Unitci 
per la Costituzione (united for the constitution), 10 to Magistratura Democratica 
(democratic magistratura), 1 to Magistratura Indipendente (independent 
magistratura), 5 for Movimento per la giustizia (movement for justice) and 2 to 
Articolo 3- I  Ghibellini (article 3, which is the article of the constitution where is 
stated that all the citizens are equal before the law).77 These associations seem to have 
different political flavours. For example, Magistratura Democratica is considered the 
radical association and close to the left, Magistratura Indipendente is considered to be 
close to the right and Unita per la Costituzione (Unicost) to the centre.
Political issues are not the only matter of debate and of confrontation. The 
centre right governments (both the former and the current) have underlined two other
74 Martirano D. “< < // Csm pensi a la v o r a r e » ”. Corriere della Sera, 25/02/2005.
74 Art. 2 statuto ANM. [Online]. 2008. Available at: 
http://www.associazionemagistrati.it/articolo.php?id=3#art01 [Accessed 30/06/2008].
76 Statistic available at: http:/Avww.associazionemagistrati.it/articolo.php?id=2 [Online]. [Accessed  
30/06/2008],
77 . . . .
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problems related to the prosecutors’ image. First, the judiciary has been attacked for 
its inefficiency, lack of managerial skills, incompetence and laziness. So, for 
example, judges and prosecutors were described as solely responsible for the backlog 
and slowness of the legal system.79 Second, centre-right politicians have remarked on 
the distance between legal actors’ decisions and what people need. For example, in 
2005 a Romanian gipsy was accused of having attempted to kidnap a 5 month old 
child while he was with his mother (literally she tried to take the child from the 
pushchair). The gipsy was arrested, but no decision to remand on custody was taken, 
as a consequence the accused was set free. In this case the pubblico ministero did not 
request measure (this is a necessary presupposition to apply a pre-trial measure, art. 
292 para. 1 cpp). The Minister of justice was asked to comment on the decision, he
O A
said that this was another decision which is distant from the people. Again in 2005 a 
famous prosecutor, Carlo Nordio, who was the president of the committee created by 
the centre-right government (2001-2006) to amend the criminal law code, did not ask 
the judge to confirm the arrest of an Albanian who attempted a theft and obstructed 
the officer who was trying to arrest him. He justified his decision saying that if  he 
would not have taken the decision in the case of an Italian, he should not do so for an 
immigrant.81 A senator, belonging to the Northern league, replied that the judiciary 
continued to fail to listen to the people’s needs and that it was thanks to these 
magistrati that the “new barbarians” were coming to Italy.82
To conclude, there is a particular political grouping (more conservative) which 
is attacking prosecutors in relation both to their practices (e. g. the way they apply the 
law, inefficiency etc.) as well as their motivation (i. e. decisions taken for political 
purposes). The centre-left coalition tends to criticise these attacks, but at the same 
time they do not want to be the guardian of judiciary’s independence. In particular, 
when prosecutors take controversial decisions like those we just analyzed, they tend to 
be very cautious. We must not forget that, especially when immigrants are involved, 
the centre-left has agreed that “safety of citizens” is an important issue. This is a topic 
which could be extremely important in the gaining or losing of votes. This thesis will 
not specifically focus on the relationship between politics and prosecutors. Moreover,
78 Nelken (2003) op. cit. pp. 122-123.
79 Ibid. pp. 122-125.
80 Acquarone A. “Libera la rom rapitrice. Fini: intervenga CastellF. II Giornale, 31/10/2005 .
81 Fum agalli M. “Libero dopo la rapina, bufera su Nordio”. Corriere della Sera, 02/11 /2005 .
82 Ibid.
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we did not specifically ask in the interviews about prosecutors’ opinions about the 
clash between the judiciary and the centre-right (though these were, sometimes, 
spontaneously given). However, we believe an account o f political perceptions of 
prosecutors is necessary for three reasons. First, the reader must not only know the 
legal rules, but must also understand the socio-political context within which 
prosecutors work. Second, this information may be useful to understand some of 
prosecutors’ distinctive features (e. g. the function of the legality principle). Third, it 
is clear that there is a substantial and powerful part of the central state that (like the 
media and the public) has a particular idea of prosecutors’ professional culture. This 
seems to collide with prosecutors’ self professional image. But are prosecutors, in 
practice, influenced by the image of the dominant political cultures? In other words: 
what is, in practice, prosecutors’ professional and legal culture?
3.2. Images of prosecutors: public representations -  media
The media implicitly promote a particular image of the prosecutor. For example, 
through the media the public learnt all about the prosecutors working in Milan, who 
dealt with tangentopoli and who deal with proceedings involving Berlusconi. 
Moreover, prosecutors working in Sicily, or in other areas where fighting against 
organized crime is a priority, capture a lot of attention from the media (everybody 
remembers Falcone and Borsellino). Generally speaking we can say that (particularly 
after tangentopoli) prosecutors were represented as incorruptible civil servants who 
perform difficult and dangerous functions. Prosecutors who did not behave according 
to these principles are generally referred as “bad apples”.
However, in the last ten years part of the media (particularly newspapers 
related to the centre-right political grouping) has changed its approach. Like the 
political parties associated with these media they tend to describe prosecutors (and the 
judiciary in general) as “politicizzatF  (taking decisions according to political values 
and ideas), thus as not impartial, or inefficient. Even those prosecutors who fight 
against the mafia in Sicily have been widely discredited by some media. Again this 
happened when prosecutors started to prosecute some politicians because of their link 
with organized crime. This attitude became clear when prosecutors accused and tried 
a politician, called Marcello Dell’Utri, who is very close to Berlusconi. These
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procuratori were described as inefficient, because they are not able to put down the 
"real” mafia; politicizzati because their ultimate aim was to capture Berlusconi; and 
unjust, because of the way they used the pentiti (former, mafiosi who decided to 
cooperate with judges).83 This is unusual. These prosecutors, because o f the 
dangerous job they do, have always been considered untouchable by the media. Thus, 
we can say that some newspapers (e. g. II Giornale), as well as other media, underline 
the conflict between the judiciary and the centre-right coalition. But they also take a 
clear position in favour of part of the political world, against the judiciary.
This does not happen for other newspapers. As we said the Corriere della Sera
was the first medium to give the news that Berlusconi was accused back in 1994.
However, we can not say that this newspaper has supported the prosecutors or the
politicians. For example, in the Dell’Utri case they reported the decision, how it was
difficult to take it, the political implication and, of course, the conflict between centre-
right politicians and prosecutors.84 It is difficult to call this approach “neutral”
(criticisms of the centre-right are substantial), but clearly they did not choose to
constantly support one side. More recently (since the centre-right won the elections in
2008) the Corriere della Sera seems to have changed its editorial line. It is too early
to analyze where this is going. However, criticisms of magistrati (and cases brought
against Berlusconi) have increased. Newspapers closer to the centre-left (like La
Repubblica) seem to welcome every judicial decision which hits the centre-right.
They show great respect for the judiciary and for prosecutors. For the Dell’Utri case
they were very happy to support the prosecutors’ thesis, to underline that it was not a
persecution and that the accused had real relations with the organized crime.83
Moreover, they emphasized (and always emphasize) the attacks that the government
86have made on the judiciary. However, once again, we must remark that, in general, 
they did not choose one party (the prosecutors) even if they do not believe that the 
magistrati are prosecuting these accused persons for political reasons.
8’ Jannuzzi L. “Dopo 42 pentiti trovato quello giusto”. II Giornale, 1 2 /1 2 /2 0 0 4 .
84 S ee for example: Bianconi G. “/ /  nodo del « c o n c o r s o  e s te r n o »  in un processo basato sui f a t tP . 
Corriere della Sera, 12/12/2004. Cavallaro F. ‘7 /  verdetto di Palermo: 9 anni a D e ll’UtrP. Corriere 
della Sera, 12/12/2004. M ichilli L. “Torna lo scontro tra Ipo li. La Cdl: errore giudiziario. L ’Ulivo: 
leganii inquietantP. Corriere della Sera, 12/12/2004.
83 See for example: Scalfari E. “Quando la giustizia funziona”. La Repubblica, 12/12/2004. D ’A vanzo  
G. "// mediatore di Cosa Nostra”. La Repubblica, 12/12/2004. Pecoraro A. uD e ll’Utri non sfugge: nove 
anni”. II Manifesto, 12/12/2004. See also, N elken (2003) op. cit. pp. 124-125.
86 See for example: Jerkov B. ‘7 / Polo a l l ’attacco delle toghe”.La Repubblica, 12/12/2004. Jerkov B. 
"Applausi a Milano, fischi a Palermo sui magistrati due linee in 15 ore”. La Repubblica, 12/12/2004.
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There is another issue which deserves to be treated here. The media belonging 
to the centre-right portray a picture of prosecutors as not focused on the real 
criminality problems. We have already seen (see above) that this is also exactly what 
some politicians do. Thus, these media support the thesis (mainly put forward by the 
Northern League and by National Alliance) that what people really need is not on the 
prosecutors’ agenda. What are these needs? For the media this is mainly linked to the 
“lack of safety”, normally in relation to street crimes committed by immigrants. What 
do other media do? If they are close to centre-left coalition they tend to be very 
cautious, especially if the debate concerns a controversial decision taken by a 
prosecutor (i. e. the case of the attempted kidnap in Florence, see above). They 
generally act like the centre-left politicians (see above), who, we must not forget, 
agree that security is an important issue and that their position on this point could 
determine a loss or a gain of votes. An example may better explain this scenario. The 
attempted kidnap in Florence was an issue for many elements of the mass media, but 
it was treated differently. II Giornale reported the facts and had a long article 
explaining that the former vice Prime Minister (Fini, leader of National Alliance, 
currently the President of the chambers of Deputies) protested and asked the Minister
• 527of Justice (Castelli) to intervene. Moreover, the day after there was an interview 
with Castelli who said that if an Italian had attempted to kidnap a baby he or she
o o
would still be in jail. On the other hand, La Repubblica had a different approach. 
The facts were explained and they put emphasis on Castelli’s and Fini’s reactions. 
Furthermore, once again, they underlined that the government was attacking the
on
judiciary. However, La Repubblica did not indicate if they believed that the 
prosecutor’s decision was right or wrong. This is the substantial difference compared 
to II Giornale, where the position is clear: the prosecutor was wrong.
To conclude, Italian media not only have their own image of crime, they also 
have an idea of what prosecutors should do to tackle the crime (i. e. prosecutors’ 
function). In many cases this reflects the political division between centre-right and 
centre-left. More generally, this is, as we said above, part of the images of crime and 
prosecutors of the dominant political cultures.
87 Acquarone A. “Libera la rom rapitrice. FinUintervenga CastellF. 11 Giornale, 31/10/2005.
88 Zurlo S. “< < /  rom? Ormai sono I  nuovi b a r b a r i» ' \  11 Giornale, 01/11/2005.
89 Bologni M. “Nomade scarcerata, I ’ira di CastellF. La Repubblica, 31/10/2005.
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4. Conclusion
In the last two chapters we tried to focus on some key characteristics of prosecutors’ 
working environment. These are both socio-political and legal. The point is that 
provide external influences. This means that prosecutors did not create these 
influences themselves, but they may potentially influence the way pubblici ministeri 
take decisions and their professional culture. In the next chapters we will move to the 
very core of this thesis: prosecutors. As we said (chap. 1), we will analyze their 
working environment, their professional culture, their relationship with the police and 
the way they define priorities. The images of the dominant political cultures (together 
with other external influences) will play an important part (particularly for the 
definition of priorities).
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PART II: PROSECUTORS’ WORKING
CONTEXT
80
CHAPTER VI. ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS
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1. Introduction
The academic literature dealing with organizational relations within Italian 
prosecution offices is mainly based on legal arguments rather than matters of 
organizational practice.1 In particular, the legal analysis explains the legal and 
constitutional transformation towards dispersed powers. Basically this analyzes the 
way legal provisions have shaped the relationship superior-inferior prosecutor, with a 
particular focus on the fact that there are not substantial centralized powers. It also 
explains the more recent developments of powers to determine organizational 
priorities through formal documents (i. e. ordinamento giudiziario reform). More 
generally all these authors have explained what the law says, how the law should be 
inteq3reted and it has been interpreted and have suggested what works and what does 
not work. The purpose of the current study goes beyond the legal and normative 
focus. It starts from but goes beyond the legal context and it seeks to understand not 
how organizational relations should work, but how they actually work on the ground 
and are understood by the participants.
A key argument of the academic literature is that prosecutors are not part of a
'y
hierarchical organization and are not accountable to anyone. The consequence of this 
organizational form is that prosecutors are de facto creating their own criminal policy 
despite the legality principle;3 and that Italian prosecution offices are inefficient.4 
Moreover, Vogliotti explains how the organizational relations within prosecution 
offices have gradually evolved since 1948, when the constitution came into force, till 
now. He describes the transition from a hierarchical Napoleonic model (similar to the 
French model of organization); to a system based on dispersal of power. This system 
gave to prosecutors the power to deal with cases in the way they want and, as a
1 See for example: Di Federico G. eds. “Manuale di Ordinamento Giudiziario”. 2004. Padova: 
CEDAM and Zanon N. and Biondi F. “/ /  sistem a costituzionale della m agistraturd\ 2006. Bologna: 
Zanichelli.
2 See for example: Grande E. (2000) op. cit.; Di Federico G. (1998) op. cit.; Guamieri C. (1997) op. 
cit.; Watkin T. G. “The seeds o f  revolution”. 1994. New Law Journal. Vol. 144 (6641).
’ See for example: Grande E. (2000) op. cit.; Di Federico G. (1998) op. cit.; Guamieri C. (1997) op. cit.
4 Di Federico G. (1998) op. cit.
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consequence, dramatically reduced the discretionary powers that the chief prosecutor
had/''
So, this literature emphasizes that prosecution offices are not organized on 
hierarchical relations between superior and inferior prosecutors. But what is the 
meaning, in practice, of this lack of hierarchical relations? What can prosecutors do 
and what can they not do? And, more important, if hierarchy is not an option, is there 
any other principle which informs organizational relations within prosecution offices?
If the aim is to study the relations between superior and inferior prosecutors it 
is fundamental to investigate the impact that the ordinamento giudiziario reform has 
had on this organization. This deals with many topics which concern the status and 
the career of prosecutors and judges (see chap. 4). And it (re)introduced hierarchical 
principles within the procure della Repubblica (see later). The Italian literature is 
focused very much on this reform. In particular, two issues have been discussed. First, 
some authors have concentrated on a legal analysis of how the reform should work, 
the differences with the previous regime and whether these provisions are consistent 
or not with the constitution.6 Second, some other comments have focused on the 
ideological conflicts between magistrati and the former centre-right government (see 
chap. 5). Some authors like Pepino have underlined that this reform threatens 
prosecutors’ independence. In their view this will affect the legality principle and the 
equality of citizens before the law. Moreover, they believe that this reform is another 
step in the direction of a more substantial influence for the executive over the 
judiciary. These publications are written by academics and by members of the 
judiciary as well. And the commentators appear more interested in understanding the 
concerns of prosecutors and, ultimately, what they think are the best conditions to
o
carry out their tasks. Finally, we should not forget the ideological connections of 
some authors’ views (as we should remember Di Federico’s strong political
5 Vogliotti M. “Les relations police-parquet en Italie: un equilibre menace1'. 2004. Droit et Societe, n. 
58. pp. 453-476. Clearly, this article was written in French, for a French journal. However, the author is 
an Italian academic working in Italy.
6 For example see: Menditto F. “L ’Organizzazione delle Procure nella Stagione della Controriforma". 
2006. Questione Giustizia. Vol. 6. pp. 890-908. pp. 890-908.
7 For example, see: Pepino L. “Introduzione”. 2006. Questione Giustizia. Vol. 1. pp. 53-56. pp. 53-55; 
Pepino L. “Editoriale". 2006. Questione Giustizia. Vol. 1. pp. V-V I; Santalucia G. “//  Pubblico  
Ministero”. 2006. Questione Giustizia. Vol. 1. pp. 103-118; Erbani S. “La Giustizia D iscip linary’. 
2006. Questione Giustizia. Vol. 1. pp. 128-138.
& For example see: Pepino (2006) op. cit. pp. 53-55; Pepino L. “Editoriale”. 2006b. Questione 
Giustizia. Vol. 2. pp. V-VI; Santalucia (2006) op. cit. pp. 103-118; Erbani (2006) op. cit. pp. 128-138.
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connections, see chap. 5). For example: Pepino is a prosecutor and an important 
member of Magistratura Democratica, the left wing magistratV s association (see 
chap. 5). Moreover, most of the critiques against the ordinamento giudiziario reform 
are published in a journal called Questione Giustizia, which is run by Magistratura 
Democratica (and directed by Pepino). Now, this debate is clearly important to 
understand the consequences, from a strictly legal point of view (i. e. losing 
independence), that the reform could have on the Italian criminal justice system. But 
no literature seems to deal with the consequences in practice. This is what we intend 
to do in this chapter.
Finally, when the literature turns to matters of organizational practice it tends 
(unsurprisingly) to the normative and prescriptive: it suggests how the prosecution 
office should be organized. The key elements were said to be the correct allocation of 
resources, working as a team, setting out priorities without forgetting that crimes 
considered less important (e. g. theft of a car) must not be ignored, formalizing tasks, 
flexibility and willingness to search for better procedures.9 Moreover, files should be 
allocated according to automatic and standardised methods. Within this context the 
chief still retains the power to organize the office, to co-ordinate prosecutors and to 
take back (following a formal procedure which requires to the chief to give reasons) a 
file which was previously allocated.10 However, as we said, our approach will be 
different. The key question is: how are prosecution offices organized in practice? 
Why? What are the consequences? And what are the conclusions we can reach (in 
terms of prosecutors’ legal culture)?
To answer these questions we will examine prosecutors’ legal independence in 
operation. We chose the focus on independence for two reasons. First, because the 
legal rules state that independence is the fundamental principle on which the 
magistratura (not only prosecutors) is organized (see chap. 4 and see later). Second, 
because our research shows that this concept shapes the way prosecutors see the 
significance of legal rules. However, the practical application of independence is only
9 Zagrebelsky V. “I  ’organizzazione del lavoro: esame delle notizie di reato, i flussi di lavoro e le 
sezioni specializzate,\  1995. in “Corso di aggiornamento sulle tecniche d ’indagine 'Paolo 
Borsellinon\  Vol. I: “Attivita e organizzazione del pubblico ministero Reati contro la pubblica  
amministrazione Reati contro ilpartim onio la fedepubbblica  e I ’economia”. In Quaderni del C onsiglio  
Superiore della Magistratura n. 78. pp. 17-45. pp. 17-23.
10 Ibid. pp. 28-29.
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part of the construction of our argument. In fact, we intend to start from the operation 
of the legal rules to understand prosecutors’ legal culture. It is at this point that we 
will introduce our analysis on the ordinamento giudiziario reform, which appears to 
be a clear example in which, even if legal rules have changed, legal culture has 
remained the same. Subsequently, we will concentrate on the consequences that this 
system has for the organization of the prosecution office. At this point, we will 
analyze the way superior prosecutors organize the procure and set out the strategies 
and principles which shape prosecutors’ working environment. Of course we will not 
forget prosecutors’ independence which, in the end, appears to be the pillar that 
supports other organizational principles.
2. Operation of legal independence: file allocation and specialized
units
The file allocation system and the way specialized units are formed are the two first 
examples of the way independence operates within prosecution offices. We will treat 
them together, because the file allocation system changes depending if there are 
specialized units or not.
In Italy the CSM regularly produces documents on the organization of courts
and prosecution offices.11 These are not detailed directives, but they state general
principles to be followed. In particular, when it comes to file allocation, the circular
provides that although the chief is responsible for this task, the system must be based
1 0on predetermined criteria which limit chiefs’ discretionary powers .
In practice, files can be allocated in two different ways, depending on whether the 
prosecution office has specialized units of prosecutors dealing with specific crimes. 
These units, o f course, can only be formed in medium-large or large prosecution 
offices (normally when there are at least 7/8 prosecutors).
There are two main patterns: turno posta (or turno interno) 13 and turno 
reperibilita (or turno esterno)14. Under the turno posta , for a fixed period (which,
11 For our purposes the most important documents are the circulars on the organization o f  uffici 
giudiziari (courts and prosecution offices) which are enacted every two years.
12 CSM. Circolare n. P-27060 enacted Dec. 19th 2005. Capo IX. points 65.1 and 65.2. This document is 
about the organization o f  uffici giudiziari for the years 2006/2007.
13 This means: “internal mail turn”. It is called like this because files move within the prosecution 
office as a sort o f  internal mail.
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normally, goes from a few days to one week repeated during the year), a particular 
prosecutor takes all the files which arrive. In practice, during that fixed period, all the 
crime reports which arrive from private citizens (and their lawyers), the police and, 
occasionally from prosecutors who decide to start an investigation, go to the 
prosecutors taking the turno posta. These will read the crime reports and they will set 
up the files (even if they only want to drop the case). Under the turno reperibilita 
cases are again allocated to each prosecutor for a fixed period, but the aim of this 
pattern is to designate a prosecutor who deals immediately with emergencies. There is 
not a fixed list of emergencies. A good example is the arrest procedure (see chap. 4): 
the police need a prosecutor to review and validate their arrests, and this has to be 
done as soon as possible. Another case concerns seizures, which need to be authorized 
by a prosecutor. Prosecutors’ authorization is also needed to move a dead body (i. e. 
when there has been murder or manslaughter). The turno reperibilita is aimed at 
dealing with emergencies and not necessarily with priorities (at least not necessarily 
with personal priorities, see chap. 9). So, for example, if the police come across a 
crime report that they consider very important, they will not send it to the prosecutor 
taking the turno reperibilita (unless there is an emergency). However the police will 
usually try to make clear that the case is a priority by, for example, writing it down on 
the papers attached to the crime report (see chap. 8). In some prosecution offices 
turno posta and turno reperibilita coincide, so there are one (or more) prosecutors 
doing both at the same time. This is the way files are allocated in small prosecution 
offices where there are no specialized units.
When there are specialized units the system works in a slightly different way. 
The turno posta  and the turno reperibilita still exist, but when a case concerns a 
specialized matter, this is sent to the specialized group. So, prosecutors who are doing 
the turno posta read the file and either deal with it or they pass it to the specialized 
group. Prosecutors who are doing the turno reperibilita deal with the emergency and 
then they pass the case to the specialized group. If the crime does not fall in a 
specialized group, and the turns coincide, they will deal with the case, otherwise they 
will pass it to the prosecutor(s) who are taking the turno posta.
So, the general criteria on which the file allocation system is based are 
twofold: rotated distribution of files and specialization. Chiefs and deputy chiefs do
14 This means “emergency turn”. It is called like this because there is a duty prosecutor(s) who takes all 
the emergencies.
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not always take a turn. It depends very much on the organizational form they want to 
give to the office. For example, in a small prosecution office in the north (maximum 5 
prosecutors), the chief takes the turno posta but not the turno reperibilita. On the 
other hand, in a big prosecution office in the north, only deputy chiefs do the turno 
posta, but this does not mean that they deal with all the cases. They read the files, 
divide those which have to go to specialized units, and then they allocate (equally) the 
remaining cases to assistant prosecutors.
The CSM allows exceptions to the “predetermined criteria” which govern file 
allocation. Once again the principle on which this exception is based is very broad. In 
particular, the chief can directly allocate a file when a prosecutor with specific 
knowledge is required.15 However, such an action must be clearly motivated in 
writing.16 This exception gives substantial power to the chief, at least when difficult 
cases have to be allocated. However, interviewed prosecutors never mentioned cases 
in which a file was directly allocated by the chief (later we will see that they believe 
this will not happen under the ordinamento giudiziario reform either). Only one 
lawyer said something like that:
My experience as an external observer, who has had continuous relations [with the 
prosecution office], [tells me] that the ch ief plays a role when files have to be allocated.
There is a sort o f automatic system that a prosecution office can use: it is a kind o f  
distribution based on objective criteria [ ...]  However, this is not a rigid system, because 
there are cases which are more important. Maybe this is because the cases relate to a 
particular topic [and/or] because there are some assistant prosecutors who specialize in 
that topic [ . . . ] S o ,  leaving aside the ordinamento giudiziario reform ,the chief has 
already now a substantial power to deal with file allocation, because he has the last word. 
However, it is true that, particularly in small prosecution offices, where the relationship 
between prosecutors is depersonalized, because there are not many prosecutors, these 
choices are the result o f a co-operation between prosecutors. I mean: it is difficult for an 
imposition or an avocazione17 to be in contradiction with the internal rules18 that the 
prosecution office has.19
15 CSM. Circolare n. P-27060 enacted Dec. 19th 2005. Capo IX. Point 65.3.
16 Ibid.
17 This is the formal procedure to take back a case which was previously allocated to a prosecutor (see 
chap. 4).
18 The internal rules dealing with file allocation. This is basically what we just explained: turno p o sta , 
turno reperibilita  and specialized units.
I9L(N 18).
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This lawyer works in a small prosecution office (between 3 to 5 prosecutors) 
and it could be that the chief has more power to control file allocation. However, he is 
not saying that the chief is directly allocating files. He talks about decisions which are 
based on “co-operation between prosecutors”. This means that decisions are taken 
collectively, rather than by hierarchical imposition (see later).
There are two other exceptions to these basic principles on file allocation, 
which are not codified anywhere, but which appear to be important. First, if some 
prosecutors are dealing with particularly important and difficult cases (i. e. organized 
crime, white collar crimes involving huge companies etc.), they are temporarily 
exempted from the ‘turns’. In particular, one lawyer, working in a big city in the north 
of Italy, told us that these prosecutors are considered “important” and they do, at the
9 0very least, fewer turns than the others. This was confirmed by a prosecutor who
91referred to white collar crimes in general, and to one very famous case in particular. 
The second exception concerns file allocation itself. This was explained by a lawyer 
and by one very high ranking police officer who had experience in many prosecution 
offices all over Italy.22 They said that police officers tend to work with the same 
prosecutors. Thus, when they have a crime report, they tend to wait until they know 
that the automatic system will mean that the file goes to the prosecutor with whom 
they want to work.
Turning to specialized units, the CSM indicates two criteria that the chief 
needs to follow in order to set up these groups. First, the commitment of prosecutors 
to deal with specific crimes must be taken into account. This has to be assessed on the 
basis of what they have dealt with in the past and on unspecified other elements which 
have to be objective and verifiable. Second, seniority, which means that the more one 
has worked as a magistrato and/or as prosecutor the more one will have the
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opportunity to join one’s preferred specialized unit. A chief prosecutor working in a 
big prosecution office in the south confirmed that seniority is a very important 
criterion.24 In fact, he has introduced a formal procedure so that, when there is a place
20 L(N21). Similar opinions were expressed by AP(N28) and by A P(N 11).
21 AP(N28).
*  L(N21) and Pol(N34).
CSM. Circolare n. P-27060 enacted Dec. 19th 2005. Capo IX. Point 64.5. On the importance o f  these 
principles see also Borgna P. and Maddalena M. “//  giudice e Isu o i limit?’. 2003. Bari: Laterza. P. 119. 
See also Vladimiro Zagrebelsky (1995) op. cit. p. 29.
24 CP(S4). See also CP(N43).
to allocate in a specialized unit, those who are interested send a sort of CV and the
chief will look at it taking into account seniority as the primary criterion. Other
prosecutors underlined that specific knowledge (including specific studies) and/or
commitment are necessary.25 Only one said that she chose that specialization because
26it was the only available place, but she added that she was happy to do it.
These considerations seem to confirm that the criteria indicated by the CSM 
are, in practice, important. However, we still do not know anything about the 
mechanism for taking these decisions. The CSM leaves this responsibility to the chief 
prosecutor,27 but our research shows a more complicated system. The usual answer 
we had was that the decision to form specialized units came from the chief (and 
deputy chiefs) and then all prosecutors participated in the final decision and had the 
chance to express their preferences. However, the clearest explanation on how these 
decisions were taken was given by one prosecutor with more than 15 years of 
experience who said:
Specializations change every two, three years, because you can not do always the same 
thing. However, some continue with the same specialization, for example: I have always 
been part o f  the group dealing with industrial accidents [in general this deals with 
companies which do not comply with certain standards o f  industrial security] and I 
changed my second group29 three times [ ...]  Anyway, the ch ief does not decide on his 
own. 1 think he takes into account the preferences and the commitment o f  the prosecutor, 
like, for example, for sexual offences [ .. .]  We can say that there is a congruence between 
what the assistant prosecutors want and the c h ie fs  evaluations. I chose the last 
specialization [environmental crimes], I chose it and I wanted it.30
She explains a system where not only all prosecutors participate in the final 
decision to create and/or to join a specialized group; some of them can choose the 
specialization they like more and decide what and when to change. This is particularly 
interesting because the CSM states that there must be a turnover so that prosecutors
25 AP(C47). See also, for example, AP(N45), CP(N43) and AP(N28).
26 AP(N28).
27 CSM. Circolare n. P-27060 enacted Dec. 19th 2005. Capo IX. Point 64.5.
28 See, for example, CP(S4), L(N24), AP(N38), AP(N39), AP(N41) and CP(N40).
29 If prosecution offices are medium size (around 8-10 prosecutors) all prosecutors are part o f  different 
groups (normally 2, sometimes 3), because otherwise specialized units are formed only by one 
prosecutor.
30 AP(N38).
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can specialize in different topics.31 This system should be based on a fixed rotation 
period, but this is not what seems to happen. Another prosecutor said:
I joined this group because I knew there were some places. This is because the trend is to 
have groups with the same number o f  prosecutors [...]  I would have chosen it anyway 
because I like it [ ...]  They try to satisfy prosecutors’ preferences. However, there are 
some groups which are considered more prestigious, like public administration [crimes 
against public administration, in particular corruption] and white collar crimes.32 It is 
more difficult to go there, because no one wants to leave and there are no places. The 
rule [the CSM circular] says that no one should stay in the same group for more than ten 
years, but it is not very much respected.33
This quotation came from a prosecutor working in a big prosecution office in 
the north, while the earlier quotation came from a prosecutor working in a medium- 
size procura. However, both the systems described are based on two principles. First, 
the chief does not unilaterally decide how specialized units are formed and who will 
be part of it. Second, the decision to change specialization is mainly left to 
prosecutors.
Finally we need to add that within the units files are allocated to prosecutors, 
following, for example, criteria like the first letter of the accused person’s name (i. e. 
prosecutor X does from letter A to letter M)34. This seems a logical consequence of 
the fact that the file allocation system in general must be based on “predetermined
criteria”.
2.1. Operation of legal independence: absence of mandatory
priorities
Chief prosecutors write internal documents about many topics. Some of these indicate 
the cases which should be prioritized. Here we want to explain that these do not seem 
to be binding directives but persuasive guidelines.
jl CSM. Circolare n. P-27060 enacted Dec. 19th 2005. Capo IX. Point 64.1 and 64.7.
j2 The implications that this can have on crime priorities will be discussed later (see chap. 9).
J3 AP(N28).
'4 On this particular point see AP(C46). For other examples o f  “predetermined” criteria see AP(N28), 
AP(N38) and AP(C54).
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The first and most famous directive was issued in 1990 by the chief prosecutor 
in Turin Vladimiro Zagrebelsky and then later amended. This was based on a mix of 
specific criteria, partly determined by the law, (i. e. whether the accused is in pre-trial 
custody, recidivism etc.) and partly general criteria which nevertheless left to the 
single prosecutor a substantial amount o f discretion (i. e. assessing the in abstracto 
seriousness of the offence). But, some of the priorities were also linked to the relevant 
penal issues of the moment (i. e. environmental crimes).35 Turin is not the only place 
where internal documents on priorities have been generated.
We conducted interviews in a medium size prosecution office in the north,
36where the chief introduced a circular similar to the one introduced in Turin. 
Specifically, the chief said that every prosecutor must treat the following as priorities:
1) Crimes which have to be judged by the corte di assise by thQtribunale 
co/legiale [composed by a panel o f  three judges], because punishments are 
more severe and, as a consequence, there is a greater disvalore3*.
2) Crimes which have to be judged by the giudice monocratico  [a single judge]
and for which the udienza prelim inare  [preliminary hearing, see chap. 4] is 
required^9.
3) Crimes which offend common goods and common interests.40
4) Top priorities must be: accused people who are in detention; investigation
developments which could require pre-trial custody (for example, when there is
a robbery and you catch one accused who starts to speak about other people 
who participated in the robbery, so you have to try to understand what happened 
without waiting four months); if  delay may cause problems in gathering 
evidence or understanding what happened (for example, if  you have to do the 
incidente probatorio41, you have to do it immediately); seriousness o f  the crime; 
victim’s interest.42
For a more detailed analysis see, for example, Vogliotti (2004) op. cit. p. 469.
’6 We interviewed prosecutors in 10 different sites. We found only two cases in which there was a 
detailed set o f  priorities: one is Turin (see later in this section) and the other one is this case we are 
treating now.
7 The corte di assise deals with the most serious criminal offences and is the only court in Italy 
(excluding youth crimes) in which there is a jury o f laymen (directed by a professional judge) who 
acquits or convicts.
jS In this case the word disvalore means that the crime is considered by the legal system as particularly 
serious. As a consequence punishments are more severe.
j9 Some crimes which are considered less serious (for example those for which the punishment can not 
exceed four years imprisonment) can be directly sent to trial, without the preliminary hearing. See art. 
550 para. 1 cpp. For a more detailed explanation see, for example, Marzaduri E. “Procedimento 
davanti aI tribunale in composizione m onocratica”. In Conso et al eds. (2003) op. cit.
40 These include all the interests o f  the people in general (i. e. environmental crimes), rather than those 
related to a specific individuals or groups.
41 The incidente probatorio  is a procedure which, de facto, anticipates the trial. This is done when there 
is a risk that an evidence will be lost (i. e. the witness is dying). The parties discuss the evidence in
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Crimes included in point one are not necessary the first priority. These are not 
priorities placed in ranking order. Only in point 4 there are stricter criteria (the 
document says: “top priorities”). However, we need to understand the impact that 
such documents can have when prosecutors establish their priorities. We interviewed 
assistant prosecutors in the site where this document was produced. They were all 
aware that common priorities had been established,43 but it seemed that everyone 
chose between following these principles and other, personal, principles. In fact, one 
said:
We can say that if  the crime is the same and if  the victim has suffered a similar damage, 
one prioritizes those crimes who can be rapidly dealt with, those which do not need a 
long and difficult investigation to carry out [ ...]  However, it is clear that murder or 
manslaughter are always a priority, but when there are so many cases, if  you have to 
choose between cases which have the same conditions, you choose that crime which can 
be dealt with in a short time or with accelerated proceedings,44 so that it is one case less 
to deal with.45
Another assistant prosecutor had a different view:
There are priority criteria determined by the chief. But, these are very general, everyone 
is free to make his/her own decisions. But, we all determine our priorities depending on 
the urgency.46
Then he explained that, at the moment, illegal immigration was considered an 
urgent matter, but not a priority (or at least not a personal priority, see chap. 9).
Finally, the most experienced assistant prosecutor we interviewed in this 
prosecution office said:
We have some common rules. Accused persons in custody are the priority, but this is 
clear: if somebody has been caught red handed and arrested you have to hurry up, 
because if you do not he can go out,47 and this is not good for a prosecutor. However,
front o f a judge, everything is recorded and will be used during the trial. See art. 392-404 cpp. For a 
more detailed explanation see, for example, Scaparone (2003) op. cit. pp. 502-508.
42 CP(N40).
43 AP(N38), AP(N39), AP(N41) and AP(N42).
44 For example, plea bargaining. These fast proceedings are designed in the code o f  criminal procedure. 
See art. 438-464 cpp.
45 AP(N41).
46 AP(N42). On the relationship between urgency and priorities see chap. 9.
47 When someone is arrested there are 48 hours to ask the judge to validate the arrest, if  the prosecutor 
does not do it the accused is free (see chap. 4).
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you always have to look at the victim’s interests and the way these have been affected, 
[...] at least this is the criterion I use. But this is the criterion that the CSM used as well 
when the organizational principles for the prosecution offices were modified.48 So, I 
think that if it was valid before it can still be valid now.49
This prosecutor decided to use one of the criteria included in the document: 
victim’s interests. However, this decision was based both on personal reasons (she 
says: “the criterion I use”) and on the CSM circulars. Thus, common criteria seem to 
have a variable impact depending on the personal preferences of the individual 
prosecutor. As we saw one prosecutor said that, at the end, “everyone is free to 
orientate his decisions”.50
If the prosecution office does not have a formalized set of priorities the 
situation does not change very much. A prosecutor with 30 years of experience said:
In 99% o f the cases it is experience which helps us to solve these practical problems [to 
determine the file to prioritize].51
Later this pubblico ministero said that his personal criterion was based on 
time. The first case to arrive has the priority. He also added that the exceptions to this 
principle were determined by urgency (i. e. accused is in jail).
Another assistant prosecutor said:
These [priorities] are part o f our common sense. I mean, these are part o f our 
professional culture. There is no need to talk about that, because they are part o f our 
professional culture.52
1S We are talking about the Circolare sul Giudice Unico di Primo Grado e Sezioni Stralcio-Criteri 
gen era liper le variazioni tabellari. CSM. Circolare n. P-99-06928 enacted April 12 1999. This circular 
(point 6) referred to art. 227 o f D.Lgs n. 51 enacted in 1998. This piece o f  delegated legislation will be 
discussed more precisely when we will deal with prosecutors’ definition o f priorities. Suffice here to 
say that this was done because a previous reform unified the preture (these were offices in which less 
serious crimes, determined by the law, were prosecuted and judged, see chap. 8) with prosecution 
offices (see chap. 9). The consequence was that prosecutors (and judges, because the pretori, who were 
the legal figures running the pretura, had the power to investigate and judge at the same time) suddenly 
had many more cases to deal with. The solution was (it was the only case since the end o f the Second 
World War) to determine some priorities. The government did it and the principles were: seriousness o f  
the crime and its practical consequences; if  delay can jeopardize investigation; and victim’s interest.
49 AP(N38).
50 AP(N42).
51 APAp!.(N50).
52 AP(C47).
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At this stage we do not intend to analyze prosecutors’ professional culture. 
What we want to underline here is that there is no sign of formal and/or informal 
mandatory directives in which the chief or the deputy chief prosecutors imposes rules 
on priorities. Prosecutors have some criteria on priorities, but these are only partially 
influenced by internal documents. Perhaps, the best evidence of this is that none of 
our interviewees ever indicated that the chief or the deputy chief prosecutors ever 
went to their office to ask them to do a case before another one.
We did not find any instance of the imposition of mandatory priorities. 
However, in one case prosecutors’ discretionary powers seem to have been limited. 
This happened in Turin, where the Zagrebelsky circular was amended and now there 
are category A crimes, which are, de facto, the priorities. These are all the crimes that 
require the preliminary hearing. More importantly, these include the specialized units: 
sexual crimes and crimes committed against persons who can not defend themselves
ro #
(i. e. disabled persons, old people etc.), organized crimes, DDA (mafia and other big 
crime organizations), white collar crimes, public administration and industrial 
security. In practice, specialized unit are the priorities. As we can see this is a detailed 
document. Moreover, the fact that specialization was associated with category A 
crimes has, as one prosecutor said, “codified the priority”.54 In practice: prosecutors 
will prioritize crimes which will be allocated to their specialized unit.55 This is 
because, in general (and not only in Turin), specialized units reflect the crimes that 
prosecutors consider more serious (see chap. 9).
This appears to be an exception, but assistant prosecutors are, in fact, still very 
much in charge o f the decisions on priorities. First, as we said, here, like in the other 
prosecution offices we visited, neither the chief nor the deputy chiefs tell prosecutors 
what to do first. This is not only true for category A crimes, but for all the crimes
x' This means Direzione D istrettuale Antimafia. This is the local brunch o f  the DNA (Direzione 
Nazionale Antimafia) which is a national organization. In particular, these specialized units are created 
only within the prosecution offices attached at the first instance court located in the cities where there is 
the court o f  appeal (but they are not managed by the prosecution office attached at the court o f  appeal). 
Moreover, every DDA is part o f  the prosecution office where it was set up and refers to the chief 
prosecutor and to the deputy ch ief prosecutors working in that office. The DNA (and the DDAs) was 
created to be more effective against organized crime and to coordinate investigations which may 
involve many prosecutors located in different prosecution offices. The DNA is directed by a prosecutor 
who has the power to coordinate investigations and to give inputs on the if, the how and the when to 
investigate organized crime. See Voena (2003) op. cit. pp. 74-80. See also art 70 bis ord. giud. and 371 
bis cpp.
54 AP(N1).
55 AP(N1), AP(N2) and AP(N3).
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allocated to them. Second, although there is this circular, assistant prosecutors 
identified other informal common principles to determine priorities: urgent matters (i. 
e. accused in jail, deaths, victim is in danger etc.),56 common sense57 and, even if  it is 
not officially into force anymore, principles stated in the Zagrebelsky circular. 
Moreover, one prosecutor reported that no documents have been enacted to specify 
the meaning of these informal criteria or to introduce new concepts.59 From this angle, 
the situation in Turin does not seem very different to other prosecution offices. In fact, 
the system in Turin may be assessed in this way: general principles on priorities are 
broad and their interpretation is left to prosecutors; but, if two cases are considered 
(by assistant prosecutors) otherwise to have the same priority, category A crimes 
should be prioritized.60
2.2. Operation of legal independence: the aim of the system
What we described above shows that chief prosecutors and deputy chief prosecutors 
have limited power when it comes to file allocation and determining priorities. Chiefs 
produce internal documents on these matters. However, these documents are not 
intended to set up strict criteria to limit prosecutors’ discretionary powers. But what is 
the purpose of having this system?
Marcello Maddalena (who is currently the chief prosecutor in Turin) has 
written that the reason for having an automatic system for files allocation is to avoid 
the suspicion that files are allocated so as to favour specific prosecutors.61 Moreover, 
Maddalena added that:
Although some directives o f  the CSM authorize the chief to allocate a file to a 
determined prosecutor, this never happens, because this would mean taking a value 
judgement on the prosecutor who had the file and, more important, on the prosecutor 
who should have had the file.62
56 AP(N1), AP(N2) and AP(N3).
57 AP(N2).
58 AP(N1).
59 AP(N2).
60 AP(N1), AP(N2) and AP(N3).
61 Borgna and Maddalena (2003) op. cit. p. 120.
So, it seems that the purpose of having such a system is to avoid the chief and 
deputy chief prosecutors taking decisions based on the merito63 of the cases. In fact, 
this can lead to distinctions being made (based on a “value judgment”) between 
prosecutors. This was also confirmed by one of our interviewees who, talking about 
file allocation within specialized units, said:
All the cases within specialized units are randomly allocated, this is in order not to have 
distinctions and evaluations based on the merito.64
Thus, we have seen that the concept of prosecutors’ independence has strong 
practical implications for organizational relations within the prosecution office. 
Moreover, we have seen that this independence seems to be aimed at avoiding 
superior prosecutors taking decisions on the merito. However, we still do not know 
the reason why prosecutors’ independence has such an impact. To understand this we 
need to start to analyze prosecutors’ office culture (as part of their professional and 
legal culture). We can do this through the analysis of the ordinamento giudiziario 
reform.
3. Legal rules and legal culture: the ordinamento giudiziario reform
As we explained (see chap. 4), this reform is related to many issues, like separation of 
functions between prosecutors and judges, the powers of the Minister of Justice, and, 
more importantly for us, the hierarchical relationship between prosecutors-assistant 
prosecutors. The possible consequence of this reform might have been a strong 
limitation of prosecutors’ independence. Later the reform was partially amended by 
the new centre-left government, which abolished the provisions making the chief the 
only the ‘responsible’ prosecutor for the implementation of the penal action, but the 
new hierarchical principles remained in force. We conducted our interviews when the 
centre-left government had just won the election and during the time when 
amendments (passed in 2006) to this reform were being discussed. At this point we do 
not want to evaluate the impact that these legal amendments had on the reform. The
6j Literally this means merits. In particular, in this context means all those decisions which are taken on 
personal criteria. For example, there is a case for murder and I will not allocate it to prosecutor X  
because I believe he will not be tough enough with the accused person.
64 AP(N38). A similar opinion was expressed by AP(N39). In particular, this prosecutor said that 
discretionary choices (for files allocation in general) would be contrary to the CSM indications, 
because these impose “predetermined and objective” criteria.
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purpose here is to study the impact of the initial ordinamento giudiziario reform in 
order to understand prosecutors’ office culture.
The first point to make is that, although the reform (re)introduces hierarchical 
relations between the chief (and deputy chief prosecutors) and assistant prosecutors, 
the organization of prosecution offices did not seem to have changed very much. The 
vast majority of our interviews made it clear that the reform did not bring any major 
practical change.65 However, in two cases we recorded that new formal rules had been 
introduced. An assistant prosecutor working in a big prosecution office of the north, 
said:
Now, from a formal point o f  view, there are requirements that we did not have before: 
the chief (and the deputy ch ief prosecutors who has been delegated authority by the chief 
himself) has to countersign some measures [like pre-trial custody requests] for which, 
before, the signature was previously not required.66
However, he immediately added:
I have to say that I have not yet seen the danger that prosecutors talked about: the 
avocazione, assistant prosecutors deprived o f  their power, I have not seen it [...]  In 
practice, I do not want to speak too early, but if  I have a look at the way this office is 
organized, I am not worried.67
Another prosecutor working in the same office said that this signature system 
had a practical impact. She reported that some other prosecutors had had to rethink 
archiviazione requests because the deputy chief prosecutor refused to sign the paper.68 
But, in fact, this is not directly related to the ordinamento giudiziario reform. A 
prosecutor working in the same prosecution office said that, even before the reform, 
he has had to rewrite certain measures because the deputy chief refused to countersign
62 24 clearly said that nothing has changed. 18 did not clearly say that nothing has changed, but they
preferred to speak about what could happen as opposed to what had happened. They did not report any
practical major change compared to the pre-reform situation. 3 did not know. 1 was not asked (due to
time limits). 2 were not clear at all.
66 AP(N30). A similar system has been introduced in another site where we conducted interviews (see 
CP(N40) and AP(N42). However, w e have not been reported major practical changes. In particular, 
prosecutors did not refer that their autonomy to deal with the case has been affected. In another big 
prosecution office in the south a similar system was already operating before the reform came into 
force (see CP(S4), DCP(S5) and AP(S6)). Even in this case we have not been reported that 
prosecutors’ autonomy was affected. In particular, the chief said that independence will always be the 
fundamental principle (CP(S4), see later in this section). Moreover, we have been said that there have 
never been contrasts between assistant prosecutors and superior prosecutors (see AP(S6).
67 AP(N30).
68 AP(N32), but she also added that she thinks that prosecutors’ autonomy will not be affected.
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them.69 However, these situations seem regarded to be as part of the relations between 
deputy chief prosecutor and assistant prosecutor and the final decisions are never 
imposed by superior prosecutors (see later).70 So, even where new (formal) rules have 
been introduced these do not seem to have substantially influenced prosecutors’ 
activities. It is clear that from a theoretical point of view, the refusal to countersign a 
measure appears to be a right of veto. However, the practical application is different. 
In the next sections we will see that these decisions are not the result of an imposition 
from above. The aim of these provisions is not to formalize a right of veto, but to 
provide a sort of supervision aimed at providing advice and consultation for less 
experienced prosecutors.
What we have just described suggests that the purpose of the reform to 
organize prosecution offices on hierarchical principles has not generally been 
successful. There are different reasons for this. The conflict between the former 
centre-right government and the magistrati created a situation where the reform was 
seen by prosecutors as an attempt to attack them as autonomous magistrati (see 
above). Moreover, the fact that the government (former centre-left government) 
changed and wanted to change further the reform made the scenario uncertain:71 can 
superiors start to exercise a power which might be withdrawn in the near future?
However, we believe that the main reason why the reform has not been 
successful has to be found in the clash that this legal rule had with prosecutors’ legal 
culture.
One prosecutor commented on the reform by saying:
This is a radical change compared to the previous set o f  legal rules. This has 
hierarchicalized the prosecution office and transformed it. In fact, before the procura 
was an institution which considered the giurisdizione72 as a diffused tool, which means 
that every single assistant prosecutor held on element o f  the giurisdizione and, as a 
consequence, he had constitutional prerogatives, like art. 112 [legality principle]. Now,
69 AP(N30).
70 AP(N30).
71 The scenario is still uncertain. The newly elected centre-right government has immediately passed 
substantial legislation to amend the criminal justice system (i. e. immunity for the Prime Minister, the 
President o f the Republic, the President o f  the Senate and the President o f the Chamber o f  Deputies, 
see chap. 4). A reform has been announced, but it is not clear what this will be.
72 This word means “to apply the law” (see Toniatti R. “Le interazioni della giurisdizione ordinaria 
con la giurisdizione costituzionale e con le giurisdizioni europee comunitaria e convenzionale”. In Di 
Federico eds (2004) op. cit. p. 229). Thus, if  a prosecutor is part o f  the giurisdizione he has the power 
to apply the law. The reform concentrates the giurisdizione in the ch ie fs  hands.
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the prosecution office is an institution in which the chief is the one only responsible [for 
the giurisdizione].73
Then, talking about the application of the reform in the prosecution office 
where he works, he added:
The application [o f the ordinamento giudiziario  reform] depends on the program that the 
chief prosecutor decides at the beginning o f  the year. Here, the chief gave it an 
exemplary interpretation, which, de facto, preserves assistant prosecutors’ powers and 
prerogatives.74
We had similar comments from the interviewees who believe that nothing has 
changed since the reform came into force and that, probably, nothing will change in 
the future.75 In fact, they realize that the ordinamento giudiziario reform, as enacted 
by the centre-right government, creates a clash between their autonomy and new chief 
prosecutors’ hierarchical powers. Moreover, they underline that the changes required 
by this piece of legislation are in opposition with the way prosecution offices have 
been organized until now (i. e. radical change). However, they seem quite confident 
that their autonomy will always be preserved.
Chief prosecutors seem to be aware o f this clash:
In any event, the general criterion is that the office must be hierarchically organized.
This means that the ch ief is the only person responsible; [but] if  the ch ief is the only 
person responsible he must have the powers to organize the office as he wants [...]  Thus, 
when we say that the chief is responsible that is fine, but what happens if  I allocate a 
case and then there is a conflict on the merito, for example when the prosecutor believes 
that something has been proved and I do not agree? Shall I take the case back? If so, 
what about prosecutors’ autonomy? It is possible that I will have to face these situations 
and the law says that I am responsible. In fact, theoretically, cases are always dealt with 
by prosecutors and me, but there is prosecutors’ autonomy to be taken into account [...] 
[because] you have to evaluate the merito  o f  the case, which means the legal
73 AP(N30).
74 AP(N30).
73 We already explained that the vast majority think that nothing has changed (see above). 14 o f  these 
clearly made reference to the future. They said that something could change, but, in fact, they were just 
explaining what the legal rules could allow the chief to do. Moreover, 4 said that things could change if  
the chief wants to do it, but it was referred as an event very unlikely to happen. In particular, AP(N32) 
said that that nothing will change “unless the ch ief is a criminal”.
76 Which crime it is, who are the accused persons, if  there are aggravating and/or mitigating 
circumstances etc.
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classification of the fact, I believe that prosecutors’ independence must be respected.
So, the reform has created a real dilemma for chief prosecutors. In fact, if  the 
consequence is that they are responsible for everything, they must also have the
no
(hierarchical) power to organize the office and direct prosecutors the way they like 
(and this is what the reform prescribes). However, our evidence shows that chief 
prosecutors did not use this power. When the decision concerns an evaluation of the 
facts which led to a crime and/or the interpretation o f the law in relation to these facts, 
the chief does not intervene.
This suggests us that in Italy the tension between professional independence 
and the need for hierarchical supervision, which is an important issue, for example, in 
France,79 is clearly solved by prioritising independence. More precisely: prosecutors 
know that if hierarchical powers increase, independence will decrease, but they solve 
this problem by recognizing independence as the fundamental principle.
The reason why independence is prioritized over hierarchical control does not
o n
only stem from the legal rules included in the constitution, in the code of criminal
o  j
procedure and in the CSM circulars, which have not been altered by the 
ordinamento giudiziario reform. This principle seems to be a substantial part of 
prosecutors’ legal culture. In fact, while legal rules have been changed (and clearly 
prioritized hierarchical control over independence), the ordinamento giudiziario 
reform has not been successful. Prosecution offices are, de facto, still organized in a 
way which preserves prosecutors’ autonomy. This did not happen just because 
assistant prosecutors refused to comply with the new rules, but also because chief 
prosecutors decided not to change their approach. This leads us to another important
77 C(S4). We interviewed two other ch ief prosecutors. CP(N43) did not directly refer to the clash 
between the reform and prosecutors’ independence. However, when he talked about common criteria to 
organize the office, he remarked that these w ill never have to limit prosecutors’ independence. 
CP(N40) did not mention prosecutors’ independence and made very clear that the reform concentrates 
on the chief all the responsibilities and, as a consequence, he w ill have to take many decisions that 
before were left to the assistant prosecutors. However, in this prosecution office, like in the others, 
nothing has changed since the reform came into force, prosecutors did not feel that their independence 
was li mited (see AP(N38), AP(N39), AP(N41) and AP(N42).
78 C(S4) and CP(N40). See also Borgna and Maddalena (2003) op. cit. p. 142.
79 Hodgson J. “Hierarchy, Bureaucracy, and Ideology in French Criminal Justice: Some Empirical
Observation”. 2002. Journal o f  Law and Society. Vol. 29(2). pp. 227-257. p. 241.
80 See art 104 para. 1, art. 108 para. 2, art. 109 and art. 112 (legality principle) cost., which are the legal 
base to state that prosecutors are “externally independent”. See, Voena (2003) op. cit. p. 58.
81 Art. 53 para. 1 cpp. See also Voena (2003) op. cit. p. 74.
82 See for example, CSM. Circolare n. P-27060 enacted Dec. 19th 2005, capo IX. In particular, point
89.3.
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consideration: assistant prosecutors, deputy chief prosecutors and chief prosecutors do 
not seem culturally distinguishable, even if they have different functions. The 
principle of independence appears to be fundamental for prosecutors’ office culture, 
no matter if some are high ranking prosecutors and have the power and the 
responsibility to organize and direct prosecution offices.
4. Consequences of legal independence: strategies of persuasion
In the previous sections we analyzed what superior prosecutors cannot do and do not 
want to do. Now we want to look at what they can do to organize prosecution offices. 
This will be part of our analysis of organizational relations. However, this will also try 
to explain the consequences o f having a system in which independence seems to 
forbid hierarchical relations between prosecutors. In particular, we will look at two 
different strategies of persuasion which seem to have been generated by this system: 
harmonization and advice and consultation.
Even if independence is a fundamental concept for prosecutors’ legal culture, 
prosecution offices are not left to anarchism. A certain degree of uniformity is 
important in order to make effective equality before the law. This concerns both the 
accused and the victim. Moreover, uniformity also appears important during the 
investigation, because standardised investigation practices could render more efficient 
the prosecution office. The strategies of persuasion we are explaining here also try to 
solve these problems.
4.1 General relations: harmonization
Harmonization is a procedure which aims at setting up common criteria within the 
prosecution office. This does not concern single decisions in specific cases. The 
principles are general and they are designed for and applied by a large group of 
prosecutors (at least those who form one specialized unit).
The majority of our interviewees confirmed that harmonization creates 
common principles for decision-making within the prosecution office.83 Normally
8j 24 explicitly talked about harmonization. 14 said that prosecutors do not tend to harmonize their 
practices. 4 did not give a clear answer, even if  they talked about a sort o f  co-ordination between 
prosecutors. 3 did not know. 2 were not asked (time limits).
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these criteria are the result o f regular meetings between prosecutors. Sometimes, 
(generally where the prosecution office is small or medium size) all the prosecutors 
meet together with the chief and, if they exist, the deputy chief prosecutors.84 On the 
other hand, if the prosecution office is very big (sometimes with more than 100 
prosecutors) decisions are taken within the specialized unit. In particular, meetings are 
not held by the chief, but by the deputy chief who directs the unit.
Harmonization may relate to interpretation of legislation and/or practices. 
Meetings can be held to discuss the interpretation of new acts. However, one 
prosecutor said that this is mainly done for those topics which require a very detailed
on
knowledge of difficult pieces o f legislation (e. g. white collar crimes). In fact, for 
other specialized units (e. g. organized crime) legislation does not require complex
OQ
interpretation, but it is necessary to know how to investigate (see chap. 9).
Harmonization of practices may relate to both investigative techniques and
89how to calibrate the prosecutors’ final richieste di pena. When it comes to 
investigation, common principles may focus, for example, on when to ask for pre-trial 
custody90 and how to deal with a particular criminal organization.91 However, there 
seem to be no strict rules. This is mainly related to the fact that each case is seen as 
different92 and that prosecutors must be left free to investigate the way they want.93 
So, these principles of harmonization are persuasive rather than binding.
Turning to prosecutors’ final requests it appears that harmonization can lead to 
very precise parameters. One prosecutor said:
There are some reati seriali94 [ ...]  these w ill have to be treated in the same way by all
prosecutors. I am thinking about sentence requests, it does not make sense that I ask for
€500 and my colleagues ask for €800. In this way harmonization guarantees equality 
before the law. We had already started to do something, without waiting for any input 
coming from the [former] chief, for example: drunken driving, we met and we designed
84 See, for exam ple, AP(C53), AP(N45) (this is a case o f  a big prosecution office) and AP(N42).
85 See, for example, AP(N33), AP(N31), AP(N1), AP(N2), AP(N3).
86 AP(N39).
87 AP(N49).
88 AP(N49).
89 T hese are literally prosecutors’ sentence requests. In fact, Italian prosecutors, unlike English 
prosecutors, suggest appropriate punishment at trial.
90 APApl.(N50).
9' AP(N49).
92 See, for example, APApl.(N50). Similar comments were made by AP(N48).
9j See, for example, CP(S4) and AP(N49).
94 T hese are “volume crimes”. In particular, these are crimes which are, normally, perpetrated in the 
sam e way and which do not require a difficult and long investigation. They can also be called ordinaria 
amministrazione.
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a series o f  possible punishments, taking into account the typical situations in order to 
guarantee equality before the law for the accused persons.95
What it is interesting here is that the aim of harmonization seems to be 
uniformity and, ultimately, equality before the law. This is the kind of comment we 
had from other interviewees who work in different prosecution offices,96 and this was 
linked to both harmonization of practices and of interpretation of legislation. 
Moreover, in the quotation we just reported, the interviewee recognized that 
harmonization is such an important aim that prosecutors decided to seek it 
themselves, without waiting for inputs from the chief.
Perhaps the clearest example o f a procura organized on common principles 
which are the result o f harmonization practices, is in Bolzano. Here the chief 
prosecutor decided to launch a project (started in 2004 and founded by the European 
Social Fund) to study some efficiency principles that might be applied to the 
prosecution office. Subsequently, he employed a project manager who set up a team 
(including sociologist, experts in human resources etc.) who started to study the way a 
prosecution office works to find the most efficient and cost saving practices. The aim 
of this project seems clear, as the chief prosecutor wrote in the official budget of the 
prosecution office in 2005: “if we want to provide a justice-service we need to put at 
the centre of the attention the citizen-user who asks for a more effective service, and 
the citizen-taxpayer who asks for a more efficient and transparent service”.97 To do 
this they are studying criteria which might measure the effectiveness and the
Q O
efficiency of the prosecution office. In particular, they are implementing two 
schemes, which are closely related to each other. First, they want to identify the 
“primary clients”, those who normally ask the prosecution office to intervene.99 
Second, they are analyzing the internal practices of the office, in order to write reports 
to be given to the superiors who will study solutions to improve these practices.100
The second scheme appears to be directly related to harmonization. We 
interviewed the chief prosecutor in Bolzano who said:
95 AP(C53). See also AP(C47).
96 CP(N43), AP(N48) and AP(N32).
97 Procura della Repubblica di Bolzano. “Bilancio Sociale 2005”. [Online]. 2005. Available at: 
http://www.procura.bz.it/fileadmin/Documenti/Bilancio sociale 2005.pdf [Accessed 05/08/08F
98 Ibid. p. 19.
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I produced a circular which says that within specialized units coordination is done by the 
most experienced prosecutor. [ ...]  This is the only principle. I do not issue any further 
guideline. I decided not to do this thing, I leave them [free] [...]  However, in order to 
harmonize, we did something new at the beginning o f the year, because I believe that it 
is important to harmonize our actions. I mean, it is not possible that, for the same fact, 
because somebody has one prosecutor and somebody else has another prosecutor, 
solutions be different. I am not saying that we all have to do everything in the same way, 
but we need to have some guidelines. This is why I created the “office o f the pubblico 
ministero”:101 I gave to each o f  them 4 police officers. So, I created a little organization 
within the prosecution office with every prosecutor who manages his police officers in 
the way he wants, so that they deal with the ordinaria amministrazione102, because we 
need to take into account that the 80, 90% o f what we do is ordinaria amministrazione. 
Thus, I created this organization [ .. .] ,  and I recommended to both, colleagues and police 
officers, to speak to each other to find the best practices. I mean, they have to ask to each 
other: “how do you do this, how do you do that etc.” Eventually, in a few months, we 
will try to find a uniform way to deal with similar facts, but, clearly, we will try to get 
the best [practices] we can have.103
Moreover, he explained:
We want to establish criteria for efficiency, which are mainly related to economic and 
temporal issues. With these we want to measure the file in terms o f cost and delay: we 
would like to introduce standards to deal with files. However, these are very complicated 
issues, because they are not part o f  the magistrates way o f thinking, these are managerial 
issues. Moreover, there is a clash with the objection, which could be made, that 
magistrati are autonomous and independent. Thus, we can go as far as we can and we 
have to try to be balanced, we do not want to become a company, but we want to have 
some criteria.104
We found another case, in a big prosecution office in the north, where a very 
experienced prosecutor tried to create the “office of the pubblico minis ter o”.105 
However, this was only limited to his own activities, this prosecutor simply decided 
this was the best way to work. In Bolzano they went further. They want to create 
standardized practices which can be used for the whole prosecution office. The first
101 This literally means prosecutor’s office.
102 These are routine files which do not need to be investigated very much and can be dealt with using 
standard practices, again the example is the drunken driving. In fact, this is a different name for 
“volume crimes” (see above).
103 CP(N43).
104 CP(N43).
105 A P(N 31).
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practical results of this new system were mainly economic. In one year (from 2004 to 
2005) the procura claimed to have saved, in total, 552.909 euros (9% less than 
2004).106 Moreover, they claim to have saved 582.244 euros (42% less) in “costi 
dell ’attivita”, which includes all the investigation activities.
The case of Bolzano is interesting and shows how far harmonization can go. 
However, the chief clearly said that prosecutors’ autonomy is very important and that 
they will always have to find a balance between independence and standardization. 
The best practices will be determined within the specialized units and, as the chief 
said, no indication was given from him .107 Superiors will intervene only later, but it is 
unlikely that they will impose measures which have not been agreed with assistant 
prosecutors. In fact, the chief said that he believes that consensus is an important 
value (see later).108 Moreover, while he was talking about the way specialized units 
are formed, the chief remarked how important is not to create division when one 
directs a prosecution office.109 As a consequence, in Bolzano, like in the other 
prosecution offices we visited, harmonization appears to be a negotiated agreement 
between the chief and the assistant prosecutors, rather than something imposed from 
above.
4.2 Individual relations: advice and consultation
Advice and consultation is a different strategy of persuasion compared to 
harmonization. Like harmonization, this is carried out through meetings between 
prosecutors. However, unlike harmonization, advice and consultation involves only 
two (or, rarely, a few) assistant prosecutors who are not discussing general principles, 
but exchanging opinions on particular decisions (normally concerning individual 
cases).
This strategy of persuasion appears to have an impact when the case is 
complicated and/or considered important by pubblici ministeri. In these situations
106 Procura della Repubblica di Bolzano (2005) op. cit. p. 61.
107 CP(N43).
108 CP(N43).
109 CP(N43).
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prosecutors tend to share their opinions with more experienced colleagues.110 One 
prosecutor, working in a big prosecution office, said:
However, I got used to being supervised, to having a direzione pregnate from the chief 
[...]  Look, for important cases I try to discuss my opinions with the most experienced 
prosecutors [ ...]  apart from this we always have the chance to discuss our opinions with 
the deputy chief or the chief. However, I have to say that, maybe I have been lucky, but 
when it comes to decisions on the way to deal with a case, we are free. It never happened 
to me to have a conflict with superior prosecutors.112
So, she regards this form of persuasion as very influential, but this prosecutor 
also remarks that they are free to take the decisions they want. This is, once again, the 
confirmation that prosecutors’ independence always prevails, even when there are 
cases in which a prosecutor can influence decisions which are taken by another 
colleague (see later in this section).
When it comes to small prosecution offices the persuasive force of advice and 
consultation appears stronger compared to bigger procure. This was explained by a 
very experienced prosecutor who currently works in a big prosecution office, but who 
had experiences in small offices as well. He said:
Generally speaking I have to say that in 18 years I have never seen a chief who 
substantially wanted to influence the way a case was dealt with. They can give you 
advice, they can tell you to keep them informed [ ...]  I think that the chief can be 
particularly influential in small prosecution offices, where prosecutors just joined the 
magistratura and they need, and ask for, advice. In fact, very often, it is the young 
assistant prosecutor who asks the ch ief what to do. But this is what the chief is there for: 
to discuss investigation practices, what to do in a particular situation [...]  So, if  the 
prosecution office is small, there can be these elements [...]  Here, or in other big 
prosecution offices, where all prosecutors have a good amount o f  experience, it would be 
very difficult for the chief to push an assistant prosecutor to do what he/she does not 
w an ttod o .llj
This example is very much focused on the size of prosecution offices. 
However, it also confirms that, more than the size, it is prosecutors’ experience which
110 See, for example, AP(N30), AP(N32) and AP(N49).
111 With this expression she is underlining that there is a strong supervision. In particular, superior 
prosecutors give directives on how to deal with a case.
112 AP(N49).
113 AP(N48).
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determines how much influential the advice of superiors to assistant prosecutors will 
be. In particular, if the chief is the only prosecutor with substantial experience (case of 
small prosecution offices) he/she will have greater power to persuade assistant 
prosecutors to do what he thinks is right. However, we must add that we did not find 
any case, either in big or in small prosecution offices, where prosecutors complained 
that they were forced to do what superiors asked to do. When assistant prosecutors 
changed their decisions, this was the result of a meeting in which equals discussed 
their opinions (see later).
So, experience is one reason why advice is influential. If there is a substantial 
difference of experience between the superior prosecutor and the assistant prosecutor, 
it is more likely that the latter will accept the former’s advice. This approach is surely 
encouraged by the fact that experienced prosecutors have acquired a strong 
professional authority which can practically influence the investigation. One 
prosecutor said:
Now, for an urgent matter, I work on a file together with the deputy chief, in order to get 
better cooperation from the police. I have noticed, and I am surely not upset with it, that 
if  you work with an influential deputy chief prosecutor, even the police [regard the case 
as important].114
Thus, experience and professional authority, and not hierarchical superiority, 
seem the reasons why advice and consultation works. This is the nature of this 
strategy of persuasion, but we need to explain better the implications which arise from 
this statement.
Previously we discussed the situation, in a big prosecution office, where some 
measures (i. e. archiviazione requests) issued by assistant prosecutors have to be 
countersigned by the deputy chief prosecutor directing the specialized unit.115 We also 
found situations where cases which are considered to be important are allocated, 
sometimes, to one prosecutor who is required to deal with the file together with the 
chief or the deputy chief.116 In these cases superior prosecutors seem to have
114 AP(N30).
115 AP(N30).
116 AP(N30), CP(N40), AP(N41) and AP(49). These prosecutors clearly referred to this possibility. 
However, it could happen everywhere, because, as AP(N49) confirmed, if  a case is very complicated it 
is necessary to have more than one prosecutor who deals with it. This is also related to the fact that in
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substantial power. However, even when this power was used, and counter-signature 
refused, prosecutors did not have the feeling that a decision was imposed.117 
Moreover, one prosecutor said that if  the deputy chief tried to force a decision that she 
does not like, she would refuse to do it and she would ask the deputy chief prosecutor
liftto take responsibility for it.
So, if  imposition is not an option, how do they solve these disagreements? One
prosecutor talked about a meeting with the deputy chief who disagreed with him and
made him think about his decision.119 In this case the assistant prosecutor recognized
1
that the deputy chief was right and changed his opinion. In fact, we did not find a 
single case where disagreements led to a conflict between prosecutors; as one
191pubblico ministero said: “a common solution was always found”. The point here is 
to understand how these common decisions are taken. The fact that there is no 
imposition suggests that superior prosecutors do not use a hierarchical power. This is 
consistent with the fact that, as we saw, advice and consultation does not seem to be 
based on hierarchical relations and, more important, when the law (ordinamento 
giudiziario reform) gave hierarchical powers to chiefs they did not use them. So, 
meetings are between equals. However, this does not mean that superior prosecutors’ 
opinion has the same value as assistant prosecutors’ opinion. The same prosecutor 
(AP(N32) who said that she would refuse impositions, also said (talking about the 
countersignature that deputy chief prosecutors have to make):
I have always accepted deputy c h ie fs  criticisms and suggestions. It is a guarantee, for 
me, to have someone who has more experience, and who is different from me, who looks 
at what I did; and who can tell me if he/she agrees or, if  he/she disagrees, why he 
disagreed.122
So, those who have more experience are regarded as having the professional 
authority to give very valuable advice. But this does not mean that these suggestions
Italy procedural requirements are very time consuming and difficult to handle (see, for example, 
APN44).
117 AP(N30) and AP(S6).
118 AP(N32).
119 AP(N30).
120 AP(N30).
Ul AP(N30). A similar comment was given by AP(N6), who explained that explained that there have 
never been contrasts between superior and assistant prosecutors.
122 AP(N32).
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are always applied. All our interviewees, not only prosecutors, confirmed that the
• 123prosecutor who is dealing with the case is free to take the decisions:
Amongst my little professional successes I include a case o f  a person who originally was 
convicted for 15 years, and who has been in jail for 7 or 8 years, then he was released, 
because he did not commit that crime. I thought so and I obtained a retrial, the court o f  
appeal said I was right [and released the accused]. I said to the chief that I was going to 
do it, because I think that for all the important and difficult matters the assistant 
prosecutor needs to inform the chief. I informed him, he was a different chief at that 
time, and I remember that he told me: “Are you sure? We have to do so much work to 
accuse someone and you want to defend that person, he has a lawyer, can’t he do it?” I 
ensured him that I would not have left aside other important matters [and I started to deal 
with that case].124
This was an informal meeting. If the procedure is formal, and the superior 
prosecutor must countersign an act, it is more difficult for the assistant not to follow 
his/her advises. However, we must repeat, even in these cases the different opinions
1 J C
are discussed on a basis of equality.
To conclude, strategies o f persuasion are the consequence of the operation of 
legal independence within prosecution offices. Negotiated agreements and meetings 
between equals are the vehicles through which these strategies are delivered. But they 
are even more important. These are the principles on which the relationship superior- 
inferior prosecutor is defined and their impact is not limited to some topics. They can 
concern: the criminal policy (i. e. priorities), the investigation (i. e. harmonization o f 
practices) and even single decisions (i. e. advice and consultation).
I2j On this point it is very interesting to note what lawyers said (for a more detailed explanation o f  
lawyers’ perception o f  the way cases are dealt with by prosecutors see, for example, Sapignoli M. “/ /  
processo penalle nella percezione di magistrati e avvocatf ’. 1999. Padova: CEDAM). In fact, although 
they complain that harmonization criteria either do not exist or are ineffective (because each prosecutor 
has a different way to choose priorities and to deal with the case), they also refer as important that 
prosecutors are free to choose. In particular, L(N17), who is part o f  a political party which helped 
(from 2001 till 2006, now it is not part o f the coalition anymore) Berlusconi in his battle against judges 
and prosecutors, said that a very strong hierarchical relation is needed, but this should not influence the 
merito o f the file, because for these sorts o f  decisions the assistant prosecutor should be free from 
directions and impositions.
124 AP(N49).
125 On this point see Sarzotti who explains that, in Italy, individual prosecutors have substantial 
discretionary powers when they deal with cases. However, he also suggests that the leadership o f  
superior prosecutors can influence the way prosecution offices are organized (in particular he uses the 
example o f Maddalena the very charismatic former chief prosecutor in Turin). Sarzotti C. “Le procure 
della Repubblica come attori nel campo penale”. In Sarzotti C. eds. “Processi di selezione del crimine. 
Procure della Repubblica e organizzazione giudiziarid\ 2008. Milano: Giufffe. pp. 27-33 and 75-93.
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5 Italian prosecution offices: an organizational system
The procuratore della Repubblica and the deputy chief prosecutors are not in practice 
responsible for the criminal justice policy of the procura and for the way files are 
dealt with. They use strategies o f persuasion aimed to create a certain degree of 
uniformity within the office, but they certainly cannot impose outcomes. This is a 
significant difference compared to, for example, the procureur de la Republique, the 
Director of Public Prosecution, the assembly of prosecutors-general in Belgium who 
are responsible for the elaboration of criminal policy and the rights of German 
superior prosecutors to interfere in case processing. If we want to find a similar 
situation in Europe we probably need to look at the Netherlands where prosecutors
"should to a high degree be independent when it comes to working and deciding on a
111concrete criminal case”. However, unlike in Italy, Dutch prosecutors are bound by 
directives made by the procurators-general, which stipulate “that the prosecutor must, 
or must not, prosecute under certain circumstances”.128
But how can we describe the Italian system? Damaska says that when 
organizations are hierarchically organized “authority is only delegated [...] and its
1 1 Q  •exercise must be closely watched”. Moreover, he says that directives must be rigid
110and standardization and formalization are demanded. Finally, “officials are 
‘servants’, members of the service class merely administering normative standards 
which are supplied to them”.131 As we saw this is not what happens within Italian 
prosecution offices. Prosecutors are not ‘servants’, but independent and autonomous 
legal figures. Thus, if it is not hierarchical what is it? Using again Damaska’s models
126 For all these see, for example: Hodgson (2002) op. cits, Ashworth A. “Developments in the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office in England and W a le s 2000. European Journal o f  Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice. Vol. 8(3). pp. 257-282; Albrecht H-J. “Criminal Prosecution: Developments, Trends 
and Open Questions in the Federal Republic of Germany”. 2000. European Journal o f Crime, Criminal 
Law and Criminal Justice. Vol. 8(3). pp. 245-256; Parmentier S., Fijnaut C. and Van Daele D. “From 
Sisyphus to Octopus: Towards a Modern Public Prosecutor’s Office in Belgium”. 2000. European 
Journal o f Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice. Vol. 8(3). pp. 154-186. p. 161.
127 de Doelder H. “The Public Prosecution Service in the Netherlands”. 2000. European Journal o f  
Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice. Vol. 8(3). pp. 187-209. p. 195.
128 Brants C. “Consensual Criminal Procedures: Plea and Confession Bargaining and Abbreviated 
Procedures to Simplify Criminal Procedure”. May 2007. Eletronic Journal o f  Comparative Law. Vol.
11.1. p 9. [Online]. Available at: http://ww w.eicl.O rg/l 11/artl 1 l-6 .pdf [Accessed 07/08/08].
129 Damaska M. “Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure”. 1975. The Yale Law 
Journal. Vol. 84. pp. 480- 544. p. 484.
1,0 Ibid. p. 485.
131 Ibid.
110
we can say that in Italy there is a coordination model, where crucial decisions are 
taken by independent prosecutors, even if “the need for a degree of uniformity is
132recognized”.
This is an exception within the conventional tendency to categorize 
continental traditions (inquisitorial) as hierarchical. Although a detailed 
investigation on the reasons why this happened is far beyond the purpose of the 
current study, we need to make some brief remarks.
The coordination model is only partially linked with the 1989 reform which 
rendered the Italian criminal justice system more adversarial. In fact, it was already 
working before 1989.134 There are different reasons for that. First of all, as we already 
explained (see chap. 4), the Italian constitution, which came into force in 1948, made 
clear that prosecutors were externally independent. At the beginning this principle 
was not fully implemented. The CSM was created in 1958 and only in 1991 the 
Constitutional Court finally stated that magistratura' s autonomy must always 
prevail.1"53 Turning to the internal independence we can identify two moments which 
helped to break the hierarchical chain within judicial offices. First, the career 
progression criteria changed radically between 1963 and 1973. Before it was only 
based on merit (now it mainly depends from the seniority of the magistrato and the 
progression is automatic unless there are reasons not to do it). This left a lot of powers 
in the hands of high ranking judges and prosecutors who were the majority in the 
CSM and had the power to decide on career progression. Second, between 1967
1 Ibid. p. 510.
|jJ See, for example, Goldstein and Marcus (1977) op. cit. particularly p.47.
14 O f course it is impossible to give an exact date when prosecution offices stopped from being 
organized on hierarchical principles. However, Vogliotti describes very well this transition and he 
points out that the period going from 1963 to 1975 was crucial to establish prosecutors’ internal 
independence. See Vogliotti (2004) op. cit. especially p. 457-462.
' ^  See sent. n. 379/1992. In this case there was a conflict between the CSM and the Minister o f  Justice. 
In particular, art. 11 para. 3 o f  Act 195/1958 states that the decision to appoint high ranking magistrati 
(e. g. chief prosecutors, president o f  the court o f  appeal etc.) is taken by the CSM together with the 
Minister o f Justice (there is a joint commission). Now, the constitutional Court was asked to intervene 
(in Italy the constitutional Court is also competent to decide on the conflicts between constitutional 
powers) because the CSM and the Minister disagreed on the name o f  the judge to appoint as president 
of the court o f  appeal in Palermo. The Court stated that when there is a disagreement the CSM ’s 
decision always prevails. See Vogliotti (2004) op. cit. p. 460. The implications o f  this decision are 
clear: the Minister can not impose his decisions to the CSM, because the magistratura is externally 
independent.
Ij6 Vogliotti (2004) op. cit. p. 460. For a more detailed explaination see, for example, Guarnieri C. 
“L’indipendenza della Magistratura”. 1981. Padova: CEDAM. pp. 209-227; Guarnieri C. 
“Magistratura e politico in Italia”. 1993. Bologna: II Mulino. pp. 87-97; and Guarnieri C. “Giustizia e 
Politico: i nodi della Seconda Repubblica”. 2003. Bologna: II Mulino. pp. 94-106.
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and 1975 the electoral system for the CSM changed and it became more proportional.
• * * 1 3 7The consequence was that high ranking magistral were no longer m the majority. 
These were normally the more conservative ones and they preferred a hierarchical 
system. On the other hand, the young magistrati who, in the fifties, did not have very
138much power within the CSM, were pushing for more internal independence.
These are the legal reasons why a continental and inquisitorial system is not 
based on hierarchical relations. But, there are historical reasons as well. During the 
fascist period prosecutors and judges started to become a body belonging to the fascist 
part) only in the thirties.139 However, political influences have always been 
substantial. In particular, magistrates jurisdiction was limited with the creation of 
special tribunals like the Tribunale speciale per la difesa dello stato,140 which was 
controlled by the party. Moreover, police powers increased.141 So, the fascists did not 
remove all the “dangerous” judges and prosecutors, they simply did not provide them 
with the tools to fulfil their mission.142
Within this scenario the hierarchical chain was fundamental to implement 
political influences. Jemolo explained very well this procedure: political pressure was 
starting from the minister, passing through all the hierarchical chain and then reaching 
a single magistrato. If somebody did not agree the case was taken back by the 
hierarchical superior and given to someone else. The magistrati who did not follow 
the indications given by the superiors did not lose their job, but could not progress in 
their career.143 So, having a hierarchical chain was not the only problem, but surely it 
was a major problem. Moreover, the fascists did not need to control all the 
prosecutors and judges, they just had to put pressure on those who were holding the 
high ranking positions.
To conclude, the reasons why the post-fascist inquisitorial Italian system was 
not supported by hierarchical relations appear to be both legal and historical. 
Moreover, the legal transition seems also linked to a generation change. The old, high
17 See, for example, Guarnieri (1981) op. cit. pp. 209-227; Guarnieri (1993) op. cit. pp. 87-97; and 
Guarnieri (2003) op. cit. pp. 94-106.
1,8 Ibid.
Ij9 Guarnieri (2003) op. cit. p. 94.
140 This tribunal had to decide on crimes which could have had a political consequence.
1,1 Guarnieri (1993) op. cit. p. 86.
142 Ibid. The author reports that only 16 out o f  around 4000 magistrati were removed.
I4j Jemolo A. C. “La magistratura italiana: constatzioni e proposte”. In Jemolo et al. '‘‘Per Vordine 
giudiziario‘\  1946. Milano: Giuffr6. p. 29.
112
ranking and conservative magistrati, who were used to work in a system based on 
hierarchical relations, were substituted by a new generation of judges and prosecutors 
who put independence and autonomy at the core of their legal culture.
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed organizational relations within Italian prosecution offices and we 
found three important principles. First, no matter what the legal rules say, 
prosecutors’ independence is always the key principle. Second, the consequence is 
that common criteria can not be imposed, they are the result of strategies of 
persuasion. Third, strategies of persuasion and the relationship between superior and 
assistant prosecutors are built around negotiated agreement and meetings between 
equals. The concept of meetings between equals could be the door to introduce a, de 
facto, hierarchical relationship. However, although experience and moral authority 
determine that some prosecutors can strongly influence single decisions, assistant 
prosecutors are still very much free to choose. In fact, even when prosecutors are 
obliged to refer to superiors, they are still in the position to refuse to do something 
they do not want to do. This means that decisions are discussed on a basis of equality 
in order to find (if consensus is not possible) a common solution which takes into 
account the different opinions. This is why we did not find cases of conflict between 
superiors and assistant prosecutors. However, this works because prosecutors’ 
independence is the key principle for both superior and assistant prosecutors who do 
not appear culturally distinguishable. In this sense prosecutors’ independence is the 
pillar which supports other organizational principles.144 But independence also seems 
to be a key feature of prosecutors’ professional and legal culture (in particular of their 
office culture). It is part of what Friedman calls ‘internal’ legal culture, which is the 
legal culture o f “those members of society who perform specialized legal tasks”.145 In 
the next chapter will continue the analysis of prosecutors’ legal culture. In particular, 
we will concentrate on their professional culture and values.
144 As we explained in chap. 4 it is the constitution which states that prosecutors are independent. This 
can certainly influence prosecutors’ professional culture and it could be one the reasons why chief 
prosecutors refrain from exercising more powers. However, we also explained that the ordinamento 
giudiziario can potentially affect and reduce prosecutors’ independence.
145 Friedman L. M. “The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective”. 1975. New York: Russel Sage 
Fundation. p. 233.
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CHAPTER VII. PROFESSIONAL ATTITUDES
AND VALUES
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1. Introduction
In the previous chapter we emphasized the importance of the operation of legal 
independence to an understanding of prosecutors’ office culture. In this chapter we 
want to focus on another aspect of prosecutors’ legal culture: their professional 
attitudes and values. Moreover, we want to mark the differences, at this stage of the 
proceedings, between prosecutors, judges and, more importantly, the police.
Italian prosecutors’ professional culture has been studied both through the 
interpretation of the legal rules and through the analysis of the law in action. In 
particular, accounts of prosecutors’ professional culture have been constructed around 
three concepts: the cultural proximity between judges and prosecutors, the legality 
principle (not in relation to the way priorities can be determined, but to the way it 
shapes prosecutors’ role in the criminal justice system) and prosecutors’ function. 
Moreover, the impact of the 1989 reform appears particularly important. As we have 
pointed out (see chap. 2), this reform introduced adversarial principles into the Italian 
criminal justice system which, as a consequence, partially modified the status and the 
function of prosecutors.
Prosecutors are considered, especially after the 1989 reform, to be a party to 
criminal proceedings from the beginning o f the investigation.1 However, supporting 
the prosecution is not the only function of prosecutors. Prosecutors are also 
responsible for the correct application of the law (art. 73 and 74 ord. giud.).2 This 
seems to give to prosecutors a more neutral status: pubblici ministeri are parties 
because they must, now, be distinguished from the judges. But they should not 
prosecute at any cost, they should carry out their functions impartially.3 So, although 
prosecutors are functionally distinguishable from judges, both are seen as impartial 
figures.4 This is the traditional interpretation of prosecutorial functions.5 This 
interpretation developed under the pre-1989 code of criminal procedure and it was
1 See, for example, Della Casa F. “S oggettC . In Conso et al eds. (2003) op. cit. pp. 57-58.
~ Della Casa (2003) op. cit. p. 58.
J See, for example, Zanon and Biondi (2006) op. cit. p. 126.
4 Ibid. p. 132.
3 See, for example, Vassalli G. “la po testa  punitiva”. 1942. Torino: UTET. p. 180. See also Zanon and
Biondi (2006) op. cit. p. 132.
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confirmed by the Italian constitutional Court6 (the Court did not change its approach 
even when the adversarial reform took place in 19897). This interpretation can be 
supported by the fact that, in the current system, judges and prosecutors belong to the 
same professional category, share the same career path and can switch functions (see 
chap); the principle of compulsory prosecution applies; and prosecutors, like judges, 
are fully independent. Maddalena, who was the chief prosecutor in Turin and is 
considered to be a conservative (politically speaking) magistrate, believes that judges 
and prosecutors are and should always be part of the same professional category. He 
has said that it is crucial that the prosecutor is seen to act as a judge. This is vital when 
the investigation concerns persons who are important in the economic and/or political 
life of the country.9 Moreover, impartiality is fundamental during the investigation. If 
the investigation is not carried out impartially, it is not possible to search for and find 
the truth, which, in his view, should be prosecutors’ and judges’ aim.10
The legality principle is also understood as protecting prosecutors’ 
independent and neutral status and it seems to support the traditional interpretation of 
prosecutorial functions. This is considered to be the projection of the principle of 
equality within the Italian criminal justice system.11 Furthermore, art. 112 states that 
prosecutors are fully independent. This means that when they decide to prosecute a 
case or to drop a prosecution they are not subject to any external (i. e. executive) 
and/or internal power pressure (eg. from within the prosecution office or from other
i ^
higher judicial bodies, e. g. a chief prosecutor attached to the court of appeal).
The traditional interpretation has been criticized. For example, Grande 
believes that, after the 1989 adversarial reform, prosecutors became “straight
. i ^
accusers”. J In particular, she claims that art. 358 cpp does not ensure that
6 Zanon and Biondi (2006) op. cit. p. 133. See Corte cost. sent. n. 190/1970; n. 123/1971; n. 63/1972; 
and n. 96/1975.
7 Zanon and Biondi (2006) op. cit. p. 133. See Corte cost. sent. n. 88/1991.
8 M addalena said these things in 1993, in the middle o f  tangentopoli (see chap. 3 and 5). In particular, 
he referred to a famous prosecutor (Antonio Di Pietro, who is now a politician) who was one o f  those 
w ho started and conducted tangentopoli. Maddalena said that the country needs more “judges” like Di 
Pietro. This is in order to underline the importance o f  prosecutors’ impartiality in carrying out such 
difficu lt investigations.
9 M addalena M. “/ /  ruolo del pubblico ministero nel processo penale”. In Centro Nazionale di 
P revenzione e Difesa Sociale. Convegni di studio « E n r ic o  De N ic o la » :  Problemi attuali di diritto e 
procedra penale. “/ / pubblico ministero oggf\ 1994. Milano: Giuffre. pp. 49-53.
10 Ibid. pp. 47-53.
11 See, for exam p le, Zanon and Biondi (2006) op. cit. p. 135.
12 Ibid. p. 137. See also, Della Casa (2003) op. cit. p. 59. See also sent. Corte cost. n. 88/1991.
Ij Grande (2000) op. cit. p. 235.
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prosecutors act like neutral legal figures.15 This article has been interpreted as asking 
the prosecutor to collect the evidence in favour of the suspect only for the very limited 
purpose of deciding whether to prosecute or not. When the prosecutor has decided 
that the case is strong enough to go to trial, he has under no further obligation to
1 (\ 17search for exculpatory elements. Zanon and Biondi agree with this point of view 
and, like Grande, refer to Cordero who says: “if the prosecutor disregards [evidence 
favourable to the suspect], looking just in one direction, he/she risks a failure at trial 
or even before at the preliminary hearing; that the prosecutor must also consider the 
suspect’s side is a matter of elementary caution”.18 So, for these authors, after the 
1989 adversarial reform, prosecutors are not under the obligation of being impartial. 
They must pay attention to exculpatory evidence only to determine if they can obtain 
a conviction or not. So, in practice, prosecutors do not have to search for the legal and 
factual truth, they just have to assess inculpatory and exculpatory evidence in order to 
decide if the case can be sent to trial or the accusation has to be dropped.
The legal analysis that Grande makes o f the 1989 reform is not only important 
to determining if prosecutors are neutral figures or not. Grande claims that the reform 
has failed because of the strong Italian continental legal tradition which has created an 
institutional resistance that, together with remnants of old procedural inquisitorial 
tradition, have rendered the 1989 adversarial reform unsuccessful.19 Grande suggests 
that this reform was not ambitious enough and failed to modify the institutional
90structure." In particular, she refers to the fact that prosecutors and judges are still part 
of the same professional category (they are both magistrati) and that, as a
u This article says that: the prosecutor completes every activity which is necessary to comply with art. 
326 cpp and also takes into consideration the information favouring the person under investigation. Art. 
326 says that the prosecutor and the police perform activities aimed at implementing the penal action. 
In particular, prosecutors carry out investigation activities, supervise police’s investigation and, at the 
end, decide if the prosecution can be continued or if  it has to be dropped.
13 The pre-1989 inquisitorial code o f  criminal procedure focused more on prosecutors’ and examining 
judges’ neutrality. In fact, art. 299 stated that one o f  the duties o f  the examining judge was that o f
searching for the truth. The same principle applies for prosecutors (see art. 391 o f  the pre-1989 code o f
criminal procedure; see also Goldstein and Marcus (1977) op. cit. p. 256). The pretore  had a slightly 
different position. This figure has now been abolished (see chap. 9), but in the past it was dealing with 
the majority o f the cases. He was conducting the examination and he was also the judge (but there was 
a prosecutor as well). However, he was still considered an impartial figure (see Goldstein and Marcus 
(1977) op. cit. p. 256).
16 Grande (2000) op. cit. p. 235.
17 Zanon and Biondi (2006) op. cit. p. 134.
18 Cordero F. “Procedura penale”. 2000. 5th ed. Milano: Giuffre. p. 742.
19 Grande (2000) op. cit;, p. 256.20 ,
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21 • •consequence, they both share the same professional culture. In Grande’s view this
99situation denies defendants a fair trial according to adversarial principles. As she 
says: “given such a close relationship, can the defendant really be conceived of as 
benefiting from a level playing field with the Italian prosecutor in a situation in which 
the fact-finder is one of the prosecutor’s ‘colleagues’?”.23 So, the point that Grande 
tries to make is that the Italian criminal justice system is a hybrid one, where, together 
with adversarial principles, there are still strong inquisitorial features. The author 
claims that this is demonstrated by some of the legal rules introduced after 1989 and 
by constitutional Court decisions as well.24
Turning to the law in action, Di Fedrico claims that prosecutors are only 
formally neutral legal figures. Di Federico and Sapignoli conducted a large empirical 
study (involving 1000 lawyers): 48.8 % o f the lawyers interviewed reported that 
prosecutors do not comply with article 358 cpp which, as we have said, requires them
9Sto search for exculpatory evidence. The conclusions are, for example, that 
prosecutors do not respect the legal rules that require them to finish the investigation 
in a fixed time; that pre-trial custody is used to put pressure on accused persons even 
when there are no lawful justification to do so; and that witnesses are not free to 
report what they saw and heard, because prosecutors put a lot of pressure on them in 
order to be sure that they will support the prosecution’s version of events. However,
9 ftas Di Federico says, his research is only analyzing the lawyers’ perspective.
So, a number of authors claim that, de facto, during the pre-trial phase 
prosecutors do not act like neutral and impartial legal figures. The conclusion that Di 
Federico and Sapignoli reach from these elements is that the stance of the prosecutor 
within the Italian criminal justice system is that of the police officer. In particular, 
prosecutors are independent police officers who are free to investigate in the direction
9 7they want (so, the legality principle is not properly implemented). Di Federico
21 Ibid. pp. 236-237.
~2 Ibid. p. 237.
Ibid. p. 236.
24 Ibid. p. 238. See also, for example, Corte cost. sent. n. 254/1992; n. 255/1992; and n. 24/1992.
23 Di Federico G. and Sapignoli M. “Processo penale e diritti della difesa”. 2002. Roma: Carocci. p. 16. 
See also that 19.5% o f  the lawyers said that prosecutors search for exculpatory evidence only when the
counsel pushes them to do so. Finally, only 2.1% o f  the lawyers said that prosecutors always search for
exculpatory evidence.
'6 Di Fedrico and Sapignoli (2002) op. cit. p. 17.
27 Ibid. p. 16. See also, Di Federico G. “/ /  pubblico ministero: indipendenza, responsabilita, carriera  
separated. In Di Federico eds. (2004a) op. cit. p. 435.
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claims that this creates strong inequalities for accused persons and victims. This is 
because cases will not be treated in the same way. As a consequence, on one hand 
some accused persons can be subject to a more intensive investigation. On the other 
some victims may not be adequately protected, because the pubblico ministero has not 
chosen to concentrate on that specific case. In Di Federico’s view this implies that
->o
prosecutors are not impartial figures. Finally, the author considers that even the 
cultural proximity between judges and prosecutors does not render prosecutors 
impartial figures. On the contrary, judges are very much influenced by the decisions 
taken by prosecutors (with the consequence that the rights of the accused persons
90appear affected). So, in general, Di Federico’s analysis is aimed at demonstrating 
that those principles which should legally support prosecutors’ impartial status (i. e. 
the traditional interpretation) are, de facto, misapplied. According to the author, 
prosecutors abuse their investigative powers and influence judges in order to be sure 
that they will support the accusation. In the end, prosecutors appear to be directly 
focused on obtaining a conviction, with little consideration for the legal rules which 
require them to be more neutral.
Di Federico has also analyzed the mission that prosecutors believe themselves 
to have in the Italian criminal justice system. Research undertaken between 1964 and 
1966 showed that prosecutors (and instructing judges) perceived their function as 
something very much “detached” from the investigation. In particular, prosecutors 
almost considered it improper to involve themselves in the investigation and left these 
tasks to the police. On the other hand, research undertaken in the eighties and in the 
early nineties showed that young magistrati were much more interested in 
prosecutorial and investigating activities compared to the past and that the mission of 
prosecutors had changed. Prosecutors not only decide if  a crime was committed, but 
they also search for crime.
Both the legal and the law in action analysis suggest interesting 
considerations. The tension between the neutral/not-neutral status of prosecutors is 
clearly very important and it will be taken into account in this chapter. Moreover, Di 
Federico’s research on the way prosecutors work in practice provides a critical point
28 Di Fedrico and Sapignoli (2002) op. cit. pp. 107-112. See also, for example, Grande (2000) op. cit. 
pp. 240-241.
29 Ibid. pp. 122-133. Se also, Di Federico (2004a) op. cit. pp. 446-450.
J° Di Federico (2004a) op. cit. pp. 447-448.
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of view on the efficiency and efficacy of the practical application of some legal rules. 
In other words: Di Federico is suggesting that reality is very different from theory and 
that reality offends certain due process principles.
In this chapter we do not want to deny the importance of detailed legal 
analysis or of lawyers’ opinions to an understanding of prosecutors’ professional 
culture. However, we want to address different questions. First, what is prosecutors’ 
professional self-image? How do prosecutors understand their own professional 
culture? What is, in prosecutors’ view, the cultural proximity between them and 
judges (what we have called judicial culture)? Finally, is the legality principle really 
important to understanding and supporting prosecutors’ professional culture? And 
why? Subsequently we will move from prosecutors’ self-image to prosecutors’ 
professional values in practice. In particular, we will try to answer two questions. 
First, what is the aim of an investigation for prosecutors? Are they searching for the 
truth or trying to obtain a conviction? And, if they are searching for the truth, what are 
the differences between the truth prosecutors search for and find and the truth that 
judges try to find? Second, what is the meaning, in practice, of prosecutors’ judicial 
culture? In fact, we will see that this concept does not seem to be linked to 
impartiality, but to the attempt to construct and emphasize the chances to obtain a 
conviction.
Prosecutors’ professional culture will be also analyzed in the light of the 1989 
reform. Here we want to understand the impact that adversarial principles have had on 
prosecutors’ professional culture. Furthermore, we will try to explain how and why 
prosecutors have tried and try “to resist” the reform. Grande talks of institutional 
resistance, but she refers to the legal rules which show that adversarial principles are 
not entrenched in the Italian legal culture. In this chapter we want to do something 
different. We will exclusively concentrate on prosecutors and on the way they have 
reshaped adversarial principles to re-state their, de facto, inquisitorial professional 
culture.
2. Legal filters, not crime fighters
In the next two sections we will start to delineate prosecutors’ own image of their 
professional culture. We will try to explain the image that prosecutors have of
120
themselves and of their mission in the Italian criminal justice system. We will use two 
images that represent different forms of cultural pressure, crime fighter (in this 
section) and judge or judicial culture (in the next section), as terms of comparison. 
Crime fighters are clearly linked with the concept of crime control (related to 
efficiency, high rate o f conviction, administrative fact-finding model etc.). On the 
other hand, the idea of judicial culture is more closely related to the concept o f due 
process (legal controls, primacy of the individual, adjudicative fact-finding model 
etc.). No prosecutor is entirely a crime fighter or a judge: they all have elements of 
both tendencies which create a continuing tension in their professional practice. But 
the mix of the elements varies. To suggest that one image/model/concept could 
completely dominate the other would be as excessive as to suggest that functioning 
criminal justice systems can be either due process or crime control. Moreover, the 
tension between crime control-due process will be taken into account, but our aim is 
not only to apply these concepts to the Italian case. These will be used to understand 
how and why prosecutors’ self professional culture is different to that of the crime 
fighter. Moreover, we want to investigate the consequences of this cultural tension for 
prosecutors’ self image of their function.
The vast majority of the prosecutors we interviewed said that they are not 
crime fighters.33 Prosecutors indicated different reasons to support this assumption. 
The first one stems from the fact that prosecutors need to look and search for both 
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence:
There is a contrast between administrative and adjudicative fact-finding. They represent different 
value systems. In particular, administrative fact-finding serves the aims o f  crime control values. So, 
repression o f  criminal conduct is the most important function performed by the criminal process. As a 
consequence, this must be efficient and facts must be established as quickly as possible with routine 
procedures which do not rely on a formal process o f  examination. As we said, adjudicative fact-finding 
is more linked with due process values. In particular, the adjudicative fact-finding module rejects 
informal administrative fact-finding procedures aimed at discovering the factual guilt. The possibilities 
of error are high, so further scrutiny is necessary. This is why the importance o f  formal procedures 
which are not primarily focused on the efficiency o f  the criminal process is emphasized. Borrowing 
Herbert Packer’s words we could say that adjudicative fact-finding tries to correct the mistakes which 
could have been done in administrative fact-finding contexts. However, we must say that, although 
these two systems are clearly different, they are interconnected. In fact, it would be very difficult to 
find a criminal process system only based on administrative fact-finding or, vice versa, only based on 
adjudicative fact-finding. Within legal systems we can find features which belong to both these 
modules. See Packer H. L. “The limits o f  the criminal sanction”. 1968. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, pp. 149-173.
'2 Packer (1968) op. cit. p .154. See also, for example, See Sanders and Young (2007) op. cit. pp. 19-27. 
JJ 22 prosecutors said that they do not act like crime fighters. 1 did not answer clearly. 4 said that they 
act like crime fighters (see later).
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I believe that one o f  the most important elements o f  the Italian legal system is the culture 
o f giurisdizione,34 which must involve both judges and prosecutors. I like very much 
being a prosecutor, but I believe that I am working like a magistrate) and that this 
approach does not change just because I am a prosecutor. I believe that this [working like 
a magistrato\ leads me to search, also, for exculpatory evidence. And every time I 
discover that a crime was not committed I am very happy. I am very happy that my job is 
not evaluated on the numbers o f  convictions I get [ .. .]  No, not at all: neither prosecutors, 
nor the magistratura fight anything.35
Here there is also another important reason why prosecutors do not see 
themselves as crime fighters: the judicial culture of prosecutors. Prosecutors believe
"X f\that judges are their “colleagues” and that they share the same professional culture 
(i. e. the culture of giurisdizione). In the next section we will analyze in depth the 
concept of prosecutors’ judicial culture and we will see how important this is in 
shaping the perception that prosecutors have of their function and of the activities 
they have to carry out.
Another element that, according to Italian prosecutors, marks the difference 
between them and the crime fighters is the search for the truth:
No, he/she [the prosecutor] is not a crime fighter [ ...]  I am not a guard dog; at the same 
time I believe we are paid to do a job and we have to do it as well as we can. The good 
thing is that prosecutors are part o f the judiciary and that [as a consequence] we have to 
search for the truth, not to obtain convictions [as the crime fighter does].37
Prosecutors seem themselves as searching for the truth, and they perceive a 
cultural distance from the crime fighter because they believe these work to obtain 
convictions and not to search for the truth. So, Italian prosecutors see crime fighters as 
sort of partisan figures (legal actors who are not neutral and impartial);38 while their 
self professional culture designates them as impartial legal figures. Moreover, they
j4 We already explained (see chap. 6) that giurisdizione means “to apply the law”. However, in this 
case it is also used to remark that (according to this prosecutor) prosecutors and judges have the same 
professional culture (i. e. giurisdizione's culture based on impartiality, see later). 
j5 AP(N31). Similar opinions were expressed by other prosecutors. See, for example, AP(C47), 
CP(N43) and A P (N ll) .
j6 AP(N29). See also AP(N38). This prosecutor said that she would not be happy if  they are seen as 
police officers’ colleagues, because “we [prosecutors] studied to become prosecutors or judges”.
'7 APN(48). Similar opinions were expressed, for example, by AP(C53), and AP(N10).
jS AP(NIO) defined the crime fighter as “that one who supports the accusation even if  there are not
enough elements”. And he said that this is not prosecutors’ function.
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believe that within the Italian legal system the crime fighting function is fulfilled by
39the police.
Now, we have explained why prosecutors do not see themselves as crime 
fighters, but that raises the positive question, what is their function? And, more 
important, why is this different to that of the crime fighter? The analogy of the filter 
seems to be the best way to describe the way Italian prosecutors perceive their 
functions compared to crime fighters:
I do not think that we can be described in this way [as crime fighters], because 
prosecutors’ function is to be a filter between the police and crime repression.40 The 
prosecutor must be lucid, calm and objective. This, probably, can not be done if  you stay 
in the “front line” [as crime fighters do].41
I think that I am 50% investigator and 50% the person who has to read [and evaluate] the 
evidence. Yes, I think we are interfaces, who stay in between [the police and judges].42
The crime fighter is the police. I work very close to the crime fighter because I have to 
controllare43 that crime fighters follow the [legal] rules. So, I am very close to them, but 
I look at the things from a different angle.44
They [the police] have to discover and repress the crimes. We have to judge the persons 
who have been denunciated.45
You must be very well-balanced and you have to try to remain, and the majority [of 
prosecutors] do it, a magistrato. This is because when the police call and they say that 
the accused person is a criminal, we are slightly influenced. So, a prosecutor must say: 
he might be the worst criminal on earth, but we have legal rules which must be applied to 
everybody. No, I do not think I am acting like a crime fighter. On the contrary, I think 
that prosecutors’ function is to check that crime fighters follow the legal rules.46
39 See, for example, CP(N43), AP(N30), AP(N28) and AP(N44).
40 Here crime repression means the judge that, through the sentence, is repressing a crime.
41 AP(C53) Similar opinions were expressed, for example, by CP(N43) and AP(N32).
4J DCP(N45).
4j In this context this means to monitor and supervise and if  necessary direct so as to ensure that crime 
fighters follow the legal rules.
44 CP(N43).
45 AP(N41).
46 AP(N42). Similar opinions were expressed, for example, by AP(N41) and AP(N28).
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So, it seems that the meaning of filtering is strictly linked with the duty to 
provide legal supervision and to control the information that the police discover and 
the necessity to link the world inhabited by the police with the courtroom. The last 
example is interesting because it shows the stages through which a crime report and 
investigative results (provided by the police) need to pass. Moreover, and more 
important, it provides the prosecutors’ representation o f when they intervene and 
what, according to their self-image of their professional culture, they have to do. In 
particular, it seems that prosecutors have to determine if the evidence collected is 
admissible.47 This is in order to fulfil their duty to ensure that crimes are investigated 
and prosecuted following the legal rules. Crime fighting must be mediated through the 
controls of the law. In fact, one prosecutor said: “it is the law which fights the crime, 
not the judge [prosecutor]”.48 This means that crime fighting is seen as one o f the 
consequences of prosecutors’ legal filtering, but it is not regarded as the immediate 
aim. In particular, it becomes a consequence when legal rules authorize crime- 
fighting.49
From this perspective the cultural self-image of prosecutors appears to have a 
due process nature. Prosecutors’ approach is based on an adjudicative-fact finding 
procedure, more than an administrative fact-finding one, which is typical of crime 
control figures.50 In other words: prosecutors must decide if the evidence collected 
(mainly by the police, but the victim can play an important role as well (i. e. querela, 
see chap. 4) and the procedures used to discover them are legally acceptable. So, as 
legal filters, Italian prosecutors prevent cases which have not been legally investigated 
from becoming prosecuted cases. Moreover, prosecutors remark that one of their
47 In Italy illegally obtained evidence is not admissible and the judge can, at any time, declare the 
inadmissibility o f  a piece o f  evidence (see art. 190 and 191 cpp.; for the legal criteria determining the 
admissibility o f  evidence see art. 62, 63, 103, 195, 197, 203, 234, 240, 254, 270 and 271 cpp.). 
However, we should not limit the discussion to illegally obtained evidence. In fact, art. 189 cpp 
provides for any evidence which is not listed in code o f criminal procedure. These pieces o f  evidence 
are not a priori inadmissible. The judge decides on a single case basis and the parties can put forward 
their arguments. In any case, the judge can not accept evidence if  this is not useful to determine the 
facts and/or if  this prejudices the morality o f  the person involved. In particular, this means that 
evidence can not be accepted if it can incapacitate (even if  it is for a short period) a person. So, for 
example, hypnosis can not be accepted (see Grevi V. “Prove”, in Conso et al eds. (2003) op. cit. pp. 
296-298). For the law o f evidence in general see, for example, Grevi (2003) op. cit. pp. 283-362.
48 AP(N33). Similar opinions were expressed, for example, by AP(C53) and AP(C46). It is also 
interesting to note that AP(N33) uses the word judges to indicate prosecutors. This is still quite 
common between magistrati, politicians, journalists and the man in the street (see, for example, Di 
Federico (2004a) op. cit. p. 437).
49 See, for example, AP(C46) and AP(C53).
50 See Sanders and Young (2007) op. cit. pp. 19-27. See also, Packer (1968) op. cit. pp.149-173.
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functions during the pre-trial phase is to filter inadmissible evidence and that this puts 
them in a very different position compared to the crime fighter. This will be analyzed 
in detail in the next chapter when we will deal with the police-prosecutor relationship 
and we will see that pubblici ministeri not only filter and review information but they 
can also prompt and provide inputs on the way the investigation should develop.
Finally, there is another important consideration to make here. We said before 
that one of the reasons why Italian prosecutors do not believe that they act as crime 
fighters is that they have to search for the truth, while crime fighters are focused on 
obtaining convictions. But what kind of truth is that? This appears to be the “legal 
truth”. So, the facts must be analyzed and understood in the light of the legal rules. In 
other words, Italian prosecutors’ self-image of their professional culture is constructed 
in terms of searching for evidence of legal guilt (i. e. filtering, reviewing and 
prompting the search for information), which means that someone is not only guilty 
because the facts say so, but also because legal rules say that.51
3. Judicial culture
In this section we want to concentrate more on the judicial function of Italian 
prosecutors. By judicial culture one is referring to the claim of prosecutors to have the 
same professional culture that adjudicative magistrates have. This is what the majority
9^of the prosecutors we interviewed said. And no matter that some prosecutors 
recognize that the function they carry out is different to the function the judge must 
carry out, they still perceive this strong cultural proximity with judges.53 The 
consequence is that prosecutors consider that the decisions they take are taken as if 
they were judges. Moreover, we have already said that prosecutors’ judicial culture is 
one of the reasons why prosecutors refuse to be seen as crime fighters. In particular, 
prosecutors regard their professional culture as being the same as judges’ professional 
culture and very different compared to the police approach (which is, in prosecutors’ 
view, the approach that the crime fighter would have). In this section we will analyze
31 Packer (1968), op. cit. pp. 166-167.
32 16 prosecutors said that there is no difference between the approach that they have and that judges 
have. 7 said that there is a difference (see below). 3 said that they are partially different compared to 
judges. These claim to have a different approach (and a different “knowledge” o f  the case, see later) 
when they have to investigate, but that they act like judges when they have to evaluate the evidence 
collected. 1 did not clearly answer.
53 See, for example, AP(N29), APApl.(N50) and CP(N43).
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the meaning that judicial culture has within prosecutors’ professional cultural self- 
image and why prosecutors believe that, in practice, they act like judges.
The first question is: what do we mean by the prosecutors’ judicial culture? 
There could be a different approach [between judges and prosecutors] but this would be 
a problem. It is a matter o f  the function you are carrying out. So if  I am a judge I have to 
think according to certain rules; on the other hand if  I am a prosecutor I have think in a 
slightly different way. However, there is something which must never change: 
impartiality. Both prosecutors and judges must be terziu  and impartial. The prosecutor is 
a third party55 and must be above the parties. Prosecutors must, sometimes, judge like 
judges?6
This example seems clear. Prosecutors eventually admit that the tasks they 
carry out are different compared to the tasks judges carry out. So, prosecutors are 
functionally different compared to judges. However, although the function is 
different, the cultural proximity between judges and prosecutors is still asserted 
because prosecutors must be (according to their professional self-image) impartial like 
judges. So, impartiality is what defines the cultural proximity between these two legal 
actors and, more important, appears to be the very nature of prosecutors’ judicial 
culture. Moreover, the functional difference between judges and prosecutors and 
prosecutors’ impartial status imply (for prosecutors’ own professional culture) that, in 
Italy, pubblici ministeri are a party, but they are neutral and impartial:
In fact, even if  prosecutors are a party to the proceedings, we are a body which is part o f  
the state and which must be impartial [ ...]  So, we are pursuing justice and the correct 
application o f the law. As a consequence we are a party like the counsel, but we are a 
veiy particular party: we are a public party. So, our aim is to pursue the correct 
application o f  the law and we have to do it impartially. This is what we have in common 
with adjudicative magistrates.57
The second question is: what is the link between prosecutors’ judicial culture 
and their functions and aims? Prosecutors claim that there is no difference between 
their approach and judges’ approach because they both search for the truth:
34 This literally means third. In this context it means that prosecutors (and judges) must be independent 
and must not be influenced by the parties.
”  This means that prosecutors are a party, but they are neutral and impartial like judges.
36 APApl.(N50). Similar opinions on the fact that prosecutors must be impartial like judges were 
expressed, for example, by AP(N29), AP(N33) and AP(C47).
57 AP(N39). Similar opinions were expressed, for example, by AP(N38), AP(C46) and APApl.(N50).
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In fact, there should be no differences [between judges and prosecutors]. This is because 
the prosecutor is a magistrato  who is searching for the truth [ ...]  but the prosecutor is 
also a public body, as a consequence his ideas about a case should not be preconceived 
[i. e. to consider the accused person(s) guilty a priori] Sometimes, not often, I conclude 
the trial asking for an acquittal. We do not support a thesis because we have to, but 
because we are searching for the truth.58
In the previous section we explained that searching for the truth is seen by 
prosecutors as one of their tasks and it is one of the reasons why they do not want to 
be seen as crime fighters. For Italian prosecutors, this aim can only be carried out by 
thinking and working like judges. Moreover, prosecutors seem sure that the truth they 
find is the truth the judge will find. They say that there are only very few cases when 
they send a case to trial and they have some doubts about the fact that the judge will 
convict the accused person(s).59
Prosecutors also say that they must be impartial like judges because they do 
not support one side (the accusation), but rather present both inculpatory and 
exculpatory evidence:
I am a public body which is working for the state. So, I support the accusation when I 
have enough evidence, but, probably, I drop 90% o f  the cases. Moreover, I often take 
decisions to help the accused person(s); sometimes I even do it before the counsel or, 
often, without saying anything to the counsel, because sometimes there are not good 
lawyers or they do not have a good relationship with their clients. So, everyday I take 
many decisions which protect the accused person(s). This is an impartial approach.60
We have already discussed this issue in explaining the difference between 
prosecutors and crime fighters. However, here (as we said above for the search for the 
truth) it is interesting to note that this prosecutor connects the function of searching 
for exculpatory evidence with his impartial approach to the cases; and not, for 
example, with the fact that this approach would give him a better idea about what to 
do during the trial and, as a consequence, to enhance his chances to obtain a 
conviction.
AP(C53). Similar opinions were expressed, for example, by AP(N29) and AP(C46).
~} See AP(N48), AP(N31) and AP(N38). O f course defence lawyers often argue that this is because 
adjudicative magistrates accept too readily arguments from their fellow magistrates the prosecutors. 
See, for example, Di Federico and Sapignoli (2002) op. cit.
60 AP(C47). Similar opinions were expressed, for example, by AP(N38), A P(N 11) and AP(N31).
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The very last issue we want to treat here concerns the point the prosecutors’ 
remark that the cultural proximity between them and judges is stronger:
It is true that prosecutors must support the accusation, but before doing that they have to 
act and think like judges. Prosecutors must ask themselves the same questions that 
judges ask themselves [ ...]  A good prosecutor must be the judge o f  h im self and the 
judge o f  the case. If he solves the case, because he believes that the accused person(s) is 
guilty, he will support the accusation. However, before doing that he must be a judge. In 
fact, we do it [judging] when we decide to send the case to trial or to ask for the 
archiviazione.6]
So, prosecutors’ judicial culture appears particularly important during the pre­
trial phase (i. e. the moment when they decide to send the case to trial or to ask for 
archmazione). In particular, prosecutors believe that they act like judges when they 
have to evaluate the evidence collected during the investigation:
When the prosecutor has to evaluate the evidence he must be like a judge. He must say if  
there is enough evidence to support the accusation during the trial.62
To conclude, judicial culture appears important to prosecutors’ professional 
cultural self-image because it is the basic principle which they see as shaping their 
activities. The cultural proximity between judges and prosecutors is seen as the basis 
of prosecutors’ impartial approach and of prosecutors’ golden principle that they are a 
party but they are neutral and impartial. Moreover, as we saw, it is impartiality (i. e. 
the judicial culture) which requires prosecutors to search for the truth, to search for 
exculpatory evidence and to evaluate the evidence like a judge. So, prosecutors’ 
professional cultural self-image seems, today, mainly judicial. This corroborates what 
we said in the previous section: prosecutors’ cultural self-image is that of a due 
process figure. Moreover, it reinforces the idea that, for pubblici ministeri, legal 
filtering (the main prosecutors’ function) is a judicial stage where legal issues 
deriving from the investigation are evaluated by prosecutors thinking like judges. 
Finally, the importance of prosecutors’ judicial culture is not surprising, given that 
one common principle informing prosecutorial functions is their quasi-judicial status 
(i. e. “scrutinizing the weight of the prosecution evidence impartially and fairly”).63
61 AP(N41). Similar opinions were expressed, for example, by AP(N48), DCP(N45) and AP(N28).
62 DCP(N45).
6j Jackson (2004) op. cit. p. 112. However, this quasi-judicial function can be interpreted in different 
ways, depending on resources, the institutional and legal framework and prosecutors’ legal culture
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These are the conclusions we can reach from the opinions of the majority of 
our interviewees. However, we found some exceptions.64 In particular, three said 
prosecutors are accusers (but not crime fighters).65 These are very important 
exceptions, because the reason given for the different perspective is linked to the view 
that, during the investigation, pubblici ministeri have a “different contact with reality” 
in comparison with judges. We will analyze the meaning of having a “different 
contact with the reality” (and the consequences that this creates) when we will deal 
with prosecutors’ professional culture in practice. Here we want to focus on different 
exceptions. Four prosecutors claimed to have a different approach to that of judges 
because they are not neutral and impartial:66
The judge is super partes. I was a judge for 20 years and then I have been (and still am) 
a prosecutor for 20 years. It is a completely different function, because the prosecutor 
must search for the evidence. I think that a prosecutor must favour the prosecution: my 
duty is to develop all the elements which support the accusation, then, maybe, I ask for 
an acquittal.67
This example is clear: prosecutors cannot be impartial and they have to 
develop the elements which support the accusation. This is the opposite of a judicial 
culture. The unsurprising consequence of this radically different approach is that these
r O
prosecutors see themselves as crime fighters. So, judicial culture seems to mark the 
difference between prosecutors who, according to their cultural self image, act like 
judges and legal filters and prosecutors acting like crime fighters. Legal filters believe 
that their judicial culture is a fundamental principle which shapes their decisions and 
function. On the other hand, crime fighters believe that being impartial is not part of 
their professional culture.
We must add that three out of four prosecutors who said they considered 
themselves as crime fighters were born, studied, worked and currently work in a big 
prosecution office in the south of Italy. The fourth prosecutor is currently the chief of 
a procura based in the north, but he has spent most of his professional life in the south 
of Italy (and he was bom there as well). All these prosecutors had to do or have to do
(ibid., pp. 112-116). In the next sections we will try to explain (also) the practice o f  judicial culture in 
Italy.
64 See above footnote n. 52.
65 AP(N32), AP(N30) and AP(N42).
66 DCP(S5), CP(S4), AP(N6) and CP(N40).
67 DCP(S5). Similar opinions were expressed by CP(S4), AP(N6) and CP(N40).
68 DCP(S5), CP(S4), AP(N6) and CP(N40).
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with a criminal environment which is very much influenced by organized crime. In 
fact, these are the kinds of prosecutors who, in Italy, are considered to be “in the front 
line” fighting organized crime. The consequences are that they face a very violent 
form of criminality and they may fall into very dangerous situations.69 Of course, 
prosecutors can be involved in dangerous investigation in the north of Italy as well.70 
However, there is no doubt that “the front line” is now (and has been for a long time) 
in the south.71 It is not the purpose of the current study to analyze in depth the 
consequences that organized crime can have on prosecutors’ professional culture. 
However, working and, perhaps more important, living in such a difficult 
environment may explain why these prosecutors have the feeling that they are fighting 
something.
4. Legality principle
The legality principle is, as we said, considered to be central in developing the 
concept of prosecutors’ external independence and it is the projection, within the 
criminal justice system, of the principle of equality. These are the legal rules. Here we 
want to understand the impact that this principle has in shaping prosecutors’ 
professional cultural self-image. But, at this stage, we will only briefly deal with the 
way prosecutors define their priorities (see chap. 9). In this section we want to explore 
the link between prosecutors’ view of the legality principle and their professional 
cultural self-image.
The faith that Italian prosecutors have in the legality principle is not affected 
by any of the common criticisms that one can make which question the extent to 
which the principle is reflected by practice. Even those prosecutors who admitted that 
there are systems to avoid prosecuting or folly investigating certain cases which are 
not considered important, are firmly convinced that the legality principle is
69 One prosecutor CP(N40) was escorted for a few years and had soldiers guarding his house 24 hours a
day.
70 There are many cases o f prosecutors who live and work in the north o f  Italy and are escorted by the 
police. Normally these pubblici ministeri have dealt with and/or are dealing with terrorism and/or 
organized crime. In particular, we interviewed a prosecutor (AP(N48) who was escorted for four years, 
because he dealt with an important organized crime case.
71 Another front line could still be, arguably, in Milan because o f  tangentopoli. The same could be said 
for all those prosecution offices where criminal proceedings involving high ranked politicians initiated.
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necessary.72 Moreover, prosecutors do not believe that having a set of priorities (for 
example, decided within the office or based on personal reasons, see chap. 9) affects 
the legality principle.73 In fact, the very nature of the legality principle does not seem 
to concern when and how a case is dealt with by them; rather it implies that, sooner or 
later, the case will be dealt with:74
So, this [the legality principle] is [important] for prosecutors and forjudges as well. This 
is because the law requires that all the crimes must be prosecuted. It does not really 
matter if some crimes are prosecuted before and better when compared to others. This is 
normal. The point is that, sooner or later, all crimes must be prosecuted.75
The bottom line, the moment when the legality principle is affected, is when 
prosecution is blocked because ofprescrizione :
If I leave the files in the in the closet for too long there will be prescrizione. This is a de 
facto violation o f  the legality principle, because there is prescrizione. It happens, it 
happens for sure.77
A chief prosecutor, who directs a medium to large prosecution office in the 
north of Italy, claims to have achieved the remarkable result that, in his prosecution 
office, there are no offences for which prosecution becomes impossible because of 
prescrizione. He explained this result as a fully effective application of the legality
72 See, for example, AP(N10), AP(N38) and AP(N42).
7j See, for example, AP(N41), AP(N1), AP(N2) and AP(N3). However, we can refer to all the 
prosecutors, because they all said that there are priorities, but that this does not conflict with the 
legality principle.
'4 Only one prosecutor, AP(N10), said: “the more the time passes, the more is difficult that a case is 
treated or that it is properly treated”.
73 AP(C53). Similar opinions were expressed, for example, by AP(N30), CP(S4) and APApl.(N50).
76 This legal concept indicates that there is a limitation o f  actions. Prosecutors have a time limit to put
forward the accusation. This is not fixed, but it depends from the crime which has been committed (the 
more the crime is serious, the more there is time, some crimes can always be prosecuted). It is also 
important to know that the fact that a trial has begun does not block the time limit. So, as it happened 
for some o f  the trials involving Italy’s Prime Minister Berlusconi (and for many other important and
less important cases), a criminal process can arrive, for example, at the court o f  appeal and then is 
blocked (by the judge) because o f  prescrizione. In these situations the accused person(s) is de facto 
acquitted. He/she is not formally innocent (sometimes they are clearly guilty) but he/she can not be 
prosecuted and/or tried anymore (or any longer) for that crime. We should also add that prescrizione 
could have consequences for prosecutors’ career. Being seen to have allowed prescrizione to take place 
deliberately could involve ministerial and CSM disciplinary hearings. One prosecutor (APN38) said: 
“The legality principle is a false problem. There are many ways [including waiting until prescrizione 
arrives] not to apply it. Then you can be sorry, there is a disciplinary proceedings, but how can you 
prove this was intentional? You just made a mistake”. See also Sarzotti who claims that, in recent 
years, prescrizione has been a de facto amnesty (i. e. cases that are not considered important are not 
treated and prescrizione legally eliminates them after a certain period o f  time). Sarzotti (2008) op. cit. 
pp. 41-42.
77 AP(N48). Similar opinions were expressed, for example, by AP(N41) and AP(N10).
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principle, with no concern for the fact that some cases are treated before others and
78  •that the amount of time spent to deal with cases can be different. This seems to 
confirm what Nelken and Zanier have found. In particular, the when and the how of 
prosecuting cases is regarded (by prosecutors) as a limited and acceptable
79discretionary power.
Why do Italian prosecutors have this great faith in the legality principle?
The legality principle is a very fair principle, because it creates a real equality before the 
law. This is a cause o f pride for this country [Italy]. Moreover, this [equality] has been 
proved by famous cases, where important persons have been prosecuted.80
This statement summarizes the aim that, in prosecutors’ view, the legality 
principle must achieve. Prosecutors believe that art. 112 cost, is the projection in the 
criminal justice system of art. 3 cost., which states that all citizens are equal before the 
law.81 Moreover, prosecutors also believe that the legality principle protects 
prosecutors’ external and full independence from the executive power. So, the 
prosecutors’ view corresponds to the interpretation that the major legal academic 
commentary and the constitutional Court have of the legality principle (see above). 
The consequence, according to prosecutors, is that all cases will be treated in the same 
way, no matter who are the accused person(s) and/or the victim(s):
No, it [the legality principle] might seem an obstacle, but, in fact, it is an important help, 
because all the persons [involved in the investigations] and the investigations are equal.83
However, even if prosecutors’ faith in the legality principle remains 
untouched, some prosecutors recognize that this provision creates some problems:
In practice, given that our criminal law code is stuffed by too many crimes, it [the 
legality principle] is an obstacle. This is because I am obliged to deal, in the same way, 
with neighbours who had an argument and insulted each other and with robbers.84
78 CP(N43).
79 Nelken and Zanier (2006) op. cit.
80 AP(N33).
81 AP(N30) said: “I believe that the legality principle is a corollary o f  the principle which states that all 
the citizens are equal before the law [...]  I put forward the state’s demand for punishment; and I do it 
from the starting point that every citizen are equal before the law”. Similar opinions were expressed, 
for example, by AP(N33), AP(N28) and AP(N10).
82 See, for example, DCP(N45) and AP(N29).
s’ AP(C47). Similar opinions were expressed, for example, by AP(N42), AP(C54) and AP(C46).
84 AP(N32). Similar opinions were expressed, for example, by AP(N49), AP(S6) and CP(S4).
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A chief prosecutor of a big prosecution office in the south gave more specific 
examples:
We are still dealing with things like ricettazione [handling or receiving stolen goods] o f  
insurance forms85 [...]  you tell me if  I have to spend time doing these things. Moreover, 
until a few years ago we were bound to prosecute those who did not pay the TV licence.
So, at that time the TV licence was something like 1000 liras [around 30 pence, this was 
the value o f  1000 liras] and the proceedings were costing 10.000 liras [around £3].86 [O f 
course, these are not the exact figures; but they were used to explain the considerable 
amount o f money which was wasted for these proceedings].
So, unsurprisingly, the problem is that there are too many cases to treat and 
that prosecutors do not have any power to drop the unimportant files. Prosecutors 
propose different solutions to these problems: the organization of the prosecution
on
office could be improved to find the best practices to deal with volume crimes; the 
government should pass legislation to provide tools to deal with volume crimes 
faster;88 the government should provide more resources;89 and, more important, the 
parliament should pass legislation aimed at de-penalizing certain minor offences .90
However, it is important to underline that none of the prosecutors we 
interviewed said that amending the legality principle is an option to solve the 
problems that the application of this principle causes. In particular, it appears that, in 
general, there is a great resistance to solutions which imply substantial discretionary 
choices. Some prosecutors suggested that the legality principle could be partially 
moderated with the introduction of (more) exceptions, but still it has to remain the 
basic principle.91 Some others accept that the parliament92 and/or very high ranking 
magistrati, like chief prosecutors and the prosecutor general attached at the corte di
8' In these cases people who did not pay their insurance (mainly car-insurance) create false forms 
which say the contrary. So, in practice, this is a fraud for the insurance company because they receive 
the documents which say that the customer has paid, but then they discover that he/she did not pay. O f 
course, this also has an impact in case o f  car accident, because the victim may believe that the 
perpetrator is insured. This prosecutor explained that, after years o f  case law, the trend is to label these 
crimes as handling and/or receiving stolen goods.
86 CP(S4).
87 See, for example, CP(N43) and AP(N33).
ss See, for example, DCP(N45) and AP(S6).
89 See, for example, DCP(N45) and AP(N29).
90 See, for example, AP(C47), AP(N44), DCP(N45) and AP(N29).
91 See, for example, AP(N33) who suggests to apply the expediency principle only for certain (minor) 
crimes and to introduce the principle o f  lieve entita del fa tto  (limited damage caused by the crime); and 
AP(N44) who suggests to increase the number o f  crimes which can only be prosecuted under the 
condition o f a victim’s formal complaint (i. e. querela).
92 See, for example, AP(N49) and AP(N44).
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cassazione93, should be able to issue general guidelines on priorities. In one case one 
prosecutor even said that the Minister of Justice should be able to set priorities; but he 
also specified that these priorities should not constitute a “binding directive”.94 In fact, 
prosecutors see more problems than positive aspects in a system based on the 
expediency principle (no matter who has to determine priorities) if  this is based on 
binding inputs. In particular, they claim that, without the legality principle, equality 
before the law would be jeopardized:
Never the minister or the Parliament [to issue binding directives]. This would be the 
defeat o f justice and o f the principle o f  equality.95
Moreover, inequalities are not only the result o f decisions taken by political 
bodies. There could be unequal consequences even if priorities were set by high 
ranking magistrate
Within our legal system it [the legality principle] is absolutely necessary, because, 
otherwise [if every prosecution office decides], there will be many little republics, where 
the chief prosecutor will set the priorities.96
In this case the example of prosecution offices as “little republics” was used to 
underline the consequences in terms of inequality that the amendment of the legality 
principle would create.
The refusal of discretionary choices is just the consequence of the fact that, as 
we said, prosecutors’ view of the legality principle is based on the indissoluble link 
between compulsory prosecution and equality before the law. In other words: the 
expediency principle (the opposite of the legality principle) implies discretionary 
choices and this, in prosecutors’ view, would undermine equality before the law. So, 
for Italian prosecutors there is no equality without the legality principle. However, 
there seems to be another very important corollary which derives from prosecutors’ 
interpretation of art. 112:
I think it [the legality principle] is a guarantee, because it prevents very dangerous 
discretionary judgements. First o f all, this is a guarantee for prosecutors, who can not be
9j See, for example, AP(S6) and AP(N10). See also, AP(N38) who is very much in favour o f  CSM ’s 
circulars which define priorities.
94 APApl.(N50). A similar opinion was expressed by AP(N41).
95 AP(N33). See also AP(C46).
96 AP(N48).
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criticized for the decisions they take. They can not be suspected o f  playing a doppio
97gioco.
So, prosecutors believe that their cultural self-image of neutral and impartial 
legal figures is emphasized by the legality principle. This constitutional provision 
seems to provide a formal protection for prosecutors from suspicions or allegations of 
prosecuting a case for reasons other than the purely legal. This has not prevented 
prosecutors from being accused many times over the last 20 years of using their 
powers to attack members of some political parties (see chap. 5). However, in a 
country like Italy, where corruption is great, but the fear of being suspected of 
corruption is even greater, prosecutors have a strong formal legal basis for their 
actions which make it difficult to prove that they are serving interests which are not 
merely legal.
Thus, in the end, the legality principle is important to the construction of 
prosecutors’ cultural self-image because, together with prosecutors’ judicial culture, it 
is seen as formally expressing prosecutors’ neutral and impartial nature. In 
prosecutors’ view equality and neutrality are not only guarantees which protect 
victims and accused persons. These are principles that, through the interpretation and 
the application of the legality principle, protect and enhance prosecutors’ professional 
cultural self-image.
So far our argument has been focused on prosecutors’ self perception of their 
functions. In the next section we want to examine the extent to which prosecutors’ 
practice reflects their own professional self-image. We have to remember that this 
analysis will be based on (and limited to) our empirical sources (i. e. interviews with 
different actors). So, although we have not been able to observe prosecutors in action 
nor to examine case-files, the interview evidence gives, at least, an indication of 
weaknesses in the self-image of prosecutors as an accurate portrayal of reality.
” AP(C53). Similar opinions were expressed, for example, by AP(N29), APApl.(N50), AP(N31) and 
DCP(N45). Doppio gioco  literally means double game. In this context it means that prosecutors can not 
be accused to prosecute (or not to prosecute) a case to favour someone or something. The legality 
principle imposes them to prosecute all the crimes.
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5. Practice and the prosecutors’ professional self-image
Prosecutors’ self professional culture is built around the dogma that prosecutors are a 
party, but they are neutral and impartial. This is clearly emphasized by concepts like 
judicial culture and by prosecutors’ view of the legality principle. Here we want to 
analyze the elements which, in practice, may put into question prosecutors’ 
professional culture and show the real nature of prosecutorial functions and of 
prosecutors’ judicial culture. Eventually, this will also show that legal filtering does 
not appear to be a judicial stage where prosecutors act like judges, but the moment 
when opportunities to obtain a conviction are constructed.
As we said before the vast majority of the prosecutors we interviewed claim 
that the cultural proximity between them and judges is very clearly perceptible during 
the pre-trial stage, no matter if the function is different. However, can we really say 
that, in Italy, there is no difference between prosecutors’ and judges’ approach? We 
believe we can start answering this question by analyzing the nature of the truth for 
which prosecutors search: is this the same truth that the judge will, eventually, 
establish?
In fact, it seems that prosecutors consider that judges “can not see very much” : 
The judge sees what he can see and he does not see very much. We, as a party, should 
explain and demonstrate [to the judge] as much as we can, but, sometimes, it is 
difficult.98
Another prosecutor emphasized the fact that the judge does not understand the 
difficulties of the investigation:
However, I think that the difference [between judges and prosecutors] stems from the 
different knowledge [of the case]. Moreover, the other side [the judge] does not 
understand the investigation [ ...]  So, you feel that it is not possible [for the judge] to 
understand the difficulties o f  an investigation, and this is a problem because you feel that 
the other side [the judge] believes that you can do things that you can not d o .99
So, it seems that prosecutors believe that, compared to judges, they are aware 
of more and different elements which enable them to understand the case and to deal
98 AP(N38). Similar opinions were expressed, for example, by AP(N1), AP(N44), AP(N2), AP(N48)
and AP(N3).
99 AP(N44).
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with it. This means, in prosecutors’ view, that they have more elements to find the 
truth, which is, as we said, prosecutors’ aim. But can this “difference of knowledge” 
mark, at the end, a substantial difference between the truth that prosecutors find and 
the truth that judges will, eventually, find?
I believe that prosecutors, together with police officers, have a better contact with social 
reality [compared to judges]. This is definitely positive, because you realize what you 
have to do [...] Sometimes one can have the feeling that the judge is sitting there and he 
does not realize what is going on. So, he becomes a teorico del diritto ,100 As a 
consequence the judge does not realize that certain investigations cannot be carried out 
or that I did not start them because I know that they would not have led to anything and 
that they were useless [...] So, the majority o f  the judges are not connected with real life 
[...]  The prosecutor does not have this problem.101
So, this pubblico ministero claims that prosecutors have a closer contact with 
the practical difficulties and consequences that a crime creates; while judges are 
sometimes more focused on the theoretical application of the law. One prosecutor 
explained her frustration when she has to communicate certain “feelings” to the judge: 
Yes, during the last turno arrestati they [the police] had arrested an accused. Then 
they were thinking all night long about the technical legal typology o f  the crime he 
committed. At the end they arrested him for handling stolen goods. The judge did not 
validate the arrest103 [and the accused was released]. The police officer said: “next time 
he [the judge] receives a false insurance form [see above], then he will validate the 
arrest”. It seems that [ ...]  if  it does not happen to you, you do not realize how serious the 
situation can be. This is what the police perceive and this is what we perceive, because 
we see what is happening, they [judges] just read it.104
So, it appears that, in practice, there is a substantial difference between the 
truth that prosecutors see and the truth that judges will find. Prosecutors perceive this 
difference and try to limit it. Prosecutors’ approach to the crime is different compared
100 This literally means a theorist o f  the law. In particular, here it means someone who knows the black 
letter o f the legal rules, but who does not know the pre-existing context and the consequences o f  the 
practical application o f the law.
101 AP(N32). See also AP(N49) who said that being a prosecutor means that you have more chances 
(compared to judges) to have an impact on the reality; AP(N30) who said that prosecutors have a more 
pragmatic approach; AP(N42) who said that judges are more “detached” from the case.
102 Another name for what some prosecutors called the turno reperibilita  (see chap. 6) which consists 
in dealing with all the urgent matters like arrests, seizures etc.
IOj Prosecutors must (within 48 hours) bring the arrested accused person(s) before a judge who must 
validate the arrest (and maybe agree for pre-trial measures) otherwise the arrested person(s) are 
immediately set free (art. 379-391 cpp).
104 AP(N2). See also AP(N1) and AP(N3).
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to judges’ approach because prosecutors are in a “different position”. In particular, 
pubblici ministeri are very much influenced by their closer contact with ‘reality’, by 
the information they receive during the investigation (mainly from the police) and by 
the pressure that dealing with a criminal case creates:
The judge has a different position. This is because the judge has a mente fredda\ while 
the prosecutor acts under pressure, he has to deal with urgent matters and he is being 
pressured into doing something. The judge has the chance to apply the law as it has to be 
applied. So, the judge is more detached [from the case] and, as a consequence, he can 
interpret the law as it should be interpreted by everybody. This happens because the 
judge is detached from the reality o f that particular case.106
Another prosecutor said:
In fact, to be honest, when we prepare our conclusions we tend to be braver [compared to 
judges]. For example, it has happened, sometimes, with pre-trial custody measures. In 
these cases we have thought there were the conditions [to impose pre-trial custody] but 
the judge did not think so. This has mainly happened when we have to put together 
records o f incoming and out-coming calls, telephone tapping, controls on where and 
when an accused person(s) has moved etc. In these cases we tend to interpret the facts in 
our favour. On the other had, the judge, because there is a pre-trial custody to give, is 
much more careful. However, if  there is a punishment to request there is not a huge 
difference [...]  I believe that, in practice, there is a difference [between judges’ and 
prosecutors’ professional culture] [ ...]  Anyway, sometimes you tend to interpret [in your 
favour] because o f the investigation [...]  Maybe this is a mistake, but there should be no 
difference between prosecutors’ and judges’ approach.107
This example is very interesting. This prosecutor explained very clearly the 
link between the investigation and the way prosecutors take their decisions. 
Moreover, she, like the vast majority of the prosecutors we interviewed, claims that 
there should be no difference between prosecutors’ and judges’ professional culture. 
However, she also said that in practice the approach is different. This difference is 
determined by the way the investigation results are perceived and interpreted. Some 
other prosecutors were not as clear when they explained the impact that the 
investigation has on the decisions they have to take. But, as we said before, they
l(b This literally means cold mind. In this case this expression means that the judge is not immediately 
and directly involved in the case. So, he is “colder” (compared to the prosecutor) when he has to deal 
with the case.
106 AP(N42).
107 AP(N38). Similar opinions were expressed, for example, by AP(N31) and AP(N44).
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talked about the “things that judges do not see”;108 the “feelings that judges can not 
perceive”;109 and that judges do not have the same contact with the reality.110
So, to see prosecutors as neutral and impartial judicial figures is problematic 
in that their relationship to criminal acts and investigations is crucially different to 
that of the judge. They supervise police investigations and determine what 
information gathered during the investigation should be passed to the judge. Thus, 
they present evidence to the judge to convince him or her that their interpretation of 
events is correct: they are thus functionally a party to proceedings. But prosecutors do 
not see this as meaning that they are not neutral and impartial. They see themselves as 
providing a neutral judicial filter which ensures that certain forms of information 
brought to them by investigators which is unduly prejudicial or fails legal tests for 
admissibility will not be seen by the judge. But while prosecutors see this legal 
filtering as a judicial role it inevitably means that their judicial distance from the 
prejudicial information and opinion thrown up by the police is compromised. In the 
end, the consequence is the prosecutors’ search for the truth takes place in a different 
context: that of an awareness of a wider-range of information, some of it illegally or 
unfairly obtained, some of it prejudicial or emotionally charged but not formally 
legally relevant or of doubtful or limited relevance, most of it untested by informed 
dialogue between parties. Judges search for the truth with an awareness of less 
information which has already received a preliminary legal filtering.
So, prosecutors’ impartiality, which is such an important feature of their self 
image, is eventually stained by the investigation and by the close relationship between 
prosecutors and the police. Now, the question is: what is left o f prosecutors’ judicial 
culture? Surely this concept can not be interpreted as prosecutors' self professional 
culture suggests. However, we do not believe that judicial culture is only the result of 
Italian prosecutors’ vivid imagination. This concept appears to have an important 
function even for prosecutors’ professional culture in practice:
At the end o f  the day I always try to take decisions as if  I am a judge. So, let us say that I 
have 100 files, I will probably ask for the archiviazione for 50% o f  these Tiles, because it
108 See above, AP(N38) and, similarly, AP(N44).
109 See above, AP(N2), AP(N1) and AP(N3).
110 AP(N32).
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is the law which says that you have to drop the accusation if  you do not have a high 
probability o f  obtaining a conviction111 [ ...]  So, in general, when I implement the penal 
action, I try to think like a judge and to decide according to the evidence that the judge 
will probably have. This is because it is useless to begin a prosecution which will end 
with an acquittal. If I implement the penal action I always try to foresee what can 
happen.112
This is a good example of what prosecutors see judicial culture as being for: it 
gives them greater capacity to evaluate the chances of obtaining a conviction. O f 
course, even this prosecutor claimed his impartial status, like a judge. But we saw that 
this does not seem to be possible. So, how can we put together judicial culture and 
prosecutors’ exposure to a range of influences that erode their capacity to maintain 
judicial distance? Judicial culture’s primary effect is not to preserve neutrality, but to 
enable pubblici ministeri to evaluate the evidence with enough judicial distance to 
anticipate a judge’s reaction. This means to assess and increase the possibilities to 
obtain a conviction and, as a consequence, it can substantially help to have a better 
case. This seems to imply that prosecutors value their ‘judicial culture’ for utilitarian 
reasons based on efficiency. In other words: it is a waste of time to put cases before 
judges to have them rejected. However, this also appears to suggest that pubblici 
ministeri value their ‘judicial culture’ because they value due process and legal values 
themselves. Moreover, there is an effect for accused persons as well that their case 
will not only be treated from the police’s perspective.
So, in practice, the effect of legal filtering is not that of emphasizing the 
neutrality of the investigation. This is because the specific context of prosecutorial 
decision-making makes neutrality problematic in practice (even assuming that 
neutrality and investigation are theoretically compatible). Illegally obtained evidence 
will be disregarded and legal filtering will still be the moment when prosecutors 
decide if a crime has been committed and if they have enough evidence to prove it. 
However, the aims of legal filtering are a) to enable judges to make decisions on 
legally relevant evidence which has been properly obtained (if the case goes to court) 
and b) to enable prosecutors to predict whether there is a ‘realistic likelihood’ of
111 This prosecutor is referring to art. 125 disp. att. (see chap. 4), which specifies that, at the end o f  the 
investigation, the prosecutor drops the case (i. e. archiviazione) if  there is not enough evidence which 
can support the accusation during the trial.
112 AP(N48). Similar opinions were expressed, for example, by AP(N41), APApl.(N50), AP(N38), 
AP(N33), AP(N42), DCP(N45), AP(N30) and AP(N28).
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conviction.113 Prosecutors present this in terms of impartiality but the very nature of 
the role of prosecutor as filter between the information generated by the investigation 
and the judge means that the primary aim is to render the judge impartial not the 
prosecutor (in the sense of deciding only on legal relevant information that has been 
properly obtained).
In the end, prosecutors’ self-image appears different compared to reality. It 
seems there is an ideology (based on impartiality) of being a prosecutor which does 
not represent the actual condition and function (based on familiarity with a wide range 
of prejudicial, irrelevant or partially irrelevant and emotionally charged information) 
that prosecutors have. However, this does not necessarily mean that there is no 
cultural distance between crime fighters and prosecutors. Is prosecutors’ supervision 
merely formal or does it provide a detailed analysis of the legal aspects of the 
investigation? How do prosecutors direct an investigation? And what is the 
relationship between the police and-prosecutor during the investigation? These are the 
kind of questions we need to answer to understand if there is, in practice, a cultural 
distance between prosecutors and the police or if, as Di Federico and Sapignoli argue, 
prosecutors are just police officers who operate in a different environment (see 
above). But this will be discussed in the next chapter, which will be completely 
dedicated to the relationship police-prosecutor.
6. Lawyers
It is now interesting to have a look at what lawyers think of prosecutors’ professional 
culture. Unlike Di Federico and Sapignoli our aim was not to understand how far the 
rights of the defence are effective and respected during a penal proceedings. We 
wanted to know what lawyers think about prosecutors’ professional culture, function 
and aims.
Ib As we said (chap. 4) even when prosecutors decide to drop the accusation (i. e. archiviazione), they 
have to make an application to the preliminary investigation judge (GIP, see chap. 4). So, even in these 
situations prosecutors’ ‘judgements’ have to be put before a judge.
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The majority of the lawyers we interviewed said that prosecutors do not act 
like crime fighters.114 However, all the lawyers agreed that there is a difference 
between the approach that prosecutors have and the approach that judges have:
It is clear that the prosecutor, particularly for the important cases that we mentioned 
before [e. g. white collar crimes, environmental crimes, corruption etc.] is pushed by the 
cultura del sospetto.us On the other hand, judges can not act like this: they have a 
cultura delle prove116 [...] A good prosecutor must have the cultura del sospetto. 
However, he must also perform a careful evaluation o f  what has to be sent to trial. 
Lawyers must be very careful when they speak with prosecutors. This is because we can 
say counterproductive things and, maybe, even if  the clients are innocent, we can 
generate doubts. For example, for a lawyer it is very difficult to prepare a brief to support 
an archiviazione request. This is because the brief can be interpreted [by the prosecutor] 
as a support for the accusation.117
This example suggests pragmatism and a range of variables affect the issues. 
In white-collar crime where the offence is both serious and complex the prosecutor is 
prepared to commit resources that he/she is not prepared to commit where offences 
are less serious and simple. Of course this suggests that seemingly ‘objective and 
impartial’ decisions about whether there is enough evidence to go to trial will be 
shaped by views about the seriousness of offending. While there are legal criteria for 
assessing seriousness inevitably the gravity of a crime is a matter o f assessing degrees 
of social harm which is inevitably shaped by social and political values. Moreover, 
the fact that prosecutors’ professional culture is based on suspicion118 (well explained 
by the example of the archiviazione brief), while judges base their decisions on 
evidence, seems to confirm what we said before: prosecutors are not neutral and
114 5 lawyers said that prosecutors do not act like crime fighters. 2 said that prosecutors act like crime 
fighters. 2 said that sometimes prosecutors act like crime fighters. 2 did not answer clearly.
113 This literally means culture o f  suspicion. In particular, it means that prosecutors do not base their 
decision only on the evidence collected, but also on the suspicions that they have about the case and/or 
the accused person(s). This implies that prosecutors have an active role and that they search for all the 
elements which can lead to the discovery o f  evidence supporting the accusation.
116 This literally means culture o f  evidence. This is the opposite compared to the cultura del sospetto. 
In particular, it means that judges only base their decisions on the evidence they have, and not on their 
suspicions about the case and/or the accused person(s). This implies that judges have a more passive 
role compared to prosecutors.
117 L(N23).
118 L(N24) said: “I had this experience with a prosecutor, who is now a judge, and before this I had a 
lot o f respect for him. My client said something which had to be interpreted in his [the client] favour. 
So, I said to the prosecutor: “do not forget that your mission is to pursue justice”; and he replied: “yes, 
but do not forget that this is also a proceedings [a dispute] between two parties”.
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impartial legal figures.119 In particular, lawyers seem to perceive a difference between 
pubblici ministeri who need to search for all elements which can be useful to obtain a 
conviction; and judges who only look at the evidence they have been given. Finally, 
another interesting point concerns the “careful evaluation” of what has to be sent to 
trial:
For the less important crimes [frauds up to a certain value, thefts, drug trafficking in the 
street etc.] prosecutors evaluate if  they can get a conviction or not. They send a case to 
trial if  they have the 70, 80% chance o f  obtaining a conviction. For the complicated 
cases, like a big white collar crime which involves the whole board o f  a big company, 
the prosecutor sends to trial all the accused persons, even if  he has some doubts. The 
prosecutor does not think that an accused person will be involved in a trial which can last 
8 to 10 years. And this [sending all the accused persons to trial] happens even if  the 
prosecutor believes that he can ask for the archiviazione for one particular accused 
person. So, he/she does not do it [to ask the archiviazione] because it is a matter o f  
coherence: I [the prosecutor] send all o f  them [the accused persons] to trial and, 
eventually, the judge will decide who has to stay out. They believe that the trial will 
clarify what happened or that [during the trial they will realize that] the accused person 
who apparently did not do anything is, in fact, responsible. So, I [the prosecutor] will 
send him to trial. This happens for industrial accidents as well, because prosecutors want 
to have 2 or 3 options and they send to trial even those who do not seem very much 
involved, because they believe that the trial will clarify everything. In these cases the 
prosecutor wants to avoid the risk that, during the trial, a different perpetrator w ill be 
discovered; and, as a consequence, the criminal proceedings has to restart from the 
beginning. The prosecutor sends all the accused persons to trial and, often, amongst them 
there are some innocent persons.120
So, prosecutors carefully evaluate the evidence they obtain, but they do not do 
it to give practical application o f their neutrality and to act like judges in order to 
understand if the accused persons are guilty or innocent. Prosecutors evaluate the real
likelihood to obtain a conviction, or, as a lawyer said, “they only see the final
121sentence”. Moreover, for the cases that they consider less important they do not go 
for the trial if they do not believe they have a very good chance of obtaining a 
conviction. On the other hand, when the case is regarded as being particularly 
important, they are ready to commit more resources and the evaluation of the chances 
to obtain a conviction does not seem so important. Prosecutors seem much more
119 See, for example, L(N16), LN(22) and L(N24).
120 L(N23).
1-1 L(N37). Similar opinions were expressed, for example, by, L(N35) and L(N15).
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focused on avoiding the possibility that accused persons who can be potentially guilty 
remain without charges. However, even in these cases if, at a certain point, the 
prosecutor believes that there is no chance of getting a conviction he/she will drop the 
accusation. In fact, the same lawyer we quoted above, who was one of the counsel in 
a very famous criminal trial dealing with an environmental crime, explained that, in 
that case, the prosecutor dropped the accusation because he realized (based on the 
evidence collected and on previous decisions taken by different courts) that “the
i
accused persons would have all been acquitted”.
In conclusion, the opinions of the lawyers we interviewed are consistent with 
the view that the investigation is not, in practice, neutral. Moreover, they see 
prosecutors as parties to the proceedings and not as impartial referees. However, 
lawyers, although they admit that there is a difference between prosecutors’ 
professional culture and judges’ professional culture, still seem to perceive that there 
is cultural distance between prosecutors and crime fighters.
7. The 1989 reform and its impact
At this stage we believe it is important to discuss briefly the 1989 reform and its 
impact on prosecutors’ professional culture. As we said Grande correctly underlined 
that the institutional resistance created by the strong Italian continental legal tradition 
is one of the reasons why the reform failed. The author explained very clearly that the 
Acts which amended the 1989 code of criminal procedure and the interventions of the 
constitutional Court have limited and frustrated the adversarial reform of 1989. 
However, as we have said, Grande talks about the resistance created by the legal 
rules. Here we want to investigate the resistance coming from prosecutors’ legal 
culture and the way prosecutors reshaped adversarial principles to re-establish their 
inquisitorial nature.
Grande wrote that “the new code configures the prosecutor as a party to the 
proceedings and deprives him of the judicial powers he previously enjoyed in the 
preliminary enquiry. The prosecutor is no longer required to pursue the search of the 
truth in his investigation. Moreover, in presenting the evidence in court he is expected
122 See above L(N23).
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to be partisan”.123 There are three important claims which need to be examined here: 
prosecutors are not judicial figures, they no longer search for the truth and they are 
not neutral and impartial. All these elements conflict with the principles which inform 
prosecutors’ professional self-image. In particular, the judicial approach is, in 
prosecutors’ view, still very clear during the investigation and pre-trial phase. 
Moreover, as we explained, Italian prosecutors see their role as that of impartial 
officials who investigate (both inculpatory and exculpatory elements) to find the truth; 
while a typical adversarial legal figure conceives criminal procedure as a dispute 
between two parties.124 So, it appears that the 1989 reform has left prosecutors’ 
professional culture relatively untouched, which still seems very inquisitorial. 
Prosecutors appear to be still influenced by the previous inquisitorial code which
1 ~) Sstated that prosecutors and instructing judges had to conduct an impartial enquiry.
If this is the (failed) impact that the 1989 reform has had on prosecutors’ 
cultural self image, what has happened to prosecutors’ exercise of their functions and 
professional values in practice? Here we need to look at the moment when 
prosecutors, acting as legal filters, evaluate the evidence collected to construct and 
enhance the chances of obtaining a conviction: can we really say that prosecutors are 
acting as a party in adversarial terms? As we explained above, the academic debate 
around prosecutors’ status during the pre-trial phase (i. e. impartial or straight 
accuser) is substantial. The reform, which is, in practice, a mix of adversarial and 
inquisitorial principles (chap. 4), clearly stated that prosecutors are in charge o f the
l_J Grande (2000) op. cit. p. 235.
124 Langer M. “From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining 
and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure”. 2004. Harvard International Law Journal. 
Vol. 45(1). pp. 1-64. p. 4. In this chapter I am looking at the adversarial and inquisitorial traditions. The 
difference is determined by the nature o f  the information which has been sought and presented. If it is 
only inculpatory then this is clearly adversarial. If it is inculpatory and exculpatory then this is clearly 
inquisitorial in its assumptions. I am using these two different models to emphasize the fact that Italian 
prosecutors’ professional and legal culture does not seem to fit with the adversarial tradition (see later). 
However, we must underline that adversarial principles has evolved to increase equality o f  arms, 
disclosure o f evidence, looking for exculpatory evidence, that evidence is collected by fair and lawful 
means etc. So, for example, within the English legal system, which is adversarial in nature, “the CPS is 
also supposed to act as a neutral truth-seeking ‘Minister o f  Justice’ (Sanders and Young (2007) op. cit. 
pp. 334-335. See also, Young R. and Sanders A. “77/e ethics of prosecution lawyers”. 2004. Legal 
Ethics 7. pp. 190-209). Moreover, para. 2.2 o f  the Code for Crown Prosecutors (2004) says: “Crown 
Prosecutors must be fair, independent and objective [ ...]  They must not be affected by any improper 
pressure from any source”. According to Ashworth and Redmayne “this aspect o f  an ethical orientation 
concerns fairness and impartiality” (Ashworth and Redmayne (2005) op. cit. pp. 203-204. For a more 
general account on adversarial and inquisitorial systems see, for example, Goldstein and Marcus (1977) 
op. cit., in particular p. 247; and Goldstein A. S. “Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in 
American Criminal Procedure”. 1974. Stanford Law Review Vol. 26. pp. 1009-1025.
123 Grande (2000) op. cit. p. 234. See also, Goldstein and Marcus (1977) op. cit. p. 257.
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investigation from the beginning (art. 327 cpp) and that they direct the police during 
the investigation (art. 56, 58 and 59 cpp). This may be seen as an inquisitorial feature. 
But some authors have pointed out that prosecutors are now intended only to have
19^investigative functions and not to be neutral and impartial (see above).
Pubblici ministeri claim that one of their aims is to transfer as many 
documents as possible from their dossier to the judge’s dossier.
Here [during the pre-trial phase! prosecutor’ s aim is to transfer as many documents as 
possible from his dossier to the judge’s dossier [ ...]  That is why we need to push the 
police to carry out investigation activities which are legally acceptable and can be used 
during the trial. This is the aim.127
This is understandable given that prosecutors believe that judges “can not see 
very much” (see above). Moreover, within the context, to transfer documents from 
their dossier to the judge’s dossier effectively means to try to recreate the examining 
judge’s file as it has existed traditionally in inquisitorial systems. Italian prosecutors 
seem to act as if their investigation is the ‘official investigation’. And, given their self- 
cultural image, they see this as an impartial investigation seeking both inculpatory and 
exculpatory information. This is clearly not adversarial, but more like an inquisitorial 
approach. However, as we explained, in practice, prosecutors cannot be neutral and 
impartial, because they are influenced by the opinion and information thrown up 
during the investigation. This does not seem to represent a big change when compared 
to the pre-1989 code of criminal procedure. As Goldstein and Marcus explain, even 
before prosecutors carried out an ‘official investigation’ which was (like now) very 
much influenced by police activity.128
So, it appears that the 1989 reform had little impact on prosecutors’ 
professional values. Italian prosecutors’ self professional culture clearly does not fit 
into the criminal justice system designed by the reform. But even if we look at the
way prosecutors’ professional culture is put into practice we can perceive significant
126 See, for example, Grande (2000) op. cit. p. 233.
1-7 AP(N48). Similar opinions were expressed by AP(N38) and AP(C46).
128 Goldstein and Marcus (1977) op. cit. pp. 256-259. During this thesis we have often expressed our 
concerns about Goldstein and Marcus’s claims about the myth o f  judicial supervision. However, on this 
point, we can agree: prosecutors are influenced by the police. The point we have already started to 
make and that we will develop in the next chapters is that prosecutors can mediate police (and other) 
influences.
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differences compared to the adversarial principles stated in the 1989 code of criminal
procedure. The story of this reform seems (at least for prosecutors), more than a legal
1transplant. It is similar to what Langer called a legal translation. The new
provisions were applied and understood (in a word: translated) according to a legal 
culture which was not and is not adversarial, but strongly inquisitorial. Prosecutors 
seem to have interpreted their new role of being a party not as requiring them to 
prepare for a dispute against another party, but to organize a file so that the 
contending arguments at trial have little impact on judges’ decisions. In other words: 
in prosecutors’ view judges’ main source of information should not be the trial 
hearing, but the dossier which includes detailed explanation of what happened during 
the investigation.
In 1989 something happened similar to what happened almost twenty years 
later with the ordinamento giudiziario reform. New and different legal tools have 
been provided, but legal culture did not change. Why did this happen? The cultural 
proximity between judges and prosecutors clearly did not favour the establishment of 
a partisan (as opposed to neutral and impartial) approach. Moreover, as we said 
before, the legality principle protected prosecutors’ formal impartiality. Further, we 
should not forget that magistral? s professional culture is also the result o f an 
historical evolution that, particularly in the sixties and in the seventies (see chap. 6), 
built up magistral? s full independence within the magistratura and from the 
executive power. Independence, the legality principle and cultural proximity with 
judges seem to be bricks in the wall that prosecutors have constructed to protect their 
sense of their own neutrality. And no matter that in practice prosecutors’ impartiality 
is, at least, questionable. This is still the principle which, in prosecutors’ view, gives 
them the opportunity to carry out properly their job. For example, how could 
prosecutors begin an investigation like tangentopoli which involved politicians, civil 
servants and entrepreneurs? As we saw, according to Maddalena, this was possible 
(also) because prosecutors are seen as impartial like judges and, as a consequence, 
they have the moral and legal status to carry out such a dramatic action. Moreover, 
when we explained the interpretation of the legality principle, we saw that prosecutors 
believe that it is their image of neutrality (which stems from the application and the
1-9 Langer (2004) op. cit.
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interpretation of the legality principle) which protects them when they have to deal 
with certain important cases.
It is within this scenario that the institutional resistance against the 1989 
reform grew up. Prosecutors refuse to be considered as other than neutral and 
impartial because this would threaten their impartial status and, eventually, would 
diminish their credibility when they prosecute certain cases. This is why adversarial 
principles have been, de facto, interpreted to restate the pivotal role of prosecutors as 
the ‘official’ party of the criminal proceedings. In particular, it seems that these 
principles, which put investigation in prosecutors’ hands, reinforced their inquisitorial 
duty to search and find for the ‘official truth’.
8. Conclusion
Prosecutors’ stance within the Italian criminal justice system appears that of an 
intermediary between the police and the judge. However, there seems to be a 
substantial difference between the way prosecutors believe they are carrying out this 
task and the way they do it in practice. In particular, the legal filtering function is 
perceived by prosecutors as a purely judicial stage, where they act impartially like 
judges. The reality seems different: the legal filtering is a judicial stage in the sense 
that prosecutors seem more concerned with the analysis of the legal issues arising 
from the investigation. However, the close connection between prosecutors and the 
investigation inevitably stains prosecutors’ impartiality. The consequence is that 
prosecutors are not neutral and impartial.
Moreover, the 1989 reform did not have the effect of causing a shift from 
inquisitorial culture to adversarial tradition. But this is not only a clash between 
adversarial legal principles and inquisitorial legal culture. And, it is not only a 
problem of schizophrenic legislation (i. e. the de facto creation of a hybrid criminal 
justice system). There are issues concerning prosecutors’ self image of their function 
which must be taken into account. Prosecutors believe that the only way to carry out 
properly their job is to preserve their image of neutrality. This principle is the very 
base of prosecutors’ institutional resistance to adversarial principles.
Finally, the analysis of prosecutors’ professional values has suggested some 
elements to describe prosecutors’ ‘different position’ within the Italian criminal
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justice system. Prosecutors can not be like judges, because their function and aim are 
different. In other words: Italian prosecutors’ mission is not only that of bringing to 
the courtroom the results of the investigation, but to build up and direct an 
investigation strategy aimed at obtaining a conviction. However, prosecutors seem to 
have a ‘different position’ compared to the police as well. The legal filtering stage 
suggests that pubblici ministeri have not been absorbed by police functions. We will 
continue to analyze this issue in the next chapter when we will deal with the relations 
between police and prosecutor.
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CHAPTER VIII. PROSECUTORS AND POLICE
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1. Introduction
While we were constructing prosecutors’ professional and legal culture we noticed 
some differences compared to the police. We said that prosecutors are in a ‘different 
position’. Here we want to analyze what this means in practice. Or it might be better 
to say that we want to continue this analysis. In the previous chapter we focused on 
prosecutors working as legal filters. This already underlines a relevant difference 
when compared to the police. But there is something more. We want to describe how 
these two legal actors interact during the pre-trial phase and how much they can 
influence each other. In particular, we will examine the relationship between the 
police and prosecutors from two different perspectives. First, we will examine the 
police pubblico ministero relationship during the investigation (i. e. the way 
prosecutors supervise the investigation). Secondly, we will examine the impact that 
police decisions in relation to the reception of crime reports may have on the 
definition of the crime problem for prosecutors. But this chapter will not just deal 
with the description of the police-prosecutors relationship during the pre-trial phase. 
The analysis will continue our investigation into prosecutors’ legal and professional 
culture in practice. Moreover, here we will begin to outline an external influence on 
decision-making that can shape the way prosecutors define the crime problem but 
which prosecutors have not created (on external influences on decision-making, see 
chap. 9). This is police decisions on priorities. At the same time we will be able to see 
that pubblici ministeri’s ‘different position’ gives them the power to mediate these 
influences. The investigation of prosecutors’ criteria for decision-making and their 
powers to mediate external influences will then continue in the following chapters. 
Before we begin to deal with these core questions we will consider the established 
literature. This is in order to highlight a certain number of orthodoxies and debates 
about the police prosecutor relationship and isolate some issues that have not been 
addressed which our empirical material can cast light upon. Then it will be in the bulk 
of the chapter that empirical data will be presented and discussed. Finally, we should 
just remind the reader of the limits of our sources: the research is based on semi­
structured interviews with legal actors and not on direct observation of prosecutors 
supervising the investigation. This proviso will influence our analysis.
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1.1. Introduction: the legal rules
The analysis of the legal background is important for the purposes of this chapter 
because there are some conceptual distinctions (and their consequences) that we need 
to set out here. Moreover, the impact of the 1989 adversarial reform (and later 
amendments) needs to be considered because it is necessary to a close analysis of the 
meaning of the legal rules defining prosecutors as directors of the investigation. 
Lastly, legal analysis will provide an opportunity to underline some of the key issues 
which will be investigated here.
The legal rules governing the relationship between police and prosecutors in 
general and in the particular context of the investigation have already been discussed 
(see chap. 4). However, it is important to remind the reader of some of the key points 
to make sure that the legal background is clear. First of all, there is a distinction 
between the polizia amministrativa, which has the function o f preventing crime; and 
the polizia giudiziaria (PG) which deals with the investigation together with 
prosecutors (prosecutors can directly carry out investigative acts). PG functions1 are: 
receiving notifications of crime and discovering crimes; managing the consequences 
of a crime (e. g. restoring public order); conducting investigations; securing evidence; 
performing any act useful to the prosecution; and limiting the consequences of a 
crime. More specifically, they retain substantial powers during the investigation. 
First, the officers of the PG may carry out investigative acts on their own initiative 
from the moment they receive notification of a crime to the moment the prosecutor 
begins to direct the investigation. Second, they can perform investigative acts under 
prosecutors’ delegated authority (the so called delega3). Third, the PG have the duty 
to communicate ‘without delay’4 the crime reports they discover to prosecutors 
(immediately in some situations) (see later). Finally, even if prosecutors start to direct 
the investigation, the police still retain some powers to take discretionary decisions
1 Which, in certain circumstances, can also be carried out on their own initiative (see art. 55 and 348 
cpp).
" See, for example, Voena (2003) op. cit. pp. 80-84. See also (in general for the role and the functions 
of PG) Scaglione (2001) op. cit.
J The delega is very similar to the French commission rogatoire. When prosecutors issue a delega  it 
means that they delegated to the police the authority to perform investigative acts (a delega  is, o f  
course, not necessary when police officers retain autonomous powers to investigate, see above).
4 The original version o f  this article was saying “within 48 hours” and not “without delay”. This was 
amended in 1992 (see later).
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about the investigative acts to perform. We will be looking at the role, functions and 
powers (in practice) of the PG during the investigation but the impact of the polizia 
cimministrativa during the pre-trial phase should not be underestimated: they too (like 
the PG) come across and collect crime reports.5
In this chapter we will not deal further with the differences between polizia 
giudiziaria and polizia amministrativa, but will concentrate on the police prosecutor 
relationships during the pre-trial phase. So, we will use the word police to indicate 
both these categories (unless it is necessary to make a distinction). But in the first part 
of the chapter, when police-prosecutors relationships during the investigation are 
discussed, the relevant police are the PG. In the second part of the chapter, dealing 
with the way the police influence prosecutors’ definition of priorities, the term police 
refers to both the PG and the polizia amministrativa.
The second important conceptual distinction to remember is between 
dipendenza funzionale (functional dependence) and dipendenza organizzativa 
(organizational dependence). The former means that superiors have the right to 
determine the functions that subordinates should carry out. The latter means that 
superiors have the right to manage the organization of their subordinates. As we 
explained (see chap. 4), PG officers are functionally dependent on prosecutors and 
organizationally dependent on police hierarchical superiors (prosecutors have no 
powers in relation to polizia amministrativa).6
Prosecutors legally have the power to direct the investigation and the police 
during the investigation (chap. 4). This is the basic principle informing the 
relationship with the police at this stage of the proceedings. But, the degree of 
functional and organizational dependence may vary depending on the type of police 
officer.7 In this sense we need to remember the key distinctions between the terms
o
sezioni and servizi. The sezioni of PG are immediately and directly dependent on 
prosecutors.9 This means that prosecutors can use these police officers without the 
prior intervention of the police’s hierarchical superiors.10 The servizi11 o f PG also
3 In Italian a crime report is called notizia di reato. This literally means crime notice.
6 V o ena  (2003) op. cit. pp. 88-90.
7 For a general discussion about functional and organizational dependence o f  PG’s officers see, for 
exam ple,  V oena  (2003) op. cit. pp. 84-90.
8 This literally means sections.
9 V oena (2003) op. cit. pp. 86-87.
10 Ibid. p. 87 and 89.
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mainly (but not exclusively) deal with investigations. However, the degree of 
organizational and hierarchical dependence upon prosecutors is substantially reduced 
compared to the sezioni. The servizi become functionally dependent on pubblici 
ministeri when they are involved in the investigation. The difference between servizi 
and sezioni stems from the different degree of dependence that the PG have on 
prosecutors. Prosecutors can directly use the sezioni, there is no ‘filter’ from police 
officers’ hierarchical superiors.13 But prosecutors have to ask if servizi are available 
(or more accurately, if the officers they want are available, see later) for the 
investigation. But, in practice, if the investigation is or becomes complicated (e. g. 
involve many accused persons, certain difficult investigative acts have to carried out 
etc.) pubblici ministeri will have to contact the servizi. The reasons are both 
quantitative and qualitative. In fact, servizi include a much higher number of police 
officers compared to the sezioni. They also include some specialized units like, for 
example, those dealing with organized crime.14 So, the servizi become essential every 
time certain complicated cases have to be investigated.
The final issue we want to discuss here concerns disciplinary matters. There is 
no need to explain again the legal rules (see chap. 4). We just have to remind the 
reader that prosecutors are involved in disciplinary proceedings but they cannot 
impose disciplinary sanctions of their own initiative. On the contrary, it is for the 
police’s hierarchical superiors to take these measures (for both servizi and sezioni). 
This shows, once again, the limits of police dependence on prosecutors. This should 
not be underestimated, because one of the crucial issues to an understanding of the 
relationship between prosecutors and the police is the way prosecutors respond, in 
practice, to police officers who do not comply with their orders.
Although in this chapter we will mainly focus on the analysis of the law in 
action, it is interesting to underline the peculiar position that the adversarial reform of 
1989 (and further amendments) seems to have given to prosecutors during the 
investigation. From 1989 till 1992, the code of criminal procedure made clear that the 
prosecutor was in charge of the investigation (i. e. the director). In particular, the 
police powers to carry out investigative acts on their own initiative were limited and,
11 This literally means services.
12 Voena (2003) op. cit. pp. 84-90.
13 Ibid. p. 87.
14 Ibid. pp. 85-86.
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although they could be generally performed under the prosecutor’s delega, this did 
not include interviewing the accused. Moreover, in order to emphasize the fact that 
one of the police’s functions was to collect crime reports and refer them immediately 
to the pubblici ministeri, art. 347 para. 1 cpp stated that the crime report had to be 
delivered to prosecutors within 48 hours.15 In 1992 a D.L.16 amended the 1989 code 
and increased police powers during the investigation so that legal context became as 
described above. Prosecutors direct the investigation, but the police retain substantial 
investigative powers that can also be used on their own initiative.
According to Cordero, this has substantially reduced prosecutors’ powers to 
govern and take charge of the investigation.17 Similar opinions have been expressed
1 Rby Giostra: he emphasized that the Relazione al progetto preliminare of the 1989 
code indicated that the meaning of art. 327 cpp (the article which states that 
prosecutors direct the investigation) was that the police no longer had the power to 
conduct an autonomous and antecedent investigation before the prosecutor’s 
investigation (unless they had been empowered by the prosecutors’ delegated 
authority).19 But the 1992 amendments de facto re-established the police’s power to 
conduct investigations on their own initiative: art. 347 para. 1 cpp now states that 
polizia giudiziaria must refer the crime report to prosecutors “without delay” and does
90not specify within 48 hours. The expression “without delay” (which certainly can 
extend to 48 hours) appears very broad and it potentially leaves the police with the 
power to take discretionary choices at the beginning of the investigation (before
9 1reporting to the pubblico ministero). In particular, Giostra claims that the police now 
have the right to determine the initial (and very important) strategy and direction of
99the investigation. The consequence is that these legal rules have created a substantial
13 Cordero (2003) op. cit. p. 808.
16 This decreto was the D.L. n. 306/1992 which was subsequently converted (with amendments) into 
the Act n. 356/1992.
17 Cordero (2003) op. cit p. 808. See also, Chiusano V. “Pubblico ministero e po lizia  giudiziaria nel
processo d ipartF . In Centro Nazionale di Prevenzione e Difesa Sociale (1994) op. cit. pp. 155-165; and
Nannucci U. “Pubblico ministero e polizia  giudiziaria nel processo  di p artF  (Comments). In Centro 
Naziona le  di Prevenzione e Difesa Sociale (1994) op. cit. pp. 169-178.
18 This literally means the report to the preliminary project (basically the bill). This is part o f  the 
travaux preparatoires o f  the 1989 code. In particular, this is the Relazione al progetto  preliminare, in 
Gazz. Uff., 24 o f  October 1998.
19 Giostra G. “Pubblico ministero e polizia  giudiziaria nel processo di partF  (Comments). In Centro 
Naziona le  di Prevenzione e Difesa Sociale (1994) op. cit. p. 179.
20 Ibid. p. 180. See also, for example, Cordero, (2003) op. cit p. 808.
21 Giostra (1994) op. cit. p. 180.
"  Ibid. See  also Nannucci who claims that, one o f  the consequences o f  the amendments to the 1989 
reform, is that there is not now one figure (the prosecutor) who is leading the investigation and one
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distinction during the pre-trial phase: the police perform the investigative acts; 
prosecutors deal with the result o f these.2j
Thus, although prosecutors direct the investigation, the legal rules seem to 
give the police important investigative powers which can be implemented on their 
own initiative. This leaves some ambiguities and unanswered questions: what does it 
mean in practice to say that prosecutors direct the investigation? Do prosecutors 
supervise all the cases in the same way? What are, in practice, the police’s powers?
1.2. Introduction: analyses of the police-prosecutor relationship 
in action
The literature dealing with police prosecutor relationships is not so extensive in its 
analysis of the law in action. Authors have mainly focused on the influence that the 
police may have on prosecutors’ decisions. In general, they have underlined the 
importance of the police during the pre-trial phase. But there is some controversy 
about the differentiation of prosecutor and police functions: authors like Goldstein 
and Marcus have emphasized the passivity of pubblici ministeri because o f their 
dependence on police information. But Vogliotti (and partially Sarzotti) have been 
more cautious and emphasized the significance of the prosecutors’ role as directors of 
the investigation. These authors have outlined the different methods of supervision 
that prosecutors use. Finally, the influence of police decisions on prosecutors’ 
definition of the crime problem has been partially analyzed as well.
Goldstein and Marcus, who wrote their article in 1977, stated that “prosecutors 
[and examining judges] generally do little more than confirm what the police have 
already done”.24 They underline the active role that the police play during the 
investigation and that their actions are not subject to any real review by prosecutors 
(and, at that time, examining judges).25 Goldstein and Marcus conclude that judicial 
supervision of the investigation is a myth and that investigation is a police function.26
figure (police) who has important but subordinate powers (subordinate to prosecutors’ directives). Both 
these figures are legally entitled autonomously to conduct investigative acts (Nannucci (1994) op. cit. 
p. 1-76).
2j Giostra (1994) op. cit. p. 181.
24 Goldstein and Marcus (1977) op. cit. p. 249.
25 Ibid. pp. 257-258.
26 Ibid. p. 279.
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When judicial supervision takes place this only concerns the most serious cases and
only occasionally do prosecutors make an important contribution. So, the authors
see the police as playing an active role in the pre-trial process while prosecutors are
passive and reactive. And they believe that this is very much linked to the fact that
pubblici ministeri are designated (by the law) as judicial figures (although the authors
28argue that prosecutors do not regard themselves as truly judicial figures).
The role of prosecutors during the investigation has been also examined, from 
a different perspective, by Di Federico. As already explained in the previous chapter, 
Di Federico claims that, during the pre-trial phase, prosecutors act like independent 
police officers. So, in practice, during the investigation there is no difference between 
police and prosecutors’ approach and functions. It is not necessary here to explain 
again in detail Di Federico’s arguments. However, two points need to be underlined 
once more. First, Di Federico’s and Sapignoli’s empirical study is only based on 
interviews conducted with lawyers. Secondly, their study does not directly concern 
police prosecutor relationships, but rather the way accused persons’ rights are 
respected by pubblici ministeri. In other words, the authors seem to be focused on 
demonstrating that the legal rules (which state that prosecutors must be impartial 
during the pre trial phase, see chap. 7) are not properly implemented. However, Di 
Federico’s views are important here because he argues that the Italian criminal justice 
system clearly puts the prosecutor in charge of the investigation and that the
O Q
consequence is that, de facto, prosecutors’ functions become police functions. So, in 
practice, the “pubblici ministeri acquire the typical characteristics that police officers 
have” (see chap. 7). However, here we will try to demonstrate that prosecutors’ 
functions have not been ‘absorbed’ by the police. Prosecutors’ professional culture is 
perceivable at this stage of the proceedings and they can still take important decisions 
(e. g. as to how to supervise a case).
Sarzotti explains that pubblici ministeri consider themselves (during the pre­
trial phase) to be the directors of the investigation, the judicial advisors of the police 
and the guardians of the investigation, which means that prosecutors are responsible
27 Ibid. p. 280.
28 Ibid. p. 282.
29 Di Federico and Sapignoli (2002) op. cit. p. 16. 
’° Ibid.
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for ensuring that investigation acts are performed according to the legal rules.31 But 
prosecutors’ supervision of the investigation may vary depending on the case. In 
particular, prosecutors use two different systems to supervise the investigation. 
Volume crimes (i. e. street crime) are mainly investigated and dealt with by the police 
and the prosecutors’ function becomes that o f police legal advisor. On the other 
hand, for serious cases which have been prioritized (by prosecutors) the pubblico 
ministero becomes the director of the investigation, he/she coordinates the police and 
he/she exercises the power to take investigative initiatives. In other words, when 
volume crimes are involved, police powers to investigate increase and the 
prosecutors’ role appears to be that of ‘routinized bureaucratic’ review o f the results 
of the investigation (aimed at implementing penal procedures).34 Prosecutors exercise 
a broader range of powers more frequently when they consider that the case is more 
complicated and, as a consequence, the trial will be more complicated (e. g. legal 
issues are difficult, evidence is not clear and difficult to explain to judges etc.).35 
Finally, Vogliotti describes the majority of investigative acts (including 
interrogations) as being performed by police officers under delega. This is because 
prosecutors trust the police’s professionalism and, perhaps more importantly, because 
the volume of files is too great for the pubblici ministeri to conduct all investigative 
ac ts /7 Moreover, the police do not just carry out investigative acts, but they may also 
prepare the documents to be included in the prosecution files.38
These analyses are relevant because they focus on what happens in practice 
instead of upon the legal rules. Both Vogliotti and Sarzotti try to explain how 
prosecutors direct the investigation in practice. Their approach seems different 
compared to Godstein and Marcus and Di Federico. In fact these authors seem to have 
different opinions about who is the dominant player as between prosecutors and the 
police. Vogliotti and Sarzotti confirm that the police can strongly influence 
prosecutors but they also say (in particular Vogliotti) that pubblici ministeri still retain 
some relevant powers. These views have the merit of emphasizing that there seems to
Sarzotti C. “Cultura giuridica e culture d e l la p e n d \  2006. Torino: L’Harmattan Italia, pp. 142-155, 
in particular p. 152.
’2 Vogliotti (2004), op. cit. p. 495 and pp. 499-500.
Ibid. pp. 500-501.
Sarzotti (2006) op. cit. pp. 142-155.
°  Ibid. p. 152.
'6 Vogliotti (2004) op. cit. p. 481. 
j7 Ibid. pp. 481-482 and p. 502. 
j8 Ibid. p. 482.
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be two methods of directing the investigation: one for volume crimes and one for 
crimes that prosecutors consider particularly serious. However, it is noticeable that 
neither Sarzotti nor Vogliotti explain in detail how, in practice, the two different 
systems of supervision work. In other words, they do not describe the meaning of 
“directing the investigation”. So, we need to deal with three different issues: the 
meaning of “directing the investigation”; the way prosecutors supervise the 
investigation of cases that they do and do not prioritize; and the way the police can 
influence their choices.
The last element of the literature that we want to analyze here concerns the 
influence of police decisions as to priorities on prosecutors’ definition of the crime 
problem. As we said above this is one of the issues we will deal with in this chapter 
(and, more substantially, later). Sarzotti has emphasized the link between police 
prosecutor relationships during the investigation and the response of the Italian 
criminal justice system to the crime problem. In particular, he analyzed the relazioni
•3Q
inaugurali dell’anno giudiziario and he suggested that prosecutors tend to rely very 
much on the police who deal with the impact that street crime has on the local 
communities. The consequence is that there is a close link between police activities 
and the implementation of the penal action, which is a prosecutors’ right.
The police certainly play a very important role before the beginning of the 
investigation, because they are, to borrow Vogliotti’s expression, “the prosecutors’ 
antennae in the field”.40 This means that, traditionally, pubblici ministeri played a 
passive role which merely consisted in receiving crime reports discovered by the 
police.41 However, Vogliotti claims that, starting from the seventies, this scenario 
began to change.42 Prosecutors noticed that that the police were acting like a filter: 
because they were not searching for certain types of crime and no crime reports were 
coming to the prosecutor.43 For example, within the area of industrial accidents, the 
less visible cases of industrial diseases were not considered by the police.44 The 
solution was to increase the degree of specialization of police and prosecutors dealing
j9 These are speeches that General Prosecutors attached at the court o f  appeal give every year (normally 
in January).
40 Vogliotti (2004), op. cit. p. 482.
41 Ibid. pp. 484-485.
42 Ibid. p. 484.
43 Ibid. p. 485.
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with certain cases (i. e. creating specialized units) and, more important here, to 
improve coordination between pubblici ministeri and the police during the pre-trial 
phase. So, for example, the pretura*5 in Milan issued a circular requesting the police 
to urgently report all the reports of industrial accidents which led to certain kind of 
injuries.46 Over the years similar coordination systems were set up for environmental 
crimes, mafia, terrorism, corruption etc. All these actions had one common element: 
prosecutors were no longer mere passive receivers of what the police decided to pass 
on but were also determining inputs themselves.47 So, police powers during the pre­
trial phase are substantial because they filter out crime reports (acting like 
“gatekeepers de la citadelle penale”). However, prosecutors become more proactive 
when it comes to searching for certain forms of offending and in these types of crime 
they direct the investigation.
To conclude, Sarzotti pointed out that there is a connection between the 
perception of crime of the local communities, the police and prosecutors. The police 
influence prosecutors because they bring them the priorities that the public perceive 
(see chap. 10). Vogliotti’s account of the police pubblici ministeri relationship when 
crime reports have to be sought is certainly very important to underline that 
prosecutors can play an active role during the pre-trial phase. But he does not explain 
the impact of police discretionary decisions as to priorities on prosecutors’ definition 
of priorities. So, these views suggest that the police and prosecutors do not just 
interact when there is an investigation. Their relationship is also important to 
understand how prosecutors will determine their priorities. But one question has not 
been sufficiently addressed: can prosecutors mediate police influences? And if they 
can, how do they do it? In other words: how strong is the external influence of the 
police on prosecutors’ decision-making?
Finally, from a comparative point of view, it is also interesting to mention 
Hodgson’s conclusions about the method of judicial supervision in France. In fact, 
despite the 1989 reform that, legally, has moved the Italian criminal justice system 
from adversarial to inquisitorial, there are still important similarities between
43 The pretura  was (it was abolished in 1998, see chap. 9) the court dealing with not-serious crimes 
(similarly to the English Magistrates’ court). There was a prosecution office attached at the pretura.
46 Vogliotti (2004) op. cit. p. 486.
47 Ibid. p. 487.
48 Ibid. pp. 492-495.
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prosecutors in Italy and France. Namely, the procureurs49 supervise the police during 
the investigation, they are supposed to play a more neutral role than that o f a partisan 
prosecutor and they are (like judges) magistrals (similar to the Italian m agistral).50 
The author (while she is discussing judicial supervision o f the garde a vue)51 defines 
the aim, for prosecutors, of judicial supervision of the police in France. This is “not to 
monitor closely the work of the police, but to provide a more general ‘legal 
orientation’ in order to ensure the construction of a legally coherent dossier that will 
withstand the scrutiny of the court”.52 More generally Hodgson carries out systemic 
observations which emphasize the limits of prosecutors’ powers in practice to direct 
and control the police during the investigation: the ideology o f supervision is 
characterized by “the structural context in which the policQ-procureur relationship 
operates [which] makes control and direction both complex and problematic. In 
particular, the procureuf s functional dependence upon officers to conduct the 
investigation for which she is responsible makes almost impossible a model o f 
supervision in practice, which challenges or goes beyond the case parameters set by 
police”.1'3 In this chapter we will try to demonstrate that in Italy the situation is 
different. In particular, models o f supervision seem to leave to prosecutors the 
opportunity (in some situations) to challenge “the case parameters set by police”.
2. Directing the investigation: the peculiar role of assigned police
officers
Before we begin to explain the relationship, in practice, between prosecutors and 
police during the investigation, we need to explain the peculiar position of “assigned” 
police officers. “Assigned” police officers are part of the sezioni o f PG. As we 
explained (see above) the sezioni are functionally and organizationally dependent on
49 The French name for prosecutors.
30 Hodgson (2005) op. cit. p. 75. For a general overview o f French prosecutors (and French criminal 
justice system) see, for example, Dervieux (2002) op. cit. pp. 218-292.
31 Garde a vue literally means ‘holding for observation’, but in practice it means ‘detention for 
questioning’. In particular, where the investigation makes it necessary a police officer (o f  the police 
judiciare, the police dealing with investigation, like the Italian polizia giudiziaria) may detain for 
questioning a suspect. The garde a vue can last, in principle, 24 hours. Further detention can only be 
authorized by prosecutors. See, Dervieux (2002) op. cit. pp. 277-278. See also, Hodgson (2005) op. cit. 
pp. 145-150.
32 Hodgson (2005) op. cit. p. 151. This research was based on interviews, questionnaires and direct
observation.
53 Ibid. pp. 169-170.
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the prosecution office as a whole. These police officers perform functions which are 
not limited to investigative acts under prosecutors’ initiative or on their own: they also 
prepare prosecution documents for the trial.
If the procura is of medium size or larger, each prosecutor has a certain 
number of police officers “assigned” to him (in the sites we visited the number varied 
from 2 to 4).54 This means that they work exclusively for that specific prosecutor (in 
fact, pubblici ministeri normally call these police officers “my police officers”); and 
that they mainly conduct the investigations that the prosecutor assigns to them. So, for 
example, prosecutor X receives a crime report and then assigns the case to police 
officer A and/or B. However, “assigned” police officers clearly cannot deal with all 
the files. In particular, there are some cases that require a specific knowledge and/or 
preparation or they are simply too complicated and they have to be handled by many 
police officers. In these situations prosecutors will involve other police officers who 
do not exclusively work for them (i. e. the “external” police):
| In this prosecution office every prosecutor has two police officers who exclusively work 
with him [i. e. assigned police officers]. Then there is also a police unit [not composed o f  
assigned police officers] which deals with certain sorts o f  investigations, for example: 
handling stolen goods, frauds where the victim is an insurance company etc. [...]  
Prosecutors are always in contact with the two assigned police officers. This is because 
they work in the same office and they [assigned police officers] deal with the cases that 
the prosecutor assigns to them. But, if  the case is too complicated, they [prosecutors] 
send it to the police unit [that we described earlier] or the investigation can be delegated 
to other police forces, like the squadra mobile,55 carabinieri56 etc.57
This was the explanation of the chief prosecutor of a big prosecution office in 
the south. The difference between “assigned” police officers and “external” police 
seems clear. “External” police do not work closely with only one prosecutor. Rather 
they become involved when certain kinds of investigations have to be performed. 
Moreover, we should emphasize that the “assigned” police officers work in the same 
building as the prosecutors. This may strengthen the connection between these two
34 The term assigned police officers is a literal translation o f  the wording used by prosecutors.
35 The squadra mobile is one o f  the police’s units specialized in dealing with investigation (in particular 
for robberies, drug trafficking, homicides etc.). So, they are part o f  the PG.
36 Carabinieri are a police force, but they also perform military actions (like military interventions in 
Afghanistan and, formerly, in Iraq). They also carry out investigation activities (as PG, see chap. 4).
57 CP(S4).
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legal actors. In some situations, “assigned” police officers really seem to be part o f a 
team managed by the prosecutor:
Every year I receive around 400 files o f  noti,58 it is not very much. However, I have to 
say, and I do not think this is what generally happens, that I have a very efficient 
ufficio.59 In fact, my collaborators are very well prepared, and I have spent some time 
training them, so that now they perform efficiently. This is why we do not have files 
which are waiting for too long. But until some months ago I had 3 [assigned] police 
officers, now I have only 2, but I hope they will give me back the third sooner or later, 
because we have some problems.60 However, the point here is that I tried to apply that 
project, which has never really been applied, concerning the ufficio del pubblico 
ministero. This means that the prosecutor is the director o f  his ufficio and he [only] 
carries out the activities which can not be delegated; these are: the hearings and the 
preparation o f  the hearings. The vast majority o f  the other activities are performed by my 
collaborators; I only read, double check, correct and sign.61
We have already introduced the concept of “ufficio del pubblico ministero” in 
explaining the organizational relations within the prosecution office (see chap. 6). As 
we can see here, the idea seems to be that of setting up a team including 
administrative personnel and “assigned” police officers (i. e. “the collaborators”). The 
prosecutor becomes the manager of the team and the coach as well, because he/she
58 These are the files where the name o f  the accused person is known.
59 This literally means office, but the appropriate translation, in this context, would be team (see below  
the concept o f  ufficio del pubblico ministero).
60 The analysis o f  prosecutors’ powers to impede (or to push for) the removal o f  police officers from 
their functions goes far beyond the purposes o f  this chapter. In fact, here we will deal with some o f  the 
consequences that a non hierarchical relationship between the police and prosecutors creates in practice 
(see later), but only for the purpose o f  explaining prosecutors’ powers when police officers do not 
properly perform investigation activities. However, it is interesting to note that Sarzotti underlines that 
prosecutors complain about the fact that PG officers directly depend on prosecutors, but they also 
depend on their hierarchical superiors within the police force who can change their functions and 
remove them from a procura (Sarzotti (2006) op. cit. pp. 153-154). Moreover, recently, in the 
prosecution office o f  Catanzaro, in the south o f  Italy, a prosecutor started to investigate some local 
entrepreneurs for corruption and later he, eventually, involved the minister o f justice (now the former 
minister o f  justice) and the prime minister as well. During such an important investigation a local 
police officer, who apparently played a very important role, was removed from his office (the decision 
was taken when the investigation was still at the beginning, but it had to be applied after a few months) 
and transferred to another place. The point here is that it seems that the pubblico ministero could not 
block and/or delay this decision. In particular, he officially asked the police officers’ superiors to wait 
until the end o f  the investigation, but it did not obtain any result (see, Vulpio C. “Trasferito il capitano 
del/’Arma «braccio destro» di De Magistris”. Corriere della Sera, 31/10/2007). We just need to 
say that the way the pubblico ministero acted during the investigation was (and still is) very 
controversial (also because o f  the interviews he gave to TV and newspapers). The case was withdrawn 
from the prosecutor (avocazione, see chap. 4), he was removed from the prosecution office and a 
disciplinary action was brought against him before the CSM.
61 AP(N31). Similar opinions (particularly on the importance o f  the personnel working with 
prosecutors) were expressed by AP(N30).
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has to train the persons working for him. Moreover, within the “ufficio del pubblico 
ministero”, “assigned” police officers (and the administrative personnel as well) not 
only carry out investigative acts, but they also prepare the documents which will be 
included in the file and then they submit them to the prosecutor who bureaucratically 
reviews the police’s activities (see later).
We have already indicated (see chap. 6) that, in another site that we visited 
(Bolzano, in the north of Italy), the chief prosecutor issued a circular in which he 
suggested that prosecutors set up and organize their office/team in order to find the 
best practices for dealing with volume crimes:
I created the ufficio del pubblico ministero. So, I gave to each prosecutor 4 police 
officers [the “assigned” police officers]. The consequence is that I created a little group 
[in fact, many little groups, each o f  them managed by one prosecutor] within the 
prosecution office. Every prosecutor directs one group and manages his 4 police officers 
the way he wants. This is aimed at dealing with volume crimes, because we have to take 
into account that 80, 90% o f  the cases we deal with that are volume crimes.62
So, the ufficio del pubblico ministero appears to be a versatile system for 
organizing prosecutorial activities. In particular, it seems that prosecutors can train 
and use the “assigned” police officers in the way they want so as to develop the most 
efficient practices. This gives a substantial amount of discretionary power to 
prosecutors. However, the role of these police officers should not be underestimated: 
pubblici ministeri appear to be themselves partially dependent upon “assigned” police 
officers who not only carry out investigative acts but also prepare the documents 
which will be part of the prosecution (or archiviazione) file.
The multifunctional nature of “assigned” police officers seems also clear in 
the cases where the “ufficio del pubblico ministero” has not been set up. A police
officer said:
Here I had a bad experience with one prosecutor who was not interested in using me to 
perform the investigation. In fact, he only wanted to have less files to deal with, so he 
was using me as a passacarte ,63 I did not like this job; and I saw colleagues who never 
carried out an interview! [ .. .]  That prosecutor was giving me a file so that I could put
62 CP(N43).
6'' This literally means: the person who passes the documents. In particular, it indicates someone who 
does not take any relevant decision and does not have power to take initiatives.
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pressure on the squadra mobile or the carabinieri who were carrying out the 
investigation. Then he wanted me to write the capo d ’imputazionel64 [ ...]  Some o f  us do 
it [writing the charges] better than prosecutors.65
So, prosecutors seem to determine these police officers’ function. They may 
be directly involved in investigations; they may prepare the files (including writing 
the charges);66 and, finally, “assigned” police officers may play an important role 
even if the case is being investigated by the “external” police: in such situations, they 
can become the prosecutor’s ‘eyes’ checking that the investigation is carried out 
properly and on time.67
In the end, the activities that ‘assigned’ police officers carry out seem to be 
prompted, directed and managed by prosecutors. Yet prosecutors themselves seem to 
be dependent upon “assigned” police officers who shape investigations in important 
ways (either by carrying out investigative acts or by checking that these are properly 
performed) and/or preparing documents that prosecutors will bureaucratically review. 
So. there is a strong functional interdependence between pubblici ministeri and “their” 
police officers
2.1. Directing the investigation: prompting and reviewing
As we explained (see chap. 4), when the investigation begins the pubblico ministero is 
in charge of it. Legally this does not mean that the police have no powers to carry out 
investigative acts autonomously. However, the legal rules demand that prosecutors 
direct the investigation. In the next sections we want to describe the meaning, in
64 The capo d’imputazione is a document which includes the name o f  the crime(s) for which a person is 
accused and the explanation o f  the reasons why he is accused o f  that specific crime(s). A lawyer 
(L(N20) who works in a big city o f  the north o f  Italy and mainly deals with white collar crimes) 
explained that once she worked in the office o f  an assistant prosecutor and she saw that there was a 
police officer who was dictating to the prosecutor the capo d’imputazione. She explained that certain 
cases (like those involving white collar crimes) are very complicated and, sometimes, the police have a 
better and more specific knowledge compared to prosecutors. However, she also said that some police 
officers do not have the necessary legal knowledge. In particular, she said that lawyers can recognize 
when the capo d ’imputazione is done by the police because the points o f  law are not very well 
explained and, sometimes, the legislation quoted is out of date.
63 Pol.(N26). Very similar opinions were expressed by Pol.(N27).
66 See also L(N20) as explained above.
67 AP(N 1), AP(N2) and AP(N3).
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practice, of the concept of directing the investigation.68 In particular, we will explain 
how prosecutors supervise the investigation when they have prioritized a case (this 
section) and then when they believe the case is not important (next section). We will 
also focus on the police-prosecutor relationship when investigations are carried out 
(by the police) under delega and we will explain what happens when pubblici 
ministeri directly carry out investigation activities. Finally, we will examine 
prosecutors’ approach when the police do not follow their directives (see later).
We must also add that here the key distinction is not between the way 
prosecutors supervise investigations carried out by ‘assigned’ police officers and 
investigations carried out by the ‘external’ police. Prosecutors are more involved in 
the investigation if they believe that the case is important and must be prioritized 
regardless o f the type of police officer. The distinction between ‘assigned’ and 
‘external’ police matters was discussed for two reasons. First, to illustrate the 
importance (just in the context of the investigation) of police activities during the pre­
trial phase. Secondly, to understand how extensive prosecutors’ powers to manage 
police officers can be (in certain circumstances). So, in the next sections we will 
simply use the word police unless it is necessary to distinguish between ‘assigned’ 
and ‘external’ police officers.
When prosecutors have prioritized a case the police prosecutor relations 
appear to be based on constant communications between these two legal actors:
If the case is more serious the prosecutor will try to co-ordinate the investigation and, for 
example, he/she will carry out the interviews [...]  However, in the vast majority o f  the 
cases, the investigation is performed by the police under prosecutors’ delegated authority 
[delega]. The only thing prosecutors do are the interviews [ ...]  They never perform 
searches, seizures, accertamenti tecn icf9 etc. [ ...]  Prosecutors intervene later. They act 
after every investigative act that the police have performed and that prosecutors have 
to ld  them to carry out [emphasis added]. This is done in order to double check and 
review  [emphasis added] what the police have done. So, prosecutors do not just step in at 
the end o f  the investigation. In particular, the police do not carry out all the investigative 
acts and then bring the results to the pubblico ministero. On the contrary, the police refer 
to the prosecutor after every single investigative act has been carried out. However, 
when the police actually perform the investigative acts, prosecutors have limited powers
6S Here we will not consider the application o f  the law, but rather what prosecutors do in practice.
69 These are literally assessments that prosecutors can do (alone or with some experts). This form o f  
investigation can concern, for example: checking photographs, checking if  a computer has been used or
not etc.
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[to control what the police are doing]. So, it is a continuous back and forward between 
the police and prosecutors.70
He/she [the prosecutor] interviews witnesses, carries out some accertamenti tecnici, 
some particular searches (e. g. when they have to search a law firm) [...] There is a 
continuous contact with the police. In fact, it often happens that, while we [lawyers] are 
waiting to speak with prosecutors, we see police officers who have their file and they are 
waiting to speak with the pubblico ministero [...] However, this happens i f  there are 
serious cases, otherwise the prosecutor just looks at the papers [prepared by the police] 
and signs them.71
So, when the case has been prioritized, prosecutors and the police discuss the 
investigation on a regular basis. In particular, as one lawyer said, in practice, police 
officers keep going backwards and forwards between prosecutor and investigative 
activities, performing a particular investigative act and then reporting back to the 
prosecutor. This “backwards and forward” system is not one where the police carry 
out all the investigative activities and only then refer back to the prosecutor. On the 
contrary, the police must report to prosecutors regularly, and, sometimes, after every 
single act conducted. Furthermore, the pubblici minister?s function does not appear to 
be limited to reviewing police’s activities, because they may also indicate the 
investigations police have to carry out. Finally, within the “backwards and forwards” 
system, prosecutors can directly carry out some investigative acts (not all o f them), 
but these appear to be more rare situations.
There are a number of reasons why pubblici ministeri do not directly conduct 
the investigation. In particular, the main problem is that prosecutors have to deal with 
a very large number of cases at the same time.72 However, we found some examples 
of situations where pubblici ministeri decided (and decide) to have a more active role:
70 L(N20).
L(N21).
We asked to prosecutors the number o f  files they have to deal with in one year. The figures are 
different (between 300 and a few thousands files). Some prosecutors have less then 300 cases, but these 
are exceptions (CP(N43) and AP(N48). Moreover, one prosecutor (APN(48) explained that he has less 
cases, but that most o f  them are very complicated, so they take a lot o f  time. However, the vast 
majority o f the prosecutors said that they have more then 1000 files to deal with every year. In 
particular, 18 prosecutors out o f 27 said so. 2 did not know (but one said that they are a lot). One did 
not clearly answer. One was not asked (due to lack o f  time). 5 said that they have less than 1000 files to 
deal with every year. Finally, all the prosecutors apart from one (CP(N43), who is a chief prosecutor 
and he claims that his prosecution office is very organized and he can deal with all the cases in the 
proper way, said that the large number o f  files is one o f  the reasons why they can not treat all the files
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O f course we need to rely on the police [to carry out the investigation] [ .. .]  but, for 
example, the collaboratori di giustizia [former criminals who have informed on former 
colleagues]73 are only interviewed by prosecutors.74
Normally the investigation is conducted by the police, the prosecutor only directs it. 
However, if  he/she [the prosecutor], when he/she has checked the results o f  the 
investigation, decides that he/she has to interview a person who has been already 
interviewed, he/she will do it personally. However, the police will carry out the 
investigation sul campo.75 This is what normally happens, but, for example, if  there is a 
murder, interviews will be carried out by prosecutors.76
It often happens that, when there has been a rape, I interview the persons involved. This 
is because sometimes there is something that I do not understand and/or because the 
victim was too succinct; so, in these cases, I will not delegate [the interview] to the 
police, I will do it myself. In fact, you lose one morning, but, at least, I have seen the 
person I wanted to interview and I asked the questions I wanted to ask [...]  This is the 
criterion I use; even when there are crimes [sexual abuses] involving minors, normally, I 
prefer to interview them personally.77
The way Italian prosecutors define the crime problem and their priorities will 
be analyzed in the following chapters. However, here we want to underline that it 
seems that prosecutors only directly carry out investigative acts when the crime is
• • • r*  7 f tvery serious (in the view of the prosecutors). For example, pentiti are normally 
implicated in cases concerning organized crime or terrorism. Moreover, minors who 
have been abused (sexually or not) are clearly involved in situations which require a 
lot of sensitivity. Prosecutors do not just decide a priori to perform investigative acts 
in particular types of cases (i. e. for murder cases). They may also choose to “step in”
in the same way. On the problems related to the lack o f resources and the increase in number o f crimes 
to deal with see. Sarzotti (2008) op. cit. pp. 34-48.
’ These are also called pentiti. They are (ex) criminals who decide to testify (and they get benefits for 
this) against criminal organizations and/or single persons. These are normally involved in organized 
crime and/or terrorism cases. In fact, most o f  the important actions taken against mafia and the red 
brigades started from information released by pentiti.
74 CP(S4).
°  This literally means in the field. In particular, this prosecutor wants to underline that the police will 
actually perform the investigation activities and pubblici ministeri do not participate, but they intervene 
later.
76 CP(N40).
AP(N28). This prosecutor works in the specialized unit dealing (mainly) with sexual crimes and
abuses.
8 Repentant persons.
168
because they are not convinced by the evidence obtained by the police (or simply 
want to reanalyze it) or because they want to be sure that a particular investigative act 
is carried out in the way they want (i. e. specific questions are asked). Moreover, 
pubblici ministeri can also decide to perform investigative acts when the case is 
evolving a certain way:
It was my first case o f  homicide. It was during the night, the police called and said there 
was a dead man on the side o f  a road and that they thought it was an accident. I told them 
to check for evidence and to do, themselves, the routine activities (e. g. prevent people 
contaminating the area, search around etc.). Then they called me back to tell me that, 
close to the body, they had found a car. Again, I said to continue with the searching 
activities. Later they called me again to tell me that they found that the dead person had a 
hole behind the head (similar to a bullet hole). So, I said to close o ff the whole area and 
to wait for me. Then they sent me a car and I was there in 15 min.79
This example, where personal intervention on site is eventually seen as 
necessary can be contrasted with another example given in interview. There the 
prosecutor received a call from a police officer reporting that they had found a dead 
man. Of course, the prosecutor started to ask for more details and, when the police 
officer said that they strongly believed it was an accident (apparently an old man was 
fixing his car, the car moved and fell on him), he said he wanted to be kept informed 
but that it was not necessary for him to be there. Moreover, he agreed with the police 
officer that they needed a doctor to double check the police’s impressions. Then the 
pubblico ministero called the doctor (the one that prosecutors, in that prosecution 
office, normally contacted for expert advice) and asked him to go to check what 
happened and to let him have his opinion. Finally, the prosecutor called police 
officers to tell them to wait for the doctor.80
So, it seems that prosecutors have, in practice, the right to decide to “step into” 
the investigation when they believe that the case may be particularly serious. 
However, the police seem to have a significant power to influence these decisions. In 
fact, it appears that pubblici ministeri mainly base their choices on police reports (in 
the cases above communications were made via phone).
Finally, we need to say a few words on the kind of investigative acts that 
pubblici ministeri perform. These are mainly interviews with the accused, victims,
79 A P (N ll) .
80 AP(NIO).
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witnesses and informers. The cases when they execute, for example, seizures, 
searches and accertamenti tecnici seem to be rare (e. g. the example made by L(N21) 
of searches carried out in law firms). So pubblici ministeri only carry out some 
investigative acts and, often, they do not perform any (see later). In fact, the 
prosecutors’ main function during the investigation is to direct the police. But what 
does “directing the investigation” mean?
However, if  during a routine investigation [concerning volume crimes, see later] it is 
necessary, for example, to perform a search, we contact the prosecutor: we describe the 
investigative acts we have performed and we explain why it is necessary to perfonn the 
search. [Moreover] for the most serious cases we constantly report, over the phone, to 
the prosecutor; sometimes we do it everyday. This means that it is the investigator [the 
police] who carries out the investigative acts and asks the prosecutor for instructions. 
Otherwise, it is the prosecutor who requests some news about the investigation.81
For the cases where the investigation is complicated we normally give instructions and 
then, every time we receive the results, we issue new instructions. So, we only directly 
intervene when the investigation is particularly difficult. These are those cases where we 
believe that the police need our input [ ...]  This happens because many police officers do 
not know what a criminal trial needs. These crimes can be: bankruptcy, white collar 
crimes in general, even frauds which, if  they are important, require us to issue 
instructions. Anyway, we decide case by case.82
So, directing the investigation seems to mean that prosecutors issue 
instructions and the police implement them. Subsequently prosecutors will review the 
results and, if necessary, will issue new instructions. So, when the case is considered 
important, directing is not only a matter of performing a bureaucratic review of 
police’s activities. It also involves pubblici ministeri prompting with inputs which 
shape the way police carry out the investigation. We believe this is the meaning of the 
“back (reviewing) and forward (prompting)” system that we described above.
A very important instrument that prosecutors use to communicate to the police 
their instructions is the delega, which is a written document:
First o f  all the delega. In fact, the more the delega  is detailed the more the investigation 
will be shaped by the prosecutor [ ...]  If the delega  is not detailed the police’s powers, 
which are already quite strong, will increase. I think that the deleghe [plural o f  delega]
81 Pol.(N19).
82 APApI.(N50).
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should be very detailed, even when the case is not so important; however I always leave 
a certain amount o f  freedom to the police83 [ ...]  If the prosecutor really wants to play his 
part he/she has to act like this. However, if  the case is less important the delega  w ill be 
less detailed, but still it has to be precise.84
So, the delega seems to be a very important tool that pubblici ministeri can use 
to exercise their right to direct and shape the investigation. Moreover, it is interesting 
to note that one pubblico ministero said that in the past (before the 1989 reform, but it 
is difficult to determine a precise date) issuing a detailed delega was, apparently, a 
huge step and that police officers perceived this as a lack o f trust in their capacity to 
perform a good investigation. On the contrary, he said, now the police are expecting 
detailed delega and this is considered (by prosecutors and the police) the right way to 
proceed.85 However, in the next section we will see that, for the cases which have not 
been prioritized, deleghe are not always detailed and, sometimes, leave a great 
amount of initiative to the police.
Finally, the delega is not the only system prosecutors have to communicate 
with the police when the case has been prioritized. In fact, pubblici ministeri can also
O Z
direct the police by phone and by setting up regular meetings as well. This does not 
mean that, in these cases, the delega will not be issued, but that prosecutors will use 
the systems which are more suitable to guarantee that they will be always kept 
informed and that the police will execute prosecutors’ directives.
In the end, when the case has been prioritized, “directing” the investigation 
seems to mean that prosecutors exercise the power to prompt through directives and 
to review the results of investigative acts. Sometimes pubblici ministeri direct the 
investigation and, also, carry out (alone or together with the police) investigative acts. 
However, the element which seems most to characterize this form of supervision is 
the fact that the police and prosecutors constantly interact and communicate. Finally, 
we should not forget that even when detailed deleghe have been issued, investigative 
acts will be mainly carried out by police officers. So, it appears misleading to look at 
the “prompting and reviewing” system as a method by which prosecutors eliminate
On this point AP(N11) said that, in the delega , it is very important to specify (i. e. writing a sort o f  
bullet points list) the activities that the police must carry out. The rest can be left to police’s initiative.
84 AP(N33). Similar opinions were expressed by A P(N 11) and AP(C46).
S;) A P(N 11). The same opinion was expressed by Pol.(N14).
86 See, for example, AP(C46), APApl.(N50) and AP(N32).
171
police influence. But it would be probably correct to see it as the best tool that 
pubblici ministeri have to mediate police influences during the investigation.
2.2. Directing the investigation: bureaucratic review
Bureaucratic review is a different form of supervision to the “prompting and 
reviewing” system. It concerns volume crimes that prosecutors, in general, do not 
prioritize; it does not imply that pubblici ministeri constantly interact and 
communicate with the police; and, sometimes, deleghe are not issued, so that, in 
practice, the police will have substantial powers to determine the investigative acts 
they have to carry out:
Prosecutors cannot direct the investigation for volume crimes; this is because they have 
so many cases to deal with at the same time (sometimes hundreds) [...] So, in practice, 
prosecutors will issue an initial delega  or, even when they do not do so, the police will 
proceed to the investigation according to the rules included in the code o f  criminal 
procedure. In practice, if  the investigative acts to carry out do not require the intervention 
o f the prosecutor (e. g. seizures,87 searches88 and/or telephone tapping89) the police will 
perform the investigation and then, at the end, will explain to the prosecutor the activities 
carried out and the results obtained.90
The routine [volume crimes] is done on paper and you try to do as little as possible. I 
mean, if it is possible you base your decision (archiviazione or send the case to trial) on 
the information included in the denunciation; you do investigative acts only if  it is 
absolutely necessary to solve the case. In particular, in those cases [where an 
investigation is necessary] you write [a delega] to say that the police should carry out a 
number o f  investigative acts and, later, after a few months, they will come back and you 
will decide whether to enter an archiviazione or rinvio a giudizio  [ ...]  This happens for
87 Seizures (art. 253-265 cpp) need to be previously authorized by prosecutors. See, for example, Grevi 
(2003) op. cit. pp. 345-351.
88 Searches (art. 247-252 cpp) need to be previously authorized by prosecutors, but there are exceptions 
(see below). See, for example, Grevi (2003) op. cit. pp. 340-345.
89 Telephone tapping must be previously authorized by a judge and the request must com e from the 
prosecutor. There are exceptions, but the police must always obtain prosecutors’ previous authorization 
and judges’ intervention can only be delayed (art. 266-271 cpp.). See, for example, Grevi (2003) op. 
cit. pp. 351-361.
90 Pol.(N 19). See also, APApl.(N50).
91 In this context this means that prosecutors send and receive written documents (e. g. via fax, see 
AP(N32), but they do not normally make phone calls and/or set up regular meetings.
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volume crimes, which are the vast majority o f  the crimes. These are, eventually, treated, 
but we do not have the time to deal with them in detail.92
Anyway, there is always the power to decide: when they give me the p o sta  I read and 
then I decide. In particular, if  I believe that no crime has been committed (e. g. the victim  
initiation o f  querela  was after the time limit); then I can immediately take a decision, 
because the police have already done everything, I decide; otherwise I think about the 
crime which has possibly been committed and then I issue a delega. If the crime is a 
priority I go to the crime site and I start directing the investigation [ .. .]  In general [for 
volume crimes] the police perform the investigation and then they refer to me. However, 
if  there is a priority my deleghe are very detailed, [in these cases] the police only have 
residual powers to take discretionary decisions about the investigative acts to carry out.94
These examples seem to confirm what we said before: when the case has not 
been prioritized the interactions between the police and prosecutors are extremely 
limited. In fact, the police and pubblici ministeri do not discuss the case on a regular 
basis. There are only two moments when these two legal actors communicate: the 
initial delega and when prosecutors review the results o f the investigation carried out 
by the police. However, the interactions between police and prosecutor may suddenly 
increase if certain investigative activities have to be carried out. The clearest example 
is arrest. When the police conduct an arrest, prosecutors must intervene (immediately) 
to review the arrest procedure (see later). But this does not necessarily mean that 
pubblici ministeri will be more involved (i. e. prompting and reviewing) in the 
investigation. As we will explain later, the legal procedure for arrest forces 
prosecutors to treat the case as soon as possible. But this does not mean that the case 
is regarded as a personal priority. For example, street crime often involves arrested 
persons, but it is not perceived as a serious crime by Italian prosecutors. So, in 
practice, an investigation can be bureaucratically supervised even when it requires a 
prompt intervention by the prosecutor.
Thus, the main consequence of the bureaucratic form of supervision is that 
prosecutors’ power to prompt by directives seems to be limited (confined to the 
initial, generally not-detailed, delega). It appears that there are no subsequent
92 DCP(N45).
9j This literally means mail. This is the word prosecutors use to indicate the files they receive when 
they are doing the turns we explained in chap. 6.
94 A P (N ll) .
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meetings, phone calls and/or deleghe. Moreover, sometimes a delega is not even 
issued. So, in these cases, prosecutors choose not to use their power to issue 
directives. However, as one prosecutor said: “there is always the power to decide” 
(see above, AP(N11). What this means is that pubblici ministeri receive the report 
from police, review it and then must decide if the case can be sent to trial or if  they 
should drop the accusation or if the case requires further investigation. But the 
significance of this “power to decide” should not be overestimated because the 
information on which prosecutors will base their decisions seems to depend very 
much 011 the police’s initiative and discretionary choices on the investigative acts to 
be performed.
One of the best examples o f the prosecutors’ bureaucratic review form of 
supervision (and of the increase of police powers) is probably the SDAS95 group in 
Milan. This is not a specialized unit, but a group which deals with cases which have 
not been prioritized (and which do not involve arrested persons). These can be 
defamations, small frauds, car accidents etc. Later we will explain in detail the way 
the SDAS group works (see chap. 9). Suffice it to say here that there are 6 prosecutors 
and one deputy chief prosecutor who manage the SDAS (but they do not only deal 
with this group) and that they claim to treat approximately 80% of the cases which 
arrive at the Milan prosecution office.96 Here we want to analyze the functions that 
the police perform within the SDAS group:
The SDAS deals with volume crimes. In fact, crime reports [which have to be allocated 
to the SDAS, see chap. 9] are immediately assessed by 11 police officers, who are 
graduates97 and who deal with the screening [of crime reports]. This means that they 
analyze the crime reports and they decide on those which have to be dropped 
[archiviazione] and those which can be immediately dealt with. All these files, once 
evaluated, are then submitted to the prosecutor who is on duty that day.98 This 
prosecutor, who knows police officers’ opinion on the crime report, and, you know, you 
can trust them, because they know what they are doing; so, this prosecutor deals very 
quickly with the files, he can do something like 100, 150 files per day, and the three
95 SDAS is the abbreviation o f  Sezione Definizione Affari Semplici. This means: unit specialized (but it 
is not like the other specialized units, see chap. 9) in dealing with simple matters. The decision to create 
this unit was taken by the prosecution office itself, in order to deal with the backlog o f  cases that the 
unification (in 1998) o f  the prosecution office attached at the first instance court with the prosecution 
office attached at the pretura  has created (see chap. 9).
96 AP(N32).
97 These are law graduates.
98 As we said there are 6 prosecutors, but they are not all on duty the same day, there is a turnover.
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quarters o f  these are immediately finished with by archiviazione [ .. .]  The capi 
d’imputazione con citazione diretta,"  i f  they can be immediately dealt with by this, are 
immediately done the day they arrive and everything is carried out by the police [ ...]  
Moreover, the police, according to our requirements, prepare everything: the report ex 
art. 415 bis cpp100 and the decreto citazione lista testi,m so, you do not need to check the 
file anymore [ ...]  In fact, our function is to decide whether to issue the archiviazione or 
if  the case has to be sent to trial [but the police have already expressed their opinion] and 
to sign the final measure. We only see measures which have been already prepared; we 
can ask them [police] to correct something, but it is very very rare.102
So, within the SDAS group, not only do police provide prosecutors with the 
information they need to take decisions; the police also suggest the decisions pubblici 
ministeri should take. However, prosecutors still retain the power to review and check 
police acts; and they can also issue guidelines that police officers will follow when 
they will have to prepare the official documents which will form part o f the 
prosecution file (e. g. report ex. 415 bis, decreto citazione lista testi etc.). But, in 
practice, prosecutors’ power to review police activity appears limited, because it is 
strongly influenced by previous police decisions. Pubblici ministeri seem to rely very 
much on the police’s opinion (i. e. “you can trust them, because they know what they 
are doing”); and the situations when pubblici ministeri review and correct the 
documents prepared by the police appear to be very rare. However, if prosecutors 
consider that a case does need further and deeper investigation, they can treat it 
personally and remove it from the SDAS group:
If 1 believe that a case is particularly important I can bring it up [to my office]103 and I 
will treat it personally. Moreover, I will involve my personal police104 with whom I have 
contacts everyday [...]  So, if  I ask my personal police to interview a person, they will do
99 These documents include the charges (like normal capi d ’imputazione, see above). However, in these 
cases the accused person is already known and, more important, the evidence is so strong that further 
investigation is not needed. In practice, everything is included in the crime report and the accused can 
be sent directly to trial (citazione diretta).
100 This report must be sent to the accused person(s) when the investigation is finished.
101 This is the list o f  witnesses who will have to testify.
102 AP(N32).
ICb There is a room where police officers working in the SDAS stay. However, prosecutors have their 
personal offices in a different place. Moreover, the pubblici ministeri working in the SDAS are not all 
located in the same area o f  the prosecution office.
104 These can be the “assigned” police officers. However, prosecutors can also set up strict relationships 
with police officers who are specialized in treating the same kind o f  cases that prosecutors deal with in 
their specialized units.
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it, but this is the biggest effort I might make for SDAS cases. For my cases [the 
priorities] I spend much more tim e.105
So, although police powers are clearly substantial, prosecutors still maintain 
their right to make important choices on the way the case has to be investigated. The 
consequence, in practice, seems to be that the form of supervision can change. In 
particular, when cases are removed from the SDAS group, prosecutors not only 
review the information provided by the police, but they can also prompt through 
directives (i. e. ask the police to interview someone). However, it seems clear that 
these cases will never have a high priority. As a consequence prosecutors’ 
preparedness to use their rights to influence the way the investigation is performed 
and the case is treated is limited. This presents a rational image of a variable degree of 
intervention shaped by the necessities of the case. But we need to remember these 
conclusions are based on our interview evidence: by definition cases where 
prosecutors do not see that a case is less straightforward than it appears will pass them 
by.
Thus, within the bureaucratic review system of supervision the pubblici 
minister? s power to issue directives on the way the investigation should be carried 
out seems to be considerably reduced compared to the “prompting and reviewing” 
system. The main consequence is that prosecutors do not seem to have their “hands 
on” the investigation. However, as Hodgson underlines for the French case: “This 
bureaucratic form of supervision, although relatively passive, has the potential benefit 
of filtering out obviously weak cases where the basic elements o f an offence are not 
made out or where there has been a failure to comply with or document basic 
procedural safeguards”.106 This conclusion could be borrowed for Italian prosecutors 
as well. In fact, the “bureaucratic review” method of supervision still leaves to 
prosecutors “the power to decide”. This is based on a file which has been, in practice, 
constructed by the police, but pubblici ministeri can still decide if the prosecution has 
to be dropped or if  the case can be sent to trial or if  it requires further investigation. 
This seems consistent with prosecutors’ filtering function that we explained before 
(see chap. 7). In particular, pubblici ministeri still appear in the position to filter out
IU" AP(N32).
106 Hodgson (2005) p. 152.
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cases which will not (in their opinion) pass scrutiny at trial. However, this power 
should not be overemphasized, because, as we saw, prosecutors’ choices appear to be 
strongly influenced by the information and the opinion provided by the police.
2.3. Directing the investigation: disciplinary powers
What happens when the police do not carry out investigative acts according to the 
directives issued by pubblici ministeri? We will concentrate on the methods that 
prosecutors have and use to make clear that, in their opinion, the police have not 
performed properly their tasks during the investigation. Here we must remember the 
distinction between functional and organizational dependence on the police (see 
above). PG officers are functionally dependent on prosecutors but organizationally 
dependent on police hierarchical superiors. Moreover, prosecutors can not issue 
disciplinary measures of their own initiative. But police hierarchical superiors can 
issue these measures.
Prosecutors seem to be extremely cautious when they have to decide if a 
delega has to be revoked or not. Revoking a delega means that prosecutors have 
decided that particular police officers should no longer be in charge of the 
investigation, which will be assigned to a different police force(s). This is clearly a 
huge step, because it means that pubblici ministeri do not believe that the police 
officers are dealing with the case properly:
Normally we tell them what is wrong [ ...]  so, if  we realize that they did not do what we 
asked them to do, we tell them and we can say that, normally, they act as we want [ ...]
Not implementing the orders coming from the prosecution office amounts to a violazione 
disciplinare.101 [But] revoking the delega  is a traumatic measure, you can reach this 
point, but it is difficult.108
The majority of the prosecutors we interviewed said that they had never had to 
revoke a delega.109 Others said that they had revoked some deleghe, but that this
107 This means disciplinary violation. It is not a criminal offence but it is a breach o f  a duty; in this 
case: the duty to implement prosecutors’ orders. This can lead to the beginning o f  disciplinary 
proceedings (art. 16 para 1 disp. att., see chap. 4).
108 DCP(N45).
109 See, for example, AP(N48), AP(C46) and AP(N32). In total 12 prosecutors said that they never had 
to revoke a delega, 4 said that they did it sometimes (but not often). One said that he used to do it in the 
prosecution office where he previously worked. One said that revoking the delega  is the first thing to
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rarely happened.110 One pubblico ministero said that, in the past, it often happened 
that one might revoke the deleghe, but that, in the prosecution office where he is 
working now, it does not happen anymore.111 However, the chief prosecutor o f a big
prosecution office in the south did suggest that revoking the delega was the first thing
• 112 he does if he believes the police are not performing properly.
Revoking the delega is not the only tool that prosecutors have to stigmatize
I i
police officers’ behaviour. They can write letters, they can telephone and/or meet 
police officers to explain to them the reasons why they believe the investigation has 
not been (or is not being) carried out properly (e. g. the police are too slow).114 
Sometimes, they contact the chief or the deputy chief prosecutor115 and/or police 
officers’ hierarchical superiors116 (via mail and/or they set up a meeting) to report and 
discuss the problems they have with the police. Finally, sometimes, prosecutors can 
underline the strong link between the way the police has carried out the investigation 
and the direct (negative) consequence that this had on the outcome of the 
investigation itself:
It never happened to me, but I know that some colleagues have dropped the accusation 
explaining that the investigation was not performed properly. And, you know, it is the 
police who carry out the investigation.117
In some circumstances police officers can be removed from their function. 
This means that they will not be allowed anymore to work in a specific prosecution 
office:
So, if  police officers do not perform properly or if  they commit crimes, because this has 
often happened [ ...]  so, if  there is something wrong the first thing to do is to take the 
investigation back [i. e. revoke the delega]. Moreover, we begin a disciplinary procedure 
1 and, if he/she [the police officer] is one o f  my police officers,118 I officially report that
do. Finally, due to lack o f  time we did not ask this question to 9 prosecutors (see methodological
appendix).
110 See, for example, AP(S6), AP(N41) and DCP(N45).
111 AP(N33).
117 CP(S4), see below.
See, for example, AP(N48), AP(N33) and AP(N31).
114 AP(N28). Similar opinions were expressed by AP(C53) and APApl.(N50).
115 See, for example, AP(N33), AP(N31) and AP(S6).
116 See, for example, APApl.(N50), AP(N48) and AP(S6).
117 AP(N32).
118 These are not only the “assigned” police officers, but they are, in general, the police officers who  
form the sezioni o f  PG. As we said (see above and chap. 4), the sezioni are attached at the prosecution 
office, they are directly linked to chief prosecutors and can not be removed from their functions (o f  
polizia  giudiziaria) if  the chief prosecutor does not agree (art. 56 para. 1 and art. 59 para. 1 and 3 cpp).
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we can not trust him/her anymore and I recommend that he is removed from his/her 
function [o fpolizia  giudiziaria  in a specific prosecution office].119
But this was the only prosecutor (chief prosecutor o f a big prosecution office 
in the south of Italy) who said that problems with the police during the investigation 
often happen. It was he who thought that the first thing to do was to revoke the delega 
(certainly after informal communication with the police officer(s). Then, a 
disciplinary procedure can be initiated. This is clearly a huge step, because it can lead 
to the removal of the police officer(s) from his/her function. The causes which can 
trigger this reaction from prosecutors can be, apparently, extremely serious and 
specific (i. e. committing crimes), but also more general (i. e. the police are not 
working properly).
So, in the end, prosecutors have different tools that they can use to stigmatize 
police officers’ behaviour when they believe that they have not properly carried out 
their tasks during the investigation. Prosecutors use these powers, but, in general, they 
seem to be very careful and reluctant when it comes to revoking a delega. Why does 
this happen? Or, in other words, why do prosecutors believe that revoking a delega is 
such a Traumatic measure’? Sometimes pubblici ministeri said that such a measure 
was never necessary because police officers always follow their directives.120 This 
does not mean that they never had to reproach the police, but that these situations 
always involved minor problems and, as a consequence, measures such as revoking 
the delega were not necessary. However, there could be another reason. Police 
officers are functionally dependent on prosecutors, but, as we explained in the 
previous two sections, prosecutors depend on the police when they have to take 
important decisions about the case. So, the police-prosecutor relationship is 
fundamental to carrying out a successful prosecution. Pubblici ministeri know that 
and, as a consequence, they may be particularly careful before taking measures which 
can compromise their relations with the police. As one prosecutor said: “No, I never 
shout at them, because I would never want to have a clash”.121 In a way this seems to 
be similar to the police-prosecutor relationship in England and Wales, where “police
119 CP(S4).
'J° See A P (N 31) and AP(C54).
1-1 AP(N32). It is also interesting to note that a high ranked police officer that we interviewed 
(Pol.(N34) complained about prosecutors who reproach too much the police. In particular, he said: 
'‘here we had one [prosecutor] who was used to call and scream at the ch ief o f  the local police station, 
this is a mistake [ ...]  luckily she left. Now there are not similar cases, but sometimes it happens”.
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1 99and prosecutors naturally avoid causing each other problems”. Finally, we should 
mention, once again, the limitation of our research. In fact, one issue that is hard to 
get at through these materials is the kind of errors or omissions that are not obvious to 
the prosecutor on the file.
2.4. Directing the investigation: some considerations on the 
interaction between police and prosecutors
In the previous sections we described two models o f supervision. The first one, that 
we called the “prompting and reviewing” system, is based on constant interactions 
between prosecutors and the police. If prosecutors decide to direct an investigation in 
this way they will have two main powers: issuing directives and reviewing the results 
of the investigative acts carried out by the police. The second model of supervision is 
the bureaucratic review system. This appears very different to the “prompting and 
reviewing” system. In particular, the interactions between police and prosecutors are 
limited and prosecutors’ power to issue directives seems to be substantially reduced. 
However, both these models have something in common: police and prosecutors’ 
functions appear to be divided. In general, the police carry out the investigative acts; 
and prosecutors’ inputs consist (sometimes) of prompting on the way these should 
performed and (always) of review of the results. So, in practice, prosecutors and the 
police seem to inhabit different worlds. However, this does not mean that these 
worlds cannot influence each other. Within the “prompting and reviewing” system 
pubblici ministeri can substantially influence the way the investigation is carried out, 
but they also depend on police implementing prosecutors’ directives. On the other 
hand, police’s power to influence prosecutors seems to increase considerably when it 
comes to the bureaucratic review model of supervision. But even in these cases, we 
should not forget that pubblici ministeri still retain “the power to decide”. In the end 
the type o f prosecutorial fact finding model that best captures the way Italian 
prosecutors direct the investigation could be the hierarchical/investigative.123 On one 
hand, pubblici ministeri are encouraged and certainly (at least when they consider the
1-2 Sanders A. “An Independent Crown Prosecution Service?”. Jan. 1986. Criminal Law Review pp. 
16-27. p. 24.
'~J Jackson (2004) op. cit. pp. 116-124.
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case a priority) can be “deeply involved in the investigation” (i. e. hierarchical).124 On 
the other, prosecutors’ need to carry out an “official” and impartial investigation to 
find the truth (i. e. investigative)125 and this is a distinctive feature of their self­
professional culture (chap. 7). However, as Jackson explains, these are ideal-types and 
represent extremes that can resemble tendencies, but do not aim at describing in detail 
the practice.126 So, for example, prosecutors in Italy are not always involved in the 
investigation and their impartiality is affected by information collected by the police.
It is difficult to say if in general during the investigation the prosecutors’ role 
is passive and reactive or proactive. Only observations and file analysis o f a 
representative sample of cases could provide this information. Pubblici ministeri 
appear passive because they do not, generally, perform investigative acts; but they are 
active when they prompt via directives. What we can say is that the reality of 
supervision is variable. Certainly Italian prosecutors appear more passive and reactive 
within the bureaucratic review model of supervision compared to the “prompting and 
reviewing” system.
However, the point here is that looking at prosecutors’ role during the 
investigation within the dichotomy passive/active would be misleading and too 
narrow. In fact, we believe that in order to understand Italian prosecutors’ functions 
when they direct the investigation we also need to take into consideration their 
professional self-image. As we saw (see chap. 7), this is mainly judicial and it is also 
based on the principle that pubblici ministeri do not want to be “stained” by police’s 
(crime fighter) activities because they want to be seen as impartial officers. This may 
explain why prosecutors and the police seem to inhabit different worlds during the 
investigation. In particular,pubblici ministeri want to mark a clear difference between 
themselves and the police. However, this difference does not seem to have prevented 
the two legal actors from being functionally interdependent. In practice both sides 
need some way of negotiating this cultural distance.
In the previous chapter, we argued that, in practice, one of prosecutors’ role 
(during the pre trial phase) is that of filtering out cases which potentially can not 
withstand scrutiny at trial. A successful prosecution surely also depends on a good 
investigation. So, prosecutors’ power to review the results of the investigative acts
124 Ibid. p. 117.
123 Ibid.
1-6 Ibid.
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carried out by the police appears particularly important. In fact, this right seems to 
enable pubblici ministeri to check if the results o f the investigation can support the 
accusation and, perhaps more importantly, if the evidence can be used during the trial. 
Finally, the analysis of the police-prosecutor relationship during the investigation also 
suggests that (particularly when the case has been prioritized) prosecutors’ function is 
not limited to reviewing (filtering) the results, but they can also issue directives to 
shape the way the investigation has to be carried out.
3. Police influence on prosecutors’ priorities: directives on anti-crime
policies
In the previous sections we have focused on the interactions between police and 
prosecutors in the pre-trial phase and on the tactics of supervision and the way the 
police can influence pubblici ministeri during the investigation. We have stressed the 
significance of prosecutors’ sense o f the importance of a case to the reality of 
supervision. In the next sections we want to concentrate on influence going in the 
other direction. This is not so directly linked with investigative acts (even though 
there may be some connections). Rather it concerns directly the definition of 
priorities. In particular, we want to analyze the situations when police decisions on 
priorities can influence prosecutors’ definition of the crime problem. In this first 
section we will focus on the impact of police anti-crime policies.
Because prosecutors and the police do not have the same hierarchical 
superiors (see above) and belong to different institutions, the police receive directives 
(from the police hierarchy) on anti-crime policies which are neither binding nor 
persuasive for prosecutors. Further pubblici ministeri do not seem to have any 
opportunity to discuss these directives or to coordinate their priorities with police 
priorities:
They [the police] have some objectives and they also have some priorities, for example:
one month they receive a directive which says that they have to focus on copyright; and,
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as a consequence, for one month we are flooded with crime reports which concern 
copyright breaches.127 Another example is prostitution: i f  they decide to focus on 
prostitution we are flooded with files concerning prostitution. So, they have some 
priorities which I am not sure match with our priorities, but [ ...] , to the best o f  my 
knowledge, there are no meetings between the prefetto ,128 the ch ief prosecutor and the 
questore'29 to coordinate the priorities [ ...]  This means that we arrive later, we receive 
their crime reports. The only coordination is within the forces o f  law and order.130
No [we do not decide the priorities together with the police], unfortunately we are 
c o l le t to r ifx we receive the urgent matters which are given to us. So, if  the questura 
decides to put forward a police operation, for example in a farmstead132 or in another 
place, and they arrest 5, 10 or 15 people, we have to deal with it.133
Issuing directives is not the only way to determine police priorities. For 
example, one high ranking police officer explained that sometimes the Ministry o f the 
Interior offers to fund new special police units. But the Ministry also indicates the aim 
of the unit (i. e. street crime).134 So, the local police officers are bound if they want 
the money.
Moreover, police power to take discretionary decisions on priorities seems to 
be accepted (by prosecutors) not only because pubblici ministeri, in practice, cannot 
influence police decisions (i. e. they are part of different institutions); but also because 
prosecutors seem to consider this function as a legitimate police function:
Yes, sure, the police have to guard the territorio  [...] yes, yes, this is a police function.
We can only push the police to focus on certain problems, but we can not do it formally 
[ ...]  We can also indicate specific investigative acts that the police have to perform, but
l2' In this case copyright breaches concern illegal copies o f  DVD and CD. In fact, this pubblico  
ministero works in a tourist area o f  Italy (at the seaside) and, particularly in summer, there are people 
(mainly foreigners, illegal immigrants) selling illegal copies o f CD and DVD on the street.
I_s The prefetto  is the representative o f  the government (directly dependent and answerable to the 
Minister o f Interior) in specific areas (which are normally quite big). In particular, the prefetto  is in 
charge o f the coordination o f  police activities within the designated area (see Act n. 121/1981).
1-9 The questore is the chief o f  the police at a local level. He is answerable to the Minister o f  Interior 
and he is responsible for the implementation o f  policies concerning public security and order (see Act 
n. 121/1981).
130 AP(C53). See also AP(N4I).
Ijl Literally collectors.
lj_ This prosecutor works in a rural area. So, farmsteads can be used as quiet places to carry out 
criminal activities (e. g. drug trafficking).
133 AP(N42).
134 Pol.(N14).
Ij5 The literal translation o f  the word territorio  is territory. In this context it means the local area where 
the police are working.
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we can not take decisions which the police have to take [decisions on priorities] [...] This 
is not our right; these are inputs which come from the questore  or from the local chief o f  
carabinieri [...] We are the terminus o f  police activity, we do not provide the inputs [ ...]  
they have to verify that crimes have been committed on the territorio  and they have to 
repress them. We have to judge the persons who have been implicated [by the police] 
[ ...]  This [guarding o f the territorio] is not our function. There is a certain co-operation, 
ma non siamo noi che andiamo sul territorio.136
The notion of “guarding the territorio” has a complicated meaning. In the 
prosecutors’ view, this concept seems to be linked to three structural features of the 
role of the police during the pre-trial phase (and even before the beginning of the 
investigation). First, the police have a very strong link with what is happening on the 
streets, because they have to control and assess the crime problem in the geographical 
area where they operate (i. e. the territorio). Secondly, the police have responsibility 
for prevention and repression of crime and the security of citizens in a specific area. 
Third, and following from the previous two points, the police take the very first
• 1T7discretionary decisions in relation to the definition of priorities. This does not mean 
that pubblici ministerVs functions cannot have an effect on prevention, repression and 
security. In fact, as we have indicated (see chap. 7), prosecutors aim to obtain 
convictions; and convictions have a deterrent effect which clearly has an impact on 
prevention, repression and security. Moreover, later (see chap. 9) we will see that 
prosecutors do not simply swallow police’s decisions on priorities: in practice, they 
also take discretionary and personal decisions on the definition of the crime problem. 
What we are arguing here is that pubblici ministeri seem to accept a strong functional 
differentiation between their role and that of the police before the start of a 
prosecution. Thus, in the example we gave above, AP(N41) said that prosecutors are 
the 'terminus of police activity’, as if he wanted to suggest that they do not have 
control over police decisions (see also, above, AP(N42) who said: “unfortunately we 
are collectors”). Moreover, and more important, AP(N41) also said that: “they [the 
police] have to verify that crimes have been committed on the territorio and they have
1 6 AP(N41). This means that prosecutors do not spend their time in the street. This also means that the
police, and not prosecutors, will decide what is important in the street.
Ij7 Prosecutors used different words to explain the concept o f  “guarding the territorio”. For example, 
AP(53) and AP(N38) talked about the police dealing with public security; and APApl.(N50) said that 
the police must prevent and repress the crime. However, they all explained police’s functions (until 
they start performing investigation activities) using the same 3 concepts: connection with the street, 
prevention and repression o f crime and taking discretionary decisions on crime problem.
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to repress them. We have to judge the persons who have been implicated [by the 
police]”. This suggests an acceptance of the legitimacy o f initial police establishment 
of priorities.
There are exceptions to the system we explained above. Sometimes, in small 
prosecution offices, prosecutors and the police communicate with each other and try 
to coordinate their different priorities:
Sometimes the police and the prosecution office have different priorities, but they 
discuss and compare these different opinions. The police try to influence [prosecutors], 
for example, they can say: “we did this, now we want to do that” [...] This happens here, 
also, because it is a small prosecution office [...] For example I know that in [he named a 
medium-big prosecution office in the north o f  Italy] the police cannot even talk with 
prosecutors. I think it is better to have a dialogue with the forces o f  law and order.138
So, there seem to be cases when the pubblici ministeri are in the position to 
influence (or at least to discuss) police’s discretionary decisions on priorities. 
However, in practice, this does not mean that, for example, prosecutors actually 
search for crime reports together with the police or, as Vogliotti explained,139 that 
police will implement prosecutors’ directives on priorities. This mainly seems to 
mean that pubblici ministeri can, sometimes, discuss (with the police) or at least be 
informed of when and how crime reports may be channelled to prosecutors and 
certain investigative acts will have to be carried out:
138 A P(N 11).
lj9 Vogliotti (2004) op. cit. pp. 484-491.
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Here we [the police] often communicate to prosecutors that we want to put forward these 
‘large scale police’ operations.140 This is because, when you do things like searches, 
these have to be validated141 [by prosecutors] [...]  So, very often, we arrange agreements 
before; you call and you can say: “Listen, I am sorry, but there is this thing, we are not 
crazy, but we need to deal with a certain problem”. So, we always give advance reports 
of these actions [large-scale police operations, see above] because it is a matter o f  
correctness, it does not matter that the law does not say that you have to do it [ ...]  So, 
given that our relations [with prosecutors] are based on correctness, we give advance 
reports of, for example, the fact we have to carry out some searches, so that the 
prosecutor w ill not get 10, 15 requests to validate searches [without knowing that they 
are arriving], because [otherwise] he/she will be perplexed. Openness and [exchanging] 
reciprocal information, are very important when the relations are based on mutual trust 
[ • ■■]
In the situations where, for example, there is a concussioneHl involving a few thousands 
euros and they [suddenly] get these things [large-scale police operations], it happens that 
they say: “It is a difficult period and there is a very important case”. For example, at the 
moment there is a very serious case o f  concussione at the military arsenal; so, they 
[prosecutors] asked us to avoid making requests o f  [for example] very complicated 
telephone tapping. This does not mean that we do not have to do these [investigative 
acts], but that we have to defer them for a few days, so that they can be pursued properly.
I repeat: in a small place like this you can do it, because you have the opportunities to
i 143communicate a lot.
Police officers are aware of the fact that their work can be rendered useless if 
prosecutors are not ready to support them (i. e. validate seizures or arrests).144 
Moreover, as we can see, this form of co-operation does not just concern the moment 
when prosecutors receive crime reports. In fact, it seems to be more generally related
140 This police officer has previously indicated as “quantitative police’s actions” those involving, for 
example, drug trafficking at a low level. So, in practice, this means to arrest 10, 15 drug pushers.
141 We explained before that searches can only be carried out if  previously authorized by prosecutors. 
However, there are important exceptions. Police officers retain autonomous powers to perform 
searches in certain situations (e. g. when they are dealing with drug trafficking). In these cases the 
police can carry out the searches but they have to refer immediately (and maximum within 48 hours) to 
the prosecutor, who, within 48 hours, w ill review and validate the searches made by the police (art. 352 
para. 4 cpp). See also, for example, Grevi (2003) op. cit. pp. 344-345.
142 Blackmail o f  a public official.
I4j Pol.(N 14). Similar opinions were expressed by A P(N 11) and AP(C46).
144 See also AP(C46) who said: “Yes, they call me to say that they w ill arrive soon with many arrested 
people [arrests performed by the police must be reviewed and validate by prosecutors and see chap. 4] 
because they had to carry out a police operation. This clearly helps us to organize our work, but this is 
important for them as well, because [what happens] if  they arrest 50 people and the prosecution office 
is not ready? It is difficult that they do it on their own, normally they communicate before that they are 
dealing with these kinds o f  investigations. This is because, if  the prosecution office is not ready to deal 
with 50 arrested persons, they do not obtain any result”.
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to important investigative acts which require prosecutors’ intervention (e. g. telephone 
tapping) and which can lead to the discovery of a crime (i. e. after a search). The 
effect of the cooperation between police and prosecutors is that some crime reports 
may be collected and treated later or before others. However, even in these situations, 
pubblici ministeri do not seem to have the power to determine police’s definition o f 
priorities. Prosecutors can limit the impact of police’s discretionary choices, but they 
cannot demand change in the definition of police anti-crime policies.
We found traces of this system of cooperation in two small sites (one in the 
centre and one in the north of Italy). So, this seems to be an exception (we visited 10 
sites): in big or medium size prosecution offices, this form of co-operation does not 
work principally because there are too many prosecutors and too many police officers: 
No, it has never happened that the police called me to say that they had to arrest 15 
people for drug trafficking or similar things. This is, also, because the prosecutor who is 
doing the turno arresti [a different name for the turno reperibilita l45] always changes, so 
I they should call before [to know who is doing the turno arresti] [ ...]  In fact, it is a 
j problem to find, suddenly, that you have 15 arrested people [to deal with].146_____________
To sum up, before the beginning of the investigation, the distinction between 
the prosecutor and police functions seems marked. The police provide prosecutors 
with the information (crime report) on which an investigation and (possibly) a 
prosecution will be based. There are exceptions, but even these do not give the 
pubblici ministeri the tools to control police decisions on the definition of priorities. 
Finally, it should be noted that there seems to be a substantial difference between the 
police and pubblici ministeri definition of the crime problem. Prosecutors in 
interviews were aware of police concerns in relation to crimes like street crime, illegal 
immigration (i. e. Bossi-Fini Act, see chap. 11), prostitution (not organized crime 
dealing with prostitution), drug pushing in the street and infringement of copyright (i. 
e. selling fake CDs and/or DVDs in the street). In the next chapters we will see that 
these do not seem to be priorities for prosecutors.
143 As we said (chap. 6) under the turno reperibilita  cases are randomly distributed to all prosecutors
(this is again based on a fixed period), but the aim o f this pattern is to have a prosecutor who deals
immediately with emergencies (i. e. arrests).
146 AP(N32). See also AP(N30).
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3.1. Police influence on prosecutors’ priorities: arrests
As we have explained before (see chap. 4) the decision to arrest is the police’s right 
(although in some circumstances the arrest is compulsory); prosecutors intervene 
(must intervene) later, when they have to review the arrest procedure in order to check 
if this was lawful or not (they may decide to set the accused free immediately). 
Moreover, within 48 hours the pubblici ministeri must refer the case to the judge who 
will finally decide if the arrest was lawful. Of course, arresting is also a way to deliver 
crime reports to prosecutors (when someone is arrested because he/she has 
presumably committed a crime). So, the arrest procedure appears relevant to 
determining the cases that prosecutors will have to deal with. In fact, we saw that, 
within prosecution offices, there are prosecutors (there is a turnover) who exclusively 
deal with urgent matters (i.e. turno reperibilita, see chap. 6) and these are, normally, 
the product of arrests carried out by the police. In this section we want to analyze the 
impact that the police’s right to arrest may have on the definition of prosecutors’ 
priorities; while in the next chapters we will see how prosecutors can limit this 
impact. In particular, here we will mainly use the example of the Bossi-Fini Act: the 
effect that this piece of legislation has had on the prosecutors’ job seems to explain 
well what can happen when the police carry out a substantial number of arrests.
As previously indicated, the Bossi-Fini Act (passed in 2002 by the former 
centre-right government) deals with illegal immigration. It includes different 
provisions and, in particular, it provides that a foreign national who does not comply 
with a deportation order must be arrested (compulsory arrest) and immediately sent 
for trial (see art. 14 para. 5 bis, 5 ter, 5 quater and 5 quinquies of the D.Lgs. 286/1998 
as amended by the Act n. 189/2002). So, this is a crime that only illegal immigrants 
can commit. The vast majority of the prosecutors we interviewed said that this Act 
has created a substantial increase of the amount of their work, because they have to 
deal with a lot of arrests:147
147 16 prosecutors out o f  27 said that the Bossi-Fini Act increased very much the amount o f  work. 5 
talked more generally about the fact that crimes committed by immigrants (not only crimes linked with 
the Bossi-Fini Act) increased very much. One chief prosecutor said that, in his prosecution office 
(middle big in the north o f  Italy), they can cope with the Bossi-Fini Act. One was not asked (due to 
lack o f  time). One did not know (because he is a prosecutor attached at the court o f appeal). Finally, 3 
prosecutors working in a big procura  in the south o f  Italy said that they do not feel the pressure o f the 
Bossi-Fini Act, because there is not very much immigration there.
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For us this [the Bossi-Fini Act] amounts to a considerable increase in the backlog o f  
cases. This is because the procedure is quite complicated. The arrest is compulsory, and 
we do not have enough cells where we can put the arrested person while we wait for the 
direttissima trial,148 which is compulsory as well. So, sometimes, it happens that we have 
to transfer them to jail, because it is not possible to have the trial the day after, then you 
need to arrange an escort [to bring the arrested persons in jail] [ ...]  you need to nominate 
a translator [because the arrested persons normally do not speak Italian], to pay him [ ...]  
[moreover] the difficulties are linked to the fact that you need to deal with many arrest 
procedures at the same time, for which you need to organize the hearing [the arrest 
procedure must be, eventually, reviewed by a judge], the charges149 etc.150
This piece of legislation, apparently, has not had the effect of creating a new 
priority for prosecutors. In fact, all the pubblici ministeri we interviewed said that the 
Bossi-Fini Act and illegal immigration were not perceived as priorities (see chap. 11). 
However, due to the fact that the number of arrests has dramatically increased (and 
that illegal immigrants must be immediately sent to trial), prosecutors can be, in 
practice, forced to treat these cases rapidly:
No [it is not a priority] [...] . However, the emergency, within the prosecution office, is 
produced by the fact that the act generates many arrests. This is why it becomes an 
emergency. In fact, [ ...]  these are all files which must be taken to the end. That Act does 
not say that we have to treat those [crimes] as a priority, the priority is de facto.151
So, the fact that police officers are legally bound to arrest illegal immigrants 
eventually binds prosecutors as well, because they cannot choose to defer the case 
(they must refer it to the judge within 48 hours from the arrest, see above). In this 
sense a case becomes a “de facto priority”.
The police right to arrest (not only for illegal immigration) also seems 
important because police officers’ efficiency is evaluated on the base of their 
statistics:
We need to show some statistics, statistics about criminality [ ...]  In particular, they 
[police local and national hierarchical superiors] need to evaluate the number o f crimes
148 This is a special proceedings, which allows prosecutors to send immediately to trial before the judge 
the accused (arrested) person(s) (art. 449-452 cpp.).
149 Some immigrants are arrested for Bossi-Fini, but then prosecutors (and the police) discover that they 
are also involved in other criminal activities (e. g. theft, drug pushing etc.). So, they have to prepare the 
file being sure that the arrested person(s) is charged for all the crimes for which he/she is accused.
150 AP(C47).
151 AP(C46). See also AP(N32).
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and how we carry out our functions. Amongst the criteria used to make these evaluations 
there are: arrests, deportations, denunciations and the controls we perform on persons 
and vehicles. Sometimes, if  the data do not look good we can receive instructions to 
perform more arrests. This normally arrives from the questore.152
Thus, the number of arrests is one of the criteria used to evaluate the police 
officers’ performance. So, if police officers need to show good statistics, they will 
presumably (also) try to carry out more arrests. Unsurprisingly this seems to have an 
impact on prosecutors’ job:
Arresting is another important point, because, at the end o f  the month, they need to have 
a certain number o f arrests. So, they push to arrest even when we do not agree.153
In the last two sections we have described the way that the police can 
influence the prosecutors’ definition of priorities, mainly in two ways: by 
implementing directives on anti-crime policy and through the arrest procedure. These 
forms of influence can sometimes be correlated with each other:
I have the strong feeling that they receive instructions to focus on certain things from 
their hierarchical superiors; and this is normal. We [prosecutors] certainly feel this 
influence; we particularly feel it in relation to arrested persons. In fact, for arrested 
persons, it mainly depends on decisions taken [by the police] [ ...]  In particular, for 
arrested persons caught red handed, it depends on whether the police decide to focus on 
areas where there is drug trafficking or prostitution or where there are illegal immigrants.
This is how it works.154
So, directives push the police to focus on certain priorities; and, in order to 
execute properly these orders, the police (also) carry out arrests. Moreover, as we 
saw, the more arrests they perform the better the statistics are and, as a consequence, 
the better the directive will be seen as having been implemented.
The analysis of the impact that police’s decision to arrest can have on 
prosecutors’ definition of priorities also leads us to some important issues concerning 
the strict division between police and prosecutor functions within the arrest 
procedure:
132 Pol.(N14). Similar opinions were expressed by Pol.(N34), Pol.(C51) and Pol.(N52).
153 AP(N28).
154 DCP(N45).
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You can not call [the police] to tell them to stop [arresting under the Bossi-Fini Act], so I 
decide on archiviazione. This happens for two reasons. First, because we do the turno 
reperibilta every two months, and we are 70 prosecutors [so we do not know police 
officers personally]. Second, the legal rules [for the Bossi-Fini Act] require that the 
arrest is compulsory when the accused is caught red handed,155 and they do it! I can not 
question a police officer’s act.156
This [the fact that prosecutors do not interfere in police’s decision to arrest] is fair 
enough: they [police] have to do it [to arrest] and we have to handle the situation. I do 
not know if  other prosecutors do it, for me it is interference [ .. .]  Yes, if  I am dealing 
with an environmental crime and I get 15 arrested drug pushers, I have to do them, I 
have to find a way to carry on.157
No, I do not agree [ ...]  The decision to arrest is a police officer’s right and you have to 
respect it. The code o f  criminal procedure says that the prosecutor must be immediately 
informed and that he/she is the dominus o f  the investigation. So, if  they ask me for a 
suggestion, I tell them my opinion, but I always conclude saying that the decision to 
arrest is a police’s right and that I have different powers [i. e. to review the arrest 
procedure].158
We interviewed a prosecutor who was doing the turno reperibilita (so she was 
responsible for the arrests).159 The mobile rang a first time, the police explained the 
facts to the prosecutor and said that they were not sure if they could make an arrest (it 
was not clear exactly what had happened, it seemed to concern an attack on a police 
officer). The Prosecutor listened carefully and replied that she was not sure. Then the 
mobile rung again, because the police wanted to explain better what happened and 
they were still not sure if they could make the arrest or not. At this point the 
prosecutor (quite upset) said: “I can not decide for you. You are in charge of the 
arrests, this is your job. Then, if I am not happy, I will set the arrested person free”.
As we have said, in the next few chapters we will see that prosecutors actually 
have the power to limit the impact police decisions to arrest. However, here, as in the 
previous section, we want to emphasize prosecutors’ desire to stress the functional
li:> In the Bossi-Fini case the immigrant can be caught red handed (simply) because he/she is an illegal 
immigrant in Italy.
156 AP(N30).
157 AP(N42).
158 AP(N33).
159 AP(N39).
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differentiation between police and prosecutor roles. It is presented as if  there were no 
overlaps at all between the police (who decide on the arrest) and prosecutors (who 
review the procedure).
3.2. Police influence on prosecutors’ priorities: individual cases
Until now we have analyzed the impact that the police decisions to focus on certain 
types of crimes (i. e. illegal immigration) can have on prosecutors’ job. Now we want 
to concentrate on a different situation. We want to describe the police influence on 
prosecutors’ decisions in individual cases.
Prosecutors seem to accept the fact that the police will normally advise them 
which cases appear more urgent and serious:
The police tell me the cases which look particularly serious [ ...]  For example, I recently 
had a case o f  robbers operating in a small village [ ...]  These are bullies who have 
crossed the line: they go to bars and they do not pay, they require their families to give 
them money, they blackmail friends and acquaintances and they become violent etc. this 
case was indicated to me by a m aresciallo160 belonging to the carabinieri and working in 
; that village. So, in 3 days, I have to say that I had no other urgent matters, I prepared the 
documents applying [to the judge] for pre-trial custody and the judge decided [agreed 
with the request] in 15 days [ ...]  Anyway, I have to say that, in general, I always 
intervene when the police report me that a case is serious.161
Although, some pubblici ministeri seem to rely very much on the police,162 it 
is difficult to say how important the police’s opinion is for prosecutors.163 In fact, 
some said that they always act upon a police’s indication that there is an 
emergency.164 However, in general, pubblici ministeri claim that police reports 
(written and/or oral) can only partially influence their decisions.165 This becomes
160 The name o f the chief o f  carabinieri at the local police station.
101 AP(N30). Similar opinions were expressed by APApl.(N50) and AP(N48).
See, for example, AP(N30) and AP(N48).
I6j It was impossible to elaborate reliable statistics. This is because prosecutors’ considerations on the 
importance o f police’s opinions on specific cases were, most o f  the times, difficult to interpret. In 
particular, pubblici ministeri could not really describe how important police’s influence is. They 
preferred to say that this was one o f  the parameters that they have to consider when they determine 
their priorities.
164 See, for example, AP(C46), AP(N30) and AP(N48).
165 See, for example, AP(N38), AP(N28) and APApl.(N50).
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particularly clear if we look at the cases in which police officers make references to 
prosecutors about the perception that the public has of the crime problem:
The initial impact [i. e. the consequences that criminality creates on the local 
community] is always upon the police [ ...]  [and] they can tell me that the local 
community is worried. Sometimes this makes me aware o f  the problems and [in these 
cases] I pay a particular attention to the allegations. Sometimes they write it up, and they 
explain that people have complained repeatedly. In other words: they make me 
understand that they are prioritizing a case, because this is a priority for the people [...]
Yes, they make me aware o f  the problems, but this only partially influences m e.166
The police have more direct relations with citizens, so they look at the things in a 
partially different way [compared to prosecutors] [...] [This happens] because they deal 
with security issues, while we intervene later [...] We have to be more detached.167
Here it is interesting to note that pubblici ministeri want to mark the difference 
between themselves and the police who deal with “the initial impact” that criminality 
creates on local communities and prosecutors who have to be “more detached”. This 
seems to suggest that the police’s opinions will be taken into account but that 
prosecutors will also look at the case from a different angle (so they will be only 
partially influenced). In fact, sometimes, pubblici ministeri seem to be able to mediate 
police’s perceptions of the importance and seriousness of a case:
We have to be more balanced compared to the police, this is because we have to 
guarantee the legalitam  more than them [...] So, this [the police reporting that local 
communities are worried] could influence us when we propose a particular sentence at 
trial [...] Yes we take into account that the police come to tell us that the local 
community is worried, but it depends on the case. [For example] if  it is a brawl we 
consider: how many persons, injuries, the allarme sociale etc. So, if  there are cases 
which have aroused great interest, I am partially influenced. But I always base my 
decisions on the injuries [suffered by the victim(s)] [...] Moreover, I never want to go for 
an exemplary punishment, I may ask for something more, but not excessively, because I 
always wonder: why these four poor devils and not all the others?169
166 AP(N28).
167 AP(N38). Similar opinions were expressed by AP(N28) and AP(C46). See also AP(N32) who said: 
‘ Anyway, they [police] do not think about the trial, they just deal with the immediate consequences 
[that crime creates]”.
168 This word literally means legality. So, in this context legalita  means that prosecutors must guarantee 
that the investigation was lawful and that the rights o f  the accused person(s) have been respected (see 
chap. 7).
169 AP(N38).
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So, prosecutors take into consideration police opinions when they report that a 
crime is serious (e. g. that it has had a great impact on the local community). 
However, they also consider other criteria (e. g. the damage suffered by the victim(s)). 
We will see that differences in police and prosecutor views of what should be 
regarded as a priority may also limit the impact of police decisions to arrest and to 
focus on certain anti-crime policies (i. e. illegal immigration).
So what we want to underline is that the police’s discretionary decisions on 
priorities can be mediated by the pubblici ministeri’s views. We are not arguing that, 
in practice, the police do not influence prosecutors when they decide if a case (or a 
type of crime) should be prioritized. But police influence seems to be just one o f the 
factors that determine the way prosecutors establish their priorities.
Before we conclude we still need to describe two situations. The first one is 
not about the impact that the police’s opinions may have on prosecutors’ decisions in 
a specific case. It explains how the police’s decision to prioritize a case can affect, in 
general, pubblici ministeri’s job:
If I need police forces for an investigation which is not perceived as a priority by police 
hierarchical superiors, it can be a problem. They will never tell you that they will not 
support you, but if  you do not get the best men [ ...]  Yes, it has happened, even for 
serious cases, but the point is: who considers these cases to be serious?170
| When a case has aroused great interest and you see it on the newspapers for many days, 
l the police are focused to deal with that case as soon as possible. So, for example, I can 
not contact the police unit which is working for me because they are all doing that
So, in these situations, the consequence is not that the police will influence the 
way pubblici ministeri define the crime problem, but that cases which have been 
prioritized by prosecutors may not be treated as a priority by the police. However, 
prosecutors can avoid these problems by trying to work with the same police
172officers. In fact, we explained before (see chap. 6) that there are systems that police 
officers use to be sure that a particular prosecutor will deal with a particular case. So, 
the strong connection between a prosecutor and the police officers he/she trusts the
170 AP(N48).
171 AP(N31).
172 L(N35). Similar opinions were expressed by L(N21) and Pol.(N34).
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most can, potentially, ensure that the case which has been prioritized will be carried 
out properly.
The second example concerns the fact that the police can have a sort o f 
mediation function in stopping certain cases before they reach the prosecutor:
I think that, particularly in small places, the police still retain the right to try to find 
peaceful solutions and they also have cautioning powers. In the big cities this does not 
happen anymore. The maresciallo belonging to the carabinieri who operates in small 
places can feel the problems and, eventually, can caution people that they might be 
formally accused in the future. I think that this mediation function is very interesting.173
The analysis o f Italian police’s cautioning powers goes far beyond the current 
study. We just need to say that, formally, this is not (unlike England and Wales) a 
police function. In Italy there is no formal power to caution (this is clearly a logical 
consequence of the legality principle). Moreover, this seems to be mainly 
concentrated in small places, where police officers are known174 and where “lawyers 
are not so many and [as a consequence] they do not have to push so hard for a 
case”.173 So, the impact of this form of mediation seems to be geographically limited. 
However, here we have to underline that this function can increase even more police’s 
powers to take discretionary decisions about the cases which will reach the 
prosecutorial stage.
To conclude, in these sections we have explained that the police not only 
influence pubblici ministeri during the investigation, but they also have an impact on 
the definition of prosecutors’ priorities. Why does this happen? We explained that the 
police have to implement directives on anti-crime policies that prosecutors cannot 
discuss or influence; that they have the right to arrest and their job is also assessed 
according to the number of arrests they perform; and that they can advise prosecutors 
on single cases. However, we also pointed out that there are strong functional 
differences and that prosecutors claim to be “more detached” from the police at this 
stage of the proceedings. These differences (compared to the police) certainly do not 
prevent prosecutors from being exposed to, and influenced by, the police’s 
discretionary choices on the definition of the crime problem. However, sometimes,
l7j A P(N 31). Similar opinions were expressed by AP(N48) and AP(N30).
174 AP(N30).
175 AP(N48).
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prosecutors seem to be able to mediate police’s decisions by taking into consideration 
other criteria.
Finally, there is another consideration which deserves to be mentioned here. 
The strong functional differences and the “distance” between the police and 
prosecutors at this stage of the proceedings seem unsurprising if we look at 
prosecutors’ professional culture. In fact, as we said (see chap. 7), the pubblici 
ministeri believe that the police act like crime fighters and that, on the contrary, they 
have to be impartial figures. So, it seems that prosecutors want to mark their cultural 
distance from the police officers who are described (by pubblici ministeri) as figures 
influenced by directives on anticrime policies and by “the initial impact” o f the crime 
problem (i. e. complaints coming from the ‘man in the street’). However, as we 
explained, the consequence, in practice, is not that prosecutors are uninfluenced by 
the police’s decisions and opinions, but that they can mediate this form of influence.
4. Conclusion
There are two main questions we have tried to answer in this chapter. First: what are 
the key elements which describe the police prosecutor relationship during the 
investigation? We explained that “directing the investigation” does not seem to imply 
that pubblici ministeri carry out all the investigative acts or that they autonomously 
decide the strategy of the investigation, but that there are interactions between the 
police and pubblici ministeri. The number and the nature (prompting and reviewing or 
bureaucratic review) of these interactions will determine how effectively the 
prosecutors’ right to direct the investigation becomes a reality in practice (i. e. to 
challenge what Hodgson calls “the case parameters set by police”). Moreover, the fact 
that prosecutors direct the investigation does not seem to affect their professional and 
legal culture. Pubblici ministeri keep emphasizing the functional and cultural 
differences (and distance) between them and the police. However, it seems that, in 
practice, prosecutors depend very much on police initiatives during the investigation.
The second question is: what is the impact (during the pre-trial phase) of 
police decisions on the definition of priorities? First, prosecutors are influenced by 
police discretionary decisions on the crimes to prioritize. Secondly, at this stage there 
is a strong distinction between the functions that these two legal actors have to carry
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out. Third, it seems that prosecutors do not simply “swallow” police’s priorities, but 
they treat them as one of the parameters they need to take into account to define the 
crime problem. Thus, it seems that pubblici ministeri interpret their relations with the 
police during the pre-trial phase in terms of strong functional and cultural differences 
which, in prosecutors’ view, should mark the distance between these two legal actors. 
These differences are less clear during the investigation, but they appear unambiguous 
when the police collect crime reports and pubblici ministeri refer to the fact that they 
have to be “more detached”. However, as we explained, in practice, the result is not 
that prosecutors are unaffected by the police’s decisions.
Finally, the analysis of the police prosecutor relationship during the pre-trial 
phase also suggests important influences on prosecutors’ professional culture in 
practice. In particular, prosecutors’ culture is not simply reflected in their “filtering 
action” (see chap. 7). Pubblici ministeri can also review the results of the acts carried 
out by the police, prompt inputs to decide the strategy of the investigation and 
mediate the impact of police’s priorities. Filtering, reviewing and prompting can be 
strongly connected. This is because prosecutors can issue directives and review results 
for the purpose of shaping the investigation the way they want and to obtain more and 
better information to decide if a case can stand scrutiny at trial. Mediating police 
priorities may be regarded as a form of filtering, aimed not at deciding the cases 
which have to be sent to trial, but those who have to be prioritized. This issue will be 
discussed in the next chapters.
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PART III: PROSECUTORS’ 
CONSTRUCTION OF PRIORITIES
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CHAPTER IX. PROSECUTORS AND THE 
DEFINITION OF PRIORITIES
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1. Introduction
We concluded the previous chapter by explaining the influence that the police can 
have on prosecutors’ definition of priorities. But we indicated that pubblici ministeri 
also take into consideration other criteria which shape their decisions and limit the 
influence that the police have upon their decision-making. What are these further 
decision-making criteria? This is the question we want to answer here. So with this 
chapter we want to develop a particular focus on defining the crime problem. At its 
broadest ‘defining the crime problem’ has a sociological meaning which might be 
better captured by the phrase ‘the social construction of crime’.1 Clearly those who 
make prosecution decisions are a small part of this broader social process, being 
influenced by broader social discourses and in turn influencing them (i. e. the 
discourses) by their decision-making. This thesis has an especial focus on 
prosecutors’ limited but significant part in this broader process. This is built around 
prosecutors’ determination of priorities in prosecution. In order to understand this we 
need to examine their criteria for decision-making. This introduces two rather 
ambiguous concepts, that of a ‘priority’ and that of a ‘criterion for decision-making’. 
Given the importance of these concepts to our subsequent analysis we start by 
defining them both and their interrelationship.
In this chapter the decision-making process will be categorised as respectively 
‘external influences’ or ‘personal considerations ’. The ‘external influences’ are those 
that prosecutors have not created themselves but cannot in practice (and do not 
necessarily want to) completely disregard. Most obviously these are legal criteria (e. 
g. prescrizione). The personal considerations relate to prosecutors’ personal 
discretionary choices, their own views of what is or is not important or urgent. How 
do these different types of criteria for decision-making relate to the idea of a 
‘priority’? In one sense the notion of priorities connotes a way of treating a case, 
giving it ‘preferential treatment’ by dealing with it first or according more care, time 
or resources to its treatment. But the term ‘priority’ also has another more personal 
connotation, relating to a personal attitude towards something such as a feeling that 
the case is serious or urgent in some sense (this might be termed a personal 
preference). Sometimes, perhaps often, a prosecutor’s personal preference (a personal
1 See. for example, Muncie J. “The Construction and Deconstruction o f  Crime”. In Muncie J. and 
McLaughlin E. eds. “The Problem o f  Crime”. 2001. 2nd ed. London: Sage. pp. 15-16.
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feeling that something is important or urgent) may lead to their ‘prioritization’ of a 
case in the sense of according it earlier or more detailed treatment (or giving it more 
resources). But lawyers and sociologists are familiar with the idea that legal or social 
actors should not and cannot simply or always act on their own personal preferences. 
There are also the external influences (criteria) which may also shape decision­
making (the law or relevant bureaucratic rules for example).
Now, at this stage we need to make a further conceptual clarification. In Italy 
there is only one legal principle which ‘externally’ imposes a clear choice (or a non­
choice) on prosecutors. This is the legality principle. Prosecutors have to prosecute all 
cases. In formal legal terms, no discretion is allowed. So, when we describe other 
legal rules as external criteria this does not imply direct legal criteria for prosecutors’ 
decisions. The Italian criminal justice system does not have anything similar, for 
example, to the Code for Crown Prosecutors2 or the Conditional Cautions Code of 
Practiced This is because these are Codes which determine which cases shall be 
prosecuted. There can be no overt place for such Codes where there is the legality 
principle and prosecutors (and judges) are in constitutional theory externally 
independent (i. e. from the executive, see chap. 4).4 In Italy, legal criteria become 
important not because they are designed to bind prosecutors’ decisions on priorities 
but as a consequence of prosecutors’ professional culture: magistrates want to be seen 
as bearers of the law. As we have said (chap. 7), Italian prosecutors’ professional self- 
image is based on their sense of themselves as being judicial figures. Thus, while the 
influence of legal rules cannot be direct, it can be indirect. Pubblici ministeri choose 
to look at legal criteria as sources to determine priorities in the sense of treating cases 
first or with more resources or care. As a consequence, ‘the legal rules’ exert an 
influence on decision-making. However, we will argue that they do not exclude the 
influence of personal priorities: even where legal rules clearly have an influence, we 
will underline the importance of personal criteria based on prosecutors’ socio-political 
views. Our analysis of legal influences will be structured around two issues: the 
construction of urgency and the construction of seriousness. The former is related to 
procedural legal rules: prescrizione, arrest and pre-trial control measures. The latter
2 http://www.cps. gov.uk/publications/docs/code2004english .pdf
J http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cond-caution-cop?view=Binary
4 Guarnieri writes: “In Italy [ ...]  there is no formal political responsibility for criminal prosecutions: the 
compulsory principle is thought to make it superfluous, since it is said that the public prosecutor must 
‘only apply the law”’. Guarnieri (1997) op. cit. p. 186.
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relates to substantive legal criteria: legislation, the characteristics o f the perpetrator 
and the impact of crime on society. We will argue that external influences are 
strongest in their construction of urgency. In contrast, the legal criteria constructing 
seriousness leave more room to the exercise of personal priorities.
Of course we will not only concentrate on legal influences. Bureaucratic 
criteria determined within prosecution offices will be analyzed as well. These criteria 
(like the legal ones) are not binding. Moreover, they appear, in general, to leave a 
great deal of room for the exercise o f prosecutors’ personal priorities (i. e. they are not 
strongly influential). The final criteria for decision-making that we will analyze have 
a strong practical nature. These mainly concern the investigation and seem to confirm 
that the influence of prosecutors’ discretion can be substantial in making personal 
decisions on the definition of the crime problem in the pre-trial phase.
We would also remind the reader that in this chapter we will not deal with 
allanne sociale. This is certainly an important decision-making criterion. But it is an 
informal, politically contested or contestable and uncertain factor in decision-making 
that has a particular importance to the argument of this thesis. So, it will be treated in 
a separate (following) chapter to emphasize its characteristics and importance in the 
definition of the crime problem.
1.1. The debate in Italy
The Italian academic literature has mainly dealt with purely legal questions. The 
debate is around the tension between the legality principle and possible legislative 
reforms to determine prosecution priorities. Within this debate priorities are not 
treated as matters relating to personal preferences. The issues are about when one case 
might be treated as a priority (i. e. before another one) because this is the way to 
provide a more efficient service. A priority is never seen to reflect prosecutors’ 
definition of the crime problem. This is because the legality principle (in its strict 
legal interpretation) is seen within the Italian literature as preventing the exercise of 
individual (even if widely shared) preferences. So, this literature has not really aimed 
at addressing the question of prosecutors’ discretionary powers. But some interesting 
points about the prosecutors’ legal environment can be made.
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One of the main issues discussed by the Italian literature concerns legislative 
interventions to reduce the amount o f cases that must be prosecuted. The proposals 
are various: there should be more legally defined exceptions to the legality principle 
(see chap. 4); depenalization; archiviazione should be easier; crimes should not be 
prosecuted if they only have minor consequences.5 But these changes should never 
affect the legality principle, which must be the basic legal rule. The expediency 
principle is not an option because, as Chiavario argues, it enables prosecutors to take 
discretionary choices.6 These authors are arguing that the system is not working 
properly. For example, Zagrebelsky explains that there is a substantial difference
n .
between what the system should do and what happens in practice. Citizens demand 
more justice, but prosecution offices are not able to provide this service. As a
O
consequence, general criteria to reduce the number of prosecutions should be created. 
However, these have to be found within the existing legal structure based on the 
legality principle.
These legal reforms are certainly not the only method to deal with the 
problems caused by the number of cases to be prosecuted. Zagrebelsky claims that 
measures such as the depenalization of petty crimes have not been successful and the 
backlog of cases has increased. So, the author concludes that it is necessary to set out 
internal priorities within prosecution offices, or at least within those prosecution 
offices which cannot cope with the amount of work.9 But how can priorities be 
determined if, at the same time, the legality principle has to be respected? This is the 
second issue fundamental to the Italian academic debate. Prosecutors should not be 
given an unfettered discretion to discontinue or continue cases as they wish, or purely 
on the basis of the circumstances of the case. This would definitely undermine the 
legality principle. Discretion should be structured by pre-determined principles. So, a 
priority should be the result of the application of efficiency-based criteria aimed at
3 Chiavario M. “Obbligatorieta dell’azione penale: il principio e la realta”. In Centro Nazionale di 
Prevenzione e Difesa Sociale (1994) op. cit. pp. 85-92; Neppi Modona G. “Principio di legalita e
nuovo processo p en a le In Centro Nazionale di Prevenzione e Difesa Sociale (1994) op. cit. pp. 119- 
129; and Zagrebelsky V. “Stabilire le priorita nell’esercizio obbligatorio della azione penale”. In
Centro Nazionale di Prevenzione e Difesa Sociale (1994) op. cit. pp. 101-118.
6 Chiavario (1994) op. cit. p. 83.
7 Zagrebelsky (1994) op. cit. p. 101.
s Chiavario (1994) op. cit. pp. 84-85.
9 Zagrebelsky (1994) op. cit. pp. 103-104.
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improving (and finding) the best practices to deal efficiently with cases.10 For 
example, petty crimes which can be dealt with in a brief and standardised way (e. g. 
road traffic offences) should be prioritized (i. e. treated before the others, not as a 
personal priority or preference).11 Moreover, decisions on the definition of the 
priorities should be taken by Parliament and/or the CSM12 and chief prosecutors 
should have the responsibility to organize their offices according to these (efficiency 
based) guidelines.13 However, the Minister of Justice must not be involved, otherwise 
pubblici ministeri might lose part of their independence from the executive power.14
Zagrebelsky has not just set out the general ‘rule’ which could ‘save’ the legality 
principle and allow the determination of priorities (i. e. the application of general 
efficiency based criteria). He has also indicated some of the external legal criteria 
which, in practice, could be taken into account to determine the cases to prioritize. 
Again the author is not suggesting that these should be direct formal criteria for 
prosecution. Only the legality principle has this function (see above). However, they 
are legal provisions that might be used as criteria to determine priorities (i. e. act as 
external influences). In particular, the author indicates these criteria:
a) The damage caused by the crime.
b) The personality and dangerousness of the accused person(s) (both determined on 
the basis of his or her crime record).
c) Whether the crime has substantially affected the property rights of the victim(s).
d) Whether the accused person(s) did or did not eliminate or limit the effect of the 
crime (e. g. industrial accidents, environmental crimes etc.).
10 Ibid. p. 105; and Chiavario (1994) op. cit. pp. 95-97. See also, Neppi Modona (1994) op. cit. pp. 119- 
129. A very similar opinion (or better to say identical) was recently included in a resolution issued by 
the CSM. This document was approved November 9th 2006 and it dealt with the problems caused by 
the recent indulto Act (n. 241/2006, this is a piece o f legislation granting pardon, but different 
compared to amnesty, because this cancels the crime, while the indulto simply eliminates part or all the 
punishment). The CSM remarked that the definition o f priorities should not be the result o f  
discretionary choices made by single prosecutors (resolution o f  the CSM November 9th 2006, as 
reported in Questione Giustizia. 2006. Vol. 6. pp. 1075-1081; see also Santalucia G. “Obbligatorieta 
d e lt’azione penale e criteri di priority. 2007. Questione Giustizia. Vol. 3. pp. 617-621).
11 Zagrebelsky (1995) op. cit. p. 17.
There is a clear difference between these two organs. The parliament has a democratic mandate; 
while the CSM ’s members are not elected. So, the power to take decisions on priorities would be 
allocated to the CSM because it is composed by experts, not because it represents the public.
Ij Chiavario (1994) op. cit. pp. 95-97.
14 Neppi Modona (1994) op. cit. pp. 119-129.
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e) Whether a pre-trial measure has been issued: such cases must always have 
priority, because the consequences of these measures (for the accused person(s)) 
must be limited, 
t) The punishment which might be, in practice, inflicted.
g) Aggravating and mitigating circumstances, because they can determine if a crime 
had a substantial or highly reduced impact.
h) The constitution and the Acts of Parliament (including amnesty) because they may 
be relevant to determining how important certain interests are for the legislator.15 
Zagrebelsky also said that time should not be an issue. So, the moment at which a
prosecutor received a crime report should not be important.16 Moreover, he remarked 
that guidelines on priorities should never lead to the situation where certain crimes are 
never prosecuted.17
Finally, Zagrebelsky argued that the specialized units created within 
prosecution offices should reflect the priorities (still based on efficiency) o f the
1 ftprosecution office. In particular, the author claims that positive effects have been 
produced by creating the following specialized units: industrial accidents (injuries, 
manslaughter etc.); industrial safety and prevention of injuries; industrial diseases; 
environmental crimes; protection of consumers (e.g. food safety) and illicit medical 
practices (i. e. doctors unauthorized to perform certain activities); town planning; 
white collar crimes; certain crimes (like domestic violence and abuse) committed 
within the family and/or against elderly people; manslaughter and injuries if  they do 
not involve car accidents and/or industrial accidents; thefts, handling stolen goods and 
forgery concerning cheques and frauds involving (as victims) insurance companies; 
different petty crimes (e. g. road traffic etc.); protection of artistic and archaeological 
goods and sites; intellectual property.19
Moreover, when Zagrebelsky was chief prosecutor in Turin, he issued a 
famous circular (in 1990) which was aimed at creating a hierarchy o f priorities (still 
based on objective criteria):
13 Zagrebelsky (1995) op. cit. pp. 35-42.
16 Ibid. p. 35.
1' Ibicl. p. 41.
18 Ibid. pp. 4 2 -4 3 .
19 Ibid. pp. 30 -31 .
'° Zagrebelsky V. “Flusso delle notizie di reato, organizzazione delle risorse, obbligatorieta  
dell'azione penale”. 1992. In “Procure circondariali (organizzazione del lavoro dei magistrati e 
rapporto con la polizia  giudiziaria)”. In Quaderni del Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura n. 56. pp. 
175-176.
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a) Crimes where the accused person(s) is subject to pre-trial measures.
b) Serious crimes (to be determined according to the criteria indicated above: 
personality o f the accused person(s), punishment etc.).
c) All other cases.
Zagrebelsky argues that only chief prosecutors are entitled to issue guidelines
on priorities. He believes this power stems from art. 70 para. 3 (ord. giud.) which
21confers on chief prosecutors the power to organize prosecution offices. However, he 
has also argued that, in order to ensure a certain degree o f uniformity, the Parliament 
should make recommendations concerning the definition o f priorities; and that chief 
prosecutors should ensure the conformity of the guidelines issued within prosecution 
offices with these recommendations. However, Parliament should not indicate the 
crimes for which the prosecution can be discontinued, but only those which should be 
prioritized.22
Finally, we should underline that there have been criticisms of the argument 
that priorities can cohabit with the legality principle. The point, unsurprisingly, is that 
if priorities are created the legality principle is affected and prosecutors may be
23prevented from prosecuting (or may choose not to prosecute) certain crimes. 
Moreover, Nannucci points out (after explaining that Italian prosecutors make, in 
practice, many discretionary choices)24 that efficiency based criteria may be difficult 
to apply in practice. In particular, the author claims that cases where the prescrizione 
is shorter will be prioritized (otherwise the prescrizione blocks the prosecution), but 
these are, normally, the less serious crimes (contravvenzioni25). On the other hand, if 
the seriousness of the case is the main criterion delitti should always be prioritized
1  f \compared to contavvenzioni, because the law says that they are more serious.
Zagrebelsky (1995) op. cit. p. 43.
~2 Zagrebelsky (1994) op. cit. pp. 115-116. See also, Chiavario (1994) op. cit.
2’ See, for example, Catellani G. “Obbligatorieta d e ll’azionepenale: tempi e metodi, costi e ben efic f\ 
In Centro Nazionale di Prevenzione e Difesa Sociale (1994) op. cit. p. 99 and pp. 117-118. Here we 
have to underline, again, that we were in the middle o f  tangentopoli. In fact, Catellani, who was at that 
time a prosecutor, posed a very clear question: could we still have tangentopoli if  we modify (or 
mediate) the legality principle?
"4 Nannucci U. “Flusso delle notizie di reato, organizzazione delle risorse, obbligatorieta d e l l’azione 
penale”. In “Procure circondariali (organizzazione del lavoro dei magistrati e rapporto con la p o liz ia  
gindiziaria)” (1992) op. cit. pp. 180-185.
"5 In the Italian criminal law system the crimes are divided between contravvenzioni and delitti (art. 39 
cp). The distinction concerns the punishment: delitti are punished more strongly. However, in practice, 
the differences are extremely limited (see, for example, Marinucci G. and Dolcini E. “Corso di diritto  
penale” (vol. 1). 2001. 3rd ed. Milano: Giuffre. pp. 399-407).
26 Nannucci (1992) op. cit. p. 187.
206
The Italian literature has certainly underlined the problems connected with the 
legality principle. Moreover, Zagrebelsky has outlined the influence that legal 
provisions can have on the definition of priorities. However, as we have said, the way 
Italian prosecutors use their discretionary powers has not been explored. This is 
because all these arguments start from the assumption (based on purely legal analysis) 
that prosecutors cannot take discretionary choices. In the authors’ views, this means 
that some crimes may be prioritized because of general efficiency based principles. 
But, there certainly cannot be preferences. In other words: personal priorities are not 
acceptable within the legal structure o f the Italian criminal justice system. In this 
chapter we will be approaching the issues from a different angle, arguing that the 
legality principle cannot, in practice, remove prosecutors’ powers to take 
discretionary decisions. But, how far can external legal (and bureaucratic) influences 
shape prosecutors’ decisions? Here we are not directly interested in the implications 
for the application of the legality principle (although some conclusions at the end of 
this thesis will be eventually made). Rather, we want to analyze the criteria for 
decision-making that prosecutors use to determine the crime problem. This includes 
both priorities influenced by external criteria and preferences determined by more 
personal considerations. How much does the academic debate in Italy tell us about 
these questions?
1.2. The debate in Italy: the law in action
There is a less substantial academic literature dealing with the way the legality 
principle is applied in practice and, more specifically, the way prosecutors define 
priorities. As we just said, we do not want to contribute to this debate. However, the 
analysis of this literature is certainly important here, because it concentrates on what 
prosecutors do in practice. The aims have been mainly two-fold: to explain that some 
legal rules, in practice, are not applied (i. e. the legality principle) and to determine 
the criteria prosecutors use to determine priorities.
The main argument is that the legality principle does not exist in practice. The 
consequence is that, as Grande (who did not use empirical evidence) claims: “the 
Italian prosecutor enjoys unfettered freedom in deciding where to concentrate his
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7 7activities and therefore whether or not to prosecute a case”. So, the individual 
decision-making powers of pubblici ministeri involve the exercise o f very broad
9 o
discretion and they are not accountable for these decisions. The legality principle 
does not exist and priorities substantially vary depending on the personal decisions of
9Qindividual prosecutors. Prosecutors have many opportunities, before and during the 
criminal proceedings, to determine priorities. They can influence the police by issuing 
guidelines about the crime reports that they do not want to receive; they can decide 
the amount of resources which should be allocated for an investigation; how long the 
investigation lasts;30 and those cases for which it is worth using special proceedings.31
27 Grande (2000) op. cit. p. 241. Here we also have to remember what we said (chap. 4) about the work 
o f  Goldstein and Marcus (1977) op. cit. p. 271). In particular, they claim that in Italy the prosecutor can 
decide to put forward certain charges and to drop others. Thus, Goldstein and Marcus argue that this 
effectively qualifies the legality principle because, in practice, during the pre-trial phase, it allows the 
police and prosecutors to drop or to put forward a case on a discretionary basis. The authors give a very 
clear example to illustrate this concept. A prosecutor who receives a report from a woman o f  dubious 
reputation, who alleges that she has been raped by a man who has no previous record, may decide, after 
an evaluation o f  the elements, that he should not be prosecuted because o f  a lack o f  victim credibility.
28 Di Federico and Sapignoli (2002) op. cit. pp. 15-30. As we previously explained (chap. 4), the author 
based his research on interviews involving only defence lawyers. See also, Grande (2000) op. cit. pp. 
240-241.
29 Di Federico and Sapignoli (2002) op. cit. p. 17 and pp. 107-112. On this point see also Di Federico 
(1998) op. cit. pp. 379-381. As we explained before (see chap. 4), according to Di Federico, in the last
30 years we have witnessed a practice called “personalization o f  prosecutorial functions”. This means 
that the initiation o f  the criminal action is an attribute o f  the single prosecutor and not o f  his/her office. 
Thus, a prosecutor can begin an investigation and a prosecution any time he wants and these actions 
will be only based on his personal considerations. Moreover, Di Federico says that this phenomenon 
also regards: directive on how to deal with single cases, on the investigative means to use and on 
whether to restrict personal liberties o f  suspects. This means that prosecutors are not bound by any rule 
and are not accountable to their superiors for all the decisions they have to take about a case (including 
to prosecute or not and to ask for precautionary measures); and that they can manage the investigation  
the way they want (more expensive, more restrictive o f  the accused person(s)’s liberty etc.). In 
particular, the author underlines that directives concerning a single case are unacceptable when they 
seem to undermine prosecutorial independence. In these cases assistant prosecutors have successfully  
challenged the c h ie fs  power to issue these directives before the CSM. A s a consequence ch ief  
prosecutors have started to use this power less and less. Di Federico’s statements about 
“personalization o f  prosecutorial functions” are supported by a survey involving 1000 defence lawyers. 
In fact, 55% o f  these said that there is “a substantial difference in the way prosecutors decide in very 
similar cases”.
~° The investigation should last maximum 6 months. There are exceptions and, more generally, 
prosecutors can ask the preliminary investigation judge to extend the limit. However, the investigation 
can never last more than 18 months (24 for some specific crimes) (art. 405-407 cpp). Fabri says that, in 
practice, prosecutors decide the length o f  the investigation. The author lists different systems that 
pubblici ministeri use to determine how long the investigation has to be. For example Fabri claims that, 
given that the 6 months limit starts when the name o f  the accused person(s) is written in a specific 
register, prosecutors can simply delay the registration and begin a sort o f  unofficial investigation before 
that (see Fabri M. “Discrezionalita e m odalita di azione del pubblico  ministero nel procedim ento  
penale". 1997. POLIS, XI. pp. 171-192. pp. 179-182).
31 Fabri (1997) op. cit., in particular pp. 179-182. The special proceedings are those that, like plea- 
bargaining, are aimed at reducing the length o f  prosecutions and trials (art. 438-464 cpp).
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Another issue which has been debated concerns the decision-making criteria 
used, in practice, by prosecutors. The literature identifies two categories: personal 
ideas and opinions of prosecutors and external influences.32 Prosecutors are said to 
base their decisions on their personal socio-political ideas.33 This seems to be the 
logical consequence of the view that prosecutors have an “unfettered freedom” in 
deciding the cases to prioritize: every prosecutor is in the position to define his/her 
own personal priorities (i. e. preferences). However, these decisions may also be 
constrained by other factors. Pubblici ministeri will be subject to external (local 
community pressure and that of the dominant political cultures in general) and 
internal pressure (following CSM recommendations in order to improve their 
career)/4 This can limit the impact of prosecutors’ purely personal opinions. In other 
words, these can be external criteria for decision-making which may have de facto a 
strong influence. In this sense, Sarzotti’s point of view is important. The author argues 
that pubblici ministeri (when they determine the cases to prioritize) are influenced by 
the dominant political cultures and, as a consequence, they tend to focus on street 
crime/''’ We will deal with these issues (and we will explain better Sarzotti’s 
arguments) in the next chapters when we describe the way prosecutors treat street 
crime and immigration.
Finally, here we need to mention, again, the work of Vogliotti (who used 
empirical evidence, like, for example, Sarzotti and Di Federico). Although he did not 
focus on decision-making criteria, the author has indicated crimes that prosecutors 
tend to prioritize. As we explained before (see chap. 8), Vogliotti described some 
situations where prosecutors directed the police to search for some specific types of 
offences: industrial accidents, industrial diseases, environmental crimes, public health, 
white collar crimes, tax evasion, mafia, terrorism and corruption. As we have said, 
prosecutors started to be more active in searching for these kinds of offences from the 
beginning of the seventies.
2 Di Federico and Sapignoli (2002) op. cit.; Fabri (1997) op. cit.; Sarzotti (2006) op. cit.. See also, 
Sarzotti C. “Le procure della Repubblica come attori del campo giuridico-penale”. 2006a. Studi sulla 
questione criminale. Vol. I n. 2. pp. 67-86; and Sarzotti C. eds. “Processi di selezione del crimine. 
Procure della Repubblica e organizzazione giudiziaria”. 2008a. Milano: Giuffre.
' ' Di Federico and Sapignoli (2002) op. cit. p. 20. See also, Fabri (1997) op. cit. pp. 179-182.
4 Di Federico and Sapignoli (2002) op. cit. p. 110.
°  Sarzotti (2006) op. cit. See also, Sarzotti (2006a) op. cit.
~'u Vogliotti (2004), op. cit. pp. 486-487.
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There is a significant difference between the literature we have analyzed in 
this section and the literature we analyzed before. For the authors we have quoted in 
this section the legality principle does not play a pivotal role. However, this still 
leaves at least two questions unanswered. First, a structure o f decision-making criteria 
for the definition of priorities has not been constructed. This is not surprising, because 
these arguments assume that each individual prosecutor will take purely personal 
decisions based on individual socio-political ideas. Certainly, decision-making is 
highly variable and dependent on personal political value-judgements. However, we 
believe that a more structured description of these criteria can be made. Second (and 
closely connected with the first issue), it seems that the academic literature has 
attempted to distinguish between external and personal criteria. But this distinction 
has not been developed substantially. External influences certainly play an important 
role. But what is, in practice, their impact? Can prosecutors mediate it? And if  they 
can, how do they do it? Here we will mainly deal with legal influences. In the next 
chapters we will concentrate on the impact of the dominant political cultures. To 
conclude, some of the Italian literature has certainly underlined the extent o f 
prosecutors’ discretionary powers during the pre-trial phase. Here we want to explain 
more precisely the criteria for decision-making which inform the exercise o f  this 
discretion and to give empirical evidence from our interviews to confirm that these 
are the criteria.
2. Legal influence: the construction of urgency - arrest, pre-trial 
measures and prescrizione
In this section we will analyze procedural legal rules which may significantly 
influence prosecutors when they choose the cases to which they give priority 
treatment. These are external influences and, as we just said, they only have an 
indirect effect on prosecutors. So, these legal rules are general principles of legal 
procedure which, de facto, affect the definition o f priorities. Here urgency means that 
the case has to be treated before others and as soon as possible. This does not 
necessarily create or reflect a personal priority or preference for prosecutors (i. e. see 
the discussion on street crime and immigration in chap. 11). Indeed we will see that 
these external influences still leave room for prosecutors’ personal considerations.
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The vast majority of the prosecutors we interviewed said that a case becomes 
urgent when the accused person(s) is in jail.37 We can distinguish two situations. First, 
the police may have arrested the accused person(s): the prosecutor (immediately), and 
the judge (within 48 hours), must decide if the arrest was lawful (see chap. 4). 
Secondly, the accused person(s) may be in pre-trial custody, because this can only last 
for a limited period (art. 303 cpp).38 So, procedural rules seem to provide external 
criteria, in practice, for some prosecutors’ decisions about the cases which have to be 
treated urgently. Moreover, some pubblici ministeri also emphasize that the reason 
why these cases need to be dealt with immediately is because the personal freedom of 
the accused person(s) has been substantially limited.39 This seems consistent with 
prosecutors’ professional self image in which they see themselves as due process 
figures who (also) have to protect the rights of accused person(s) (see chap. 7). So, the 
external influence, which leads, in practice, to the urgent consideration of such cases, 
is reinforced by the internalisation by prosecutors of the values expressed in the legal 
rule. External factors often only operate through personal choices. In other words 
prosecutors are choosing to be influenced. Finally, we need to add that pubblici 
ministeri also seem to consider urgent the cases in which the pre-trial measure of 
seizure has been applied.40 Here the urgency seems to be determined (also) on 
resource grounds. This measure limits a right (property) of the accused person(s), but 
it can also mean increases in expenses for the justice system in general41 This is 
because seizure of goods can become expensive. For example, the sequestration of 
stolen cars means that they have to be kept in secure areas and guarded. This will cost 
money (and time).
j7 23 prosecutors said that a case is urgent (i. e. prioritized) when the accused person(s) is in jail. 1 did
not clearly answer (this question and questions about priorities in general). 3 did not mention accused 
person(s) in jail as one o f  the factors to take into account to determine priorities. This is because they 
preferred to talk about the cases they prioritize within their specialized matter (environmental crimes 
and industrial accidents, sexual crimes and crimes against the public administration). So, it seems that 
they did not refer to this criterion because, instead o f discussing the general criteria, they preferred to 
concentrate on more specific issues concerning the specialized area (and their personal priorities, see 
later).
"s Judges decide about pre-trial custody (and pre-trial measures in general). There is a proper 
proceedings where accuse and defence debate before a judge. 
j9 See, for example, AP(N31), AP(N28) and AP(C47).
40 See, for example, AP(C54), AP(C47) and CP(S4).
41 See in particular AP(54) said: “Now we are used to take into account [when we define the urgent 
matters] economical issues. So, a seizure o f  [for example] a big shed or o f  the goods which are 
deposited inside means a substantial increase o f  expenses”.
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A case also becomes urgent when prescrizione might become a problem. In 
these situations the urgency is clear, given that the prescrizione impedes/pre vents the 
prosecution (see chap. 7):
The general criterion, which was my personal criterion, was based on time: the older the 
case, the higher was the priority. This could be mediated because o f  urgent matters. So, 
the fact that there were arrested persons was a reason to treat a case before another. The 
same happened for cases close to prescrizione, cases for which the 6 months deadline 
was about to expire, [cases] where there were problems in gathering evidence [etc.].
These were the general rules, but there could be other factors.42
For example, I received a very big file [...]  and I started to work very much on that 
because there is the risk o f  prescrizione; and dropping a case for prescrizione is really 
horrible.43
The first example is particularly interesting because it brings together three 
factors which seem to determine urgency: the existence of arrested or detained 
suspects, the “fear” of prescrizione and the need to carry out investigative acts as soon 
as possible (e. g. because the evidence would otherwise be lost or be less probative). 
However, we should not be too seduced by the clarity of this explanation. As we have 
said (and as this prosecutor eventually admits: “these were the general rules, but there 
could be other factors”). There are a number of important criteria and they interact 
with each other. So, what happens in practice does not suggest a fixed hierarchical list 
of priorities. Here the interesting point is that these decision-making criteria are not 
mutually exclusive. They all interact with each other and they are assessed and 
balanced by prosecutors.
When the risk of prescrizione is limited (and there is no need for urgent 
investigative acts (see later) the treatment of a case can be delayed:
There are some files which do not need an investigation. So, for example, when the 
guardia di finanza44 ‘denunciates’ [accuses] a person because he/she has made a false 
declaration about his/her income, maybe to obtain unemployment benefits, rent
12 APApl.(N50).
43 AP(N30).
44 The police mainly dealing with financial crimes and crimes against public administration (see also 
chap. 4).
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discounts, books for the school etc. [ ...]  These things do not need investigation; so the 
only criterion is the prescrizione. So, I only have to fill in the capo d ’imputazione,45 to 
send the notifications, to deal with the counsel [i. e. sending the documents the counsel 
must receive] [and] the only thing which can happen is that accused person(s) wants to 
be interviewed. Anyway, the criminal proceedings is done, there is no priority here, the 
only point is the prescrizione, but we are talking o f years. So, I put these files aside and I 
treat them when I am free.46
Finally, it seems that cases where prescrizione cannot be avoided tend to be 
considered as non-priorities and possibly they will not be treated at all:
There are crimes for which the prescrizione often arrives; for example: when the 
denunciation/accusation arrives too late. So, it is useless to spend time on these cases, 
because the prescrizione will arrive. In general these cases are put aside [and not 
treated].47
Thus, in this section we have analyzed legal criteria (arrests, pre-trial measures 
and prescrizione) which influence prosecutors to treat certain cases as urgent. These 
certainly shape prosecutors’ exercise of discretion when they make decisions about 
prosecution. The consequence is that the cases prioritized according to these criteria 
may not necessarily reflect personal priorities. However, prosecutors’ personal 
discretion is not eliminated. First of all, pubblici ministeri choose to consider these as 
being external criteria for decision-making. There is no legal rule that requires 
prosecutors to treat these cases urgently for breach of which prosecutors could be held 
accountable. Secondly, we will see later (chap. 11) that crimes like street crime and 
illegal immigration are normally immediately treated and are not delayed (because 
they often involve arrested persons) but these do not appear to be cases that 
prosecutors regard as especially important (i. e. that reflect personal priorities or 
preferences). In particular, prosecutors do not seem to be ready to commit substantial 
resources (including time) to tackle these crimes. So, a case treated with urgency is 
not always a priority in the sense that it is personally perceived as important by the 
prosecutor; rather urgency is suggested by external criteria and the case becomes a 
priority in temporal terms alone. It must be dealt with now (or soon).
L The capo d ’imputazione is a document which includes the name o f  the crime(s) for which a person is 
accused and the explanation o f  the reasons why he is accused o f  that specific crime(s) (see chap. 8).
46 AP(S6). This prosecutor works in the specialized unit dealing with crimes against public
administration.
47 CP(S4). Similar opinions were expressed by, for example, AP(S6) and AP(N32).
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2.1. Legal influence: construction of seriousness - constitution and
legislation
This section is dedicated to the impact of political decisions taken by the legislator 
(and the constitutional fathers) concerning the seriousness of certain crimes (i. e. 
setting the level of punishment). Here we do not want to describe the way prosecutors 
interpret certain pieces of legislation but rather discuss whether they may be another 
external criterion that pubblici ministeri take into account when they define their 
priorities.
A crime may not be a priority if there is the possibility that it is no longer a 
crime (i. e. the condono). On the other hand, crimes which can result in (at least) 2 to 
3 years of imprisonment are always treated:
Other situations may relate to crimes which are under the condono and you have to 
determine if  these are still crimes or not [...] Anyway, here crimes which involve 
punishments around (minimum) 2, 3 years o f  imprisonment are always treated.49
Similarly other prosecutors emphasized the importance of legislative
provisions:
The criterion to determine priorities is given, at least to me, by the legislator. In fact, [for 
example] a crime which is punished between 5 to 20 years o f  imprisonment is considered 
[by the legislator] to be more serious than a contravvenzione. This could be the first 
criterion to take into consideration.50
We also determine the seriousness [o f a case] from the interests and the rights protected 
by the constitution.51
4S The effect o f this piece o f  legislation is to grant pardon. However, this is normally subject to the 
payment o f  a fine. So, in practice, a person (or a company) can choose to pay a fine to avoid
prosecution. The condono is normally enacted for matters like tax evasion and violation o f  town
planning law when it would be too expensive to prosecute all the crimes. It is also, for the government,
an easy way to obtain money. The last condono was in 2003 (former centre-right government) and it 
regarded tax evasion.
49 AP(NIO). Similar opinions on the fact that when the consequences (for the victim) o f  a crime are 
limited the priority can be lower were expressed, for example, by caused by AP(N41), AP(N38) and 
AP(N2).
50 AP(N32).
51 AP(C46).
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Thus, both the constitution and primary legislation seem to be sources that 
pubblici ministeri use when they decide the priority to be given to a case. 
Furthermore, the more severe the potential punishment, the more the crime will be 
prioritized. However, when we deal with street crime and illegal immigration we will 
see that crimes that the law punishes quite strongly are not always considered 
personal priorities by prosecutors. Moreover, decisions, for example, on the 
importance of the condono and on the levels of punishment which require a crime to 
be prioritized are clearly left to prosecutors. Legislation gives certain general 
indications, but legal actors can interpret these provisions in deciding what to do. In 
this case: to prosecute. So, decision-making criteria which might be said to be 
external (i. e. legislation) are given a meaning thought appropriate by the particular 
pubblici ministeri. Once again, external factors are operationalised through personal 
choices. This seems to suggest that the legislator has only limited and indirect powers 
to influence prosecutors (perhaps the clearest example is the D.Lgs. 1998 n. 51, see 
later). But we know that this is not always the case: some procedural criteria (e. g. 
setting up a time limit such as for the prescrizione) seem to influence pubblici 
ministeri more clearly (but still without binding, in practice, their decisions).
Finally, a very recent Act (n. 125/2008) introduces an interesting provision. 
The prosecution of crimes which are included in the recent indulto Act (n. 241/2006, 
see above) and which were committed no later than 2 May 2006 can be suspended 
(prosecutors decide) for maximum 18 months. Moreover, the Act also indicates 
crimes that should be prosecuted before others. These are: terrorism, mafia, industrial 
accidents (deaths), violation of traffic circulation (i. e. drink and drive), recidivists, 
arrested and detained persons, all the fast proceedings (like the direttissima, so the 
Bossi-Fini should be included) and, in general, all the crimes punished with, at least, 4 
years of imprisonment. These crimes should be prosecuted before the others. Chief 
prosecutors are asked to implement these provisions (i. e. organize the procura). At 
the moment prosecutors seem to like these new legal rules.52 Certainly these are not 
impositions (as it was in the previous version of the Act). Moreover, it seems that
;2 See, for example, Guastella G. “Caselli: ora la norma va bene. Casa a fuoco, p o i i pom pierP . 
Corriere della Sera , 12/07/2008; and Martirano D. “L ’Anm apprezza, dal PD prim e aperture”. 
Corriere della Sera  12/07/2008.
x’ The previous version imposed prosecutors to block (for one year) certain criminal proceedings. 
These also included serious crimes (up to 10 years imprisonment) and, de facto, imposed priorities to 
prosecutors. Amongst the crimes to be blocked there were those involving Berlusconi. This is not
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prosecutors are, in practice, in charge of the application o f these provisions. The Act 
includes some criteria (e. g. arrested persons) which, we believe, prosecutors are 
already using (see above and later). Finally, this potentially increases the powers of 
the chief prosecutors to suggest priorities. However, given that this Act has just been 
approved, we can not say very much about its impact in practice.
2.2. Legal influence: construction of seriousness - perpetrator
Here we want to discuss the situations where certain characteristics of the perpetrator 
can lead prosecutors to prioritize a case. In particular, we will concentrate on 
recidivism and social dangerousness.
First of all, we want to describe prosecutors’ reaction when the perpetrator 
appears dangerous, not necessarily (and only) for a specific victim(s), but for the 
society in general:
I had a case where the husband shot 12 times his wife. She had little injuries, but, in 
I terms o f seriousness, it does not change very much compared to a murder. So, this is a 
serious crime, where there are problems o f security and o f  pericolosita sociale .54
When a crime is particularly serious, [which means that] it is dangerous because o f  the 
pericolosita sociale [and] there is a risk for the victim(s) and/or for other persons, the 
first thing to do is to impose a pre-trial measure. If you can not do that, but you realize 
that there is the pericolosita sociale, for example when a person is accused o f  having 
raped a neighbour [and there is not enough evidence to ask for pre-trial custody], you 
prepare a delega which imposes a sort o f fast track procedure [for the investigation], 
maybe you also impose some time limits. Then, when you have enough evidence, you 
ask for the pre-trial measure. If there is substantial evidence, the first thing to do is to 
avoid recidivism.55
[A case is prioritized] when the risk o f recidivism is substantial, like for crimes against 
property [e. g. robberies], sexual crimes, crimes affecting life [e. g. injuries] [etc .]56
necessary anymore given that the criminal proceedings against the Prime Minister must be suspended
(see chap. 5).
'M A P (N 31). Pericolosita sociale means, literally, social dangerousness. More specifically, it means that 
a person is dangerous for the society.
55 AP(N33).
56 AP(NIO).
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There is always the need to stop recidivism. So, for example, a rape committed by an 
Italian or by an extracomunitario,51 the difference is that to catch, and stop recidivism, in 
relation to the extracomunitario it is necessary to use a lot o f  police resources [because 
the extracomunitario, who is often an illegal immigrant, is more difficult to find]. 
However, the cases will not be treated differently [i. e. prosecutors are not tougher 
against the extracomunitario].58
For example, I remember that in another prosecution office I had a problem [ ...]  with 
ingiurie or harassments. [These were in fact] stalkers, former husbands and boyfriends. 
So, even if for these crimes we could not impose pre-trial measures, it was necessary to 
intervene [...]  [So] I sent the cases to trial hoping that this might have a [deterrent] effect 
[...]  Robberies [are the same]; there can be a need [to intervene] because you know that 
the accused person(s) will commit another robbery.59
So, prosecutors seem to concentrate on two characteristics of the accused 
person(s): the risk of recidivism and the concept of pericolosita sociale which, in 
these cases, seems to be linked to the fact that the accused person(s) is dangerous for 
the society because his or her behaviour (e. g. shooting his wife 12 times) shows that 
he/she may commit serious crimes. So, the dangerousness is not necessarily linked to 
the actual effects of the current crime. In the first example, although the perpetrator 
shot 12 times, the victim did not seem to have suffered serious injury. In these 
situations the priority is not (only) the result of the actual consequences of a crime, 
but by the fact that the accused person(s) has acted in a certain way. In other words: 
prosecutors seem to prioritize these cases because they want to prevent the future 
actions of a certain perpetrator. However, the fact that prosecutors are focused on the 
characteristics of the accused person(s) does not mean that the crime committed is not 
important. In general, dangerousness seems to be related to facts which may affect life 
more than property (robberies affect property, but they also imply violence against 
persons, as stated in art. 628 cp).
Finally, this discussion of recidivism and pericolosita sociale shows the 
complex interrelationships between external criteria and personal criteria. The first is 
very clearly an external criterion: prosecutors merely have to look at the criminal
3 Tliis word should indicate all the persons who do not come from the EU. However, in practice, only
people coming from third world countries are called like this. For example, an American will be called
American and not extracomunitario.
5S L(N20).
5V AP(S6).
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record of the accused person(s) to know whether it is applicable (although, we repeat, 
there no legal requirements imposing the prosecution of recidivists as a priority).60 
While the second leaves pubblici ministeri more free to develop their own concept of 
dangerousness. This is not just linked to the criminal record of the accused person(s), 
but more generally, to the way he/she behaved. This evaluation will be necessary left 
to pubblici ministeri. It is also important to say that this is where the distinction 
between external and personal criteria becomes difficult to draw. Is the prosecutor 
drawing on an external legal criterion ‘social dangerousness’ or is the prosecutor 
constructing his own personal criterion o f ‘crime seriousness’?
2.3. Legal influence: construction of seriousness - victim
The rights and the interests of the victim seem important to the determining of the 
crime problem. In particular, prosecutors seem to focus on the damage suffered: 
Anyway, you always have to evaluate the damage suffered by the victim, I mean the 
importance o f the victim’s interest [...] At least this is what I do.61
Then you take into account the damage suffered by the victim. It is clear that the victim  
of a rape has suffered greater damage compared to the victim o f  a mobile theft.62
I prioritize rapes and domestic violence. This is because I prioritize all the cases where
the minor must be physically removed from the accused person(s). In fact, one minute
more could cause more damage. So, the first thing to do is to check if  the victim can be 
I 63
still reached by the perpetrator.
So, in these cases, the aim is to protect the interest of the victim. The more the 
victim may suffer damage, the more prosecutors will choose to prioritize the case. On 
the other hand, it seems that when the damage appears limited the priority will be
lower:
60 The importance o f  recidivism should not be underestimated. This is one o f  the criteria to determine if 
a pre-trial measure can be given or not (art. 274 para. 1 c cpp). So, for example, recidivism will be used 
by a prosecutor to request pre-trial custody. The judge will concede this measure and the accused 
person(s) will be imprisoned. As we explained above, this is one o f  the situations where a case become 
urgent and can be prioritized.
61 AP(N38).
62 AP(N32).
63 AP(N33).
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Sometimes you monitor the cases, then you take the files and you say: I w ill do this and I 
will not do that, because there is no time. Maybe they [the cases which will not be 
treated] concern deleghe issued months ago and you realize they [the police] did not 
respond; so you wonder if  it is necessary to put some pressure or not, given that, maybe, 
the victim does not have an interest anymore. For example, you delegated an 
investigation concerning an abuso edilizio64 which is not really serious and the 
competent office within the city council did not respond, so you put the case aside, even 
if, in general, they respond. Other situations may concern crimes which are under the 
condono and you have to determine if  these are still crimes or not [ ...]  Anyway, here 
crimes which involve punishment around (a minimum of) 2, 3 years imprisonment are 
always dealt with.65
This example shows, once again, how the criteria for decision-making connect 
with each other to define priorities and preferences. Some cases may not be prioritized 
because the victim does not have any relevant interest and/or because the 
consequences of the crime (see later) are limited (i. e. a not very important abuso 
edilizio). Moreover, prosecutors’ considerations about certain political decisions taken 
by the legislator (e. g. condono) can be important. So, effectively decisions are very 
strongly influenced by particular contexts and precise circumstances and cannot 
readily be predicted on the basis of pre-established rules.
We should also underline, once again, the importance of the role of the police. 
At least in some circumstances, they can decide how quickly a delega is implemented; 
and this may influence prosecutors when they choose to prioritize a case or not. 
However, pubblici ministeri always seem to retain the power to decide if there are 
reasons to continue the investigation (and, as a consequence, to push the police to 
implement a delega) or not.
2.4. Legal influence: construction of seriousness - consequences of
crime on society
The previous section analyzed the situations when, in prosecutors’ view, a crime 
creates substantial damage for the victim(s). Here we want to focus on the 
consequences of crime for society (and/or local communities). So, in these cases there
64 Violation o f town planning law.
63 AP(NIO). Similar opinions on the fact that when the consequences (for the victim) o f  a crime are
limited the priority can be lower were expressed, for example, by AP(N41), AP(N38) and AP(N2).
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may not be a specific recognizable victim(s). But the crime may affect the public
more generally:
I, but I am not the only one, consider crimes against justice to be very important. This is 
because I consider them as the sign o f  great contempt for the rules o f  vivere so c ia le 66 
So, [for example] for me perjury is very important. [In fact] maybe these crimes do not 
damage anyone in particular, but they are the sign o f a deformation o f  the vivere c iv ile 67 
1 think this has to be punished, because [otherwise] thep a tti socia lz68 are in danger.69
A situation like that with the rubbish becomes important because there is a danger for the 
local communities. The rubbish became a problem because it directly affected the local 
communities. [In fact] when the collection [of rubbish] points was affected by a strike 
we had, at a certain stage, piles o f  rubbish which could reach [the windows] at the first
j  floor o f  buildings.70_________________________________________________________________
These examples suggest that the importance of the consequences of a crime is 
often related to the impact on the society and/or on local communities. However, this 
is not only based on situations (like the rubbish) where there is an actual danger for 
the community. The consequences of a crime can also have some effects which, in 
prosecutors’ view, can put into question the legal and social principles on which the 
society is based (e. g. when a crime may jeopardize the patti sociali). In this sense it 
appears important to report what a police officer said when we asked why white collar 
crimes are prioritized by prosecutors:
White collar crimes are important because the system is affected. The rules governing 
the market are violated. So, you do not only have to think about the specific crime, but to 
the chain reaction that [the accused person(s)] has triggered and which will affect the 
whole system.71
Thus, white collar crimes are prioritized because of the “violation of the 
system’', where the word system seems to embody the rules which govern the market 
and that the society must respect. Another explanation was given by a lawyer:
Well, white collar crimes are considered more important [ ...]  the point is that you
66 This basically means “living together”. So, the rules which permit that people live together (broadly 
similar to the social contract).
67 Another expression which means “living together”.
68 Literally this means social pacts. Again these are the rules which permit that people live together.
69 AP(N32).
70 CP(S4).
71 Pol.(N14).
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discover crimes committed by persons who did not commit crimes until a certain age 
[...]  So, you have a bankrupt causing very substantial damage to savers [...] There is a 
big problem: white collar crimes often affect the interests o f  many different subjects.72
This lawyer explained the prioritization of white collar crimes in different 
terms: the cases are normally more interesting, legal rules tend to suggest these crimes 
are more serious (i. e. heavier punishments)73 and that these crimes are more difficult 
to discover and repress. However, the main focus is on the characteristics of the 
perpetrator (who starts to commit crimes when he/she is older) and, more important, 
on the impact that these crimes can have on the society. In particular, white collar 
crimes are prioritized because they can affect interests which involve a large amount 
of people.
To sum up, priorities seem also to be determined by the impact that a crime 
can have on society. However, when we will deal with street crime and immigration 
(and. more generally, with allarme sociale), we will see that (although external 
influences can surely be relevant) the decision as to whether a crime (or a number of 
crimes) has or is going to have a relevant impact on society seems to be left to 
prosecutors, who, once again, have substantial discretionary powers. So, in practice, 
the decision whether the principles governing the society (and/or the market) have 
been threatened or not is personal and it appears to be left to prosecutors: assessments 
are based on social value judgments. Once again an influence that might be seen as 
based on external criteria (i.e. derived from legal considerations) can only operate 
through personal choices. Moreover, the example of white collar crimes outlines a 
difference between Italy and Britain. In fact, there is a great deal of criminological 
literature in the Anglo-Saxon world which argues that white-collar crime is treated 
less seriously than street crime because it is not seen as a social threat in the same 
clear and unambivalent way.74 Italian prosecutors seem to act in a different way (not 
the media, the public and the central state which considers street crime a greater social
~2 L(N23).
In 2002 (D.Lgs. 61/2002) the former centre-right government amended the law dealing with false 
accounting. It is not our purpose to explain the legal details o f  this reform. It is sufficient to say that it 
was very much criticized because, in practice, it made more difficult to prosecute this crime (See, for 
example, Bagnoli R. “Falso in bilancio: oggi il si alia nuova legge”. Corriere della Sera, 28/09/2001). 
One lawyer (L(N23) who mainly deals with white collar crimes) said that the reform had a great impact 
and that, now, prosecutors only treat the most serious false accountings.
74 See, for example, Nelken. D. “White-collar crime and corporate crime’'. In Maguire et al. eds.
(2007) op. cit.
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threat, see chap. 10 and 11). White collar crimes are apparently perceived as more 
dangerous for the society compared to street crime.
3. Bureaucratic criteria: circulars
We need to discuss briefly circulars concerning the definition o f priorities issued, not 
by prosecution offices attached to the first instance courts, but by the CSM and by the 
prosecution offices attached to the court of appeal. This is just to say that, although 
some prosecutors referred to these documents and considered them as significant 
decision-making criteria in determining priorities, the vast majority of the pubblici 
ministeri we interviewed said that such documents did not exist or that they were not 
intended to set out external criteria for decision-making.75 In other words, prosecutors, 
in practice, seem to be in the position to decide if and how these guidelines can be 
followed.
One of these circulars76 (which have existed since 1998) appears particularly 
important. Art. 227 of the D.Lgs. 1998 n. 51 (the act of delegated legislation which 
unified prosecution offices, see later) stated that, in order to deal properly with 
criminal proceedings which were outstanding at the moment when the D.Lgs. came 
into force, prosecutors had to take into account certain criteria for determining 
priorities. These were: the seriousness of the case, the problems that delay might 
create in collecting evidence and determining the facts, and the interest of the victim. 
This provision was enacted to deal with the substantial increase in the number of 
cases that the unification (unification of prosecution offices and courts) created (see
°  20 prosecutors said that these documents did not exist and/or they were not intended to set out 
(binding) priorities. 1 did not clearly answer. 1 was not asked (due to lack o f  time). 5 said that such 
documents existed and were intended to create priorities. In particular, 3 referred to circulars issued, by 
the CSM and by the prosecution office attached at the court o f  appeal, at the time when prosecution 
offices were unified (these mainly concern the application o f  the criteria included in art. 227 o f  the 
D.Lgs. 51/1998, see later). 1 referred to other circulars (not dealing with art. 227) issued by the 
prosecution office attached at the court o f  appeal, but clearly said that these were not mandatory 
provisions. 1 talked about circulars issued by the CSM, but could not give any example. We also need 
to add that the CSM did not only deal with priorities by issuing circulars concerning the application o f  
art. 227. In fact, in 1977, this body enacted a document “aimed at prioritizing crimes [that at that time 
were] creating a substantial allarme sociale” (see Questione Giustizia. 2006. Vol. 5. p. 1078). 
However, once again, this was not a binding directive and specifically stated that less serious crimes 
had to be treated anyway.
70 Circulars are advisory. Surely they do not have legal force and they are not binding. However, the 
CSM is, theoretically, in the position to begin a disciplinary proceedings against prosecutors (even  
chief prosecutors) who do not implement these guidelines.
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later). But, it only concerns criminal proceedings which were initiated before the 
D.Lgs. came into force. Further, art. 227 also stated that prosecution offices must 
communicate to the CSM the criteria that they would use to determine priorities.
The CSM issued circulars which dealt with art. 227. So, these were 
implementing a provision set out in a piece of legislation which was, of course, 
legally binding. In particular, the circular n. P-27060 (2005) concerning the 
organization of the uffici giudiziari (courts and prosecution offices) for 2006/2007, 
talks about (capo VI, paragraph 57) priority criteria (that prosecution offices have to 
determine) under art. 227. Now, it is not the purpose of this study to carry out a legal 
analysis of art. 227, its aims and its impact when it was enacted ten years ago. We 
also do not want to discuss any tension between this provision and the legality 
principle (see chap. 1). However, here we want to underline that, although this legal 
rule still exists (the CSM circulars confirm it), its impact, in practice, appears now to 
be very limited. As it has just been indicated, only three prosecutors referred directly 
to art. 227 or to the circulars which deal with this provision. Thus, in practice, these 
external criteria for the decision-making seem to have (at least now) little impact on 
prosecutors’ definition of priorities.
3.1. Bureaucratic criteria and specialization
Some of the elements of bureaucratic organization are included within legal rules. For 
example, the ordinamento giudiziario law (see chap. 4) defines some general 
principles that should shape the way prosecution offices are organized. Previously we 
have touched on part of these when we analyzed the organizational relations within 
prosecution offices (see chap. 6). Here we are talking about administrative guidance 
within the office. In particular, we will be looking at the circulars (advisory) 
establishing criteria for the decision-making which are issued within prosecution 
offices. We have already said (chap. 6) that priorities decided within the procure do 
not appear to be, in practice, mandatory and that pubblici ministeri can take into
77  • •account other criteria. This is because prosecution offices are not hierarchically
The Turin prosecution office recently issued a circular (circular n. 58/07, 10 o f  January 2007, similar 
circulars were issued by the prosecution offices o f  Palermo (big prosecution office in the south o f  Italy) 
and Busto Arsizio (small place in the north o f  Italy), see resolution o f  the CSM May 15th 2007, in 
Questione Giustizia. 2007. Vol. 3. pp. 621-636) dealing with the cases which, because o f the indulto, 
will lead to no punishment. In fact, given that the indulto cancels part o f the punishment but not the
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organized, but common criteria are the result of strategies of persuasion. Superior 
prosecutors have a lot of consideration for the independence of individual inferior 
prosecutors. This is confirmed by the little practical impact that the ordinamento 
giudiziario reform seems to have had.
Circulars on the definition of priorities may include a list o f more serious 
crimes (e. g. category A crimes in Turin) and/or more general principles (e. g. crimes 
which offend common goods and common interests78). Prosecutors are aware of these 
documents and they take them into consideration. However, they seem to treat them 
as purely advisory and not as binding.79 They know that they ultimately decide when 
and how to use these criteria. Apparently superior prosecutors never impose a 
requirement to treat a case before another. So, these guidelines can be influential 
insofar as they are persuasive. They do not have, in practice, any binding force. 
Finally, we have to remember that we visited 10 prosecution offices, but only 2 had 
issued formal circulars determining a set of priorities.
So, we have an idea o f the limited impact that guidelines on priorities 
established within prosecution offices can have on prosecutors. However, there are 
still issues which need to be investigated. These mainly concern specialized units. Is 
there a link between the creation of specialized units and other specialized groups (i. 
c. SDAS and urban safety group) dealing with certain crimes and the way prosecutors 
define the crime problem? In other words, can these, de facto, influence the way 
prosecutors determine their priorities, or not? Specialization should normally define, 
within this context, a group of prosecutors who mainly deal with certain crimes. 
However, here we will define specialized units according to the criteria that
crime (as the am nesty  does), prosecutors must (because o f  the legality principle) treat these cases even 
i f  they k n o w  that, in practice, they will obtain no results. The circular basically allows prosecutors not 
to deal with so m e  o f these files. The CSM (resolution o f the CSM May 15th 2 0 0 7  (see above), see also 
Santalucia G. ( 2 0 0 7 )  op. cit.) said that this document does not conflict with the legality principle 
because  it is based on objective criteria which do not confer to pubblici ministeri the power to take 
discretionary decisions about single and specific cases (see above). The interviews we conducted in 
Turin (like all the other interviews) were previous to the circular and prosecutors did not mention this 
issue. H ow ever ,  some pubblici ministeri working in others prosecution offices (see, for example, 
AP(N49) and AP(C54) raised the problem o f  the cases which will not lead to any punishment, but 
could  not really say anything about a possible solution (the interviews were conducted before and 
im m ediate ly  after the enactment o f  the indulto).
8 T hese  include all the interests o f the people in general (i. e. environmental crimes), rather than those 
related to a specific individuals or groups.
79 A s  w e  explained, the ordinamento giudiziario reform increased the powers o f  ch ief prosecutors to 
organize  the prosecution office. These powers appear hierarchical in nature. For example, chief 
prosecutors determine the way cases are allocated and can take cases back from assistant prosecutors 
(see  chap. 4). However, as we explained (chap. 6), the relationship superior-inferior prosecutor does 
not seem ,  in practice, hierarchical in nature.
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prosecutors used during the interviews. Specialized units have two main 
characteristics. First, they define, in general, the crimes which are considered (by 
prosecutors) more serious. Second, they relate to types of crime that require a specific 
technical (legal) and/or investigative (how to carry out and direct the investigation) 
knowledge. Thus, the SDAS and the urban safety group are not in these senses 
specialized units, though they involve prosecutors specializing in dealing with certain 
crimes.
The SDAS group in Milan was created to deal with certain kinds of volume 
crimes.80 This is not a specialized unit in either of the senses set out above. In fact, 
prosecutors who belong to the SDAS also belong to a unit (e. g. crimes against 
property, public administration etc.) which is their ‘real’ specialized unit:
-------------------    —  —  ------------------   — i —  ■ i ■ ■ ■ ' -  ■ ■ -  g . -------------------- -----------------------
I retain my specialization [...]  However, instead o f receiving the ordinario I receive the 
cases which go to the SDAS.82
So, pubblici ministeri working in the SDAS still deal with crimes which fit 
into their specialization. But, instead of dealing with non-specialized volume crimes 
via the ordinario, they take the cases which are allocated to the SDAS group. So, it 
seems that volume crimes have been, in practice, divided between the ordinario and 
the SDAS. Now, we have already analyzed the number and make-up of the cases this 
group treats and the substantial powers that the police have to influence prosecutors’ 
decisions (i. e. bureaucratic review, see chap. 8). Here we want to focus on the 
reasons why the group was created, on the crimes that the SDAS treats and on the 
way prosecutors consider them.
The SDAS group was created in 1998 to avoid the problems linked with the 
merger of prosecution offices: in 1998 (see D.Lgs. 1998 n. 51) prosecution offices
O 3
attached to the pretura were merged with prosecution offices attached to the first
so AP(N32). Similar opinions were expressed, for example, by AP(N30), AP(N28) and L(N20).
This indicates the ordinary cases. In particular, this means the cases which are not allocated to
specialized units. In practice, these are the volume crimes, but they are not necessarily minor cases. For 
example, in Milan, like in other prosecution offices, murders ( if  they do not have to be allocated to 
specialized units, see later) are part o f the ordinario.
s~ AP(N32). We interviewed 6 prosecutors, 6 lawyers (2 were consultants) and 2 police officers 
working in Milan. They were all aware (and had similar opinions) about the way the SDAS operates, 
but only AP(N32) actually works in this group.
Sj Until 1998 the pretura  was the first instance court competent for certain kinds o f  crimes; for 
example, crimes which could not be punished with more than 4 years o f  imprisonment. There was a 
prosecution office attached at this court and the judge was the pretore  (see chap. 8).
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instance courts which thus became the only prosecution offices (i. e. procure della 
Repubblica). Before 1998 prosecution offices attached to the pretura were treating the 
vast majority of the cases. So, the problem was that, with the merger, the number of
84cases, for the procure della Repubblica, suddenly increased:
This [the SDAS group] is an idea which was proposed by some prosecutors working at 
the procura circondariale.85 They realized that the amount o f  work done by the procura 
circondariale, the merger was close, would have suffocated the prosecution office 
attached to the first instance court [i. e. the procura della Repubblica], which was only 
dealing with 5/6000 cases compared to the 150,000 o f  the procura circondariale.86 This 
would have strangled prosecutors, creating two big risks: that the serious cases would not 
be treated properly and that the less serious cases would not be treated at all [ ...]  So, this 
group was created with the idea o f having a separate body [still within the prosecution 
office] which deals with minor crimes [and] which relieves prosecutors from the burden 
o f minor cases.87
Apparently, the main purpose of the reform was not to define a set of personal 
priorities in the sense of defining cases that were regarded as in and of themselves 
important. Rather they defined a preferred means of treatment for a particular 
category of case. The cases which are allocated to the SDAS group are considered 
minor cases and, as we saw (chap. 8), they will be mainly treated by the police which 
will take all the major decisions. Prosecutors will only bureaucratically review the 
results of the investigation. Now, what are the cases which will be treated within the 
SDAS and which, as a consequence, are considered as minor cases?
S4 O f course this problem did not only affect the Milan prosecution office.
Another name to call the prosecution office attached at the pretura.
86 These are not the exact figures. This prosecutor is using these numbers to underline the huge 
difference between the amount o f cases the two prosecution offices were treating.
8 AP(N32). Similar opinions about the fact that the SDAS cases are considered as minor cases were 
expressed by AP(N30), AP(N28) and L(N20). It is interesting to note that AP(N29), while he was 
trying to prove that all the cases are treated in the same way and that, because o f  the legality principle, 
there are no priorities, refused to refer to the cases allocated to the SDAS as minor cases. He preferred 
to call them simpler cases. However, he subsequently admitted that these are part o f  the minor criminal 
law and that these are petty crimes. In particular, he said: “No, the SDAS is not an archive where we 
put all the things which are not urgent, it is not like this [...]  there are cases which can be treated in a 
simple way; so, for example, when there are no investigative acts to carry out, petty crimes [ ...]  I 
mean, all the minor criminal law, but which is not minor [!]”.
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There are all the ignoti,88 apart from those which have to be allocated to specialized units 
[...]  There are no thefts, because there is another group, the pool patrimonio,89 there are 
the false documents [persons who have showed false documents], all the 
contravvenzioni, forgery; Bossi-Fini only for art. 6, when the accused person(s) have 
failed to show identification documents, and art. 13 which [also] deals with immigrants 
who [illegally] come back to Italy after deportation,90 art. 14 [o f the Bossi-Fini Act], 
where the arrest is compulsory, goes in the turno esterno91 then there is [also] small- 
scale drug trafficking. In practice, the SDAS deals with all those crimes which can be 
immediately treated, which do not require difficult and lengthy investigation. [However] 
if  the drug dealer is arrested the case goes to the turno esterno. It rarely happens that pre­
trial measures are imposed; it is really very rare [and] it may happen for harassment 
which then becomes violenzaprivataf2 [For example] stalking by a boyfriend. However, 
in these cases, I can say that my colleagues, who are responsible persons, do not leave 
the case in the SDAS, but they bring it back to their office.93
[In order] to determine the cases which go to the SDAS the prosecution office has 
created a list. This, for example, includes: ingiurie,94 arguments between joint owners, 
arguments between motorists, car accidents with little consequences, defamation, a 
denunciation which involves a doctor [medical responsibility] but it is not clear at all, 
environmental crimes which are not clear, such as, for example, someone believes that a 
nasty smell is coming out from a nearby factory. For these cases the archiviazione is not 
automatic, because, for example, when there is an ingiuria, the crime is visible [there is 
an insult]. However, there is the attempt to convince the parties to withdraw the 
complaint. So, there are very strong attempts to mediate, [Sometimes] the parties are 
[also] asked to attend a meeting. Anyway, in particular, there are [in the SDAS group] 
frauds, denunciations made by private citizens [e. g. querela, in general these are the 
cases where the investigation was not started by the police or prosecutors] and, in
88 Cases were the name o f the accused person is not known.
89 This is not a proper specialized unit. In fact, it is a group (not only dealing with thefts) created within 
the specialized unit which treats crimes against property. In particular, AP(N30) said: “Within this 
specialized unit there is the pool patrimonio which is coordinated by one prosecutor, but, in practice, it 
is managed by 20 police officers. In this group there are all the ignoti, which concern crimes like car 
thefts, small thefts, mugging [etc.]. This is because it is known that these crimes are committed by 
persons who can not be found and they are really a lot. [So], these are ignoti and, in general, the 
prosecution is dropped [archiviazione]". It is interesting to note that the pool patrimonio seems to have 
some similarities with the SDAS. In particular, the powers o f the police (who manage the group) 
appear substantial. This is also relevant to understand prosecutors’ approach towards street crime 
(chap. 11).
90 In these cases the arrest is not compulsory.
91 This is the “internal mail turn” and, as we said (chap. 6), prosecutors who are doing the turno esterno 
mainly have to deal with arrests.
This is a crime and it means using violence (or threatening violence) to force someone to do or not-to 
do something (art. 610 cp).
9j AP(N32). Similar opinions were expressed by AP(N28).
94 These are, in practice, insults (art. 594 cp).
227
general, all those matters which seem very personal [such as the arguments] [...] We 
have never seen white collar crimes in the SDAS [ ...]  The small frauds will end up in the 
SDAS and then there is the archiviazione based on the fact that these are cases which 
should be dealt with by civil justice95 [...]  All the frauds which are below €  20/30.000  
are matters for civil actions.96
It appears difficult to identify a fixed and precise list of the cases which will 
be allocated to the SDAS. However, some general criteria can be derived from it. It 
often (but not always) includes offences which can only be prosecuted if there is a 
complaint by a victim (see the legal discussion of the legality principle, chap. 4). It 
also excludes crimes which involve an arrest, because if an arrest has been carried out 
prosecutors must immediately intervene (chap. 4 and chap. 6 for the turno esterno 
where pnbblici ministeri are mainly dealing with arrested persons). Street crime is 
normally not included (because it often involves arrested persons, see chap. 11) but 
the ignoti are (if they do not fall into a specialized area). Also it includes crimes 
which do not fall into any of the specialized units (but not all, because there is the 
ordinario as well) and those which do not require a long and difficult investigation. 
Finally, quantitative issues seem important as well (i. e. frauds which involve a 
maximum amount of € 20/30,000). These are general criteria which help to determine 
the cases assigned to the SDAS and, as a consequence, which help us to understand 
how the Milan prosecution office identified these non-serious (or minor) cases. 
However, these criteria should not be understood and analyzed as fixed rules. In fact, 
as we have already explained (chap. 8), prosecutors working in the SDAS can always 
decide to spend more time on a case (e. g. stalking) when they believe this is serious.
How do prosecutors working in the SDAS group actually treat these cases? 
We have already explained that substantial police powers exist. But the prosecutors’ 
aim seems to be that of dealing with as many cases as possible and as fast as possible: 
(AP(N32) claimed that the prosecution normally begins within 2 months of the case 
being allocated). So, this means that the less-serious prosecutions are normally dealt 
with (this does not always seem the case for frauds) and not just dropped. The 
differences when compared to cases which are seen to be real priorities for the 
prosecutors themselves are revealed in the way the investigation is supervised (see
x In practice, prosecutors say that these are not crimes, but issues which concern contracts and/or 
obligations between private parties (see L(N20).
96 L(N20).
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chap. 8). Prosecutors do not seem to be intent on focussing on the tackling of an 
especially important crime problem (as they perceive it), but on “getting rid” of these 
files (i. e. as many as possible, as fast as possible).
Turning to the urban security group in Turin there are certainly some 
similarities (and some differences as well) with the SDAS. In fact, this is not 
considered a specialized unit (but prosecutors who are part of this group are 
suspended from their specialized unit for 6 months). It deals with crimes which are 
not considered personal priorities by prosecutors (although the idea of the chief 
prosecutor seems to be different, see chap. 11); and the aim of the pubblici ministeri 
does not seem to be that of tackling a particular crime problem, but to deal with as 
many cases as possible and as fast as possible (so they can become urgent matters). 
However, as we said, we will describe the functioning and the aims of the urban 
security group in greater detail later, when we deal with street crime and illegal 
immigration.
So the SDAS and the urban safety group are not considered to be ‘real’ 
specialized units. The variety of cases they treat is huge and prosecutors, while they 
are working for these groups, still belong to a proper specialized unit. Now we want 
to discuss the connections between real specialization and the definition of priorities. 
Can the formation of specialized units influence the way prosecutors determine 
priorities? In other words: can these decisions, taken by superior prosecutors, create, 
in practice, some criteria for decision-making? It is clearly difficult to call these 
external criteria. This is because they are set up within prosecution offices and by 
prosecutors. However, they may be thought to be external in the sense that decisions 
taken by some superior prosecutors can influence the way assistant prosecutors work. 
These criteria (like legal ones) could, in practice, potentially limit prosecutors’ power 
to determine personal priorities.
In general, specialized units seem to have been created for 3 reasons: the need 
to take consistent and uniform decisions for similar cases,97 the need for specific 
training (specific knowledge of complicated legal rules (e. g. white collar crimes) 
and/or specific preparation to supervise a difficult investigation (e. g. organized 
crime)98 and as an attempt to determine some shared priorities.99 Here priority seems
9^  See, for example, CP(N43), AP(S6) and AP(C46).
9S See, for example, AP(S6), AP(N49) and AP(C47).
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to be very much linked with the seriousness of a crime for prosecutors (i. e 
preferences). This is why the SDAS and the urban safety group are not specialized 
units. They treat cases with urgency (as fast as possible) but they have not been set up 
to deal with crimes that prosecutors consider particularly serious.
Now, it is very difficult to say clearly whether prosecutors give preferential 
treatment to crimes which fall into their specialized units. In fact, only 8 prosecutors 
out of 26 expressly said that they consider the cases concerning their specialization to 
be more important.100 A clear example of specialized units having a clear impact on 
the definition of priorities has already been indicated (chap. 6): Turin where category 
A crimes have been codified as priorities:
; I tend to prioritize specialized matters [ ...]  Now, here, because o f  the way the 
prosecution office is organized, the specialized matters are the category A crimes. Thus, 
priorities are codified. Specialized matters always come first [ . . . ]  Specialized units 
mirror the crime problem.101
In this case there seems to be a close connection being made between 
priorities and specialized units. Certain categories of crimes (environmental, white 
collar etc.) are dealt with by specialized units. In Turin the category A crimes seem to 
reflect the preferences of the prosecution office (“specialized units mirror the crime 
problem”), but these are not the only personal priorities. Pubblici ministeri can 
consider other criteria (e. g. accused in jail, victim in danger etc., in general the 
criteria we are describing here). These can also be included in circulars (see chap. 6). 
The point is that prosecutors do not just deal with specialized matters and, within the 
unit, there is not a strict hierarchy of cases which have to be prioritized. So, the sense 
of prioritization is twofold: prioritization as category of crime and as individual case.
In other prosecution offices, where there is not a clear distinction between 
category A and category B crimes as there is in Turin, some pubblici ministeri still 
seemed to consider specialized units as a reflection of the crime problem in a certain 
area:
It is not necessary for prosecutors working in specialized units specifically to prioritize 
specialized matters. This happens because, given the two reasons I explained before [the
99 See. for example, CP(S4), AP(N49) and AP(N28).
K0 We visited 10 prosecution offices and 9 had specialized units. A P(N 10) works in a small 
prosecution office (between 3 to 5 prosecutors) where there are not specialized units. So, in this case, 
the statistical analysis will be based on the interviews o f  26 prosecutors and not 27.
101 AP(N 1). Similar opinions were expressed by AP(N2) and AP(N3).
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reasons why, according to this prosecutor, specialized units were created: specific 
knowledge o f  complicated legal rules and/or specific preparation to carry out a difficult 
investigation], specialized units already include the most serious crimes and the most 
| difficult criminal proceedings.102
Specializations clearly reflect the local problems. For example, here there are a lot o f  
environmental crimes. So I had to create a unit composed o f a substantial number o f  
prosecutors [ ...]  On the other hand, here terrorism is not a quantitative large issue,103 so I 
only allocated 2 prosecutors. In fact, [when you determine the specialized units and their 
composition] you need to take into account the complaints you receive and the crime 
problem [in general].104
So for these prosecutors, the very existence of the specialized units was a 
reflection of the priority accorded to the relevant offences. On the other hand, pubblici 
ministeri who said that specialized units were not created to indicate priorities had a 
different approach. They did not deny the importance of these groups. But they say 
that that priorities are chosen on different general criteria (e. g. police decisions, 
prescrizione, allarme sociale etc.) which apply to all cases, no matter if they are part 
of their specialization or not. So, the decision is, normally, not between specialized 
matters and the ordinario. Both can be priorities depending on the circumstances:
I do not think that specialized matters are prioritized compared to the ordinario; it 
depends [ ...]  there can be some attempted murders [which are part o f  the ordinario, 
unless they are the consequence o f  a crime which fall into a specialized unit] which are, 
objectively, not very serious. [On the other hand] some others [attempted murders] are 
serious because they were very close to become a murder [ ...]  I think that you never 
have to decide between specialized matters and ordinario, the problem is different [...]  
Between a petty ordinario  case, like fraudulent conversion, and domestic violence, I tend 
to prioritize the domestic violence.105
102 AP(N49).
10’ This prosecutor is not saying that terrorism is not important in general. It is not a serious crime 
problem in that area (i. e. south o f  Italy).
104 CP(S4).
103 AP(N31). The example refers to domestic violence because this prosecutor works for a specialized
units dealing with sexual crimes, harassments and, in general, all the violent crimes which involve
victims who appear particularly vulnerable (e. g. minors). Similar opinions about the fact that non­
specialized matters (i. e. the ordinario) can be priorities were expressed, for example, by AP(N33), 
DCP(N45) and AP(C54). In particular, AP(C54) said that the priority is not necessarily linked with the 
specializations, but it is surely connected with the “objective seriousness” o f  the single case.
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In the end, the difference between Turin and other prosecution offices where 
preferences are less structured could be more apparent than real. Prosecutors are 
always in the position to consider other criteria then those established within the 
prosecution offices. The consequence is that (even in Turin) cases o f  the ordinario 
may become more important than specialized matters.
There seems to be a more indirect link between specialization and preferences.
Pubblici ministeri are normally in the position to choose their specialization(s). If the
prosecution office is o f medium-large or just medium size, prosecutors are part of at
least 2 specialized units (see chap. 6). So, these are likely to be the crimes they
consider more important and more interesting because they have chosen to specialize
in those offences. Furthermore, when prosecutors gave examples o f the cases they
considered more serious they tended to refer to: murders (even attempted),106 white
collar crimes,107 sexual crimes (and domestic violence and harassment in general,
which are normally grouped with the specialized unit dealing w ith crimes committed
against vulnerable victims (e. g. women, minors etc)108, environmental crimes,109
industrial accidents110 and crimes against public administration111. Excluding murders
• 112 *(for which there is not a specialized unit), in the prosecution offices visited which 
had specialized units (which was 9 out of 10), there were specialized units dealing 
with all these crimes.113 This is illustrated below:
106 See. for example, AP(N39), AP(C47) and AP(N31).
107 See, for example, AP(C46), AP(N48) and CP(S4).
I0S See, for example, AP(N33), AP(N31) and AP(N28).
109 See, for example, AP(N42), AP(N38) and DCP(S5).
110 See, for example, AP(N1), AP(N2) and DCP(N45).
111 See, for example, AP(S6), AP(N28) and AP(N49).
112 Murders may still be treated within a specialized group if, for example, a murder is the result o f  an
industrial accident.
"J Organized crime and terrorism were also considered priorities (see, for example, AP(N49) and 
DCP(N45). Moreover, there are specialized units dealing with these crimes. H owever, as we explained 
(chap. 6), when it com es to organized crime specialized units can only be set up in the biggest 
prosecution offices and, although they are part o f  the procura, they also interact with a national body 
(the DNA). For terrorism the situation is different. In fact, a specialized organ like the DNA has not 
been created yet. The analysis o f  the way prosecutors deal with organized crimes and terrorism goes far 
beyond this work. Suffice here to say that, in practice, it seems that these crim es are specifically treated 
by the biggest prosecution offices.
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So, the few exceptions generally relate to crimes against public administration. 
But the point we want to make here concerns the link between specialization and 
definition of the crime problem. It appears that it is the preference which, in practice, 
leads to the organization of specialist units and not vice-versa. Specialized units 
reflect prosecutors’ cultural assumptions about the definition of the crime problem. As 
we have explained (see chap. 6) specialized units (and the way prosecutors choose 
their specialized units) are not imposed. All the prosecutors are allowed to participate 
when these decisions are taken. This is not surprising given that, as we said (see 
above and chap. 6), prosecution offices are not hierarchically organized and 
prosecutors’ legal independence plays a pivotal role in shaping the organizational 
relations. Moreover, these relations seem to be based on strategies of persuasion.
To conclude, if  there is a positive correlation between specialized unit status 
and prioritization it is because the special unit exists to express the fact that a
1,4 Here, environmental crimes do not seem to be part o f  the ordinario (see, AP(N1), AP(N2) and 
AP(N3). However, apparently, there is not a specific unit dealing with them. So, from our interviews it 
is not clear if there is, at least informally, a group o f prosecutors dealing with environmental crimes.
Here there is not a specialized unit dealing with crimes against public administration. However, 
there is a group, dealing with financial crimes, which also treats cases involving frauds against public 
institutions (e. g. the European Union). So, in practice, this unit seems to be able to absorb at least 
some o f the crimes against public administration and public bodies in general.
116 In this prosecutors office there are some prosecutors who, de facto, specialized in treating crimes 
against public administration. However, there is not a formal specialized unit (see AP(C46).
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particular type of crime is a priority not because a crime is a priority because there is a 
special unit. So, special unit status is not a criterion for determining the seriousness of 
particular crimes. But seriousness of crime might be one criterion for determining 
whether to create a special unit. Furthermore, the units deal with general categories of 
crimes, but the decision about which case should have a preferential treatment 
amongst those which have been allocated to the specialized group is left to pubblici 
ministeri. This means that even if  we assume, as some prosecutors suggest, that 
specializations do mirror the prosecutors’ view of the crime problem, we still need to 
search for and analyze other personal criteria. However, the decision to create 
specialized units seems, in practice, to have institutionalized the general categories of 
crimes which are considered by prosecutors more serious. This could indicate the 
borders of the definition of the crime problem. But there may be influence in more 
that one direction. This is because there is a constant turnover of prosecutors. So, the 
young and the new pubblici ministeri arrive to find a structure of established special 
units. These may contribute to ‘socializing’ new prosecutors into a particular 
definition of the crime problem (for example, that white-collar crime is important). 
However, for the reasons we explained above (i. e. prosecutors’ professional culture, 
legal independence and absence o f hierarchical relations), it may well be that the 
structure of preferences reflected in special units will change if collectively 
prosecutors’ definitions of the crime problem change.
Finally, these considerations only partially apply to the SDAS and the urban 
safety group. As we said, these are not specialized units. But they are composed of 
prosecutors who deal with a diverse range of cases with the aim of dealing with them 
as fast as possible. But, in the prosecutors’ view, these groups were created to deal 
with non-serious crimes. So there is a correlation between the minor nature o f the case 
and the creation of, for example, the SDAS. Even in these cases it is the (non) 
preference (together, surely, with efficiency issues) which leads to the organization 
and not vice-versa. This is what seems to have happened in practice.
4. Practical criteria: investigation
This section considers the relevance of the urgency of carrying out certain 
investigative acts. This is a different situation compared to those we have described
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above. Prescrizione, arrests and pre-trial measures are linked with clear legal- 
procedural rules. On the other hand, when urgency is related to the investigation, 
prosecutors’ discretionary powers to assess and decide on the different circumstances 
of a case appear more substantial:
It happens that [sometimes] when a serious crime has been committed you need to deal 
with it as soon as possible, because, otherwise, you will not find any evidence.117
Someone could say: environmental crimes are contrawenzioni, so we can put them 
aside. However, for example, it happened that the police realized that there was rubbish 
under the soil in an area where they were about to build [...] So, we started to investigate 
and we discovered that the rubbish could be toxic [...] So, in this case, even if, at the end, 
the punishment may not be substantial, it was necessary to act immediately, because they 
were about to build.118
| Urgent matters can be determined by the fact that there are cases for which there is the 
need to carry out investigative acts as soon as possible. [So, for example] denunciations
i
for personal injuries or deaths because o f  medical responsibility, attempted murders, 
industrial accidents [etc.]. [Also], situations where it is necessary to stop a criminal 
activity which is still going on.119
There are investigative acts which must be carried out immediately, otherwise they lead 
to no results. This happens for murders,120 but there are also some cases which involve 
domestic violence or violence against minors. So, for example, when there is a 
paedophile. [In fact] the paedophile contacts the minor via internet and he changes the 
server to access the net every week. If we can not get him during the first week we lose 
him and we can not find him anymore.121
It is not possible to list all the reasons why certain investigative acts become 
urgent because it depends very much on the circumstances o f the single case. 
However, it seems that three key criteria can be identified: investigative acts must be 
carried out immediately when the evidence must be collected as soon as possible; 
when there is the risk that the perpetrator will escape; and/or when it is necessary to
117 CP(S4).
118 AP(N38).
119 AP(C47).
1-0 See AP(N39) who explained why murders are urgent matters. In particular, she said: “When the 
crime is particularly serious, like a murder, we do have to go to the crime scene and, for example, we 
have to authorize the removal o f  the body”.
121 AP(C46).
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prevent or limit consequences of the crime. Thus, while prosecutors’ discretionary 
powers to determine that a case is urgent appear substantial, certain commonly cited 
principles exist concerning the urgency of the investigation just as there are common 
criteria taken into account in determining more general priorities. Prosecutors do not 
simply accept priorities determined by police officers; they are in the position to 
consider other elements and, as a consequence, mediate the influence of police’s 
decisions on the definition of the crime problem (chap. 8). The analysis o f urgency (of 
the investigation) as a criterion for determining priorities seems to confirm this 
argument. It seems to show that, in the pre-trial phase, prosecutors still have power to 
decide on the circumstances they consider relevant to define the crime problem. In 
other words: pubblici ministeri seem to be, in practice, in the position to assess and 
evaluate all the information they have obtained about a case. Prosecutors’ power to 
resist the impact of external influences will be further explained when we will deal 
with prosecutors’ approach to street crime and illegal immigration and we will see 
how pubblici ministeri seem to be able to filter certain forms of social anxiety.
5. Conclusion
Prosecutors’ definition of the crime problem appears to be the result of complex 
considerations involving different criteria which interact with each other. This does 
not mean that decisions on priorities are anarchic and that general criteria cannot be 
determined. Substantive and procedural legal provisions may influence prosecutors’ 
decisions (i. e. prescrizione). On the other hand, the existence of specialized units 
(and other groups like the SDAS) may indicate a priority accorded to particular types 
of crime. Finally, pubblici ministeri also take into consideration the urgency of 
carrying out investigative acts, the consequences of a crime, the characteristics of the 
perpetrator and the damage suffered by the victim. But there is no ranking of criteria. 
So. there are no cases which, a priori, are more important than others. Prosecutors 
appear to adopt a pragmatic, case by case approach to determining the weight o f 
particular criteria (e. g. prescrizione, damages suffered by the victim etc.) in a 
particular case. Socio-political considerations and opinions of prosecutors appear 
important as well. In particular, a case can be prioritized if its consequences can
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threaten the principles which govern the way society lives, even if there are no 
specific victims. But it is prosecutors who determine what is particularly threatening.
To conclude, although general criteria can be identified, prosecutors are in the 
position to take personal decisions on the definition of the crime problem. In other 
words: they have the power to determine preferences. This is linked to earlier 
comments and seems to confirm that pubblici ministeri retain the power to determine 
the influence of externally defined criteria such as legal rules. This also poses 
questions about the meaning, in practice, of the legality principle, but this will be 
discussed later (see chap. 12) when the analysis of the way prosecutors define the 
crime problem has been completed. Moreover, this mediating function seems to have 
the effect of reducing the effective impact of externally defined influences on 
prosecutors’ discretion (though they remain relevant to decision-making). As a 
consequence, the pubblici ministeri retain the power to filter out (and treat later or 
drop) cases that they do not consider as priorities. This will be better analyzed in the 
next chapters when we will deal with the way prosecutors define allarme sociale and 
prosecutors street crime and immigration.
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CHAPTER X. PROSECUTORS AND SOCIAL
ALARM
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1. Introduction
This section will set out the (limited) literature concerning prosecutors and social 
alarm and explain the questions we want to answer in this chapter. In addition, before 
we begin to describe the meaning of allarme sociale for prosecutors, we need to 
define this concept more generally and to examine other ideas connected to the 
definition of allarme sociale.
Allarme sociale1 is an expression that, in Italy, is used by the media, by 
politicians, by ordinary people and by prosecutors (and legal actors in general) as 
well. As we said (chap. 8), it literally means social alarm and defines the reaction 
(possibly disproportionate) of society when certain crimes have been committed 
and/or certain perpetrators are involved. This reaction can be unjustified and directed 
against a particular group of people (mainly immigrants, see later), but it can also be 
spontaneous and linked to moral and political issues. In particular, social alarm tends 
to identify those situations where a certain (criminal and/or non-criminal) 
phenomenon becomes a source o f fear within the society and, as a consequence, it 
creates fear.3 As for the consequences that the public concern about allarme sociale 
can create, Cornelli argues that the fear of crime provides the opportunity to begin a 
political confrontation (i. e. political parties discuss security issues), to divert the 
attention of public opinion from other issues (e. g. economic recessions etc.) and to 
increase the level of control over society. So, social alarm does not just influence 
specific victims of crimes and/or those who actually live in dangerous areas.4 This 
seems to be a public issue which may involve institutions and ordinary people (i. e. 
the civil society in general) who do not live in places where certain crimes have been 
committed.
Social alarm also appears connected to events which are not necessarily 
crimes. Sometimes it is more a matter of disorder and incivilities (e. g. homeless
1 For similarities and differences with the concept o f  moral panic see chap. 1.
" Cornelli R. “Paura della criminalita e allarme sociale”. In Selmini R. eds. “La sicurezza urbana”. 
2004. Bologna: U Mulino. p. 111. See also, Barbagli M. eds. “Egregio Signor Sindaco”. 1999. 
Bologna: 11 Mulino.
' Cornelli (2004) op. cit. p. 113.
4 Ibid. p. 114.
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people, drug addicts, prostitutes etc .).5 For example, as we said (chap. 5), a leader of 
one of the committees of citizens in  Modena (Emilia Romagna), talking about the lack 
of safety in a certain area, said: “I t ’s also the way they [immigrants] behave in public 
places”.6 So, as Chiesi explains, although in Italy criminality is not growing and the 
crime rate seems lower compared to  the rest of Europe,7 social alarm remains and the 
demand for security keeps increasing, because incivilities have become a source o f 
fear as well.8 The author explains th is concept using a diagram:9
crime fear (so c ia l 
alarm)
-► demand 
for
security
incivilities discom fort
As we can see Chiesi links social alarm (together with crime and incivilities) 
with insecurity (or increase in the demand for security). This is not unusual. In fact, 
many authors remark on this connection.10 The argument is that the panic caused by 
an event(s) (not necessarily a crim e, as we saw) increases the demand for security11 
from civil society. As we saw, recent (and less recent) statistical analyses seem to 
have proved that ordinary people really perceive this sense of insecurity. Moreover, 
mass media, politics and the public  (i. e. the dominant political cultures) consider 
insecurity as a very important issue. We have already discussed these issues (chap. 5). 
However, here it is important to summarize what we said before and to underline the 
connections with social alarm.
' Chiesi L. “Le incivilta: degrado u rban o  e  insicurezza". In Selmini eds. (2004) op. cit. pp. 129-140. 
See also, Barbagli M. “La paura della crim in a lita". In Barbagli M. and Gatti U. eds. “La crm inalita in 
Ita lia". 2002. Bologna: II Mulino. pp. 2 0 5 -2 1 2 .
6 Melossi and Selmini (2000) op. cit. p. 1 5 0 . See also: Melossi (2003) op. cit. p. 384.
See, for example, Chiesi (2004) op. c it.  p. 131 and Barbagli (2002) op. cit. For a general idea about
the crime problem in Italy see: Muratore e t  al eds. (2004) op. cit. See also chap. 5. 
b Chiesi (2004) op. cit. p. 131. See a lso , for example, Barbagli (2002) op. cit. pp. 207-209 and 
Corazziari I. and Federici A. ^La zona in  cu i si vive e il degrado sociale". In Muratore et al eds. (2004)  
op. cit. p. 129.
9 Chiesi (2004) op. cit. p. 131.
10 Melossi and Selmini (2000) op. cit. pp. 151-153. See also, for example, Maneri M. “/ / panico m orale  
come dispositivo di trasformazione d e l l ’insicurezza". January-March 2001. In RASSEGNA  
ITALIANA DI SOCIOLOGIA/ a. XLII. p p . 5-40.
11 When we talk about security here we m ean  safety. In particular, insecurity is created by the (real and 
perceived) lack o f  safety (for us, our fam ily and our properties). See, Naldi A. ‘ Mass m edia  e 
insicurezza". In Selmini eds. (2004) op. c i t .  p. 118. See also, for example, Melossi and Selmini (2000)
op. cit.
240
In Italy, like in many other western capitalistic countries, security (and crimes
which create insecurity, like street crime and crimes committed by immigrants, see
later) is a very important matter (but in Italy it became important later, in the 1990s).
This involves the central state, the media and the man and the woman in the street.
The importance of security issues for Italian politics can be very well demonstrated if
we analyze the results of the 2008 elections. The Lega Nord (Northern League, the
12secessionist party, supporting the centre-right coalition) obtained a remarkable result 
focusing on two issues: devolution and ‘fighting’ against immigration and 
insecurity.13 The ‘fight against crime and insecurity’ is not a monopoly o f one or 
several political parties. Both the centre-right and the centre-left coalitions have put 
security and crime-control at the top of their agenda. However, their solutions are 
partially different: the centre-right coalition, as we have said, proposes more 
repression (against crime); the centre-left is more focused on solving social conflicts. 
So, in Italy, the differences between left and right still seem perceptible when it comes 
to defining the crime problem and how to find solutions to tackle crime. The mass 
media seem to reflect these political differences. In particular, the centre-right media 
tend to stress the need for repression, while the centre-left media emphasize social 
problems. However, in general, security issues (in particular the demand for more 
security) appear clearly important. Moreover, as Naldi claims, the media may have 
contributed to social alarm by its stereotypical representation.14 The lack of safety is 
very much an issue for civil society as well. In the last twenty years, local committees 
of citizens have been created; protests against lack of security have increased; and, in 
general, the public has started to be more involved when political institutions have 
had to define the criminal policy.
Thus, although, as Nelken says, in Italy there is much less “media exploited 
public fear of conventional crime as compared to common law countries”,15 security 
has clearly became an important issue within the Italian society. Moreover, insecurity 
and social alarm seem to be mainly related to street crime and immigration (chap.
12 Around 8-9% o f the votes, but this was all concentrated in the north, because this is a territorial party 
which does not exist in the south o f  Italy.
L> The language used by this party against immigration is often characterized by a strong racism. In 
fact, for example, radio Padania libera  (the official radio o f  the Lega Nord) has once said that 
' unfortunately, it is easier to kill rats then getting rid o f  gipsies” (see Lerner G. uIl N ord del Senatur”. 
[Online]. 2008. Available at: http://www.repubblica.it/2008/04/sezioni/politica/elezioni-2008-
uno/nord-senatur/nord-senatur.html [Accessed 16/04/2008]). 
u See, Naldi A. (2004) op. cit. pp. 117-128, in particular p. 118.
Nelken (2006) op. cit. p. 172.
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I I ) .16 In particular, immigration has become important because o f the (street) crimes
17committed by extracomunitari, because some of these are illegal immigrants and, 
sometimes, because there are extracomunitari who behave in a certain way (i. e. 
incivilities). We will specifically deal with prosecutors, street crime and immigration 
in the next chapter. Suffice it here to say that, in relation to security issues, the 
dominant political cultures (media, politics and public opinion) seem to concentrate 
on these crimes as two o f the most serious crime problems and as sources of allarme 
sociale,18
The literature on Italian prosecutors and social alarm does not appear 
particularly extensive. Authors have mainly focused on two (different) issues: the 
impact and influence o f social alarm on prosecutors’ job (the majority) and the way 
pubblici ministeri have used this concept.
Some authors have argued that legal actors (the police, prosecutors, judges 
and, sometimes, lawyers as well) are very much influenced by ‘common sense’ about 
crime. In particular, legal actors, like ordinary people, stigmatize the behaviour of 
immigrants and suppose that they are inclined to commit certain crimes (i. e. street 
crime). So, the views about crime within the dominant political cultures, which, as we 
explained, are very much based on social alarm and insecurity, are assumed to have a 
great impact on the way legal actors behave. In fact, for example, Faiella, Paduanello 
and Sbraccia say that (immigrant) accused persons are ‘socially identified’ by legal 
actors and that this identification determines the way the criminal proceedings will 
end.19 Thus, according to these authors, an extracomunitario is seen by the ordinary
16 See. for example, Chiesi (2004), op. cit., p. 132. The author says that “fear o f  crime is mainly related 
to robberies and mugging compared to murders”. On the connections between allarme sociale, 
immigration, insecurity, crime, deviance and mass media in Italy and in Europe see, for example, 
Melossi D. “Stato controllo sociale, devianza”. 2002. Milano: Bruno Mondadori. pp. 255-299. See also 
Maneri (2001) op. cit.
17 Even being an illegal immigrant is, in practice, a crime, see the Bossi-Fini Act (chap. 11).
18 Ferrajoli says: “the security campaigns [from the central state] are made to deal with the diffuse 
feeling o f social insecurity. This implies a mobilization against the deviant and the different persons, 
preferably if coloured or extracomunitario". (Ferrajoli L. “Principia iuris. Teoria del diritto e della  
dem ocrazid  ’ (vol. II). 2007. Roma-Bari: Laterza. P. 373.
19 Faiella F., Paduanello M. and Sbraccia A., “La costruzione d e ll’identita dell'im putato nel corso della  
fuse dibattimentale”. In Mosconi G. and Padovan D. eds. “L afabbrica  dei delinquenti. Processo penale  
e meccanismi di costruzione del condannato”. 2005. Torino: L’Harmattan Italia, pp. 58-121, in 
particular p. 70. In this book the authors analyzed files concerning criminal proceedings involving both 
Italians and foreigners (20 files each in the area o f Padua, a wealthy town in the north o f  Italy). In 
particular, they selected proceedings which dealt with crimes against property and drug trafficking 
(small drug trafficking).
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people as a source of crime and panic. This influences legal actors who tend to 
‘socially identify’ immigrants as criminals.
Quassoli seems to have very similar opinions.20 He says that “the stereotype of 
the illegal immigrant, who is socially and economically excluded [i. e. living at the 
'fringes of the society’] and systematically involved in criminal activities” plays an 
important part in shaping the decisions that legal actors take during criminal 
proceedings.21 In the next chapter we will explain in detail how, in Quassoli and 
others’ view, legal actors in general (and prosecutors in particular) focus on dealing 
with immigrant crime. Here we just want to remark that the author clearly wants to 
underline that there is no possibility (or at least only an increasingly limited one) for 
prosecutors to mediate the inputs and the opinions about crime and justice which 
come from civil society (i. e. ‘what everybody knows’).
The work of Sarzotti runs in the same direction. He analyzed the “discorsi 
annuali dell’anno giudiziario dei Procuratori Generali” from 1999 till 2002 (in total 
87 speeches).22 These are speeches that the chief prosecutors of the prosecution 
offices attached to the courts of appeal make every year. These accounts describe 
(sometimes with statistics as well) the way prosecution offices are working. They 
include views about the problems of the justice system and, more importantly for us, 
considerations on crime and criminality. As the author explains, these speeches were 
studied to investigate prosecutors’ professional culture and the way they define their 
criminal policy.24 Sarzotti describes a scenario where pubblici ministeri appear very 
much affected by civil society which is in turn strongly influenced by the concept of 
law and order and by common sense about crime (stereotypes and stigmatizations 
concerning crime and criminals, i. e. extracomunitari). In other words: the author 
(similarly to Quassoli) claims that pubblici ministeri are strongly influenced by the 
images of crime within the dominant political cultures; and suggests that prosecutors’
Quassoli F. “Immigrazione uguale criminalita. Rappresentazioni di senso comune e pratiche  
organizzative degli operatori del diritto”. January-march 1999. RASSEGNA ITALIANA DI 
SOCIOLOGIA/ a. XXX, n. 1. pp. 43-75. This article was based on the analysis o f  files concerning 
criminal proceedings involving non Italian nationals (i. e. extracomunitari) and on interviews with 
prosecutors, judges and lawyers (the location was Milan).
21 Quassoli (1999) op. cit. p 59.
"  These speeches are official. This is the moment when high ranked prosecutors (each one representing 
the prosecution offices which are working within the area covered by the court o f appeal) ‘officially  
communicate’ with the media, the central sate and the civil society in general. This should be taken into 
account while we explain Sarzotti’s analysis o f  these speeches.
Sarzotti (2006) op. cit. See also Sarzotti (2006a) op. cit. where the author interviewed prosecutors in 
two prosecution offices: Turin and Bari (big town in the south o f  Italy); and Sarzotti (2008a) op. cit.
”4 Sarzotti (2006) op. cit. p. 10.
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professional culture does not seem to mitigate this effect. However, Sarzotti 
eventually emphasizes that prosecutors try to appear, at the sam e time, on the one 
hand, as guardians of equality before the law who try not to be influenced by the 
populism behind social alarm and the need of security; and on the other, they want to 
be seen as legal figures which fight against street crime and insecurity (i. e. for whom 
social alarm is a relevant issue).26 This is considered to be prosecutors’ professional 
culture. But the author explains that, in practice, pubblici m inisteri are extremely 
influenced by the populism behind the definition of the crime problem  and that their
97vision of criminal justice is emotional and political as in the Anglo-Saxon world. In 
particular, Sarzotti says: “We can presume [from the analysis o f  the speeches] that 
prosecutors’ professional experience is filtered and influenced by the image of crime 
and criminals made by mass media”.28 In the author’s view, the consequences are that 
Italian prosecutors tend to link certain crimes (mainly street crim e) with immigrants 
and immigration. In fact, at least in some prosecution offices, street crime and 
immigration are defined as major crime problems. In particular, a s  we will describe 
better in the next chapter, Sarzotti explains that in Turin, where the urban safety group 
was created, street crime became a priority because it was necessary to deal with the 
lack of safety and the social alarm that these crimes were creating.29 The author, 
unsurprisingly, concludes that, at least pubblici ministeri working in Turin appear to 
be strongly influenced by the inputs coming from the dominant political cultures in 
general and from the local community in particular (i. e. allarme sociale caused by 
street crime and immigration).30
At this point it is also important to mention the research carried out by Field 
and Nelken. This concerned youth justice in Italy and Wales. The authors underline 
the cooler expert ‘tone’ of youth justice in Italy compared to the Anglo-Saxon world. 
This means that Italian judges and magistrates dealing with youth justice have a 
professional self image rooted in a notion of themselves as ‘bearers o f the law’ whose 
actions are legitimated through legal values rather than representatives of the
25 Ibid. p. 13 and 16.
16 Ibid. pp. 70-71
27 Ibid. p. 68. For the Anglo-Saxon world the author refers to Garland D. “T he Culture o f  control: 
Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society". 2001. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
28 Sarzotti (2006), op. cit. p. 97.
29 Sarzotti (2006a) op. cit.
:’° Ibid. p. 82.
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community accountable to popular opinion.31 So, it seems that, according to Field and 
Nelken, the link between the definition of the crime problem and common sense about 
crime and justice is not as strong as it appears, for example, from Sarzotti’s research. 
Similar (although more radical) ideas were expressed by De Cataldo. He claims that 
Italian legal actors are not influenced by the ‘propaganda’ carried out by the media 
(but not only the media) which tends to stigmatize extracomunitari as criminals and to 
create insecurity (and social alarm) within the civil society. The author specifically 
talked about judges, but, in general, he referred to all the magistrati (prosecutors and 
judges). In particular, Di Cataldo wanted to underline the role of legal actors as 
‘professional experts’ who are not (never, for the author) affected by external 
influences.j2
Finally, we have to mention the work of Marco Fabri. This author did not 
focus on the impact of social alarm on prosecutors, but on how pubblici ministeri use 
this concept. The author describes allarme sociale as a sort of container which 
includes all the different considerations that prosecutors make when they determine 
priorities. Moreover, he claims that pubblici ministeri justify their decisions by saying 
that certain crimes cause (or do not cause) social alarm. Fabri explains that the 
consequence is that every prosecutor has a personal idea of the crime problem and
• ' I ' l
common criteria cannot be identified. In this sense the author seems to agree with Di 
Federico who, as we said, talked about the ‘personalization’ of prosecutorial functions 
and of the excess of independence that prosecutors have when they define priorities.34 
So, Fabri wants to underline how pubblici ministeri (mis)use the concept of social 
alarm and the consequences that, in his opinion, this creates. However, given that he 
claims that every pubblico ministero uses allarme sociale in a different way, he does 
not explain what this concept means for prosecutors.
In this chapter we want to answer two questions. First, we want to analyze the 
meaning of social alarm for prosecutors. Second, we want to understand how 
important this concept is when pubblici ministeri define priorities. Moreover, this
j| Field S. and Nelken D. “Early Intervention and Cultures o f  Youth Justice: a Comparison o f  Italy and  
Wales”. In Gessner V. and Nelken D. eds. “European Ways o f  Law”. 2007. Oxford: Hart publishing, 
pp. 349-373, in particular p. 364-365.
De Cataldo G. “La legge, lazingara  e la propaganda”. 2007. Questione Giustizia. Vol. 6. pp. 1265-
1267.
" Fabri (1997) op. cit. pp. 178-179.
' * Di Federico (1998) op. cit.
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second question will give us the chance to describe the impact that social alarm seems 
to have on the prosecutors’ job. As we have explained, these issues have been already 
partially addressed by some authors. However, our research leads to different 
conclusions when compared to the dominant academic literature. In fact, although 
social alarm is certainly one o f the criteria prosecutors use to determine the crime 
problem, this does not appear, as Fabri claims, as a container. Furthermore, it seems 
possible to identify some characteristics o f this concept which are common to 
different prosecutors. In other words: pubblici ministeri seem to have developed their 
own meaning of social alarm, which is only partially similar to the ideas developed 
within civil society. Finally, although here we do not want to deny that images of 
crime, security and social alarm within the dominant political cultures can influence 
pubblici ministeri, we will try to demonstrate that these legal actors are in the position 
to mediate this impact.
2. Prosecutors’ sense of social alarm
As we have just explained, the approach of the media, the reaction o f local 
communities and the response of the central state suggest that social alarm is now an 
issue in the Italian society. Public fear, the sense o f insecurity, the social reactions and 
the attempt to identify a group (i. e. immigrants) as a threat to societal values are now 
perceptible. But what is social alarm in the prosecutors’ view? And how does this 
affect their choices? In order to answer to these questions we will (also) refer to the 
examples of street crime and crimes committed by immigrants (including the fact o f 
being an illegal immigrant), because these are crimes that, as we said, are supposed to 
create social alarm. However, we will not explain in detail how pubblici ministeri deal 
with these crimes. This will be done in the next chapter.
The vast majority o f the pubblici ministeri we interviewed admit that street 
crime and illegal immigration create social alarm.35 Prosecutors talk about local 
communities’ reactions and media exploitation o f public fear. However, they also said 
that street crime and crimes committed by immigrants have a medium-low priority
35 21 Prosecutors said that street crime and illegal immigration create social alarm (particularly for the 
local community). Two (one in a small prosecution office in the north and one in a big office in the 
south) believe that, in the area where they work, the local community is not so much affected by these 
crimes. Two were not asked due to lack o f  time. Two did not clearly answer.
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(see chap. 11).36 Moreover, pubblici ministeri do not seem particularly influenced by 
the perception within civil society of crime and social alarm (unless this is connected 
to a crime or a series of crimes which, in prosecutors’ view, are serious, see later). 
This appears particularly clearly when we examine the way Italian prosecutors deal 
with pressure and claims which come from local communities (and civil society in 
general):
I think that [pressure coming from the civil society] does not influence us very much.
The police can be more influenced because [for example] they see that in [he indicated a 
street] there are 150 Nigerian prostitutes who always stay there and [as a consequence] 
the local committees o f  citizens push them to intervene. They [police] intervene and then 
they send us a report; and we intervene. So, it [the pressure] is only indirect.37
1 mean, there are certain crimes. [For example] I remember that last year there has been a 
case o f  a car accident where the driver was drunk and two young girls died. There was a 
debate within the local community about traffic, drunken driving [ .. .]  We are necessarily 
in contact with people. I say that we work on people’s flesh. I mean, there are the 
accused persons or the victims and we are in a situation which is always evolving. So, 
everything can require careful consideration and you may need to change your approach 
and your behaviour. However, we can not say that we determine our actions according to 
the pressure o f  public opinion, or any other form o f pressure. We do not have to do it and 
we can not do it.38
The fact that people write [to protest] does not influence me. But it depends on the case: 
if  I have an indication that [for example] in a certain park there is a frequent and 
substantial drug trafficking I begin an investigation to understand if  this is really 
happening or not. It does not matter if  10 people wrote to me; if  I believe that the 
indication is reliable I begin an investigation. However, the fact that there are 50 
signatures [he is making the example o f  a petition] does not determine that an 
investigation will begin or not begin, I can do it anyway.39
So, prosecutors seem to take into consideration and they are aware that certain 
crime problems can affect society (e. g. pressure coming from committees o f citizens, 
debate about drunken driving etc.) However, pubblici ministeri say that the pressure
6 22 prosecutors out o f  27 said that street crimes and crimes committed by immigrants have a medium- 
low priority. One was not asked (due to lack o f  time) and one did not clearly answer. 3 said that these 
crimes are prioritized.
37 AP(N30).
3S AP(N39).
39 AP(C54).
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coming from ordinary people does not seem to be fundamental when they decide to 
focus on a particular crime problem.40 In fact, only two prosecutors referred to 
pressure coming from civil society (and the media as well) as an important reason to 
prioritize a case:
The prosecution office surely has to take into account the allarme sociale. This is 
because, amongst its priorities, the procura  has, as much as it is possible, that o f  dealing 
with people’s security needs. So, maybe, a case which has created more social alarm is 
treated as soon as possible. Even a case o f  teppismo,41 a violent case o f  mugging which 
will be reported in the newspaper; you try to deal with them as soon as possible [ .. .]  We 
should not be influenced. The m agistratura's system should keep the m agistratura  [i. e. 
judges and prosecutors] as far as possible from political choices. However, as I said, the 
social alarm [is important] and it is clear that if  something goes on and the newspapers 
and the media pay attention to that, you need to treat it as soon as possible. This is 
because it is not nice when they [the media] come to ask you [about the case] and you 
say that you do not have time to do it.42
I believe that the citizen who does not feel safe when he/she is walking in the street
needs to be protected [ .. .]  I think that, in general, security is a priority.43
_________________________________________________________________________
These seem to be relevant exceptions. In particular, here prosecutors refer to 
security, social alarm and the impact o f the media and local communities as important 
issues that determine the way they will deal with crime. However, these differences 
could be more apparent than real. Neither of these pubblici ministeri consider street 
crime and immigration as priorities (and, as we will explain (chap. 11), there are no 
specialized units dealing with these crimes). Moreover, DCP(N45) does not seem to 
link social alarm to general crime problems, but to specific crimes which have had a 
great impact in the society. So, his aim does not seem to be that of tackling, for 
example, street crime (e. g. mugging and teppismo) because they create social alarm,
40 19 prosecutors said that they are not influenced (unless they consider these crimes serious) by the 
reaction o f  local communities when certain crimes have created (and create) social alarm (in the 
question we referred, as examples, to street crime and immigration). 2 said that local community 
pressure is important, even when it concerns street crime. However, they work in an area (south o f  
Italy) where street crime is synonymous with organized crime, and they clearly linked the two issues. 2 
were not asked due to lack o f  time. 2 did not clearly answer, but they said that, in general, street crime 
and crimes committed by immigrants are not the real crime problem. 2 said that community (and 
media) pressure is very important (see later).
41 This mainly refers to situations where a gang(s) or a single person has caused substantial property 
damages, but it can involve injuries as well (similar to hooliganism).
42 DCP(N45).
43 AP(N32).
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but to deal efficiently with single cases that have shocked society. Furthermore, 
AP(N32) talks about the need to guarantee the security of people “walking in the 
street”. This is surely linked with street crime. In fact, she mentioned, for example, the 
problems created by thefts. However, her idea of security does not seem to reflect, 
completely, the idea that civil society seems to have. For this prosecutor, the goal, as 
we said, is not to deal with street crime and immigration as priorities, but to ensure 
that these crimes are actually treated and not just abandoned (see chap. 11):
N ow, it is a bit too much to say that microcriminalita  is a priority. The priority should 
go to other more important crimes which have bigger and devastating effects. The point 
is that it [the microcriminalita] should not be ignored. In a big prosecution office [where 
she works] there is always the risk that you only do the big things and you do not 
consider at all the medium-small ones.45
Moreover, although she seems to apply strictly the Bossi-Fini legislation, she 
considers it to be a problem, because pubblici ministeri need to spend a lot of time on 
these cases; while they could focus on more important crimes. So, even in these 
situations, where prosecutors admit to being influenced by the opinions o f civil 
society about crime and justice, we should be careful when we evaluate the impact, in 
practice, of these influences. In other words: pubblici ministeri still seem to retain the 
right to take important decisions about the crime problem. And they do not seem mere 
executors of anti-crime policies based on fighting against crimes which create social 
alarm.
So, in general, Italian prosecutors do not appear particularly influenced by 
dominant political cultures when they define the crime problem. What is the 
explanation for this? First of all, the influence prosecutors perceive is ‘indirect’. This 
is because it is the police that are directly in contact with civil society, whereas the 
involvement of pubblici ministeri comes later:
So, the police deal with public order. However, we feel that pressure, because people ask 
for more control. But we arrive later, because public order is a matter for the police and 
the prefetto. [So] we are involved, because we have more crime reports [coming from
44 This literally means micro crimes. In Italian this expression is used (by legal actors, media,
politicians and ordinary people) to indicate street crime (but it is becoming more common to call them 
criminalita di strada  which means street crime).
45 AP(N32).
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ordinary people and the police], but it is indirect, through the crime reports [ .. .]  We can 
not do anything in terms o f  prevention, but when we receive a denunciation [we act].46
In this case, the distinction between the police who deal with public order and 
general issues coming from the community and prosecutors who treat specific crime 
reports appears clear. This seems to confirm what we said before about police 
influence during the pre-trial phase (chap. 8). In particular, the police have to be in 
‘the street’ and pubblici ministeri seem to accept police’s role as initial establishers of 
priorities. However, prosecutors have to be more ‘detached’. So, the effect o f claims 
coming from ‘the street’ appears to have direct impact on the police and only an 
indirect influence on prosecutors who do not have a close contact with the society (at 
least not as close as the police have). It is interesting to note that police officers seem 
to confirm this view:
The pattuglie appiedate were created for this purpose [to deal with people’s sense o f  
insecurity]. This [security and the claims coming from the ordinary people] is a police 
problem, prosecutors w ill decide later, but the impact on society does not involve the 
prosecutor. The police directly control; you do not need prosecutors for people’s security 
[ .. .]  Prosecutors will act, but later48
Again, this is consistent with what we explained before (chap. 8). Police 
officers deal with security (i. e. ‘guarding the territorio')\ prosecutors intervene later 
when there is a crime report to treat. However, what we want to underline here is that 
police officers’ accounts seem to confirm the idea that images of crime and (dis)order 
coming from ordinary people do not substantially influence prosecutors. In fact, one
46 CP(S4). On the fact that prosecutors only indirectly perceive the pressure coming from the civil 
society see, for example, AP(N10), AP(N28) and AP(N38).
47 These are groups o f  police officers who control certain areas. The point is that, unlike the others, they 
do it by walking around.
48 Pol.(N26). Similar opinions about the fact that prosecutors are not very much influenced by the 
pressure coming from the civil society were expressed, for example, by Pol.(N26), Pol.(N 14) and 
Pol.(N 12). Moreover, Pol.(N14) gave an example o f  a prosecution office (not located in the area where 
he works) where he believes the police and prosecutors have been influenced by the media and the 
public opinion. In particular, he said: “I know that in other prosecution offices they act in a different 
way [they are influenced]. For example, in [ .. .]  they used to arrest prostitutes’ clients and to charge 
them for prostitution exploitation; prosecutors were supporting them [the police]! The media and the 
local community agreed. Then, one day, a well know entrepreneur was too much ashamed [because he 
has been arrested] and he killed himself. Since that moment everything has changed, the media and the 
prosecution office [did not focus anymore on these issues]”.
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police officer said: “in [...] citizens have a great power on the police; for the 
prosecution office it is different [citizens have much less influence]”.49
Is this enough to explain that social alarm only partially influences 
prosecutors? As we said (chap. 8), police officers affect prosecutors’ decisions on the 
definition of priorities because they implement directives on anti-crime policies (often 
aimed at tackling street crime and illegal immigration) which have been determined 
by the central government (minister of interior) and high ranked local authorities 
(prefetto and questore). Moreover, the police have the right to arrest and this, as in the 
case of the Bossi-Fini, can have a great impact on prosecutors’ job. So, how can 
pubblici ministeri mediate the impact of these external influences which, indirectly, 
could require them to prioritize cases which create panic and fear within the society? 
Prosecutors take into consideration the fact that some crimes create allarme sociale. 
So, this is one of the criteria to be taken into account to determine priorities.
Yes, the impact on society [is important] because it creates a demand for justice that, 
maybe, we have to take into account [ ...]  So, I prioritize the cases which are more 
important because o f  the investigation we need to carry out and because they had a great 
impact on society.50
However, prosecutors’ idea o f social alarm includes various concepts. In 
particular, for prosecutors, the crimes which create allarme sociale are those which 
are particularly dangerous,51 which jeopardize people’s sense o f security in their 
everyday life,32 which involve certain kinds of victims (e. g. women and elderly 
people)'-3 and, in general, which have a great impact on the society.34 These elements 
are surely compatible with the idea that the ordinary person, the media and the central 
state have of social alarm. However, when the allarme sociale reaches prosecutors it 
suddenly loses part of its impact. In fact, Italian prosecutors do not seem to accept 
blindly the notion of social alarm fed by the media and/or social reactions which they 
regard as merely populist. In particular, to be influential, social alarm must be related 
to an offence which is, in the prosecutors’ view, serious:
49 Pol.(N27).
30 AP(C53). Similar opinions were expressed, for example, by A P(N 31), CP(N43) and AP(C47).
31 See, for example, CP(S4).
32 See, for example, AP(N48).
31 See, for example, AP(NIO).
34 See, for example, CP(N40).
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I repeat: the impact [o f a crime] on the community [local and/or national] is linked with 
the objective seriousness o f  the case. When the crime is objectively serious we have the 
duty to be as ready as possible to prosecute the guilty person(s). In this sense the impact 
on the society is transmitted to us, only in this sense. On the other hand, ‘stomach aches’ 
[that people have because o f  crime] which derive from frustrations or xenophobic 
approaches do not influence us at all.55
Unsurprisingly, the criteria to determine the seriousness o f a case are mainly 
those we identified in the previous chapter when we analyzed the criteria that 
prosecutors use to determine priorities. In particular, the seriousness of a crime may 
be defined by the law: the more serious the crime, the more severe the punishment (i. 
e. impact of legislation).56 Moreover, the fact that the accused person is in jail (held in
rn #
i.e. pre-trial custody) or that measures like seizures have to be taken are important
ro # t
criteria as well. A case can also be prioritized if there is the risk that the prosecution 
will be blocked because of the prescrizione 59 Furthermore, the interests affected are 
also very important: crimes which threaten life are more important than crimes which 
threaten property.60 Finally, the damage suffered by the victim can be a relevant 
criterion as well.61 However, in practice these objective criteria can be, sometimes, 
disregarded. The clearest example is the Bossi-Fini, which, for the violations o f art. 14 
(i. e. failure to comply with a deportation order) provides very strict punishments 
(from 1 to 4 years excluding aggravating and mitigating circumstances), but which 
has a low priority. Moreover, mugging, which could lead to substantial injuries for the 
victim (e. g. when an old person is mugged and falls on the ground), has a medium- 
low (often only low) priority, unless substantial injuries actually happen. In fact, in 
these cases, life can be threatened.
So, it seems that Italian prosecutors accept that one of their functions is to 
provide a response to public fear; but they also believe that they have to analyze what 
creates public fear and to decide if this is really a priority. As one of the lawyers we 
interviewed said: “‘judicial social alarm’ is very different compared to social alarm as
55 AP(C53).
36 See, for example, AP(C46).
37 See, for example, DCP(N45).
38 See, for example, AP(C47).
39 See, for example, APApl.(N50).
60 See, for example, CP(N40).
61 See, for example, AP(N38).
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perceived in the society”.62 Here the word judicial is used to indicate the judiciary and 
those who are part of the judiciary. In particular, these are the magistrati in general 
and prosecutors in particular. The consequence is that the idea of social alarm for 
ordinary people, the central state and the media is different to the concept of allarme 
socicde for prosecutors. In particular, prosecutors seem to be in the position to filter 
these external influences, which do not disappear, but they are substantially 
moderated by other internal considerations:
We need to understand what we mean by influence. If someone, wrongly, believes that 
influence means to support the public’s will, he/she is completely wrong. On the 
contrary, if it means to realize that there is a social problem and that we need to find the 
right measures to tackle it [it is fine]. It is clear that, if  I work in an area where robberies 
are the major problem I will specialize in robberies [...]  We do not have to follow  the 
fashion [about crime] imposed by media or the fears o f society [i. e. allarme sociale], 
otherwise this becomes la caccia all’uomo nero.a
In this case the distinction seems clear between an emotional public opinion 
and prosecutors who have to analyze and determine whether the point of view of 
ordinary people about crime and justice corresponds to a real crime problem. This 
example also raises another question: who decides whether, for example, robberies are 
the major crime problem? In other words: are Italian prosecutors in the position to act 
like legal experts entitled to define the crime problem? This will be answered in the 
next section (prosecutors, street crime and immigration), here we want to focus on the 
way pubblici ministeri treat and filter social alarm. One very experienced prosecutor 
who works in a big prosecution office in the north of Italy said:
Now, the concept o f  allarme sociale is interesting. But this does not have to becom e a 
priority if  it is only based on what people think in a particular moment. Judges and 
prosecutors must not follow the feelings o f  ordinary people. So, I only take into 
consideration the allarme sociale when this is created by a really serious crime or series 
o f crimes [for example] a rape perpetrated by a group o f people or in a street in the night.
These attract a lot o f  interest from the media and the man in the street, but they are also 
very serious cases, so they become a priority.64
(’2 L(N23).
6' AP(N33). La caccia all’uomo nero literally means “hunting the black man”. In Italian you use this 
expression to indicate that you are searching, fighting against and scared o f  something which either 
does not exist or, at least, it is not so serious.
64 AP(N3 1).
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This prosecutor, like the vast majority of those we interviewed (see above), 
also said that he knows that street crime and illegal immigrations create social alarm, 
but that these are not priorities.
One prosecutor (working in a medium-size prosecution office in the north of Italy) 
gave a very good example of the way he puts together the impact that a crime has on 
the society with the interest affected by the crime itself:
The importance [o f a case] stems from the importance o f  the interests affected; for 
example: once I had to deal with a case, which is still not finished, involving an 
environmental crime; basically they were illegally digging (during the night) on the 
banks o f  the Po river in order to remove the sand [and reuse it]. Moreover, some accused 
persons had been caught red-handed and arrested. This really had an impact on public 
opinion. Furthermore, the interest affected was the environment, which is protected by 
the constitution. As a consequence, one is emotionally involved by such a case [and will 
prioritize it].65
The reasoning constructed by this prosecutor for the case of illegal digging 
does not apply for street crime and illegal immigration, because, as he said, the 
interests affected are not so important:
If you are talking about crimes committed within the area o f  illegal immigration [e. g. 
art. 14 o f  the Bossi-Fini] these are not really important. In fact, because o f  the reasons I 
explained before [i. e. accused in jail, urgency and, more important, the importance o f  
interests affected like in the case o f  the illegal digging] they are not at the top o f  the 
agenda.66
The consequence is that the impact of social alarm is seen as varying 
depending upon the crime committed. Moreover, these examples also show the 
attempt to put together personal considerations with legal rules. In fact, there is an 
obvious problem if the discourse of prosecutors is simply: I will take into account 
public fear as a priority when I personally think that public fear is real and it is based 
on a fact or a series of facts that I believe are important. So prosecutors try to link 
their choices with legal texts in order to put in more ‘objective’ terms their personal 
values.
^  AP(N42). It is interesting to note that other prosecutors linked social alarm and environmental 
crimes. In particular, see, for example AP(C47), AP(C53) and AP(N48).
66 AP(N42).
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In this sense it is interesting to note what a prosecutor, who works for a 
specialized unit which also deals with organized crime not involving Italian 
organizations (i. e. criminal organizations set up by extracomunitari), said about the 
Bossi-Fini:
I have a personal opinion about the problem o f  illegal immigration, but my job is to 
apply the law [ . . . ] !  can tell you that I think that certain parts o f  the Bossi-Fini are calling 
for revenge! Between 1 to 4 years imprisonment for the non national Italian who does 
not obey a deportation order [i. e. art. 14: all the prosecutors have to treat this crime, 
there is no specialized unit, see chap. 11], this [this legal provision] is a crime! Writing 
this piece o f  legislation is a crime! As a consequence, my interpretation o f  this Act is 
very strict [ ...]  [However] The Bossi-Fini Act is [also] very tough against criminal 
organizations which organize networks to favour illegal immigration. This is reflecting 
an existing allarme sociale ,67
In the next chapter we will explain in detail how prosecutors can have a more 
or less strict approach when they apply the Bossi-Fini Act (especially art. 14). Flere 
we want to underline the fact that this prosecutor refers to ‘existing social alarm’. In 
particular, allarme sociale only seems to exist in relation to certain crimes committed 
by illegal immigrants. This surely does not match (completely) with the idea that the 
dominant political cultures have about the sources of public fear. And it seems to 
confirm what we just said: prosecutors’ perception and the importance o f allarme 
sociale can vary depending on the seriousness (in prosecutors’ view) o f the crime 
committed. Moreover, the importance of personal considerations about crime and 
immigration, although mediated by objective principles (i. e. the duty to apply the 
law), is perceptible when this pubblico ministero talks about the application o f the 
Bossi-Fini. This appears to support our argument that prosecutors do not simply 
'swallow’ the inputs coming from the civil society.
In one case a chief prosecutor working in a prosecution office where, he 
claims, all the cases are treated (but not in the same way) and, as a consequence, there 
are no problems with the prescrizione (in his view this amounts to a proper 
application of the legality principle, see chap. 7), said that social alarm becomes 
important even if it is not linked to extremely serious crimes:
67 AP(N30).
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The other criterion [to determine priorities] is the allarme sociale, this is clear. So, if  
there are some problems like, for example, robberies in villas [detached isolated houses] 
or a gang which is perpetrating some thefts in a certain area; you need obviously to 
prioritize these matters, like when something very serious happens [ ...]  Yes, thefts as 
well, because when we look at the statistics, we can understand if  there are areas which 
are particularly [afflicted by certain crimes]. So, in general, we tend to deal with crimes 
which create allarme sociale, even if these are not very serious, even drunken driving.68
However, when it comes to street crime and immigration the idea of social 
alarm as a criterion to determine priorities does not appear so important anymore: 
Turning to immigrants, I think that the situation, here, is similar to everywhere else. One 
year ago I organized a conference where we compared the crime rate for extracomunitari 
and the crime rate for non-extracomunitari, at the end we realized that the crime rate for 
extracomunitari was just a little bit higher; so, it was perfectly normal, taking into 
account that, with the Bossi-Fini, the extracomunitario can commit crimes that the others 
can not commit [i. e. art. 14] [...]  So, I think this is normal: there is a high crime rate for 
crimes committed by extracomuntiari, but it is not dangerous. I can think about the 
extracomunitario who is very unlucky [i. e. living ‘at the fringes o f society’], who needs 
to go stealing; but I do not believe this is as important as the newspapers say. If  an Italian 
commits a theft you have a little tiny article on the newspaper; if  the perpetrator is an 
extracomunitario you have half o f  a page.69
The impact of the media and the fact that extracomunitari live in particular 
conditions and could be more inclined to commit certain crimes are not sufficient 
elements to determine that immigration is a priority. Moreover, this pubblico 
ministero, as in the other examples we just gave, seems to use objective criteria (i. e. 
crime rate) to explain and support his personal views about crimes committed by 
immigrants (i. e. there is a high crime rate, but it is not dangerous yet). Immigration 
can become important if, according to this prosecutor, there is a real crime problem 
corroborated by statistical evidence.70 So, even in this situation, in practice, the impact 
of allarme sociale may vary and, although public fear is an important criterion to 
establish priorities, it is not enough to determine the seriousness of a crime.
68 CP(N43).
69 CP(N43).
70 AP(C47) underlined as well that it is necessary to carry out a proper statistical analysis before 
deciding if crimes committed by immigrants are a problem or not. Moreover, he said that, at the 
moment, this information does not exist and that media tend to exaggerate the link between  
immigration and crime.
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So, social alarm alone is not sufficient to determine priorities. Prosecutors 
seem to carry out a sort of balancing exercise in which allarme sociale is only one 
(and not the most important) factor. Moreover, for Italian prosecutors, the concept of 
social alarm appears to be something very much internal. They seem to have their 
own idea of social alarm which is also based on interactions with the other criteria 
pubblici ministeri use to determine priorities (e. g. accused person in jail, damage 
suffered by the victim etc.). The consequence is that external influences which define 
the crime problem do not seem to affect very much the way prosecutors define the 
crime problem. Here we are not saying that prosecutors are a sort of formidable wall 
which blocks entirely the influences of the dominant political cultures about crime 
and justice. In fact, as we said, the impact of public opinion may be indirect, but it 
exists and the police seem to be able to represent it very well. However, these 
influences appear to be mediated. Up to this point we have tried to demonstrate that 
this is what happens. We believe that the reason why this happens needs to be found 
in prosecutors’ professional culture and self-image.
3. Prosecutors’ professional culture and social alarm
In this section we will try to explain that the reasons why pubblici ministeri can resist 
the external influences stem from their professional culture. In particular, three issues 
will be (re)analyzed (we already discussed prosecutors’ professional culture, see chap. 
7): prosecutors’ self image and professional culture in practice, the meaning of being 
‘legal filters’ and the legal and institutional rules which shape prosecutors’ 
professional culture.
As we explained, Italian prosecutors’ professional culture or self-image is 
founded on their sense o f themselves not as crime fighters but as judicial figures. In 
particular, pubblici ministeri see themselves as legal figures who perform a neutral 
and impartial investigation to find the truth; while they perceive a cultural distance 
between themselves and the crime fighter because they believe such a role implies 
exclusively working to obtain convictions. The consequence is that prosecutors 
consider that the decisions they take are taken as if they were judges. It does not 
matter if judges and prosecutors are functionally different, the key element is that, in 
prosecutors’ view, they are culturally indistinguishable. Finally, prosecutors believe
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that their sense o f being impartial means that they do not support one side (the 
prosecution), but rather present both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. However, 
as we have tried to demonstrate, in practice, prosecutors do not act as neutral and 
judicial figures. They are legal filters, who prevent cases which have not been legally 
investigated from becoming prosecuted cases. Moreover, the aim o f prosecutors’ 
filtering function seems to be that of presenting evidence to the judge to convince 
him/her that their interpretation of events is correct: they are thus functionally a party 
to proceedings. Finally, while prosecutors see this legal filtering as a judicial role it 
inevitably means that their judicial distance from the prejudicial information and 
opinion thrown up by the investigation is compromised. This is, in practice, the 
cultural difference between pubblici ministeri and judges.
Prosecutors’ filtering action can also concern the definition of the crime 
problem. In fact, although external influences are perceptible (see above) and pubblici 
ministeri seem, at the beginning of the investigation, mere ‘collectors’ of crime 
reports, Italian prosecutors also appear to be able to mediate these external influences. 
In particular, the impact of public concern about crime and of police’s priorities is 
mediated by other criteria (i. e. the seriousness of the case) which are both objective 
(e. g. procedural issues like prescrizione) and linked to prosecutors’ personal values 
and decisions (see above). So, Italian prosecutors in their reaction through their 
prosecution practices to political and public concern about crime may also be seen to 
be filtering out certain forms of social anxiety. This will be further explained and 
demonstrated in the next chapter when we will deal with prosecutors’ approach to 
street crime and immigration. What we want to underline here is not that Italian 
prosecutors can actually define the crime problem purely through legal principles or 
that they are impermeable to police decisions and opinions. Personal value- 
judgements about the social significance of different forms of criminality play their 
part and, as we said, external influences are perceptible. However, prosecutors see 
themselves as legal figures. Their ‘cultural goal’ is to maintain a distance between 
themselves and the external influences that might be seen to undermine their non­
partisan role:
There could be a different approach [between judges and prosecutors] but this would be 
a problem. It is a matter o f  the function you are carrying out. So i f  I am a judge I have to 
think according to certain rules; on the other hand if I am a prosecutor I have think in a 
slightly different way. However, there is something which must never change:
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impartiality. Both prosecutors and judges must be terzi and impartial. The prosecutor is 
a third party72 and must be above the parties. Prosecutors must, sometimes, judge like
judges.73
The police have more direct relations with citizens, so they look at the things in a 
partially different way [compared to prosecutors] [...] [This happens] because they deal 
with security issues, while we intervene later [...] We have to be more detached.74
In particular, prosecutors seek to preserve a degree of judicial distance from 
the claims of victims, communities, politicians and from police decisions on the 
definition of the crime problem. Thus, prosecutors’ professional culture in practice 
does not seem to be just focused on constructing a case which will stand scrutiny at 
trial. It also tends to emphasize the image of pubblici ministeri as legal experts who 
are by that very status entitled to determine the priorities of the criminal justice 
system.
These observations seem to run counter to Sarzotti’s opinions who, as we said 
(see above), claims that Italian prosecutors’ professional culture does not seem to 
mitigate the effect of the images o f crime, order and security that the dominant 
political cultures express.75 On the other hand, what we said seems to confirm what 
Field and Nelken explained about the cooler expert ‘tone’ of youth justice in Italy. In 
particular, prosecutors’ self-image of legal figures legitimated to define the crime 
problem derives not from any claims to connection to popular opinion but rather from 
their role as bearers of the law (i. e. legal experts). As the authors underline, this 
seems to suggest that the move away from a cool expert-dominated vision of criminal 
justice to a more emotional and political criminal justice charted by Garland in the
7 A 77Anglo-Saxon world may find less easy expression in Italy.
71 This literally means third. In this context it means that prosecutors (and judges) must be independent 
and must not be influenced by the parties (see chap. 7).
2 This means that prosecutors are a party, but they are neutral and impartial like judges.
APApl.(N50). Similar opinions on the fact that prosecutors must be impartial like judges were 
expressed, for example, by AP(N29), AP(N33) and AP(C47)
74 AP(N38). Similar opinions were expressed by AP(N28) and AP(C46). See also AP(N32) who said: 
“Anyway, they [police] do not think about the trial, they just deal with the immediate consequences 
[that crime creates]”.
73 Sarzotti (2006) op. cit. p. 13 and 16.
6 Garland (2001) op. cit.
,7 Field and Nelken (2007) op. cit.
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Before we finish we just need to remind the reader that the professional image 
of Italian prosecutors as judicial, neutral and impartial legal figures is also rooted in 
institutional and legal principles which state pubblici minister?s independence. In 
particular, prosecutors have an ‘external independence’ from all the other 
constitutional powers (see chap. 4). This means that they should not be subject to any 
form of external pressure (particularly from the executive) when they execute their 
functions. Moreover, pubblici ministeri are part of the judiciary as much as judges and 
they share the same status (art. 104 para. 1 cost.). Furthermore, prosecutors and judges 
are both subject to the CSM, which is, as we said, an independent body governing the 
magistrcitura (art. 105, 106, 107 cost.). Finally, prosecutors’ independence is also 
emphasized by the legality principle. In fact, as we explained (chap. 7) this provision 
may be seen as the projection into the criminal justice system of the principle of 
equality. But, in practice, it is also important to provide a formal protection to 
prosecutors from suspicions or allegations of prosecuting a case for reasons other than 
the purely legal. Thus, pubblici ministeri have strong legal base to protect their 
choices.
To conclude, in order to understand why social alarm has a limited impact on 
prosecutors’ job we need to look at prosecutors’ professional culture. Although 
pubblici minister?s sense of themselves as neutral judicial figures does not totally 
protect them from the external influences, their professional culture, in practice, puts 
them in the position to filter the pressure which comes from the civil society. In doing 
this, prosecutors do not eliminate allarme sociale. This becomes important when, in 
prosecutors’ opinion, it is the result of a serious crime problem. In order to determine 
that a crime is serious and needs to be prioritized pubblici ministeri use different 
criteria which interact with each other (and with social alarm). This scenario suggests 
two considerations. First, prosecutors’ sense of social alarm is linked to criteria which 
are not necessarily taken into consideration by the dominant political cultures. 
Second, prosecutors’ filtering function seems to concern both specific cases to 
prosecute and general categories of crime to prioritize or not to prioritize. Within this 
context the magistratura?s legal and institutional framework appears to play an 
important part. This is because ‘external independence’ and the legality principle 
partially protect prosecutors from external pressure and criticisms about the way they 
define their priorities.
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4. Conclusion
The story of Italian prosecutors and social alarm can be seen as a story about the way 
a partial separation can sometimes be maintained, albeit with difficulty, between 
dominant political cultures and dominant legal cultures. Italian prosecutors see 
themselves as legal figures who are entitled (together with judges) to define the crime 
problem. In their view they have the legal tools and the neutral and impartial approach 
which give them the legitimate authority to define the crime problem and thus to 
decide that street crime and immigration are not priorities, but that, for example, 
environmental and white collar crimes are. There are two main consequences. First, 
procedures which are aimed at imposing priorities on prosecutors (i. e. street crime 
and immigration) do not seem to be completely successful, if they do not fit with 
prosecutors’ definition of the crime problem (see chap. 11). Second, although 
prosecutors’ professional culture and self-image, rooted in notions o f judicial 
‘distance’ is, in practice, compromised by their lack of distance from the day to day 
realities of crime and policing, it still seems to be important to an understanding of 
why there is a distance between criminal policy as expressed by prosecution practices 
and the dominant political cultures. This does not mean that prosecutors are not 
influenced by external influences. But that they are not mere executors of anti-crime 
policies determined politically. On the contrary they still appear in the position to 
mediate the inputs of the dominant political cultures. In the end, the impact, in 
practice, of prosecutors’ professional and legal culture seems to be that o f ‘creating 
room’ for the choices and the evaluations of pubblici ministeri.
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CHAPTER XL PROSECUTORS, STREET CRIME
AND IMMIGRATION
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1. Introduction: the media, the central state and the public
This chapter develops issues raised in the previous chapter. Using the examples of the 
urban safety group and o f the Bossi-Fini Act we intend to provide further evidence of 
the way prosecutors mediate the impact of external influences. However, before we 
address this and other important questions, we need to remind the reader what we 
have previously argued (chap. 5) about the way the media, the central state and the 
civil society have treated immigration and the crime problem. Moreover, in the 
following section we will review the way that the Italian academic literature has dealt 
with the relationship between prosecutors (and legal actors in general), street crime 
and immigration. We will then turn again to an analysis of our empirical data.
Street crime started to be an issue in the 1990s when demands for safety 
increased.1 Now almost every day newspapers contain articles about robberies, thefts
'y
and muggings. This is done in a way that emphasizes the ‘risk of insecurity’. Finally, 
immigrants are assumed to be, most o f the time, the perpetrators of these crimes. The 
importance o f the ‘fight against crime and immigration’ is even clearer if  we look at 
the way the central state and the political class define the crime problem. The 
legislation enacted (even now, see chap. 5) shows that governments have tried to 
target a particular group: immigrants. This becomes clear with the Bossi-Fini Act 
(passed in 2002 by the former centre-right government and still the fundamental piece 
of legislation dealing with immigration) that, as we said (chap. 8), provides that a non 
Italian national who does not comply with a deportation order shall be arrested and 
immediately sent for trial. Surveys conducted have shown that Italian citizens are 
fearful of crime and are mainly scared of theft, robberies, ‘drugs’ and muggings.4 
Moreover, through the role of the citizen’s committees that the local communities and 
the public can express their view of the crime problem and deviance and influence 
local politics and policy in relation to street crime, immigration and security issues.
1 Melossi and Selmini (2000) op. cit. pp. 149-151.
2 Naldi (2004) op. cit.
' See art. 14 para. 5 bis, 5 ter, 5 quater and 5 quinquies o f  the D.Lgs. n. 286/1998 as amended by the 
A ctn. 189/2002.
4 Melossi (2000) op. cit. p. 152. See also (chap. 5) the first and the second national victimization
survey.
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1.1. Introduction: the debate in Italy
When it conies to street crime, immigration and legal actors the Italian academic 
literature has mainly focused on one particular issue. Authors have tried to 
demonstrate that legal actors focus on street crime. Moreover, they have tried to show 
that the main reason that they do this is because they are influenced by the dominant 
stereotypes about crime and deviance (see above). Thus, immigration, deviance and 
allarme sociale seem, according to the dominant Italian academic literature, to merge 
together and to create a sort of ‘irresistible force’ which shapes the way Italian legal 
actors act. This approach is not surprising. As we explained (chap. 10), the same 
literature (and, most of the time, the same authors) emphasizes that Italian prosecutors 
(and legal actors in general) are strongly influenced by allarme sociale.
Who are the criminals that legal actors are searching for? This seems to be the 
main debate addressed by the Italian literature. These are the immigrants and, more 
generally, those who live at ‘the fringes of society’. This is because extracomunitari 
represent, in Melossi’s own words, ‘suitable enemies’ who are easily recognizable and 
who are perceived as deviant by the civil society (and the police).5 Melossi compared 
the results of research conducted in Emilia Romagna between 1997 and 1998 (based 
on interviews with 250 immigrants) with the results (limited to Emilia Romagna) of 
the first Italian national victimization survey. 49.7% of adult Italian males were 
stopped by the police in one year; for adult immigrants males the figure was only 
43%. However, if we just consider the data for those who were stopped on foot (so, 
excluding traffic car stops), the likelihood of being stopped goes down to 1.4% for 
Italian males, but it is at 14% for foreign males.6 The significance of this relates to the 
fact that traffic car stops are normally random (the police do not know who is driving 
the car); while stops on foot patrol imply some sort o f selection of the person(s) to 
stop.7 Melossi seems to suggest that Italian police forces have specifically chosen to 
concentrate on immigrants. Extracomunitari are what Campesi calls the ‘dangerous
2 M elo ss i  (2003) op. cit. p. 388.
6 Ibid. p. 395. See also, Melossi (2002) op. cit. pp. 289-290.
7 M eloss i  (2002) op. cit. p. 290.
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(social) classes’.8 The author argues that, in practice, police officers, prosecutors and 
judges will first determine the type of criminal they are dealing with; then they will 
try to find a suitable punishment (taking into account the type o f criminal); and finally 
they will search for the legal basis to justify their decisions. In the end, the dominant 
type (or stereotype) of criminal is that of the extracomunitario and, more generally, 
those who live at ‘the fringes of society’ and commit certain crimes (i. e. street 
crimes, in particular small drug trafficking and thefts). These are, the ‘dangerous 
classes’ that the Italian criminal justice system wants to control. Legal actors (and 
prosecutors in particular) consider these crimes and these criminals as one of the 
major crime problems.
A related question is: how do legal actors determine the ‘dangerous classes’? 
The academic literature has focused on the images o f crime and criminals that 
prosecutors and the police (more rarely judges) use to define priorities. Italian legal 
actors are described as very much influenced by external stereotypes o f crime and 
criminals (i. e. those created by the dominant political cultures). For example, 
Quassoli claims that prosecutors (like judges), for a number o f reasons mainly linked 
with inefficiency of the Italian criminal justice system, do not normally have access to 
some crucial information. These are, for example, the precedenti di polizia.9 The 
consequence is that legal actors will mainly base their decisions (e. g. whether to ask 
for pre-trial custody or not) on external factors.10 So, in practice, prosecutors will be 
very much influenced by, for example, the fact that the accused person(s) has a job or 
not, a house or not etc. In other words, Quassoli says that extracomunitari are 
penalized not because their tendency to commit crimes, but because (as Campesi says) 
of their lifestyle (i. e. living ‘at the fringes o f society’) .11 The author talks about a 
clear “ethnic construction of crime”.12
8 Campesi G. “// controllo delle nuove classi pericolose. Sotto-sistem a pen ale di po lizia  ed  immigrate". 
2003. Dei Delitti e delle Pene, 1-3. pp. 146-243. This article was based on interviews with legal actors 
(the police, prosecutors, judges and lawyers) and on observation o f  case-files.
This is information kept by the police and it mainly deals with people involved in investigation 
activities. So, even when one does not have a real criminal record (e. g. the trial is not concluded), it is 
possible to check if he/she was involved in some criminal activities.
10 Quassoli (1999) op. cit. pp. 58-59.
11 Ibid. p. 66. See also, Padovan D. and Padovano S. “M eccanism i di valutazione della moralitd e 
de/J’identita sociale degli attori soggetti aprovvedim en ti restrittivC \ M osconi et al eds (2005) op. cit. 
pp. 22-58, in particular p. 32; Campesi (2003) op. cit.\ and M elossi (2003) op. cit. For a broad analysis 
of these issues see, for example, Dal Lago (2005) op. cit.
12 Quassoli (1999) op. cit. p. 51.
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Faiella (et. al.) has also discussed the connection between the position that the
perpetrator has in the society and his/her criminalization. In particular, the author
1 ^claims that legal actors take into account:
• Documents (e. g. having or not a passport, a document establishing an official 
residence etc.).
• Socio-economic issues (a job, a house, a family etc.).
• Age and gender.
• Education.
• Race (colour of the skin, language(s) spoken etc.).
It is clear that, if these are the factors which determine the outcome o f criminal 
proceedings, foreigners will normally be in a difficult position because 
extracomunitari (particularly illegal immigrants) often do not have a job, a house 
etc.14
Images of crime are said to influence prosecutors and the police in the same way. 
Both these legal actors have, at this stage of the proceedings, similar aims (i. e. a 
focus on street crime and immigration). Furthermore, they are said to be influenced by 
the same stereotypes on crime and deviance.15 In this sense, Palidda emphasizes the 
close connection between policing and civil society.16 Police decisions are the result 
of interactions and mediations between the law enforcement forces and the attori 
sociali}1 As a consequence the police will be strongly influenced by the images of 
crime of the attori sociali. Finally, Campesi argues that external influences which 
suggest how to define the crime problem can not be mediated by legal actors 
(prosecutors in particular). He sees both the police and prosecutors as acting to filter 
out cases which will not stand scrutiny at trial. But this idea o f prosecutors’ (and 
police) filtering action appears different to our arguments. Specifically, Campesi 
seems to suggest that, in practice, there are no relevant differences between the police 
and the prosecutorial stages. Pubblici ministeri simply continue what the police have
lj Faiella et al. (2005) op. cit. pp. 58-122, in particular p. 75.
14 Ibid. pp. 58-122, in particular p. 87.
13 Palidda S. “Polizia e immigrati: u n ’analisi etnografica". January-march 1999. RASSEGNA  
1TALIANA DI SOCIOLOGIA/ a. XXX, n. 1. pp. 77-114. In particular p. 94 and 101.
16 Ibid. See also, And Palidda S. “Polizia postm oderna. Etnografia del nuovo controllo sociale". 2000. 
Milano: Feltrinelli.
17 Ibid. p. 91. A ttori sociali literally means social actors. In this context the social actors are the civil 
society (including, for example, the committees o f  citizens).
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started.18 We believe that prosecutors’ filtering function is highly influenced by the 
information obtained by the police (chap. 8). But we have tried to demonstrate that the 
legal filtering stage suggests that prosecutors have not been absorbed by police 
functions. Prosecutors may also be seen to be filtering out certain forms o f political 
pressure and with it certain forms of social anxiety.
What are the consequences, in practice, of this approach? Clearly, these views 
drawn from the Italian literature seek to demonstrate that legal actors concentrate on 
street crime and immigration. The criminal justice system is now predominantly 
designed to punish particular criminals (extracomunitari) who have committed 
particular (street) crimes. This is the main thesis.19 But what happens in practice? 
How are these crimes treated? Prosecutors will try to deal with these cases as fast as 
possible. In particular, pubblici ministeri seem to use widely standardised legal (i. e. 
direttissima20) procedures in order to deal with these cases as soon as possible,21 or, as
99 • •Campesi says, to remove these criminals ‘from the street’. In Palidda’s view this is a 
sign that the police and prosecutors tend to discriminate against the perpetrators of 
these crimes. Legal actors may not consider immigrants and street crime as important 
issues, but this does not prevent them from focusing on these problems. In practice, 
these cases will be treated as priorities in order to ‘get rid’ of the criminals who, using
9TPalidda’s own words, the “police find repulsive” (though he does not use the word 
priorities).24 In other words, the author suggests that these cases are not regarded as 
important because they are not interesting (for legal actors). But they are still seen as
18 C a m p es i  (2003) op. cit.
19 Chiodi explains that the police function (the author’s main focus) is to respond to social pressure 
c o m in g  from the civil society. In particular, the police have to deal with social alarm and its sources (i. 
e. soc ia l  construction o f  crime and deviance). The consequence is that, within the Italian criminal 
jus t ice  system, extracomunitari are discriminated against. So, the higher crime rates associated with 
im m igrants (when compared to Italian nationals) are (also) the result o f  the fact that the police and 
m agistrali tend to consider immigrants as deviant subjects. Moreover, the author underlines that, 
c om pared  to Italians, immigrants are more likely to go to jail and they are normally incarcerated for a 
longer  period. See ,  Chiodi M. “Devianza e fenomeni m igratorf \  In Selmini eds. (2004) op. cit. p. 153- 
161. S e e  a lso ,  Campesi (2003) op. cit.) Palidda (1999) op. cit.) Quassoli (1999) op. cit.) M elossi (2003) 
op. cit. p. 395; Natale L. “G// stranieri nelle carceri italiane”. 1990. POLIS, IV. pp. 325-352; and 
Padovan D. “L ’immigrato, lo straniero, il carcere: il nuovo razzismo nelle cittadelle occidentalF\ 
1993. Dei Delitti  e delle Pene, 1. pp. 149-161.
20 T his  is a special proceedings which is supposed to be very fast. In particular, the direttissim a  (also) 
a l lo w s  prosecutors to send the accused (arrested) person(s) immediately to trial before the judge (art. 
449-452 cpp.). It is normally an option, but, under art. 14 o f  the Bossi-Fini Act, it becomes compulsory.
21 Palidda (1999) op. cit. pp. 93-94.
22 C am p es i  (2003) op. cit.
2j Palidda (1999) op. cit. p. 94.
21 Ibid. p. 93. S e e  also Padovan and Padovano (2005) op. cit. p. 40.
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major crime problems. Finally, Palidda seems to imply that street crime and 
immigration have been, de facto, suggested by external influences (i. e. dominant 
political cultures) as priorities. And legal actors have chosen to focus on these issues. 
This is surely consistent with the fact that legal actors are strongly influenced by the 
images of crime of the dominant political cultures (and, as a consequence, by social 
alarm, see above and chap. 10).
We have already discussed the work of Sarzotti (chap. 8, 9 and 10). His 
conclusions (in terms of the connection between stereotypes o f crime and deviance 
and the way legal actors treat street crime and immigration) are not dissimilar to those 
of the authors above. However, Sarzotti’s work deserves to be treated separately 
because he specifically concentrates on prosecutors. While analyzing the discorsi 
annuali dell ’anno giudiziario dei Procuratori Generali (chap. 9), the author remarks 
that some prosecutors (chief prosecutors attached at the courts of appeal) identify 
crimes committed by foreigners as a separate category (much like white collar crimes 
etc.).23 The words microcriminalita (micro-crimes, see above), extracomunitario, 
clandestino (illegal immigrant) are often used during these speeches. In Sarzotti’s 
view these expressions clearly identify particular (street) crimes and particular
9 f\perpetrators (i. e. immigrants). So, the author suggests that prosecutors have 
constructed a category of crime and criminals which mirrors the images of crime 
within the dominant political cultures. Street crime and immigration, together with 
environmental crimes, white collars crimes, sexual harassments etc., are now part of 
the crime problem. Prosecutors prioritize these crimes. This assumption is 
corroborated by two observations. First, pubblici ministeri recognize that street crime
97and immigration create social alarm. Second, prosecutors support (or at least
9  Q
understand) the reactions of the civil society (e. g. citizens’ committees).
Sarzotti also examined the way street crime and immigration was dealt with 
within the Turin prosecution office (i. e. the gruppo sicurezza urbana, urban safety 
group). This is particularly important, given that, in this chapter, we will (also) 
concentrate on the gruppo sicurezza urbana. The author treats this group as a 
specialized unit created in order to respond to the demand for more security coming
23 Sarzotti (2006) op. cit. pp. 39-40.
26 Ibid. pp. 58-61.
27 Ibid. p. 94.
28 Ibid. p. 96.
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from the local community. The Turin prosecution office was organized (by the higher 
ranking prosecutors) so as to ensure that street crime (i. e. crimes which create social 
alarm) were always treated. This is because, in the past, the risk of prescrizione was
9Q • •very high. The consequence is that this procura  appears, now, to have substantially 
increased its attention on street crime.30 In other words: Sarzotti claims that the 
creation of the urban safety group amounts precisely to a choice to prioritize these 
crimes. He claims that prosecutors who work for this group mainly have two tasks: to 
treat street crime with the direttissima trial and always to appeal against sentences
31which do not conform to prosecutors’ requests. So, according to the author, there is 
a clear link between social alarm, the creation o f the urban safety group and the way 
prosecutors determine their priorities. In Sarzotti’ view this is confirmed by the 
impact of social pressure in the definition o f priorities. In fact, he claims that, on one 
hand prosecutors (the prosecutors interviewed in Turin) emphasize their independence 
from external influences. On the other, they say that, when priorities have to be 
decided, it is necessary to take into account what the civil society wants.
Thus, the author’s argument has three elements. First, pubblici m in isterfs  
power to take (discretionary) decisions on the cases they consider more serious is 
substantially affected by external influences (i. e. they have to focus on street crime 
and immigration). Second, prosecutors will treat street crime and immigration in a 
different way. In particular, they will deal with these cases as soon as possible (i. e. 
with the direttissima) without considering some of the due-process rules established 
by the criminal justice  system. Third, this approach is creating two different ways to 
prosecute crime. The first seems to have a strong due process nature (i. e. prosecutors 
will carefully consider the position of the accused person(s)) but it concerns only a 
small number o f cases. The second is based on the principle that certain crimes have 
to be treated as soon as possible and as fast as possible. These cases (which represent 
the vast majority o f  the cases treated by prosecutors) mainly involve immigrants who 
have committed street crimes. Sarzotti concludes that Italian criminal justice system 
is experiencing a radical change and becoming more selective (acting against the
29 Sarzotti (2006a) op. cit. p. 76.
Ibid. p. 80. 
jl Ibid. p. 81.
’2 Ibid. p. 82.
JJ Ibid. pp. 82-84.
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‘dangerous classes’) and repressive (i. e. crime control). Prosecutors’ professional 
culture is no longer a ‘formidable obstacle’ to this change.34
A rather different analysis is presented by Borgna and Maddalena (two 
prosecutors; until 2008 Maddalena was the chief prosecutor in Turin and the creator 
of the urban safety group). They stress the importance o f the pubblici minister? s 
external independence and of the legality principle. However, they say that Italian 
prosecutors are gatekeepers who play a very important role in determining the 
priorities of the criminal justice system. This right is exercised using substantial 
discretionary powers. According to Borgna and Maddalena prosecutors, using their 
discretionary powers, have chosen (in the past) not to focus on street crime. They 
seem to suggest that, by acting in this way, Italian prosecutors have not properly 
considered the demands for security coming from civil society. On the contrary, 
pubblici ministeri should take into consideration the sense o f insecurity and the panic 
that certain crimes create. So, Borgna and Maddalena criticize prosecutors’ approach 
towards street crime and immigration. In particular, they emphasize the distance 
between what the legal actors do and what ordinary people want.
Thus, Italian academic literature, in discussing the images o f crime and 
criminals which influence legal actors and the impact of certain legal procedures (e. g. 
direttissima), has dealt with how and why Italian legal actors focus on street crime 
and immigration. We do not intend to deny the big changes which have happened 
within the Italian criminal justice system: we will also underline (as we have already 
done, see chap. 9) the importance of legal and bureaucratic criteria which may shape 
prosecutors’ decisions. However, our argument, which has three elements, will be 
different. First, procedures which are aimed at imposing priorities on prosecutors (i. e. 
street crime and immigration) do not seem to have been completely successful. This is 
because they do not fit with prosecutors’ definition o f the crime problem. Secondly, 
prosecutors may be seen to be filtering out certain forms of social anxiety. Thirdly, 
analysis of the way prosecutors treat street crime and immigration will help us to 
understand the difference between external influences and personal priorities. As we 
said (chap. 9), this is a rather crude distinction. In practice prosecutors’ decisions are 
never fully determined by external influences nor fully discretionary. However,
;4 Ibid. p. 68 and 84.
Borgna and Maddalena (2003) op. cit. pp. 102-106.
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external and personal priorities seem, de facto, to be treated differently by 
prosecutors.
2. Prosecutors, street crime and immigration: the urban security 
group
How have prosecutors reacted to this situation where street crime and illegal 
immigration are now at the top of the political agenda? First of all, in general
i / '
prosecutors recognize that these crimes create many problems. Moreover, they 
admit that the number of crimes committed by immigrants is also increasing rapidly 
(they claim these are between 50% to 70% of the crimes they deal with).37 
Furthermore, when immigrants are involved it is very complicated to trace their 
identity and, because they do not normally have a fixed residence, to deliver them all
o o
the official notifications. But, despite this, these crimes do not seem to be perceived 
as priorities. In fact, the vast majority of the prosecutors we interviewed said that 
street crime and crimes committed by immigrants have a medium-low priority.39 The 
exceptions were located in areas where crimes like mugging and robberies are treated 
in a different way because of the potential connection with organized crime:
Yes, [in general] they are treated [by prosecutors] as the crimes committed by Italians. 
However, for drug trafficking, immigrants [are more involved] [ .. .]  Then there is 
organized crime, because they use Albanians to make robberies. Criminalita diffusa,40
'6 21 Prosecutors out o f  27 said that crimes committed by immigrants (mainly street crime and crimes 
related to illegal immigration and not organized crime, see later) create many problems. A chief 
prosecutor (CP(N43) working in a medium-big prosecution office in the north o f  Italy) said that they do 
not have big problems with immigrants committing crimes. In general, he claims that the prosecution 
office is very well organized and that they do not have particular problems with any crime. Two 
prosecutors (CP(S4) and AP(S6) who work in a big prosecution office in the south) said that they these 
crimes are not an issue (unless they are linked with organized crime, see later) because there is not very 
much immigration in the south o f  Italy. However, it is interesting to note that DCP(S5), who works in 
the same prosecution office, disagreed and he believes that crimes committed by immigrants have a 
substantial impact (street crime in particular). One was not asked (due to lack o f  time), one did not 
know (because he is a prosecutor attached at the court o f  appeal) and one did not clearly answer.
'7 Those who said that crimes committed by immigrants (i. e. street crime and illegal immigration) 
create problems also said these crimes increased in the last years, are increasing now and will, 
probably, increase in the future. 
s See, for example, DCP(N45), AP(N49) and AP(N28).
j9 22 prosecutors out o f  27 said that street crimes and crimes committed by immigrants have a medium- 
low priority. One was not asked (due to lack o f  time) and one did not clearly answer.
40 This literally means diffused crime. It is another expression to identify street crime and, more 
generally, crimes which happen quite often and that are diffused in a large area. This is why this
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like robberies, thefts, blackmail, [etc.] is a priority, as much as the camorra is.
Here the connection organized crime-immigration-street crime is clear. 
Noticeably, this prosecutor, while discussing priorities, treats street crime and camorra 
as equal. More broadly pubblici ministeri in general (whether in the north or the south 
of Italy) become interested in street crime and illegal immigration if they provide a 
chance to investigate and search for the organizations behind human trafficking, drug 
trafficking and organized crime in general.42 But this is to see them as means to 
pursue other ends rather than priorities in themselves.
This lack of prioritization may be further illustrated by the way medium or 
large prosecution offices use specialized units. As previously argued, (chap. 9) 
specialized units often reflect the crimes that pubblici ministeri consider more 
important and more interesting and which require particular investigative skills. We 
did not find any prosecution office where there was a specialized unit dealing with 
street crime. This seems to suggest three considerations: pubblici ministeri do not 
consider these as interesting and serious crimes; there is no need to have particular 
investigative and legal skills to deal with these issues; and street crime does not seem 
to be a (personal) priority.
There are two specific examples where procedures aimed at prioritizing street 
crime and illegal immigration have not really succeeded because prosecutors have 
tended to neutralize what are effectively attempts to ‘suggest’ priorities: these are the 
urban safety group in Turin (in this section) and the application of the Bossi-Fini Act 
(in the next section).
In 2001, in Turin, the chief prosecutor, together with the deputy chief 
prosecutors (and the assistant prosecutors who were asked to express an opinion), 
created the gruppo sicurezza urbana (urban safety group) to deal with street crime. 
This is made up of prosecutors who, for a fixed period of six months (which can be 
extended if prosecutors agree), only deal with street crime. All the assistant
prosecutor refers to blackmail as well. This is a crime that, in the south o f  Italy, is widely perpetrated 
by criminal organizations (i. e. mafia and camorra).
41 CP(S4) See also, AP(N48) and AP(N49) who work in a big prosecution office in the north and 
consider street crimes committed by immigrants a priority because they are linked with organized 
crime. However, this is not Italian organized crime which ‘employed’ foreigners; these are groups o f  
foreigners (e. g. South Americans, people coming from former Yugoslavia, Albanians etc.) who had 
created their own organizations. Camorra is the equivalent of the mafia, but it is not located in Sicily.
42 See. for example, AP(C47), AP(N30) and AP(N49).
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prosecutors have to do it, so there is a turnover. But, the urban safety group is not a 
specialized unit. In fact, as we said (see chap. 6 and 9) in Turin (and only in Turin: 
this is not a national division), specialized groups only exist in relation to the so called 
A category crimes (sexual crimes and crimes committed against vulnerable victims (e. 
g. disabled persons, old people etc.), organized crimes, DDA43 (mafia and other big 
crime organizations), white collar crimes, public administration and industrial 
security. These category A crimes are the most serious crimes, whereas all the other 
crimes, called category B crimes, are not supposed to be less serious. However, in 
practice, this can not be seen as a fixed list of priorities (and non-priorities): assistant 
prosecutors can take into consideration other criteria (see above what we said about 
specialized units and priorities and see chap. 9).
If the urban safety group deals with street crime, like drug dealing, car thefts, 
mugging and crimes related to the Bossi-Fini Act (especially the failure to comply 
with a deportation order), why does its creation not establish street crime as a 
prosecutorial priority? This group was created for two reasons: the decision of the 
chief prosecutor and the external pressure coming from the media and the local 
community.44 The chief prosecutor Maddalena wanted to put a clearer focus on street 
crime, because, he believed that in the past the choice not to focus on street crime had 
created “hateful consequences”. In particular, he claimed that this choice de facto 
denied “the status of victim” to those who suffered the consequences o f street crimes 
and that some areas were deprived of a sufficient “controllo di legalita”.45 The 
external pressures were very clear as well. Committees of citizens were created in two 
areas of Turin called San Salvario and Porta Palazzo. The protests mainly concerned 
the fact that immigrants did not comply with legal rules and kept committing street 
crimes. Moreover, the media amplified these complaints. In fact, some local
1' This is the Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia. As we said (chap. 6) this is the local branch o f  the DNA  
(Direzione Nazionale Antimafia) which is a national organization. However, every DDA is part o f  a 
prosecution office and refers to the chief prosecutor and to the deputy ch ief prosecutors working in that 
office. The DNA (and the DDA) was created to be more effective against organized crime and to 
coordinate investigations which may involve many prosecutors located in different prosecution offices. 
The DNA is directed by a prosecutor who has the power to coordinate investigations and to give inputs 
on the if, the how and the when to investigate organized crime.
44 Sarzotti (2006a) op. cit. p. 82
43 Borgna and Maddalena (2003) op. cit. pp. 101-109, in particular, p. 103. In this context controllo di
legalia  means to ensure that single persons and/or groups o f  citizens are acting according to the legal
rules.
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newspapers and magazines were created purely to advertise the complaints coming 
from the local communities.46
This is the scenario which led to the creation of the sicurezza urbana group; 
but how did prosecutors perceive the function of this group? They did not perceive it 
in the same ways as the chief prosecutor. In particular, they did not think that the 
urban safety group was designed to put a particular focus on street crime:
Now, with the urban security group, all these things [street crime] are dealt with; but 
these are not priorities, we do them because there is a procedure [to follow]. I mean: if  it 
depended on me I would do other crimes first, and I would leave these where they were 
before: in the closet.47
So, the urban safety group suggested a priority in the sense of a specified 
outcome (i. e. “we do them because there is a procedure”). But street crime is clearly 
not a personal priority for prosecutors, something perceived as particularly important. 
This is significant. It shows that even when certain external criteria (bureaucratic in 
this case) are established to define the crime problem, pubblici ministeri still maintain 
certain discretionary powers (see chap. 9). In this case the consequence is that 
prosecutors treat the sicurezza urbana group as a matter o f practical application. They 
believe that, in practice, this group is aimed at improving the organization o f the 
prosecution office and at least suggesting priorities. In Turin all the prosecutors, as 
well as dealing with crimes in their specialized unit, have to deal (for a fixed period) 
with B category crimes and with arrests.48 The problem was and is that the police 
make many arrests (prosecutors say between 20 to 30 arrests every day) and that 
prosecutors need to spend too much time dealing with non-serious cases (i. e. street 
crime). So, in the prosecutors’ view, the urban safety group was created to solve this 
problem. Now there are prosecutors who only deal with arrests for the non serious
46 AMAPOLA. “L ’insicurezza a mosaico. Estratto del rapporto di ricerca sulla in/sicurezza nella  
provincia di Torino nel 2002”. [Online]. Available at:
http://www.provincia.torino.it/speciali/mosaico/pdf/estratto.pdf [Accessed 5/08/08]. See also, more 
generally, Belluati M. “Z, 'in/sicurezza dei quartieri: media territorio ep ercezio n i d ’insicurezza”. 2004. 
Franco Angeli: Milano.
47 AP(N3). Similar opinions were expressed by AP(N1) and AP(N2).
48 We have to remember, once again, that when the police arrest som eone they must immediately 
inform the prosecutor who can decide to set free the arrested person immediately or to ask, within 48 
hours, the judge to confirm that the arrest was lawful and necessary. The decision to arrest is the 
police’s right (although in some circumstances the arrest is compulsory).
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crimes (i. e. the crimes which fall in the gruppo sicurezza urbana), so that the other 
prosecutors can spend more time on more serious cases:
These prosecutors [those who work for the urban safety group] deal with all the backlog 
o f cases concerning street crime; so, small drug trafficking, car thefts etc. This is because 
our prosecution office is competent for an area where the number o f  arrests for these 
crimes is really high. [The consequence was that] the prosecutor who was doing the 
turno cirrestati49 could not properly deal with the arrests which required more work [i. e. 
the arrested person(s) involved in the most important cases]. This is because, for 
example, he/she had to deal with 10 arrested persons for small drug trafficking [i. e. 
pushing drugs in the street] [ ...]  So, we tried to create this group which only treats these 
crimes.50
According to the prosecutors interviewed another function of the urban safety 
group is to avoid street crime not being prosecuted at all. Prosecutors recall that in the 
past these crimes were just put aside (they tended to say they were ‘kept in the 
closet’). The consequences were that street crimes were not prosecuted because o f the 
prescrizione and if they were prosecuted the approach was to ask for a lesser 
punishment in order to deal with the case as quickly as possible (this was a de facto 
abbreviated procedure or a plea bargaining in the sense that pubblici ministeri were 
offering a lesser punishment to deal with the case as fast as possible).51 Now, the 
urban safety group, de facto, pushes prosecutors to deal with street crime (i. e. 
suggests priorities); but they deal with these cases in a particular way. Their aim does 
not seem to be to deal with a particular crime problem (which has been prioritized) in 
order to find solutions which can limit its impact. Prosecutors say that the gruppo 
sicurezza urbana cannot solve these problems (one prosecutor said that: “ it is like 
trying to empty the ocean with a tea-spoon” ). On the contrary, the aim appears to be 
that of dealing with as many cases as possible and as fast as possible. In particular, the 
procedure to deal with these crimes (which was described by prosecutors as 
‘automatic03), normally does not involve investigative acts carried out by prosecutors 
and/or by the police supervised by prosecutors. The accused person is immediately
49 This literally means ‘arrested person(s) turn’ and it is another name prosecutors use to call the turno 
estem o  ( ‘external mail turn’, see chap. 6). So, the name changes, but the function is the same: 
prosecutors who are doing the turno arrestati mainly have to deal with arrests.
50 AP(N3). See also AP(N1) and AP(N2).
51 See, AP(N1), AP(N2) and AP(N3).
52 AP(N1).
53 See. AP(N1), AP(N2) and AP(N3).
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sent to trial (normally using a direttissima54) on the basis of the information collected 
by the police when they carried out the arrest. This confirms what Sarzotti and other 
authors have argued. Prosecutors use particular legal procedures (i. e. direttissima) to 
treat street crime. However, the lack o f prosecutorial intervention in the investigative 
processes expresses the relative lack o f priority they accord to such offences.
Finally, external influences are also important to describe the aims of the 
gruppo sicurezza urbana. Prosecutors agree that the name was carefully chosen in 
order to show to the civil society, the media and the government (local and national) 
that the prosecution office was doing something to tackle street crime in Turin. 
Prosecutors seem very clear about the fact that the name of the group is just a label 
and it does not mean that street crime is now the priority:
I If we had doubled the turno arrestati, we could have reached the same result. I mean, 
without labelling it, without specifically calling it urban safety group.55
This does not mean that pubblici ministeri believe that the demand for security 
coming from the public is unjustified:
I read a book written by a GP who lives in San Salvario. I think the title was “Not on my 
stairs”. I was quite affected. I can objectively say that immigration is not a problem. 
However, he explained, and he is a citizen living in San Salvario, that some 
[extracomunitari] were urinating on his door, some were trafficking with drugs in the 
entrance hall, his wife was mugged etc. How can you say that this is not important? This 
can ruin your life! If you are scared to go out, scared to go in [your house], scared to stay 
on the stairs [ ...]  These are persons that, more or less, can not defend themselves.56
Moreover, prosecutors understand the importance of dealing with people’s 
sense of insecurity:
A few years ago we had some meetings with the committees o f  citizens o f  San Salvario 
[...]  even now they asked us to meet the citizens’ committees. This is to say what the 
prosecution office can do to solve their problems, to show them that we acknowledged 
these problems. On the other hand, w e have to explain the measures we can take, 
because, sometimes, the public is expecting something that we can not do.57
34 This is a special proceedings which is supposed to be very fast. In particular, the direttissim a  (also) 
allows prosecutors to send the accused (arrested) person(s) immediately to trial before the judge (art. 
449-452 cpp.). It is normally an option, but, under art. 14 o f  the Bossi-Fini Act, it becomes compulsory.
55 AP(N 1). See also, AP(N2) and AP(N3).
56 AP(N 1). See also, AP(N2) and AP(N3).
57 AP(N1). See also, AP(N2) and AP(N3).
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Moreover, when it com es to finding solutions, prosecutors did not simply say 
that street crime and im m igration are not priorities. They also noted that security 
issues have to be dealt with by th e  police:
For example, they put a p o lice  station in Porta Palazzo. This is very good, because, 
before that area was very d isru pted  [i. e. incivilities]. So, this is surely not our job, but 
this is what they [police] can d o .  They walk around, they increase the controls etc. This 
means that they have done a lot f o r  that area. But you need to be on the te r r i to r ia l
Once again the word “territorio” (i. e. stay in the street, see chap. 8) is used to 
mark the difference between p o lic e  and prosecutors. The former have to directly treat 
the problems which affect the public. The latter intervene later. In other words: 
prosecutors see themselves as m o re  “detached” when compared to the police. As 
argued in the previous chapter, th i s  puts them in the position to reconsider some o f the 
external inputs and, as a consequence, to mediate certain forms o f social anxiety.
2.1. Prosecutors, street cr im e and immigration: the Bossi-Fini Act
The Bossi-Fini Act is another g o o d  example of how prosecutors treat street crime and 
immigration. As we said (chap. 8), this involves a procedure which requires the arrest 
and immediate trial of illegal im m igrants who have not complied with a deportation 
order. How have prosecutors reac ted  in the face o f this clear attempt (from the centre- 
right government) to p rio ritize  illegal immigration as a crime problem? 
Unsurprisingly this is not regarded  as a priority.59 This despite the fact that, in 
prosecutors’ view, immigration ( lik e  street crime) creates social alarm (see chap. 10). 
However, as previously argued (chap. 8), the vast majority of the prosecutors we 
interviewed said that this Act h a d  created a substantial increase in their amount of 
work, because the number of a rre s ts  had increased and the procedure stated in the Act 
is quite cumbersome.60 One o f t h e  clearest quotations supporting this argument (see 
chap. 8) was this:
*8 AP(N3). See also, AP(N2) and A P ( N 1 ) .
39 N o one o f  the prosecutors we in terv iew ed  said that the Bossi-Fini Act (art. 14 para. 5 bis, 5 ter, 5 
qua ter and 5 quinquies) is a priority. L a w y e r s  and police officers confirmed this.
60 As we said in chap. 8 16 prosecutors o u t  o f  27 said that the Bossi-Fini Act increased very much the 
amount o f  work. 5 talked more g e n e r a lly  about the fact that crimes committed by immigrants (not only 
crimes linked with the Bossi-Fini A c t )  increased very much. One chief prosecutor said that, in his
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For us this [the Bossi-Fini Act] amounts to a considerable increase in the backlog o f  
cases. This is because the procedure is quite complicated. The arrest is compulsory, and 
we do not have enough cells where we can put the arrested person while we wait for the 
direttissima trial, which is compulsory as well. So, sometimes, it happens that we have to 
transfer them to jail, because it is not possible to have the trial the day after, then you  
need to arrange an escort [to bring the arrested persons to jail] [ .. .]  you need to nominate 
a translator [because the arrested persons normally do not speak Italian], to pay him [ ...]  
[moreover] the difficulties are linked to the fact that you need to deal at the same time 
with many arrest procedures, for which you need to organize the hearing [the arrest 
procedure must be, eventually, reviewed by a judge], the charges61 etc.62
We also said that pubblici ministeri are, in practice, forced to treat these cases 
rapidly because there is a procedure which binds them:
No [it is not a priority] [...] . However, the emergency, within the prosecution office, is 
produced by the fact that the act generates many arrests. This is why it becom es an 
emergency. In fact, [ ...]  these are all files which must be taken to the end. That Act does 
not say that we have to treat those [crimes] as a priority, the priority is de facto.63
None of the prosecutors we interviewed said they were interested in 
investigating these cases (unless there was a link with a criminal organization dealing 
with illegal immigration). Moreover, prosecutors did not appear to be interested in 
asking for a severe punishment (also because judges do not give severe punishments, 
see later) and for pre-trial custody for Bossi-Fini cases.64 In fact, the accused 
(arrested) person(s) will normally remain in jail only in case o f recidivism. When it 
comes to illegal immigration, recidivism seems to be connected to crimes which do 
not only regard the Bossi-Fini:
Speaking for myself, i f  I realize that the accused person(s) does not have a criminal 
record and there is a sort o f  reasonable reason, because you need to have a reasonable 
reason to arrest, I immediately set him/her free.65
prosecution office (middle big in the north o f  Italy), they can cope with the Bossi-Fini Act. One was 
not asked (due to lack o f time). One did not know (because he is a prosecutor attached at the court o f  
appeal). Finally, 3 prosecutors working in a big procura  in the south o f  Italy said that they do not feel 
the pressure o f  the Bossi-Fini Act, because there is not very much immigration there.
61 Some immigrants are arrested for Bossi-Fini, but then prosecutors (and the police) discover that they 
are also involved in other criminal activities (e. g. theft, drug pushing etc.). So, they have to prepare the 
file being sure that the arrested person(s) is charged for all the crimes for which he/she is accused.
62 AP(C47).
63 AP(C46). See also AP(N32).
64 See, for example, AP(N28), AP(N33) and AP(N10).
65 AP(N28).
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So, they are arrested and there is the direttissim a. In 90% o f  the cases they are set free.
This because, let us be honest, no one sends to jail som eone who did not comply with a 
deportation order. U nless the accused person(s) has a huge criminal record.66
In a moment we will explain what the ‘reasonable reason’ is. Here we want to 
make a different point. Recidivism appears to be one o f the criteria for deciding how 
the Bossi-Fini cases will be treated (i. e. whether the arrested person(s) will remain in 
jail or not). This seems to confirm what we said before (chap. 9): recidivism is one of 
the decision-making criteria that prosecutors use to determine the seriousness o f a 
crime. However, this is not enough to determine a priority. In fact, art. 14 o f the 
Bossi-Fini is not a major crime problem for Italian prosecutors. As we said (chap. 9), 
priorities are determined by a variety o f widely accepted general criteria and more 
personal political decisions which interact with each other. The example of recidivism 
and the Bossi-Fini shows how substantial pubblici minister? s discretionary powers 
can be. This is so even when they are working with external decision-making criteria 
(i. e. recidivism):
You can choose to ask for pre-trial custody or not. This is because, within the urban 
safety group [they also deal with the Bossi-Fini, see above], w e leave this choice to the 
vice p ro cu ra to re  onorario  [VPO].67 But he/she can only ask for pre-trial custody if  the 
accused person(s) has a huge criminal record for crimes which do not [only] concern the 
B ossi-F ini.68
We rarely give pre-trial measures for the Bossi-Fini. This normally happens when we 
realize that som eone has entered [Italy] many times [ .. .] .  I have som etim es asked for 
pre-trial custody just because the accused person went back and forward [from Italy] 
many tim es.69
These are rather extreme opinions (prosecutors were not from the same 
procure/), bu t they show  how far prosecutors’ discretionary powers can go.
66 AP(N32). S ee  also, for exam ple, AP(N30).
67 These are law  graduates w ho are, normally, preparing for the public competition to becom e a 
magistrate*; and they are entitled to represent the prosecution in minor cases.
68 AP(N3). Sim ilar opinions w ere expressed by A P(N 1) and AP(N2).
69 AP(C47). S ee  also, for exam ple, CP(N40).
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Recidivism loses or gains importance (also) depending on prosecutors’ personal 
considerations about the crimes previously committed.
If the crime is only related to the Bossi-Fini Act, illegal immigrants are 
arrested and, normally, sentenced to a few months o f  imprisonment (some said 3 
months, some other 6), but the sentence will be suspended.70 This means that the 
illegal immigrant will be set free and, given that he/she has no documents nor any 
official residence in Italy, he/she will disappear. So, the aim o f the Act, which is to 
deport illegal immigrants, is clearly being frustrated. Furthermore, in some 
prosecution offices, prosecutors do not themselves take Bossi-Fini cases to their 
conclusion. They read the arrest file and, if  they do not set free the arrested person, 
they pass the file to a vice procuratore onorario (VPO).
The Bossi-Fini Act imposes certain conditions on the arrest and prosecution of 
illegal immigrants: article 5 ter says that the crime is committed when the immigrant 
remains in Italy without having a ‘reasonable reason’ to do so. When the police arrest 
someone prosecutors have to review the arrest procedure and can immediately set free 
the arrested person if they believe that there was no justification for arrest (see chap.
4). So, in the Bossi-Fini case, prosecutors can immediately set free the arrested person 
if they believe he/she had a reasonable reason not to comply with the deportation 
order. Prosecutors interpret the concept o f reasonable reason in different ways. For 
example, one said that only a woman who is 8 or 9 months pregnant can have a reason 
to remain in Italy.71 Another one believes that his role is to check, carefully, if  the 
arrested person had the money to leave the country. So, for example, even if  the 
foreigner claims that he/she could not fly back home, he/she is arrested because
72he/she owns an expensive mobile, which is a sign that he has enough money. The 
point here is that the interpretation o f the concept o f ‘reasonable reason’ can lead to 
varying application of the procedure stated in the Bossi-Fini Act:
I have a very strict approach towards the Bossi-Fini Act, in particular art. 14 which has 
created many doubts about its interpretation. For the vast majority o f  the cases I
70 See, for example, A P(C54), A PA pl.(N 50) and A P(N 33).
71 AP(N32).
72 AP(C54).
280
immediately set free the arrested person, unless there is a strong criminal record or 
strong preceden ti di p o liz ia  n  In other words: these have to be subjects that, in the past, 
have created a little ‘social alarm’, in these cases I can validate the arrest [ ...]  However, 
the poor immigrant, without documents, who owns nothing, who has been caught in an 
abandoned house and they also arrest him/her! I set him/her immediately free and drop 
the accusation [i. e. archiviazione}. I have to say that no GIP [the judge responsible for 
verifying that the investigation is being (or has been) lawfully carried out] has ever 
refused [to allow the archiviazione] [ .. .]  In fact, this is based on [the interpretation o f  the 
concept of] reasonable reason, according to the law [ .. .]  within the Bossi-Fini Act, the 
reasonable reason includes: I [illegal immigrant] can not leave the country, I can not buy 
the ticket, I can not leave the country in a way which com plies with the law etc. Then, 
leaving the country implies to go back to your own country, what about those who come 
from the far east?74
For the reasonable reason the interpretation varies, because every one [prosecutor] is 
different. For me it has to be that he/she [the arrested person] is about to die, because, 
otherwise, everybody has a reasonable reason because they are illegal immigrants who, 
surely, live better here compared to the place where they com e from. The fact that they 
do not have money is not, for me, a reasonable reason, because they are [often] caught 
with a mobile which costs €400, they have €300 with them, and they live here. The 
reasonable reason is a woman who is 8 months pregnant; it has to be something 
extreme.73
These comments suggest, first, that although prosecutors try to relate their 
interpretation of the concept o f reasonable reason to objective legal criteria, their 
considerations are inspired by personal value judgements and by socio-political views 
about the definition of the crime problem. Secondly, these two prosecutors work in 
the same big prosecution office in the north of Italy, but they clearly have very 
different opinions. As we have said (chap. 6 and 9) apparently there are no strict 
internal guidelines (produced within the prosecution office) which, de facto, impose a 
particular way in which prosecutors should deal with an offence or which sets 
priorities within the prosecution office. Finally, we have to underline that even those 
prosecutors who believe they strictly apply the procedure required by the Bossi-Fini
7j This is information kept by the police. It mainly deals with people involved in investigation 
activities. So, even when one does not have a real criminal record (e. g. the trial is not concluded), it is 
possible to check if  he/she was involved in some criminal activities.
74 AP(N30).
75 AP(N32).
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Act did not consider (like all the prosecutors we interviewed) illegal immigration as a 
priority.
3. Some considerations on the urban security group and on the Bossi-
Fini Act
Why are street crime and immigration not priorities for prosecutors? There are various 
reasons: they consider the law ineffective (i.e. the Bossi-Fini Act); judges impose 
very light punishments or acquit the accused (e.g. the Bossi-Fini Act, where the 
accused persons are normally sentenced to a 3 months sentence, but the sentence is 
suspended); there are too many crimes to prosecute;77 resources are insufficient;78 
there are technical legal problems (e. g. the impossibility o f delivering official 
notifications because illegal immigrants do not have an official residence, the
7Qprocedure for the Bossi-Fini Act is too complicated etc.); moral doubts (i. e. should I
on
seek pre-trial custody for someone who just has not left Italy?); finally the interests 
affected are not substantial (i. e. street crime and illegal immigration are not regarded 
as serious crimes).81 These are all important reasons. In particular, the final reason 
shows, once again, how important are prosecutors’ personal considerations about 
crime and justice. However, the analysis of the way the urban safety group and the 
procedure for the Bossi-Fini work suggests other considerations. These are not just 
connected to street crime and immigration: they concern more generally the difference 
between external and personal priorities.
6 See, for example, AP(N32). Bu see also AP(N1), AP(N2) and AP(N3) who do not believe that, in 
Turin, the urban security group is effective against street crime.
' We asked to prosecutors the number o f  files they have to deal with in one year. The figures are 
different (between 300 and a few thousands files). Some prosecutors have less then 300 cases, but these 
are exceptions (CP(N43) and AP(N48). Moreover, one prosecutor APN(48) explained that he has less 
cases, but that most o f  them are very complicated, so they take a lot o f  time. However, the vast 
majority o f  the prosecutors said that they have more then 1000 files to deal with every year. 18
prosecutors out o f  27 said so. 2 did not know (but one said that they are a lot). One did not clearly
answer. One was not asked (due to lack o f  time). 5 said that they have less than 1000 files to deal with 
every year. Finally, all the prosecutors apart from one (CP(N43) who is a chief prosecutor in a medium 
big prosecution office in the north) who claims that his prosecution office is very organized and 
prosecutors can deal with all the cases in the proper way, said that the large number o f  files is one o f
the reasons why they can not treat all the files in the same way.
78 Those who said that there are too many cases to deal with also said that they do not have enough 
resources. This mainly means police officers to investigate the cases and administrative staff to deal 
with the bureaucracy.
79 See, for example, AP(N39) and AP(C47).
80 See, for example, AP(N30).
81 See, for example, CP(N40).
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First of all, our research supports the arguments of Sarzotti and other 
academics. Legal procedures force prosecutors to treat street crime and illegal 
immigration in a different way compared to other cases. There are three indicators 
which support this assumption: (a) the way prosecutors use the direttissima\ (b) the 
fact that, in Turin, street crime and immigration can not now “be kept in the closet”; 
(c) the fact that these cases have to be treated as soon as possible and as fast as 
possible. Moreover, this also confirms that legal external decision-making criteria can 
have an impact on prosecutors’ definition of the crime problem (see chap. 9).
So, at this point the question is: could these procedures eliminate prosecutors’ 
discretionary powers to define the crime problem? In other words, have Italian 
prosecutors fully accepted the attempts to suggest street crime and immigration as 
priorities? Our research shows that the answer to this question is not as 
straightforward as the dominant academic literature (in Italian) seems to imply. 
Prosecutors appear to be in the position to mediate these external influences and to 
limit the impact o f the legal procedures. Why does this happen? We believe the 
answer to this question has to be found in prosecutors’ professional and legal culture. 
As explained in the previous chapter, pubblici ministeri regard themselves as ‘the 
experts’ entitled to define the crime problem. Moreover, there is a partial separation 
between dominant political cultures and dominant legal cultures.
To understand this last point, we need to consider the consequence, in practice, 
of prosecutors’ power to filter and mediate certain external influences. Prosecutors do 
not just ignore street crime and immigration, but they do not treat them as personal 
priorities. One prosecutor said (about the cases which fall into the urban safety 
group):
[Those who work for the urban safety group], using a sort o f  automatic procedure, 
because this is routine, can deal with the volume crimes which can be immediately 
treated. This is because there is no investigation to do. The arrest is confirmed 
[ultimately by the judge], then there is the giudizio immediate?2 or the direttissim a  or 
something else [ .. .]  [On the other hand] If something is urgent [and it is a personal 
priority] you do it personally, you spend much more time, you issue more deleghe, you 
are more involved in the investigation. You are only focused on that [ ...]  you carry out 
activities like: requesting telephone tapping, pre-trial custody, searches etc.83
82 This means ‘immediate judgem ent’. It is another kind o f  fast procedure that prosecutors (and accused 
person(s) can use (see art. 453-458 cpp).
s'' AP(N1). Similar opinions were expressed by AP(N2) and AP(N3).
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So, an external priority (determined, in this case, by the creation of the urban 
safety group) can lead to an “automatic” response. This means that these cases are 
routinely treated without the sense o f  attempting to tackle a priority crime problem. 
The aim is to get rid of files as soon as possible and as fast as possible (as with the 
SDAS group, see chap. 9). Personal priorities are treated differently. Prosecutors are 
more involved in the investigation. As a consequence, their intervention during the 
pre-trial phase is particularly visible (i. e. telephone tapping, pre-trial measures etc.). 
In other words, the main difference (during the pre-trial phase) between external and 
personal priorities seems to be expressed through the different methods that 
prosecutors use to direct the investigation. Cases involving external priorities are 
bureaucratically supervised. This means that there are few interactions between 
prosecutors and the police; and few attempts to determine investigative strategies (i. e. 
the bureaucratic review system as discussed in chap. 8). On the other hand, for cases 
involving personal priorities, prosecutors choose to participate more effectively 
during the investigation. This implies more interactions with the police and more 
issuing of directives on investigative activities (i. e. the prompting and reviewing 
system, see chap. 8). The reference to the delega  makes this clear: it is the tool 
prosecutors use to influence the investigation. The more they use the delega , the more 
they can effectively direct the investigation.
4. Conclusion
The main conclusion to be drawn, is that there is still room, during the pre-trial phase, 
for prosecutors’ legal and professional culture. This confirms what we said before 
(chap. 9 and 10). However, there is something more. The analysis conducted in this 
chapter completes our portrait o f the prosecutor during the pre-trial phase. What are 
the effects, in practice, o f pubblici ministerVs power to mediate external influences 
(and to express their professional culture)? Prosecutors are not able to block the 
changes within the criminal justice system. They partially reflect the focus of the 
dominant political cultures (the central state in particular). This seems to be 
demonstrated by the impact o f legal (i. e. the procedure for the Bossi-Fini) and 
bureaucratic (i. e. the urban safety group) external decision-making criteria. However, 
pubblici ministeri are still in the position to decide between external and personal
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priorities. These decisions have substantial practical effects. First, they determine the 
way the investigation will be directed by prosecutors. Secondly, they effectively shape 
prosecutors’ aims. In particular, pubblici ministeri seem to follow the dichotomy: treat 
cases as soon as possible and as fast as possible o r make a real attempt to deal with a 
specific crime problem (e. g. environmental crimes, corruption etc.). Thirdly, by 
acting on their own sense o f personal priorities, prosecutors can mediate the impact of 
police decisions. The police implement directives on anti-crime policies which are the 
direct product o f political decisions taken by the central state. Prosecutors are 
influenced by the police: for example, the police can, de facto, push cases on 
prosecutors for treatment (i. e. via the arrest). However, by choosing their personal 
priorities, pubblici ministeri can mediate this impact. In other words: this seems to be 
one of the moments when prosecutors can m odify what Hodgson calls “the case 
parameters set by police” (see chap. 8).
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This study has tried to analyze the way crime is defined, investigated and prosecuted 
by Italian prosecutors. The point we tried to emphasize is that, during the pre-trial 
phase, there seems to be room for prosecutors’ discretionary powers. And that they 
are in a different position compared to other legal actors. There are two moments 
when this seems to be particularly visible. First, prosecutors decide how an 
investigation has to be supervised. This is not a mere formal decision. Prosecutors 
determine the strategy o f the investigation and how they will interact with the police. 
Effectively they decide how their right to direct the investigation becomes a reality. 
Secondly, prosecutors are in the position to mediate the impact o f external influences. 
Their role as experts who are entitled to define the crime problem seems to be a 
reality. But this does not mean that influences disappear. So, in Italy, amongst the 
different legal and political structures within which crime is defined, investigated and 
prosecuted, prosecution is a distinct and different stage, where important decisions are 
taken by legal actors who have a peculiar legal and professional culture.
There are different reasons why prosecutors are in this position. As we 
remarked many times there are legal provisions which determine and protect certain 
distinctive features o f Italian prosecutors. In particular: pubblici ministeri are part of 
the judiciary (like judges), they are fully independent from any other institutional 
power, they direct the investigation (and the police) and they have to comply with the 
legality principle. The study o f these principles has not been our primary focus. 
However, we should not ignore that the law already gives a substantial amount of 
independence to prosecutors. But we wanted to look at the practice. In this sense, 
prosecutors’ professional and legal culture seems fundamental to understand their 
position within the legal system. We underlined two issues. First, when it comes to 
legal independence prosecutors are culturally indistinguishable, no matter if  they are 
superior or assistant prosecutors. The consequences in practice are substantial. 
Prosecution offices are not hierarchically organized and file allocation and guidelines 
on priorities are not imposed. The importance o f legal independence as a key feature 
of Italian prosecutors’ legal culture is demonstrated by the way the ordinamento 
giudiziario reform was applied. Although these provisions considerably increased the 
powers of chief and deputy chief prosecutors, this did not seem to have affected 
prosecutors’ independence in practice. The second, and most important, characteristic 
regards the meaning o f legal filtering. Italian prosecutors’ professional self-image is
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founded on their sense o f themselves not as crime fighters but as judicial figures, 
magistrates with professional functions and culture similar to that o f the adjudicative 
magistrates (judges). They supervise police investigations and determine what 
information gathered during the investigation should be passed to the judge. They see 
themselves as providing a neutral judicial filter which ensures that certain forms o f 
information brought to them by investigators which is unduly prejudicial or fails legal 
tests for admissibility will not be seen by the judge. But while prosecutors see this 
legal filtering as a judicial role it inevitably means that their judicial distance from the 
prejudicial information and opinion thrown up by the investigation is compromised. 
So, legal filtering does not mean that prosecutors are impartial legal figures. But it 
means that they are in the position to look at the case from a different angle compared 
to the police: their aim is to build up a file which can stand scrutiny at trial. This also 
explains the meaning, in practice, o f  prosecutors’ judicial culture: they are not 
impartial like judges, but they have to foresee the way the judge will look at the case. 
This is in order to enhance the chances o f obtaining a conviction. However, 
prosecutors’ professional self-image still has some practical effects. They believe that, 
in order to carry out properly their job, they have to preserve their image o f neutrality. 
This principle is the very foundation o f  prosecutors’ institutional resistance to 
adversarial principles (i. e. the 1989 reform).
The construction o f prosecutors’ special position has also been built around 
their relationship with the police. As we have explained, prosecutors determine the 
way the investigation will be supervised. This implies different interactions with the 
police. This has led to three conclusions. First, prosecutors’ functions during the pre­
trial phase are not always and only passive. Prosecutors have the power to review the 
investigation carried out by the police and to prompt directives. In this way they can 
have their hands on the investigation. Moreover, while prompting and reviewing, they 
can shape the investigation the way they want and can obtain more and better 
information to decide if a case can stand scrutiny at trial. In other words: the methods 
of supervision (prompting and reviewing more active; bureaucratic review more 
passive) effectively qualify the way prosecutors act as legal filters. Secondly, during 
the investigation there seems to be strong functional and cultural differences which, in 
prosecutors’ view, should mark the distance between them and the police. These are 
less clear during the investigation, but they appear clear when the police collect crime
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reports and prosecutors refer to the fact that they have to be “more detached”. 
However, this does not mean that, in practice, prosecutors are not influenced by the 
police. The point we want to make is different. During and after the investigation 
prosecutors are in the position to challenge and modify what Hodgson called “the case 
parameters set by police”1 (third conclusion). They can do this in two ways: choosing 
how to supervise the investigation and mediating the impact o f police decisions on the 
definition of priorities.
This directly leads us to another core question that we discussed in this thesis: 
the way prosecutors define their priorities. O f course there is no need here to list all 
the parameters we identified in the previous chapters. But it is important to underline 
that, although defying prosecutors’ priorities implies the analysis of complex 
considerations involving different criteria which interact with each other, one major 
distinction can be done. In practice there seems to be a difference between external 
and personal priorities. The former are linked to external influences that prosecutors 
have not created themselves. The latter are more based on prosecutors’ socio-political 
considerations. Now this seems to demonstrate that prosecutors are certainly not 
immune from external influences. Priorities can be, in practice, suggested by, for 
example, legislative provisions. However, by choosing their personal priorities, 
prosecutors mediate the impact o f external influences. This has substantial practical 
effects. First, for a personal priority prosecutors will be more involved in the 
investigation (i. e. prompting and reviewing). This effectively shapes prosecutors’ 
aims (i. e. as between the choice to treat cases as soon as possible and as fast as 
possible or to make a real attempt to deal with a specific crime problem). Secondly, if 
a case is not a personal priority it may be dropped or treated later. Thirdly, by 
choosing their personal priorities prosecutors can mediate the impact o f police 
decisions. Finally, the distinction between ‘external’ and ‘personal’ can become 
blurred in practice. Prosecutors appeal to external legal standards like the legality 
principle and other legal criteria seeming to want to give an objective basis to what is 
ultimately discretionary decision-making with a strong subjective element. But in 
practice, external influences only operate through personal choices. So the constraints 
and pressures, while real, may be less strong than the presentation suggests. 
Furthermore, the degree of consistency that existed in the definition of personal
1 Hodgson (2005) op. cit. pp. 169-170.
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priorities may well be more a product o f shared social and political values into which 
magistrates are ‘socialised’ within the profession or local court culture.2
Amongst the criteria for decision-making that prosecutors use to determine 
priorities we have put a particular focus on social alarm. Social alarm certainly 
influences the images o f crime within the dominant political cultures. Moreover, 
legislation and administrative guidance within prosecution offices which concern 
street crime and immigration have affected prosecutors’ choices. However, through 
the analysis of the way prosecutors deal with social alarm, we can reach the 
conclusion that a partial separation can be maintained between the dominant political 
cultures and the dominant legal cultures. Street crime and immigration may become 
external priorities because there are legal and administrative procedures which, in 
practice, force prosecutors to treat these cases as soon as possible and as fast as 
possible. However, these will not be personal priorities, with the consequences we 
outlined above.
Now that we almost concluded we can not avoid some direct considerations 
about the legality principle. The legality principle is a legal provision which seems to 
have two aims: regulate discretionary decisions on the definition of priorities and 
protect prosecutors’ image o f neutrality and impartiality. As we said prosecutors are 
neither neutral and/or impartial. However, as we explained, in a country like Italy, 
where corruption is great, but the fear o f being suspected o f corruption is even greater, 
prosecutors have a strong formal legal basis for their actions which makes it difficult 
to prove that they are serving interests which are not merely legal. But this is not the 
only practical consequence of the legality principle. Prosecutors still seem to have 
substantial discretionary powers when they have to define the crime problem. This has 
already been explained (for Italy) by, for example, Goldstein and Marcus3 and, more 
recently, Guarnieri.4 However, the point we want to make is that prosecutors’ 
discretionary powers, although based on complex interactions of criteria for decision­
making and on their socio-political considerations, are not totally unstructured. This 
study seems to demonstrate that there is a common legal culture amongst prosecutors 
and that priorities are, in general, chosen according to common criteria. Of course,
~ This may evoke image o f  ‘red’ and ‘black’ judges and could raise questions about prosecutors’ 
political socialization. We thought about asking questions on political preferences and influences, but 
we eventually decided not to do it. The risk was to lose co-operation or access (see appendices).
J Goldstein and Marcus (1977) op. cit. But the authors also say that prosecutors are passive legal 
figures and their decisions are strongly influenced by the police (see chap. 4).
4 Guarnieri (1997) op. cit.
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there are exceptions, like, for example, the interpretation o f the concept of reasonable 
reason for the Bossi-Fini. However, more general issues like the meaning of social 
alarm, the damages suffered by the victim and the importance of certain crimes (e. g. 
white collar and environmental crimes) seem to be treated by prosecutors in a very 
similar way. In this sense the legality principle seems to be one o f the tools which can 
be used to give prosecutors discretionary powers. In other words: this principle still 
seems to protect prosecutors’ role as experts entitled to define the crime problem. But, 
as the analysis of the Italian case suggests, this is only one of the conditions, and it 
may not be a necessary one. There are certainly other reasons such as Italian 
prosecutors’ professional culture and the way legal independence operates in practice. 
We should also not forget the socio-political context in which Italian prosecutors 
work. The clashes between the judiciary and part o f the political world, and the 
importance that prosecutors acquired in Italy (now reduced) during tangentopoli may 
also have legitimated (in prosecutors’ view) prosecutors’ powers. So, it is important to 
underline that we are not arguing that the legality principle can, alone, give to 
prosecutors the distinctive features we outlined in this thesis. Moreover, the legality 
principle surely does not protect prosecutors from all the external influences. For 
example, the impact o f certain legislative measures is perceivable.
The study o f criminal justice systems is also the study of legal actors who 
apply and interpret the system. In this sense, this thesis has tried to demonstrate that 
the practice of prosecution in Italy has distinctive features. Italian prosecutors do not 
seem to be mere executors o f decisions (on anti-crime policies) taken by other legal, 
political and, more generally, social actors. If  we compare this, for example, with 
France the significant differences are clear. Hodgson describes a system where 
prosecutors have little room to influence the way a case will be investigated and 
prosecuted. The author writes: “whilst judicial supervision is at the centre o f the 
procedural model o f criminal justice, in practice, it is police who dominate the process 
of case construction”;5 and: “most cases that come before the courts [...] are the 
product o f a police investigation which has been subject to the relatively distant and 
bureaucratic oversight o f the procureur”.6 For England and Wales the conclusions are 
not so dissimilar. The police are the only legal actors responsible for the investigation
5 Hodgson (2005) op. cit. pp. 245-246.
6 Ibid. p. 249. Procureur means prosecutor.
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of crime and “continue to be the gatekeepers to the prosecution process in many
n
instances”. Empirical research analyzing decisions to prosecute has remarked the 
difficulties that prosecutors have to influence and modify conclusions reached by the 
police. The case is, in practice, constructed by the police.8 Moreover, as we said, in 
Italy there is nothing like the Code for Crown Prosecutors or the Conditional Cautions 
Code of Practice which suggest decision-making criteria to determine priorities. This 
is because of the legality principle. However, it would be misleading to think that 
mere legal reforms might bring the Italian system closer to the French and/or the 
English systems or vice versa. Prosecutorial functions vary considerably depending on 
different legal cultures.9 Finally, in Italy the ruling class (politicians, entrepreneurs, 
academics etc.) has proved (particularly in the last 20 years) to be unreliable and 
corrupt. Within this scenario prosecutors and, more generally, the judiciary, are seen 
to make up for this lack o f authority. This is not the case of, for example, England and 
France and it should be taken into account.10 In the end the analysis o f Italian 
prosecutors’ role and functions in practice during the pre-trial phase shows that we 
may have underestimated the resources that enable prosecutors to mediate the 
influence of the dominant political cultures.
7 Ibid. p. 74.
8 M cConville M., Sanders A. and Leng R. “ The Case fo r  the Prosecution”. 1991. Routledge: London.
9 Jackson (2004) op. cit., in particular p. 110.
10 Here we are not arguing that, in order to give to prosecutors an important role in the definition o f  the 
crime problem, it is necessary to knock out (or at least to reduce the importance) o f  other members o f  
the ruling class. This may help, but this issue is too complicated to be treated here and it goes far 
beyond the purpose o f  this study.
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Appendix A: methodology
We have already discussed the key methodological issues (see chap. 3). Here we will 
just add some more information. First o f all, we did not seek any formal authorization 
to interview prosecutors and police officers. Everything was informal and started 
thanks to some friends (in particular a judge and a lawyer) and some other very 
supportive people (including one o f my former professors in Pavia University). Then, 
it was a matter o f public relations and o f selling my research. It proved to be 
successful given that the interviews numbered 54 but could have been doubled or 
tripled (if we only had more time). Secondly, as I said (chap. 3) in general I was made 
very well welcome. Even those who were sceptical and defensive eventually gave 
interesting information. This showed that our questions were properly designed to 
identify key ideas and contradictions. We are talking about those prosecutors who 
wanted to deny that priorities exist. Moreover, given that, as we explained (see chap.
5), there is a strong confrontation between prosecutors (and the judiciary in general) 
and part of the political world, I always had to be very careful and explain that I was 
not looking for any secret and/or information on specific cases. The other interesting 
consideration is that the higher the rank o f the interviewee (and we interviewed some 
very important prosecutors) the more they were ready to talk. The chief prosecutor in 
Bolzano even called me (20 minutes after I spoke with his secretary) to arrange a 
meeting as soon as possible. So, in general, interviewees found the research quite 
interesting. It was a bit more difficult with the police who were more formal than 
prosecutors and, normally, gave very politically correct answers. But, in the end, they 
were helpful as well. Finally, the more I interviewed people the more I got interesting 
information. This is because if  I could show knowledge o f what prosecutors do in 
practice, they were very happy to explain more and they avoided long and exhausting 
speeches about the very nature o f legal principles.
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Appendix B: summary tables of interviews
Size and geographical location o f prosecution offices: 
B (big)
MB (medium-big)
M (medium)
S (small)
N (north)
St. (south)
C (centre)
1. Consultants
LOCATION PROSECUTORS POLICE
OFFICERS
LAWYERS
NB 2
NMB 1
NS 1 1
Prosecutors: 2
Police officers: 1 
Lawyers: 2 
In total: 5
2. Interviewees
LOCATION PROSECUTORS POLICE
OFFICERS
LAWYERS
St.B 3 (1 chief pros.)
NB 6 2 4
NMB 4 (1 chef pros.) 1 3
NS 1 3 4
NB 2
NB 3 (1 pros. At the 
court o f appeal)
CM 2
NB 3
CM 2 2
NMB 1 (chief pros.)
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Prosecutors: 27 
Police officers: 11 
Lawyers: 11 
In total: 49
Total interviews (consultants and interviewees): 54
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Appendix C: questions for consultants
Prosecutors
I. Prosecution office
1. How do you decide to allocate a file to a prosecutor? Or how does your superior 
allocate a file to a prosecutor? What did the new ordinamento giudiziario reform 
change?
2. How many dossiers in progress would you typically have to deal with at any one 
time? How do you deal with such a large number o f cases? Do you deal with some 
types of cases first? If you think a particular offence or type o f offence is a 
particular priority what would you do? How do you treat that offence or type of 
offence differently so as to make clear it is a priority?
3. How do you decide what requires this kind o f treatment from you? Do you discuss 
local priorities with other prosecutors? Examples? How? Where? Are there rules 
to determine priorities? How and who determine these rules? Who control that 
these rules are properly followed?
4. Is there a specific procedure or register for cases which are considered less urgent 
or more urgent?
5. What do you do with the cases where the name o f the accused is not known or in 
which the crime notice is not clear?
6. Do you have a particular archive? Do you just leave it? Do you deal with it as a 
normal case (no priorities compared to the cases where the accused is named)?
7. Does the chief prosecutor seek to co-ordinate or harmonise prosecution practice 
within this prosecution office? If  so how does he/she do it? Does he/she use legal 
powers to do so or is the co-ordination based on consensus and agreement? Do 
you ever work from home? What about other colleagues?
8. Did it ever happen to you to be substituted from an investigation? Why? Do you 
know anyone else who had been substituted? What happened? How often? Will 
the new ordinamento giudiziario reform change something?
9. Did you ever issue a disciplinary measure? What happened? Have you ever been 
the addressee o f a disciplinary measure? What happened?
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10. What do you see as the most important crime problems facing your area?
11. Does crime by immigrants/youths pose particular problems for prosecutors (or the 
local area)? If so why?
II. Prosecutors and other legal actors
12. What is the difference between the cultural approach that prosecutors have and the 
cultural approach that judges have? Why? Examples. Have you ever served as a 
judge? How is the approach o f a prosecutor to his/her job different? Does this ever 
produce tensions or conflicts with judges? Examples. How are they resolved? Are 
there informal channels o f communication, such as meetings at which judges and 
prosecutors can resolve these differences? If he/she had the choice to be thought 
of an effective crime fighter or as a ‘judicious’ magistrate which would they 
choose? Why? Do they welcome greater separation between the role and career of 
prosecutor and judge or oppose it?
13. What are the arguments that you use to convince the GUP that a rinvio a giudizio 
is the right measure or the GIP that the case should be dismissed? What happens if 
the victim opposes to the archiviazione request? Does this change your approach?
13. Does the social alarm play a part when you ask for the archiviazione or for the 
rinvio a giudizio?
14. Do you discuss priorities with the police? How? Where? How do you convey your 
sense of priorities to the police? How do you deal with it if  you feel the police do 
not share your sense o f priority o f a particular case or category of case? How does 
your relationship with the police work? By letters and files, personal meetings, on 
the telephone?
III. Prosecutors and external influences
15. Measures issued by the Minister o f Justice. How does it work? Inspectors are sent 
straight away? There is an informal channel to communicate? For which reasons 
the inspectors are sent? Who are the inspectors (former magistrati etc.)? How 
does it work when you are called in Roma? Who is will speak with you?
16. Have you ever been involved in cases which had an impact in the local or national 
media? How did this affect the case? How did you deal with the media? Is there a
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general policy within this prosecution office about dealing with the media? What 
about the investigation, will you be more involved (e. g. undertaking investigation 
activities that normally the prosecutor would not undertake)? Trying to use them? 
Giving information? Do you know if this happens in other prosecution offices?
17. Have you ever dealt with crimes or types o f crime which have been a matter of 
acute local feeling amongst local community? How did you deal with that local 
feeling? Do you feel that such local concerns should be taken into account or 
excluded from decision-making? Do you ever meet representatives of local 
communities (citizens committees, major from small villages etc.)? What do you 
discuss? Does it happen in other prosecution offices?
18. Are you part o f a magistrates association? What made you join and what made 
you choose that particular association? What do you see as the function of these 
associations? Are they a forum for discussing and co-ordinating priorities for 
prosecutors? How often do you submit questions or requests to the CSM? To 
which extent these questions or requests concern your job?
IV. Vignettes
19. Outside of a club there is a brawl involving 5 young Italians (all adults). The 
reason is futile (like arguing for a parking place) and when the police arrive they 
realize that the guys are drunk and under the effect o f some drugs. Two of the 
guys are injured with minor damages, but an ambulance is called and the doctors 
say that the prognosis is for three days. Given that the guys did not lodge any 
querela for personal damages: would the police report this case to you? Why? 
Would you prosecute it? Why? What is the element that leads you to the decision 
to prosecute/not to prosecute? Would it be different if  you had complaints from 
those living in that area, because these things often happen? And if some or all the 
guys were immigrants?
20. During a routine control the guardia di finanza  discovers that there are some 
anomalies in the accounting records o f a local entrepreneur (medium size). It 
appears that the crime o f false accounting has been committed, however it is not 
clear if the crime had substantial consequences or not in the company’s financial 
situation. Would the police report this case to you? Why? Would you prosecute it?
299
Why? What is the element that leads you to the decision to prosecute/not to 
prosecute?
Lawyers
I. Prosecution office
1. How are the files allocated in the prosecution office working in your area? What 
about cases where the name o f the accused is not know and where the crime 
notice is not clear or it is anonymous? Do you know prosecution offices which use 
different systems?
2. How do prosecutors treat the offences differently so as to make clear that it is a 
priority? Could you make an example? What are the rules to determine priorities?
3. Do you know if the rules concerning priorities are decided by the chief, through 
common rules decided by all the prosecutors or every single prosecutor has his/her 
set o f priorities? Do you know if in other prosecution offices the procedure is 
different?
4. Does the social alarm play a part when the prosecutor asks for the archiviazione or 
for the rinvio a giudizio?
5. Are prosecutors substituted from an investigation? How often? For which 
reasons? Could you make an example?
6. Do you meet prosecutors to discuss about cases? Only in formal occasions, 
informal occasions? For certain matters do you have to meet the chief? What are 
these matters?
7. What do you see as the most important crime problems facing your area?
8. Does crime by immigrants/youths pose particular problems for prosecutors (or the 
local area)? If so why?
II. Prosecutors and other legal actors
9. Do you often see judges talking with prosecutors (in the bars around the court, in 
the corridors etc.)? Do you know if  they discuss, informally, about cases?
10. Based on your experience have you ever had cases (before the GIP, GUP or trial 
judge) where you felt that your requests were discriminated compared to the
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prosecutors’ requests? Have you ever heard about similar cases? Could you make 
an example (e. g. how often the judge accepts lawyers’ requests (30%, 40% of the 
times, more)?
11 .1 have been told that sometimes the police literally dictates to prosecutors the 
charges to be reported in the file. Have you ever had this feeling? Do you know if 
this happened for a case you were dealing with?
12. Based on your experience: to which extent prosecutors control the police during 
the investigation? Could you make an example?
13. What are the investigative activities that prosecutors normally undertake and those 
that the police undertake? Could you make examples?
14. Did you ever complaint to prosecutors about something that the police did? Have 
you ever heard about something like this? Could you make examples?
III. Prosecutors and external influences
15. Measures issued by the Minister o f Justice. How does it work? Inspectors are sent 
straight away? There is an informal channel to communicate? For which reasons 
the inspectors are sent? Who are the inspectors (former magistrati etc.)? How 
does it work when prosecutors are called in Roma? Who will speak with them?
16. Have you ever been involved in cases which had a great impact on the media? 
How did prosecutors behave? Did they look closer to part o f the media (e. g. 
journalists belonging to a certain newspaper)? On the contrary, did they want to 
have nothing to do with the media? What about the investigation, will prosecutors 
be more involved (e. g. undertaking investigation activities that normally the 
prosecutor would not undertake)? Could you make an example?
17. Have you ever dealt with crimes or types o f crime which have been a matter of 
acute local feeling amongst local community? Did the prosecutor behave in a 
different way (e. g. requests for stronger punishments, more involved in the 
investigation)? Do you feel that such local concerns have been taken into account 
or have been excluded from decision-making? Examples?
18. Do you know prosecutors who belong to ANM ’s associations? Why do they 
belong to that association? Is there a political reason, or something else?
19. Do you think that prosecutors belonging to different ANM ’s associations behave 
in a different way? Could you make an example?
301
IV  Vignettes
20. Outside of a club there is a brawl involving 5 young Italians (all adults). The 
reason is futile (like arguing for a parking place) and when the police arrive they 
realize that the guys are drunk and under the effect o f some drugs. Two of the 
guys are injured with minor damages, but an ambulance is called and the doctors 
say that the prognosis is for three days. Given that the guys did not lodge any 
querela for personal damages: would the police report this case to the prosecutor? 
Would he prosecute it? Why? What is the element that leads the prosecutor to the 
decision to prosecute/not to prosecute? Would it be different if  you had 
complaints from those living in that area, because these things often happen? And 
if some or all the guys were immigrants?
21. During a routine control the guardia di finanza  discovers that there are some 
anomalies in the accounting records o f a local entrepreneur (medium size). It 
appears that the crime o f false accounting has been committed, however it is not 
clear if the crime had substantial consequences or not in the company’s financial 
situation. Would the police report this case to the prosecutor? Why? Will it be 
prosecuted? Why? What is the element that leads the prosecutor to the decision to 
prosecute/not to prosecute?
Police
I. Prosecution office
1. How are the files allocated in the prosecution office working in your area? What 
about cases where the name o f the accused is not know and where the crime 
notice is not clear or it is anonymous? Do you know prosecution offices which use 
different systems?
2. How do prosecutors treat the offences differently so as to make clear that it is a 
priority? Could you make an example? What are the rules to determine priorities?
3. Do you know if the rules concerning priorities are decided by the chief, through 
common rules decided by all the prosecutors or every single prosecutor has his/her 
set o f priorities? Do you know if in other prosecution offices the procedure is 
different?
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4. Does the social alarm play a part when the prosecutor asks for the archiviazione or 
for the rinvio a giudizio?
5. Are prosecutors substituted from an investigation? How often? For which 
reasons? Could you make an example?
6. What do you see as the most important crime problems facing your area?
7. Does crime by immigrants/youths pose particular problems for prosecutors (or the 
local area)? If  so why?
II. Prosecutors and other legal actors
8. Do you often see judges talking with prosecutors (in the bars around the court, in 
the corridors etc.)? Do you know if  they discuss, informally, about cases?
9. I have been told that sometimes the police literally dictates to prosecutors the 
charges to be reported in the file. Does it really happen? Could you make an 
example?
10. Based on your experience: to which extent prosecutors control the police during 
the investigation? Could you make an example?
11. What are the investigative activities that prosecutors normally undertake and those 
that the police undertake? Could you make examples?
12. During the investigation (from the moment when you communicate the crime 
notice till the end o f the investigation) how do you communicate with prosecutors 
(written, oral)? How often? Do you have formal meetings to attend? On the 
contrary, is everything informal?
13. Do you meet prosecutors (when there is not any investigation involved)? What do 
you talk about? Only in formal occasions, informal occasions? For certain matters 
do you have to meet the chief? What are these matters?
III. Prosecutors and external influences
14. Measures issued by the Minister o f justice. How does it work? Inspectors are sent 
straight away? There is an informal channel to communicate? For which reasons 
the inspectors are sent? Who are the inspectors (former magistrati etc.)? How 
does it work when prosecutors are called in Roma? Who will speak with them?
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15. Have you ever been involved in cases which had a great impact on the media? 
How did prosecutors behave? Did they look closer to part o f the media (e. g. 
journalists belonging to a certain newspaper)? On the contrary, did they want to 
have nothing to do with the media? What about the investigation, will you be 
more involved (e. g. undertaking investigation activities that normally the 
prosecutor would not undertake)? Could you make an example?
16. Have you ever dealt with crimes or types o f crime which have been a matter of 
acute local feeling amongst local community? Did the prosecutor behave in a 
different way (e. g. requests for stronger punishments, more involved in the 
investigation)? Do you feel that such local concerns have been taken into account 
or have been excluded from decision-making? Examples?
17. Do you know prosecutors who belong to ANM associations? Why do they belong 
to that association? Is there a political reason, or something else?
18. Do you think that prosecutors belonging to different ANM associations behave in 
a different way? Could you make an example?
IV  Vignettes
19. Outside of a club there is a brawl involving 5 young Italians (all adults). The 
reason is futile (like arguing for a parking place) and when the police arrive they 
realize that the guys are drunk and under the effect o f some drugs. Two o f the 
guys are injured with minor damages, but an ambulance is called and the doctors 
say that the prognosis is for three days. Given that the guys did not lodge any 
querela for personal damages: would the police report this case to the prosecutor? 
Would he prosecute it? Why? What is the element that leads the prosecutor to the 
decision to prosecute/not to prosecute? Would it be different if  you had 
complaints from those living in that area, because these things often happen? And 
if some or all the guys were immigrants?
20. During a routine control the guardia di finanza  discovers that there are some 
anomalies in the accounting records o f a local entrepreneur (medium size). It 
appears that the crime o f false accounting has been committed, however it is not 
clear if the crime had substantial consequences or not in the company’s financial 
situation. Would the police report this case to the prosecutor? Why? Will it be
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prosecuted? Why? What is the element that leads the prosecutor to the decision to 
prosecute/not to prosecute?
All the questions (different depending from the function: prosecutor, police or lawyer) 
have been asked to the consultants.
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Appendix D: questions for interviewees
Prosecutors
I. Office culture: allocating work
1. How are the files allocated in this prosecution office? Are the files allocated 
through the turno posta  or you have specializations as well? Who decided that this 
was the system to use? The chief, there was an informal agreement, a general 
consensus, a democratic discussion etc.? Who decides who and how many turns 
have to be done and the specializations? How are the files allocated between those 
who are specialized in a topic? What will the reform change?
> This question was asked to 26 out of 27 prosecutors.
II. Sorting files: the process
2. How many dossiers in progress would you typically have to deal with at any one 
time? How do you deal with such a large number o f cases? Do you deal with some 
types of cases first? If you think a particular offence or type o f offence is a 
particular priority/of particular significance/seriousness what would you do? How 
do you treat that offence or type o f offence differently so as to make clear that it is 
more serious?
> This question was asked to 26 out of 27 prosecutors.
3. How do you decide what requires this kind o f treatment from you? Do you discuss 
local priorities with other prosecutors? How? Where? How do you decide what 
cases are more important?
> This question was asked to 26 out of 27 prosecutors.
4. Are these priorities determined or influenced by the prosecution office (court of 
appeal or local) or by the CSM? How?
> This question was asked to 26 out of 27 prosecutors.
306
5. Does the chief try to harmonize or co-ordinate your approach to particular cases 
(by perhaps suggesting common rules about prosecuting particular types of 
crimes)? For example: does he ever come to say: “look, you should do the case X 
before the case Y”? Will he/she do it with the reform?
> This question was asked to 26 out of 27 prosecutors.
III. Sorting files: prosecutors ’ sense o f 'priorities ’
6. What types o f crime seem to you particularly important to act quickly upon or 
supervise closely or do yourself what you normally delegate or ask for an 
expensive investigation act etc.
> This question was asked to 26 out of 27 prosecutors.
7. Why do you think these types o f crime are more important (more social impact?)? 
Do prosecutors with particular specialisms prioritise those types o f crime?
>  This question was asked to 26 out of 27 prosecutors.
8. Do you regard crimes committed by immigrants or street crime are not a priority? 
Why? Why not?
> This question was asked to 26 out of 27 prosecutors.
9. Is it true that the forces o f law and order and/or the PG can have priorities which 
are different than yours? For example, in relation to street crime and immigrants, 
where there is persuasion/pressure on the forces o f law and order to achieve 
results. What do you do if  the investigating forces o f law and order do not appear 
to share your sense o f priorities?
> This question was asked to 24 out of 27 prosecutors.
10. Is it true that the forces o f law and order directly deal directly with the local 
community’s complaints (e. g. they break things, there are always brawls etc.)? 
Does this lead them to want to prioritise those offences which led to these 
complaints? Do they draw that public concern to your attention? Does this make 
any difference to your decision-making?
> This question was asked to 24 out of 27 prosecutors.
11. How do you supervise the PG during investigation (telephone, written reports, 
face to face)? What determines which methods you use? What happens when the 
police do not follow your orders? What do you do if you are unhappy with their
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investigation but you do not want to revoke the investigation (perhaps because 
you believe this is too strong as a sanction)?
> This question was asked to 22 out of 27 prosecutors.
IV  Crime and social alarm
12. What are the most pressing crime problems in this area?
> This question was asked to 25 out of 27 prosecutors.
13. Does criminality linked to immigration pose particular problems? Why? What 
proportion o f your cases involves immigrants? Does lack of official residence 
pose a problem?
> This question was asked to 26 out of 27 prosecutors.
14. What do you do with the Bossi-Fini?
> This question was asked to 26 out of 27 prosecutors.
15. Does the Bossi-Fini Act effectively mean that you have to treat immigrants as a 
priority? Do you feel this is appropriate?
> This question was asked to 26 out of 27 prosecutors.
16. Do you think that any o f the following: a) crimes committed by immigrants, b) 
immigration itself with the Bossi-Fini, or c) street crime create particular social 
alarm within the local community? How, if  at all does this affect your decision­
making?
> This question was asked to 24 out of 27 prosecutors.
17. How, if at all is the approach o f a prosecutor different to that o f a judge? Do you 
see yourself as a crime-fighter? If someone suggested that you were known as a 
crime fighter would you be pleased or not? Why?
> This question was asked to all prosecutors.
18. Do you think the legality principle helps prosecutors to work effectively or 
hinders them? Do you think it should be abolished or moderated? Should the 
legislator or the Ministry o f Justice set out the general priorities?
> This question was asked to all prosecutors.
19. Are you part o f the ANM? Any particular group inside the ANM?
r* This question was asked to 20 out of 27 prosecutors.
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V. Managing the cases and efficiency (extra questions asked to the ch ief prosecutor in
Bolzano)
a) What is the meaning o f the project you are putting forward here?
b) What does a project manager do in a prosecution office?
c) What are the sorts o f cases where it is easier to introduce efficiency? What are the 
ones where it will not be able to work so easily?
d) How will better management relate, if  at all, to increasing the use of alternatives 
introduced by the new criminal procedure o f 1989?
e) How will managerial measuring influence how cases are handled? For example 
regarding priority? How, if  at all, it is expected/intended to have this effect?
f) Is there a difference between efficiency and effectiveness in your job? Is it 
possible that too much efficiency will undermine the effectiveness o f your job?
Lawyers
I. Office culture
1. How do they allocate files in this prosecution office? In this prosecution office are 
the files allocated through the turno posta  or they have specializations as well? 
Who decided that this was the system to use? The chief, there was an informal 
agreement, a general consensus, a democratic discussion etc.? Who decides who 
and how many turns have to be done and the specializations? How are the files 
allocated between those who are specialized in a topic? Do you know the lists of 
those who are part o f the specialized units? What will the reform change?
II. Office culture: the priorities
2. Would you say that there are certain types o f case that are regarded as priorities by 
the prosecution office? Cases which are processed immediately with substantial 
investigative resources if necessary? Do priorities reflect the specialization areas? 
Why do you think there are more important cases (more social impact?)?
3. Are crimes committed by immigrants and street crime a priority or not? Why?
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4. Do you know if  the rules about priorities are decided by the chief together with 
the other prosecutors or every one is free?
5. Which is the role o f the forces of law and order and of the PG in 
shaping/influencing priorities?
II. Office culture: how prosecutors deal with priorities
6. When a prosecutor prioritizes a case how is this reflected in the way he/she deals 
with the case? What does he/she do that he/she normally delegates?
7. To what extent, if  at all, do chief prosecutors monitor the way prosecutors deal 
with cases or try to harmonize or co-ordinate their decision-making? Does he/she 
try to establish common policies about prosecution or enforce a particular set of 
priorities?
I l l  Crime and social alarm
8. What are the most pressing crime problems in this area?
9. Does criminality linked to immigration pose particular problems? Why? What 
proportion of prosecutors’ cases involves immigrants? Does lack of official 
residence pose a problem?
10. What do prosecutors do with the Bossi-Fini?
11. Does the Bossi-Fini Act effectively mean that prosecutors have to treat 
immigrants as a priority? Do you feel this is appropriate?
12. Do you think that any o f the following: a) crimes committed by immigrants, b) 
immigration itself with the Bossi-Fini, or c) street crime create particular social 
alarm within the local community? How, if  at all does this affect prosecutors’ 
decision-making?
13. How, if at all is the approach of a prosecutor different to that of a judge? Do they 
see themselves as a crime-fighter? If someone suggested that they were known as 
a crime fighter would they be pleased or not? Why?
14. Do you think the legality principle helps prosecutors to work effectively or 
hinders them? Do you think it should be abolished or moderated? Should the 
legislator or the Ministry o f Justice set out the general priorities?
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15. Do you think that the priorities of magistrati belonging to different associations 
are different?
All the questions have been asked to the lawyers. The only exception was 
question 15 that I asked to 8 out o f 11 lawyers. 
Police
I. Office culture
1. In this prosecution office are the files allocated through the turno posta  or they 
have specializations as well? Who decided that this was the system to use? The 
chief, there was an informal agreement, a general consensus, a democratic 
discussion etc.? Who decides who and how many turns have to be done and the 
specializations? How are the files allocated between those who are specialized in a 
topic? What will the reform change?
II. Office culture: the priorities
2. Would you say that there are certain types o f case that are regarded as priorities by 
the prosecution office? Cases which are processed immediately with substantial 
investigative resources if necessary? Do priorities reflect the specialization areas? 
Why do you think there are more important cases (more social impact?)?
3. Are crimes committed by immigrants and street crime a priority or not? Why?
4. Do you know if  the rules about priorities are decided by the chief together with 
the other prosecutors or every one is free?
5. Is it true that the forces o f law and order and/or the PG can have priorities which 
are different than yours? I think about street crime and immigrants, where some 
results could be asked to the forces o f law and order.
6. How do prosecutors do a delegal What happens when the police do not follow 
prosecutors’ orders? What do prosecutors do if they want to punish a police 
officer but they do not want to revoke the investigation because you believe it is a 
too strong punishment?
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III. Office culture: how prosecutors deal with priorities
7. When a prosecutor prioritizes a case what does he/she do that he/she normally 
delegates?
8. I have been told that in general the chief never goes to a prosecutor’s office to ask: 
“Excuse me what are you doing with that case?” What does it mean? Does it mean 
that the chief does not try to harmonize or co-ordinate prosecutors’ activity when 
they deal with a specific file (such as deciding common rules about prosecuting 
crimes)? For example: does he/she ever come to say (to prosecutors): “look, you 
should do the case X before the case Y”?
IV. Crime and social alarm
9. What are the most pressing crime problems in this area?
10. Does criminality linked to immigration pose particular problems? Why? What 
proportion of prosecutors’ cases involves immigrants? Does lack of official 
residence pose a problem?
11. What do prosecutors do with the Bossi-Fini?
12. Does the Bossi-Fini Act effectively mean that prosecutors have to treat 
immigrants as a priority? Do you feel this is appropriate?
13. Do you think that any o f the following: a) crimes committed by immigrants, b) 
immigration itself with the Bossi-Fini, or c) street crime create particular social 
alarm within the local community? How, if at all does this affect prosecutors’ 
decision-making?
14. How, if at all is the approach o f a prosecutor different to that o f a judge? Do they 
see themselves as a crime-fighter? If  someone suggested that they were known as 
a crime fighter would they be pleased or not? Why?
15. Do you think the legality principle helps prosecutors to work effectively or 
hinders them? Do you think it should be abolished or moderated? Should the 
legislator or the Ministry o f Justice set out the general priorities?
All the questions have been asked to the lawyers. The only exception was
question 8 that we asked to 9 out of 11 police officers.
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Comments
There are two kinds o f comments that we want to make here. First, we want to outline 
and explain the differences between the questions we asked to consultants and the 
questions we asked to interviewees. Second, we want to explain the reasons behind 
the choice of dropping some questions.
There are three main differences between the themes we developed with 
consultants and those we developed with the interviewees. First, we abandoned any 
question concerning the relationship with the executive. If we wanted to pursue this 
we would have had to add many more questions, and certainly there was not enough 
time. Moreover, this proved not to be very useful to analyze external influences and, 
also, prosecutors’ working environment. Finally, these questions implied opinions on 
political choices taken by the government. This is a very difficult topic in Italy and we 
thought that too many questions on prosecutors’ political opinions could have 
jeopardized cooperation and access. Secondly, we did not ask any specific question 
about the media. This did not disappear. Interviewees talked about this sort o f external 
influence when they were discussing the impact o f immigration (i. e. the Bossi-Fini 
Act) and street crime. So, it was included, more generally, in the influence of the 
dominant political cultures. The reason why we decided not to ask any specific 
question about the media is that this is a research on its own. This could have created 
two problems: interviews would have been too long and this study would have lost its 
focus. Third, the vignettes were abandoned because we could not get any interesting 
information from them.
There is one fundamental reason why I had to drop questions: time. This 
regarded prosecutors, police officers and lawyers as well. However, there is a more 
detailed explanation for prosecutors. The first thing I did to avoid wasting time was to 
limit question 1. Once I had clear in my mind the way cases are allocated (and the 
differences in each prosecution office) I was only asking for confirmation. But 
opinions on the impact on the ordinamento giudiziario law were always asked (with 
one exception). The same technique was used with police officers and lawyers. 
Another question that was not always asked is n. 19 (on political affiliations, see 
above). This was also a not very useful question. We could not clearly spot any link
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between politics and the way prosecutors define their priorities. With lawyers 
(question n. 15) the results were different. They suggested some interesting 
considerations about prosecutors’ personal priorities in general. However, even for 
lawyers this is a very sensitive issue that I had to introduce carefully. Finally, if  I was 
really running out o f time I dropped questions (for prosecutors) n. 9, 10, 11 and 16. 
The first three questions concern the police. I left them out for three reasons. First, I 
wanted to concentrate more on the definition of priorities. Second, and more 
importantly, these questions almost always received very similar (if not identical) and 
clear answers. So, the information could be understood and organized quite well, 
without further explanation. Third, in practice (and thanks to the fact that the 
questions were quite open), opinions on the police were always given. Similarly, 
question 16 out was left because, in practice, prosecutors answered this while they 
were discussing the Bossi-Fini. Finally, we decided to add some questions only for 
Bolzano because of the project launched by the chief prosecutor (see chap. 6). This 
was a very good chance to analyze in depth a very peculiar way to organize a 
prosecution office.
Why did we choose these questions? Obviously these were designed to 
achieve the purposes o f this study (see chap. 1). So, we focused on 4 issues: the 
organization of the prosecution office, the definition o f the crime problem (with a 
particular focus on social alarm), prosecutors’ legal and professional culture and their 
relationship with the police. Why did we focus on street crime and immigration? We 
wanted to analyze the impact of social alarm. Street crime and immigration certainly 
create social alarm. This can not be said, for example, for white collar crimes. This 
can be a source o f social alarm for prosecutors but, for sure, not for the dominant 
political cultures. O f course we would have liked to ask many other questions, but 
there was not the time. In the end, even if our empirical data clearly have some limits, 
we believe these were the clearest and sharpest questions we could have asked. 
Moreover, while this is not a totally unstructured (e. g. crime fighters/judges, social 
alarm etc.) work, we tried to avoid, as much as possible, the problems of 
ethnocentrism (see chap. 1 and 3). So, the questions were made also to discover and 
emphasize some distinctive features of Italian prosecutors (e. g. legal filters and the 
operation of legal independence).
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Appendix E: families and codes used to analyze interviews (ATLAS)
Here we will indicate the families (I, II, III etc.) and the codes which were included in 
each family. This is to give a general idea about how we classified our information.
I. Difference between prosecutors sense of social alarm and other meaning of 
social alarm
1. Diff. Between pros, social alarm and other meanings of social alarm
2. Prosecutors and local community pressure.
3. Prosecutors: a formidable wall
II. Illegal immigration and street crime
1. Crime and immigration: a very difficult issue
2. exceptions
3. Illegal imm. is not a priority: impossibility to prosecute all these sort o f cases
4. Illegal imm. is not a priority: interests affected are not substantial
5. Illegal imm. is not a priority: moral issues and technical prob.
6. Illegal immigration is not a priority
7. Street crime is not a priority.
8. Street crime is not a priority: impossibility to prosecute all these sort of cases
9. Street crime is not a priority: interests affected are not substantial
10. The Bossi-Fini Act and its applications
II. Is this prosecutors’ sense of justice?
1. Immigration and street crime: a police matter
2. Lenient attitude
3. Prosecutors contesting political choices or seeking for justice?
4. prosecutors do not deal with security
IV. Organizational relations
1. All. files (non-specialized units)
2. All. files (specialized units)
3. Chief prosecutors and their hierarchical powers
4. Reform and its application
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5. Spec, units and files allocation within these
6. The absence o f external control.
7. The absence o f internal control.
V. Priorities and external influences
1. Prosecutors and police: implications before the investigation.
2. Prosecutors and police: implications during the investigation
3. Prosecutors and police: which implications on priority issues?
VI. Priorities and the prosecutor
1. Shared rules
2. Other criteria
3. Crime problem (in general).
4. Non-priorities
VII. Priorities and working relations
1. Priorities and the leg. princ. in pros, view
2. SDAS and B categories crimes
3. Selective remedies for huge case load
4. Specialized units: priorities or needs?
5. Opinions on the leg. princ. by non pros.
6. Gruppo Sicurezza Urbana (TO)
VIII. Professional attitudes and values
1. A third kind?
2. Crime fighters.
3. Evaluating the faith in the leg. princ.
4. Expediency principle and interferences from the political world
5. Independence
6. Judging culture
7. Non quiescent politics and prosecutors' reactions
8. Prosecutors' proposals to improve the leg. princ.
9. Suppliers o f authority
10. The impact o f the 1989 reform
11. The purpose o f the leg. principle now in Italy
12. Prosecutors and their political flavoured associations
13. Diff. between prosecutors and judges
IX. Prosecutors and social alarm
1. Social alarm as a priority issue
2. The concept of social alarm for prosecutors
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